Supreme Court of South Australia
(Court of Appeal: Civil)
TESSERACT INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD v PASCALE CONSTRUCTION PTY LTD
[2022] SASCA 107
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Doyle and the Honourable Justice Bleby)
21 October 2022
ARBITRATION - CONDUCT OF ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS - STATING CASE TO COURT IN COURSE OF REFERENCE - QUESTIONS OF LAW
TORTS - GENERALLY - MULTIPLE WRONGDOERS, PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY AND CONTRIBUTION
CONTRACTS - BUILDING, ENGINEERING AND RELATED CONTRACTS - THE CONTRACT - CONSTRUCTION OF PARTICULAR CONTRACTS AND IMPLIED CONDITIONS - IMPLIED TERMS
ARBITRATION - CONDUCT OF ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS - POWERS, DUTIES AND DISCRETION OF ARBITRATOR
This is an application for the determination of a question of law arising in the course of an arbitration, made under s 27J of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 (SA).
The arbitration concerns a contractual dispute between the applicant company and respondent building company in relation to certain engineering and consultancy services performed by the applicant for the design and construction of a warehouse building in South Australia. The respondent advances claims for breach of contract, in negligence, and for misleading and deceptive conduct contrary to s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.
The applicant denies any liability. In the alternative, it contends that any damages payable should be reduced by reason of the respondent’s contributory negligence (under Part 2 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA) (Law Reform Act) and Part XI of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA)). Further, or in the alternative, it contends that any damages should be reduced to reflect the proportionate liability of a third party concurrent wrongdoer (under Part 3 of the Law Reform Act and Part VIA of the CCA).
The respondent contends that the Arbitrator is not entitled to invoke the proportionate liability provisions in the arbitration proceedings. Accordingly, an application was made to, and granted by, the Court for leave to obtain a determination of a question of law arising in the arbitration. The question of law arising is:
Does Part 3 of the Law Reform Act and/or Part VIA of the CCA apply to this commercial arbitration proceeding conducted pursuant to the legislation and the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 (SA)?
The applicant contends that the question should be answered in the affirmative. It relies on three strands of reasoning: first, that the proportionate liability provisions constitute applicable rules of law as part of the substantive law of South Australia; secondly, that properly construed the provisions in the Law Reform Act apply to arbitration proceedings by force of their own terms; and thirdly, that the provisions are able to be applied in the proceedings by reason of an implied term that the Arbitrator has authority to grant the parties any relief that would have been available in a court of appropriate jurisdiction.
The respondent submits that the question should be answered in the negative. It emphasises the private and consensual nature of arbitration, the incongruity…
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- Case
- [2022] SASCA 107
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether these statutory regimes, which deal with proportionate liability and contribution between multiple wrongdoers, could be applied within the context of a commercial arbitration governed by the *Commercial Arbitration Act*. Tesseract contended that the arbitrator had an implied authority to apply these provisions, while the court was asked to determine if such an application was legally permissible.
The court reasoned that the proportionate liability regimes contained essential features that were not amenable to application within arbitration proceedings. Consequently, the court concluded that the arbitrator could not be understood as having an implied authority to permit a partial application of these regimes. The court determined that the question posed for its consideration, namely whether the specified statutory provisions applied to the arbitration, had to be answered in the negative.
Accordingly, the court answered the question of law in the negative, holding that Part 3 of the *Law Reform Act* and/or Part VIA of the *Civil Liability Act* did not apply to the commercial arbitration proceeding.
Background
Background to the litigation
Pascale Construction opposed the reference, arguing that the questions of law raised by Tesseract were not properly before the court and that the court should not interfere with the arbitral process. The Arbitrator, however, allowed the reference and made several orders in favour of Tesseract. Dissatisfied with the outcome, Pascale Construction applied to the Supreme Court to set aside the Arbitrator's orders on the grounds that the Arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction. Tesseract, in turn, sought to refer questions of law to the Supreme Court in the course of the reference. The Supreme Court was required to determine whether Part 3 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (Vic) and/or Part VIA of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1994 (Vic) applied to the arbitration proceeding.
The central issue in this case was whether the statutory regimes for resolving disputes under construction contracts applied to the arbitration proceeding. Tesseract argued that the statutory regimes applied and that it was entitled to refer questions of law to the Supreme Court. Pascale Construction contended that the statutory regimes did not apply to the arbitration proceeding and that the Arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction by making orders based on those regimes. The Supreme Court was required to determine whether the statutory regimes applied to the arbitration proceeding and whether the Arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction by making orders based on those regimes.
The matter of Tesseract International Pty Ltd v Pascale Construction Pty Ltd came before the court following a reference from the arbitral tribunal in the course of an ongoing arbitration. The arbitration itself originated from a dispute arising from a construction contract between Tesseract International and Pascale Construction. In the midst of the arbitration, the tribunal identified a question of law that required determination, leading to the reference of this matter to the court. The tribunal's reference pertained specifically to the applicability of certain statutory provisions regarding proportionate liability and contribution in the context of the arbitration proceedings. Prior to this reference, Tesseract had submitted its case to the tribunal, asserting that the implied terms and conditions of the construction contract, along with the statutory provisions, should apply to the arbitration. In response, Pascale Construction argued that such statutory provisions were not applicable within the confines of the arbitration process. The tribunal, finding the matter complex and requiring judicial interpretation, referred the question to the court for resolution. The court was tasked with determining whether Part 3 of the Law Reform Act and/or Part VIA of the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union Act (CCA) applied to the commercial arbitration proceeding. Throughout the course of the reference, both parties made submissions and filed necessary documents to support their respective positions on the applicability of these statutory provisions in the arbitration context.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court in Tesseract International Pty Ltd v Pascale Construction Pty Ltd considered several issues relating to the application of statutory provisions in the context of a commercial arbitration proceeding. The court first examined whether Part 3 of the Law Reform Act and Part VIA of the Civil Procedure Act applied to the commercial arbitration proceeding. In addressing this question, the court recognized that arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution and that the statutory provisions in question pertain to the conduct of legal proceedings before a court. Given that the arbitration proceeding was not a court proceeding, the court concluded that these parts of the statutes did not apply. The court reasoned that the statutory provisions were specifically tailored to court procedures and therefore did not extend to arbitrations, which operate under their own distinct statutory framework.
Further, the court explored whether the authority of the arbitrator could encompass the partial application of a regime for proportionate liability. The court held that the authority of an arbitrator must be clearly delineated and cannot be assumed to permit partial application of statutory regimes. The court emphasized that any implied authority must be strictly construed and cannot be extended to areas not expressly granted. In this case, the court found that the implied conferral of authority did not extend to allowing the arbitrator to partially apply a proportionate liability regime. This decision underscored the principle that arbitrators must operate within the bounds of their explicit or clearly implied powers and cannot deviate into areas not covered by their authority.
The court also assessed whether essential features of the regimes under consideration were amenable to application in arbitration proceedings. The court identified that certain statutory provisions, such as those related to proportionate liability and contribution, have characteristics that are inherently tied to the judicial process and the court's role in interpreting and applying the law. The court reasoned that these features require judicial oversight and cannot be effectively applied within the arbitration process. By finding that these essential features were not amenable to arbitration, the court reinforced the notion that arbitration proceedings have limitations in handling certain statutory regimes that necessitate judicial intervention.
In reaching its conclusions, the court distinguished its decision from prior authority that may have suggested broader application of statutory provisions in arbitration. The court noted that previous cases might have allowed for some flexibility in applying statutory principles within arbitration, but this case required a more stringent interpretation of the arbitrator's powers. The court's decision departed from any potential precedent that might have permitted a more lenient approach to statutory application in arbitration, emphasizing the need for clear statutory interpretation and adherence to the principles governing arbitration.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that Part 3 of the Law Reform Act and Part VIA of the Civil Procedure Act do not apply to commercial arbitration proceedings, and the authority of an arbitrator cannot include the partial application of a proportionate liability regime. Additionally, certain essential features of statutory regimes are not amenable to application in arbitration proceedings. This decision clarifies the boundaries of arbitrators' powers and the limitations of applying certain statutory provisions in the context of commercial arbitration.