Peros v Nationwide News Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 71 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: Peros v Nationwide News Pty Ltd & Ors [2024] QSC 80
PARTIES:

JOHN PEROS

(plaintiff)
v

NATIONWIDE NEWS PTY LTD ACN 008 438 828

(first defendant) AND

HEDLEY THOMAS

(second defendant) AND

SHANNAH BLACKBURN

(third defendant)

FILENO: BS 7796 of 2023
DIVISION: Trial Division
PROCEEDING: Application
ORIGINATINGCOURT: Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane

DELIVEREDON:

13 May 2024

DELIVEREDAT: Brisbane
HEARINGDATE: 29 April 2024
JUDGE: Applegarth J
ORDER:

1.     Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the amended application filed 20 March 2024 are dismissed.

2. Pursuant to ss 10A(4) and 10A(5) of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) the following issue be determined as soon as practicable before the trial commences:

Whether the publications sued upon, or any of them, have caused, or are likely to cause, serious harm to the plaintiff’s reputation (“the issue”).

3.     The hearing of the issue be listed to commence on 29 July 2024.

4.     There be further directions for the preparation and conduct of that hearing.

CATCHWORDS:

STATUTES – INTERPRETATION – PRESUMPTIONS AS TO   LEGISLATIVE   INTENTION   –   NOT   TO   GIVE

EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT – where the plaintiff commenced proceedings for defamation in the Supreme Court of Western Australia – where Western Australian law did not require the plaintiff to give a “concerns notice”

before starting his proceeding – where the defendants contend that s 12B of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) applied to the proceeding and that the plaintiff therefore was required to give a concerns notice before starting his proceeding – whether, as a matter of statutory construction, s 12B of the Queensland Act regulates the conduct of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Western Australia – whether the Queensland Parliament, in enacting s 12B, manifested an intention to exclude the presumption against extraterritorial operation of a State Act - whether s 12B has an extraterritorial operation - whether s 12 B should be construed to refer to a “proceeding” in Queensland and not to a proceeding in another State

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – CHOICE OF LAW – TORTS AND SIMILAR – GENERAL PRINCIPLES –

whether statutory provisions in relation to the resolution of claims before litigation and, in particular, a requirement to give a notice before action are substantive or procedural – whether the notice before action requirement regulates the mode or conduct of court proceedings – whether the provision is part of the mechanism or machinery of litigation

– whether it regulates the manner in which pre-existing rights are to be enforced rather than extinguishes a claim

DEFAMATION – where the plaintiff was charged with, and later acquitted of, murder – where the defendant was later found by a coroner to have violently killed the deceased using a bladed instrument – where the coroner’s finding was widely publicised – where the defendants published an investigative podcast into the death of the victim – where an episode of the podcast is alleged to have imputed that he murdered the deceased – where the plaintiff pleads that the episode “caused or is…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Peros v Nationwide News Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] QSC 80
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of Western Australia, Peros initiated defamation proceedings against Nationwide News Pty Ltd, contending that a podcast episode published by the defendants defamed him by implying he murdered a deceased individual. The defendants argued that the plaintiff was required to give a "concerns notice" before starting the proceeding, as mandated by s 12B of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld). The court was tasked with determining whether s 12B of the Queensland Act applied to the proceeding in Western Australia, and if it had extraterritorial effect. Furthermore, the court had to ascertain whether the notice before action requirement was substantive or procedural, and if "special circumstances" justified postponing the determination of the serious harm issue.

The court considered whether s 12B of the Queensland Act applied to the proceeding in Western Australia, focusing on whether the provision had an extraterritorial operation. It examined whether the Queensland Parliament intended for s 12B to exclude the presumption against the extraterritorial effect of State Acts. The court also had to determine whether the notice before action requirement was procedural or substantive, and whether it constituted part of the mechanism or machinery of litigation. Additionally, the court needed to decide if "special circumstances" existed to justify postponing the determination of the serious harm issue.

Callinan J concluded that the pre-proceeding notice requirement, such as the one in s 12B of the Queensland Act, could be procedural as it regulates the mode or conduct of court proceedings. The court distinguished such requirements from limitation provisions that extinguish rights. The learned authors of Private International Law in Australia supported the view that notice before action provisions are procedural. Callinan J also found that the provision in s 12B did not have extraterritorial effect, and that the Queensland Parliament did not intend for the provision to exclude the presumption against extraterritorial effect. Furthermore, the court determined that "special circumstances" did not justify postponing the determination of the serious harm issue.

The court ordered that the amended application filed on 20 March 2024 be dismissed. It directed that the serious harm issue be determined as soon as practicable before the trial commences. The hearing of the issue was listed to commence on 29 July 2024, with further directions for the preparation and conduct of that hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the amended application filed 20 March 2024 are dismissed.

2. Pursuant to ss 10A(4) and 10A(5) of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) the following issue be determined as soon as practicable before the trial commences:

Whether the publications sued upon, or any of them, have caused, or are likely to cause, serious harm to the plaintiff’s reputation (“the issue”).

3. The hearing of the issue be listed to commence on 29 July 2024.

4. There be further directions for the preparation and conduct of that hearing.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Callinan J stated:32“[W]hat should be regarded as procedural are the laws and regulations which are reasonable and necessary, in the lexi fori for the conduct of the action only; that is to say the law and rules relating to procedures such as the initiation, preparation and the prosecution of the case, the recovery processes following judgment and the rules of evidence.”(emphasis added) The statement of Mason CJ in McKain, endorsed by the joint judgment in Pfeiffer, that “rules which are directed to governing or regulating the mode or conduct of court proceedings” are procedural should not be read too literally. Otherwise, a pre-proceeding notice requirement of the kind considered in Hamilton (and that is required by s 12B of the Queensland Act), would never be procedural because it applies at the pre-proceeding stage. Instead, as Hamilton illustrates, such a requirement, which seeks to resolve claims through settlement before proceedings are commenced by prohibiting the commencement of proceedings until a notice has been given, may be said to regulate the mode or conduct of court proceedings and constitute part of the mechanism or machinery for litigating proceedings. Such a notice provision differs from a limitation period provision (whether one that bans the remedy or extinguishes the right) which Pfeiffer held to be substantive. The learned authors of Private International Law in Australia distil the position in relation to notice before action provisions as follows:33 Pfeiffer at 542 [97]. Pfeiffer at 543 [99] (footnote omitted). Pfeiffer at 554 [133]. Pfeiffer at 574 [192]. R Mortensen, R Garnett & M Keyes, Private International Law in Australia (5th Ed) 2023 LexisNexis at [11.51] citing Hamilton. The fact that a provision states that a proceeding “must not be commenced” before a certain step is taken cannot itself determine that the provision is substantive rather than procedural. Otherwise, every notice requirement would be substantive: a result inconsistent with Hamilton and not one for which the defendants contend. The task is one of characterisation of the particular provision in the context of a statutory scheme. The essential issue is whether it is a provision that affects the mode or conduct of proceedings taken to enforce a right. If it is, the provision is procedural. Such a provision differs from the provisions of a statutory scheme that is intended to wholly replace a common law cause of action, or, alternatively, schemes that create a brand new cause of action that have not been recognised at common law.34 In Hamilton, Spigelman CJ explained the meaning of “enforceability” in the sense used by the joint judgment in Pfeiffer. The notice provision was not concerned with a new right of action created by statute. It was unlike a limitation provision that “bars the remedy” at a certain time after which the right is not enforceable. The PIPA provisions were said to correspond to the category referred to by Dixon J in Maxwell v Murphy,35 a case about the procedural/substantive distinction with respect to retrospectivity. Dixon J referred to “rights … which have an existence and a purpose although the remedy be suspended or wanting”. Spigelman CJ stated that such a provision may not fall within the scope of matter affecting “enforceability” as that word is used in Pfeiffer.36 He continued:37“The formulation found in each of s 9 and s 36, requiring that steps be taken ‘before starting a proceeding in a court’, is capable of constituting a condition precedent that can be characterised as substantive. That would be the correct conclusion if that formulation were employed in a legislative scheme that creates a new right or, as a matter of construction, entirely substitutes a legislative scheme for pre-existing common law rights.”