Bowtell v The Commonwealth of Australia

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Registry No Cl of 1988

B e t w e e n -

CLIFFORD JOHN BOWTELL

Plaintiff

and

THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Defendant

Application for remitter

TOOHEY J

(In Chambers)

Bowtell

TRANSCRIPT QF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 30 MAY 1989, AT 8.58 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

C3Tl/l/RB 1 30/5/89

MR S.D. RAPOPORT: If Your Honour pleases, I appear for the

plaintfff applicant. (instructed by Crossin and Co.)

MR C.M. ERSKINE: If it please the Court, I appear for the

defendant. (instructed by the Australian Government

Solicitor)

HIS HONOUR:  Yes, Mr Rapoport.
MR RAPOPORT:  Thank you, Your Honour. I have an outline of

submissions, if I may hand that up to you.

HIS HONOUR:  Yes, thank you. Yes, Mr Rapoport.
MR RAPOPORT:  Thank you, Your Honour. I do not know that my

friend is disputing the proposition stated in

paragraph 1, but if Your Honour wishes me to address

you further on that I would be happy to, but it seems

a fairly straightforward application of the six-year

rule there. The six years applies by reason of

section llof the A.C.T. LIMITATION ACT together with

section 2 which, in fact, repeals the application

of the 1623 IMPERIAL ACT which is referred to in

WILLIAMS V MILOTIN. Section 4, I might add, does

not seem to add anything further because that says

that nothing in the ordinance will affect the

position of the Crown if there is another statute

specially to that effect. I have been unable to

find anything special about that so, in my submission,

the six-year provision would apply.

HIS HONOUR:  Yes, very well.
MR RAPOPORT:  So if we can move to the number 2 point which,

I understand, is much more contentious as far as

my learned friend is concerned. Your Honour, the

argument really is as to what section 44(2A)

particularly covers. There is no doubt that it

may have been seen to cover the gap that was left

which was referred to by Chief Justice Gibbs in

the STATE BANK case. If I can take Your Honour to

th,at.

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HIS HONOUR: -Just before you get to that, Mr Rapoport, there

seems to be no objection on the part of either

party to a remitter to the Supreme Court of

Queensland save for the slight cloud that appears

to be hanging over the applicability of the limitation

period.

MR RAPOPORT:  That is on the one part, Your Honour. The other

aspect is the aspect of the balance of convenience which

Your Honour recently referred to in that matter

which I have listed here.

C3Tl/2/VH 2 30/5/89
Bowtell
HIS HONOUR:  The balance of convenience - let me put it

in the form of a question: is there anything
in the balance of convenience that would point

to the action being remitted to the Federal

Court in Canberra?

MR RAPOPORT:  No, certainly not.

HIS HONOUR: 

If anything, it would seem to point…

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Details
Case
[1989] HCATrans 119
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before the High Court of Australia concerning an application for remitter. The applicant, Clifford John Bowtell, sought to have his case remitted to a court, with the primary contention revolving around the applicability of limitation periods. The respondent was the Commonwealth of Australia.

The central legal issues before the court were the applicability of the six-year limitation period under the *A.C.T. Limitation Act* and the scope of section 44(2A) of an unspecified Act, which was raised in the context of a gap identified by Chief Justice Gibbs in the *State Bank* case. Additionally, the court considered the balance of convenience in determining the appropriate venue for the proceedings.

The court noted that there was no objection to a remitter to the Supreme Court of Queensland, provided the "slight cloud" hanging over the applicability of the limitation period could be resolved. The applicant indicated that he would be content with a remitter to Queensland if assured that the defendant would not plead the limitation period as a defence. The Commonwealth, while suggesting that authorities were against such a plea being available to it, stopped short of providing an undertaking. The court observed that if an assurance regarding the limitation defence were given, the only remaining arguments would likely concern the comparative speed of proceedings in the Federal Court in Brisbane versus another venue.

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