Giudice v Legal Profession Complaints Committee

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   GIUDICE -v- LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE [2014] WASCA 115

CORAM:   MARTIN CJ

BUSS JA
EDELMAN J

HEARD:   5 MAY 2014

DELIVERED          :   4 JUNE 2014

FILE NO/S:   CACV 99 of 2012

BETWEEN:   PETER GEORGE GIUDICE

Appellant

AND

LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :JUDGE T SHARP (DEPUTY PRESIDENT)

MS S GILLETT (MEMBER)

MR C PHILLIPS (SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER)

Citation  :LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE and GIUDICE [2012] WASAT 144

File No  :VR 113 of 2011, VR 114 of 2011

Catchwords:

Legal practitioners - Unsatisfactory professional conduct - Reckless disregard as to truth or falsity of statement in affidavit - Meaning of recklessness - Subjective assessment of actual state of mind

Legislation:

Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA), s 3
Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 402, s 403, s 438(1), s 442
Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 60, s 62
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 105

Result:

Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Decisions of the Tribunal set aside
Matter remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration and determination in accordance with the reasons of the court
No order as to costs

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr I L K Marshall

Respondent:     Mr M D Cuerden & Ms P Le Miere

Solicitors:

Appellant:     D L Armstrong

Respondent:     Legal Profession Complaints Committee

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Angus v Clifford [1891] 2 Ch 449

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321

Banditt v The Queen [2005] HCA 80; (2005) 224 CLR 262

Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2003] UKHL 5; [2003] 2 AC 430

Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 456; (1993) 43 FCR 280

Commissioner for Consumer Protection v Carey [2014] WASCA 7

Commissioner of Metropolitan Police v Caldwell [1982] AC 341

Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan [1976] AC 182

Executive Director of Public Health v Lily Creek International Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 410

Fidock v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2013] WASCA 108

Gillard v The Queen [2014] HCA 16

He v Aloe & Co Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 235

Hope v Bathurst City Council [1980] HCA 16; (1980) 144 CLR 1

Kane v Dureau [1911] VLR 293

Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 32; (2010) 241 CLR 390

Kural v The Queen [1987] HCA 16; (1987) 162 CLR 502

Kyle v Legal Practitioners' Complaints Committee [1999] WASCA 115; (1999) 21 WAR 56

La Fontaine v The Queen [1976] HCA 52; (1976) 136 CLR 62

Le Lievre v Gould [1893] 1 QB 491

Lederer v Hitchins [1961] WAR 99

Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Giudice [2012] WASAT 144

Legal Profession…

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Details
Case
[2014] WASCA 115
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Giudice was a legal practitioner who faced disciplinary action by the Legal Profession Complaints Committee (LPCC) for unsatisfactory professional conduct. Giudice's conduct in question related to a statement made in an affidavit which the LPCC alleged was false and was made with a reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity. Giudice challenged the LPCC's decision in the Supreme Court of Victoria, which was then appealed to the Court of Appeal. The central issue was whether the Tribunal had erred in concluding that Giudice acted recklessly when making the statement in the affidavit. This involved determining the meaning of recklessness in this context and whether the Tribunal had correctly assessed Giudice's state of mind.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the Tribunal had properly understood and applied the concept of recklessness. The Court examined whether the Tribunal's references to 'should have' in its reasons indicated mere looseness in language or whether they reflected an actual error in the assessment of Giudice's state of mind. The Court noted that while the Tribunal's language could have been clearer, several factors suggested that the Tribunal did not fully consider the evidence relevant to Giudice's state of mind. These included the Tribunal's failure to address specific evidence provided by Giudice about his understanding at the time of drafting the affidavit and the conflation of recklessness with carelessness in the respondent's closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal determined that the Tribunal had indeed erred in its assessment of Giudice's state of mind, leading to an incorrect conclusion about the recklessness of his conduct. The Court found that the Tribunal's reasons did not adequately address the subjective assessment required to determine recklessness, particularly in light of Giudice's direct evidence about his state of mind. As a result, the Court allowed the appeal, quashed the Tribunal's decision, and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for reconsideration in light of the Court's findings.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

By themselves, it is possible that these references might have been capable of being understood in this way, especially since in 'appeals' of this nature a court should not be 'concerned with looseness in the language ... nor with unhappy phrasing' of the decision-maker, and the reasons for the decision under review should not be 'construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error'.[37][37] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259, 272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh & Gummow JJ); Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 456; (1993) 43 FCR 280, 287 (the Court). See also Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (No 2) [2010] HCA 24; (2010) 241 CLR 320, 332 ‑ 333 [20] (French CJ, Gummow & Bell JJ). However, these references to 'should have' must also be considered in the context that the Tribunal made no express conclusion that the practitioner's state of mind was one of indifference, or not caring, about the truth of par 20 of the affidavit. Further, for the four additional reasons below, the references to 'should have' cannot be attributed to mere looseness in language. Secondly, the Tribunal made no reference to any of the practitioner's evidence that was directly relevant to his state of mind. If the Tribunal's focus in its reasons was on the subjective state of mind of the practitioner then an important consideration ought to have been the practitioner's direct evidence about his state of mind. In cross‑examination, the practitioner's evidence was that what 'was in [his] head' was that the 'bail conditions were varied' to enable 'supervised contact under an order of a family law magistrate'.[38] He reiterated that his understanding at the time he settled the affidavit was that 'bail was varied enabling [the client] to have supervised contact by order of a Family Court magistrate'.[39] The practitioner then said that this was how he had read par 20 of the affidavit at the time.[40][38] ts 210 (30 May 2012).[39] ts 207 (30 May 2012). [40] ts 210 (30 May 2012). If accepted by the Tribunal, this evidence from the practitioner might have invited the conclusion that the practitioner, however carelessly, had incorrectly formed the opinion that par 20 was true. More precisely, to put the matter in terms of the burden of proof upon the LPCC and the context in which that burden needed to be satisfied,[41] unless the practitioner's evidence were rejected by the Tribunal, his evidence might have prevented the inference that he was indifferent about whether par 20 was true or false.[41] Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336. Thirdly, the issue of recklessness also appears to have been conflated with carelessness in closing submissions of counsel for the respondent (who was not counsel on this appeal). Although the submissions of counsel are not directly relevant to construing the reasons of the Tribunal, those submissions provide relevant context to the Tribunal's decision.