Negligence—Joint tortfeasors—Contribution—Such amounts as may be found by the court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of responsibility for damage*—Statutory limitation to monetary liability of one tortfeasor for negligence—Whether that limitation applicable to contribution—Whether applicable to actions under Lord Campbell's Act—Whether a proportion equivalent to the proportion of liability of the tortfeasor entitled to statutory limitation deductible from statutory limit—Amendment of parties to appeal—The Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act of 1952 (Q.), ss. 5 (c),* 6,* 10 (1) (b), (4)*—The Railways Acts 1914 to 1955 (Q.), s. 121 (1)*—The Common Law Practice Acts 1867 to 1940 (Q.), SS. 12, 15D—The Rules of the Supreme Court of Queensland, O. XVII—High Court Rules, O. 70, r. 29.
Decisions
August 28. The following written judgments were delivered:- McTIERNAN A.C.J. The appellant and respondent were parties to proceedings for contribution which were determined at the trial of this action pursuant to O. XVII of The Rules of the Supreme Court of Queensland: such proceedings were under Pt. II of The Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory Negligence, and Division of Chattels) Act of 1952. The provisions of the Act as to contribution, now material, are: - " 5 . Where damage is suffered by any person as a result of a tort . . . (c) Any tortfeasor liable in respect of that damage may recover contribution from any other tortfeasor who is, or would if sued have been, liable in respect of the same damage, whether as a joint tortfeasor or otherwise . . . ". "6 . In any proceedings for contribution under this Part of this Act the amount of the contribution recoverable from any person shall be such as may be found by the Court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person's responsibility for the damage . . . ". The appeal is brought against a judgment which was given in the above-mentioned proceedings for contribution relating to the damages which were found by the jury on the claim in the action based on s. 12 of The Common Law Practice Acts 1867 to 1940 (Q). This section is textually like s. 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1846, commonly referred to as Lord Campbell's Act. The plaintiff in the action is not a party to the appeal. The appellant and respondent were the defendants to the action. (at p80)
2. The plaintiff's husband was fatally injured when a motor car in which he was a passenger, driven by the appellant, ran into some railway trucks which had been stopped at a level crossing in consequence of a collision with a semi-trailer. The jury assessed the total damages suffered by the widow and children in consequence of the fatality at 5,615 pounds. The jury's findings establish that the collision between the motor…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Unsworth v Commissioner for Railways [1958] HCA 41
Case
[1958] HCA 41
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *Unsworth v Commissioner for Railways* concerned a dispute between the plaintiff, Unsworth, and the defendant, the Commissioner for Railways. The matter came before the High Court of Australia.
The central legal issue before the court was whether the Commissioner for Railways owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, Unsworth, in relation to the operation of a railway line. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Commissioner was negligent in failing to take reasonable precautions to prevent injury to persons who might be lawfully on or near the railway line, particularly in circumstances where a train might be approaching.
The court's reasoning focused on the established principles of negligence. It was held that the Commissioner, as the operator of the railway, had a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of those who might foreseeably be injured by the operation of its trains. This duty extended to taking reasonable steps to warn persons of approaching trains, especially where there was a known risk of persons being present in a position of danger. The court considered the specific circumstances of the plaintiff's presence near the line and whether the Commissioner had acted reasonably in the circumstances to mitigate foreseeable risks.
The High Court found in favour of the plaintiff, upholding the appeal. The court determined that the Commissioner had breached its duty of care and was liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff.