HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Stephen J.
BARGEN v. STATE GOVERNMENT INSURANCE OFFICE (Q.)
7 May 1982
High Court
High Court—Practice—Federal jurisdiction—Action between residents of different States—Commencement in Western Australia—Cause of action arising in Queensland—Issues concerning liability and assessment of damages remitted for trial to Supreme Court of Queensland—Queensland statute of limitations—Whether bar to maintenance of action—Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s. 79—Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Q.), s. 11.
Decision
May 7.
STEPHEN J. delivered the following written judgment:-
The plaintiff was injured in Queensland on 20 May 1971 when a car in which he was a passenger and which was being driven by the first defendant collided with a semi-trailer driven by the second defendant. No writ was issued until just before the expiration of six years when, on 17 May 1977, the plaintiff, then resident in Western Australia, issued a writ out of the Western Australian registry of this Court against both defendants, who were residents of Queensland and New South Wales respectively. (at p320)
2. In August 1979 Barwick C.J. sitting in chambers in Western Australia gave leave to the first defendant to serve a third party notice on the State Government Insurance Office (Q.) ("S.G.I.O."). By that notice the first defendant claimed indemnity against or alternatively contribution from S.G.I.O., alleging that the collision was either caused or contributed to by the negligence of the second defendant, that that second defendant could not be served with process and that in those circumstances s. 4A of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Act 1936-1972 (Q.) entitled the first defendant to make its claim for indemnity or contribution against S.G.I.O. (at p321)
3. By that same order his Honour directed that "the issue of liability and as to assessment of damages be remitted to the Supreme Court of Queensland and the remainder of the cause be retained in this Court". Subsequently S.G.I.O. raised as a defence to the claim against it by the first defendant the terms of s. 11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Q.). That section reads as follows:
"Notwithstanding any other Act or law or rule of law, an action for damages for negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or a provision made by or under a statute or independently of a contract or such provision) in which damages claimed by the plaintiff consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person shall not be brought after the expiration of three years from the date on which the cause of action arose." (at p321)
4. There were matters, said to affect the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the plaintiff's action in its diversity jurisdiction, which then intervened and the resolution of which apparently served for some years to prevent the matter from approaching any nearer to trial. Now, some five years after the issue of the writ and two and a half years after the issues…
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- Case
- [1982] HCA 22
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the appellant was entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering, and loss of amenities of life, in circumstances where the relevant statutory provision stipulated that damages were not recoverable for "pain, suffering, or other like damages". The court had to determine the scope and meaning of this exclusion in the context of the overall legislative scheme for compensation.
Stephen J, delivering the judgment of the Court, reasoned that the exclusion was intended to prevent recovery for non-economic loss, which encompassed pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life. His Honour held that the phrase "other like damages" was to be interpreted in light of the preceding words, meaning it referred to damages of a similar nature to pain and suffering. Consequently, the appellant was not entitled to recover damages for these categories of loss.
The appeal was dismissed.
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