Constitutional Law (Cth)—Places acquired by Commonwealth for public purposes—Exclusive legislative power of Commonwealth Parliament—Extent of power—State law made before place acquired—Whether continued in operation—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 52 (i.)—Criminal Code Act, 1913 (W.A.)—Judiciary Act 1903-1969 (Cth), s. 40A.
Decisions
November 30. The following written judgments were delivered:- BARWICK C.J. The Court decided in Worthing v. Rowell and Muston Pty. Ltd. (1970) 123 CLR 89 that s. 52(i.) of the Australian Constitution denies legislative power to the States to enact laws which will operate to regulate or control the conduct of persons - in that acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes. In reaching that conclusion, the Court decided that the denial of legislative power to the States by s. 52(i.) was not limited to the making of laws expressed specifically to operate in the place acquired by the Commonwealth: the generality of the State law, as a law regulating or controlling the conduct of persons throughout the area within the territorial limits of the State will not save it from invalidity in so far as it would operate in the place which had been acquired by the Commonwealth. The Court rejected the view that the legislative power of the Commonwealth granted by s. 52(i.) was limited to the making of laws with respect to the seat of government, as such, or to places acquired as such or as places. (at p97)
2. The question whether a State Act regulating the conduct of persons generally in the area within the territorial limits of the State continues to operate in a place which is acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes subsequent to its enactment was not decided by the Court. That question now arises for our decision. (at p97)
3. In a criminal prosecution launched in the District Court of Western Australia questions were referred, pursuant to s. 49 of the District Court of Western Australia Act, 1969-1970 (W.A.) for the consideration of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeal. The questions so referred involved the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and those of a State. Accordingly the proceeding before the Supreme Court of Western Australia, by force of s. 40A of the Judiciary Act 1903-1969 (Cth), was removed into this Court. (at p97)
4. The accused was charged on indictment with having committed at Bullsbrook in the State of Western Australia an act of gross indecency with a male person contrary to the provisions of s. 184 of the Criminal Code Act, 1913 (W.A.). He demurred to the indictment, on the ground that the indictment did "not disclose an offence for the reason that the place where the alleged offence was committed was a place acquired by the Commonwealth of Australia for…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading R v Phillips
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
R v Phillips [1970] HCA 50
Case
[1970] HCA 50
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *R v Phillips* concerned an appeal by the applicant, Phillips, against his conviction for the offence of receiving stolen property. The prosecution alleged that Phillips had received a quantity of stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen. The dispute centred on whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish Phillips' guilty knowledge at the time he received the goods. The High Court of Australia was tasked with determining the validity of the conviction.
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in law by directing the jury that they could infer guilty knowledge from the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the goods, even in the absence of direct evidence of Phillips' actual knowledge. Specifically, the court had to consider the nature and sufficiency of circumstantial evidence required to prove the mental element of the offence of receiving stolen property.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, affirmed the principle that guilty knowledge could be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Their Honours reasoned that while direct proof of a person's state of mind is often impossible, the jury is entitled to draw inferences from the surrounding facts and circumstances. These circumstances, when considered collectively, could lead a reasonable person to conclude that the accused knew the property was stolen. The court emphasised that the inference of guilty knowledge must be based on the evidence presented and be a reasonable inference, not mere speculation. The conviction was upheld.