LEGAL SERVICES AND COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE and BENNETT

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JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

ACT: LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 2008 (WA)

CITATION:   LEGAL SERVICES AND COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE and BENNETT [2024] WASAT 28

MEMBER:   JUDGE H JACKSON, DEPUTY PRESIDENT

MR D AITKEN, SENIOR MEMBER

MS R LAVERY, MEMBER

HEARD:   ON THE PAPERS

DELIVERED          :   17 APRIL 2024

FILE NO/S:   VR 26 of 2023

BETWEEN:   LEGAL SERVICES AND COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE

Applicant

AND

MARTIN LAWRENCE BENNETT

Respondent


Catchwords:

Vocational regulation - Lawyer - Professional misconduct - Consent orders - Role of Tribunal - Reckless vs grossly careless conduct

Legislation:

Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 5(a), s 402, s 403(1)(a)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 60(2)

Result:

Lawyer found to have engaged in two counts of professional misconduct and one of unsatisfactory professional conduct
Lawyer reprimanded
Lawyer fined $23,000
Lawyer to pay applicant's costs fixed at $12,500

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant : Not Applicable
Respondent : Not Applicable

Solicitors:

Applicant : Not Applicable
Respondent : Not Applicable

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Australian Securities & Investments Commission In the Matter of Richstar Enterprises Pty Ltd ACN 099 071 968 v Carey (No 17) [2007] FCA 1395

BHP Billiton Ltd v Dunning [2013] NSWCA 421

CD [2020] WASAT 41

Connor v Veitch [2023] WASCA 186

Danberg v Danberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 492, 522

Giudice v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2014] WASCA 115

Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280

Khosa v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2017] WASCA 192

Palmer v Dolman [2005] NSWCA 361

Wintle v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee & James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 369

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Introduction

  1. The parties have proposed that the Tribunal make certain orders in relation to the disciplinary action commenced by the applicant against the respondent, Mr Martin Lawrence Bennett (the practitioner).

  2. We have determined the application on the documents, pursuant to s 60(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act).

  3. However, given certain matters which are set out in more detail below, we consider it necessary to provide some brief reasons by way of explanation for that agreement.  Those reasons now follow.

Background

  1. The practitioner was admitted to practice on 22 December 1978 and at all material times was an Australian legal practitioner within the meaning of s 5(a) of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) (LP Act).

  2. The conduct in question occurred in June 2018 and June and August 2019.

  3. Significantly for present purposes, the conduct the subject of ground one was the subject of proceedings before her Honour, Pritchard P, whose reasons are reported in CD [2020] WASAT 41 (CD)

  4. The applicant referred five grounds of complaint to the Tribunal on 4 April 2023.

  5. On 4 October 2023, the parties filed a Minute of Consent Orders by which they agreed that:

    (i)in relation to two grounds, one of which concerned conduct in June 2018 (ground one) and the other in June 2019 (

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Details
Case
[2024] WASAT 28
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involves the Legal Services and Complaints Committee and Bennett, a legal practitioner, regarding allegations of professional misconduct. The key issue pertains to whether the practitioner was grossly careless in allowing his client to affirm an affidavit containing information obtained from Tribunal proceedings that was subject to orders limiting its use. The practitioner was aware of these orders and believed, albeit mistakenly, that the affidavit was being used for a permitted purpose. Despite a senior associate's query about the inclusion of the protected information, the practitioner did not conduct any research to verify his belief, nor did he seek a variation of the Tribunal's orders. The central legal issue was whether the practitioner's conduct was reckless or grossly careless, particularly in light of the Tribunal's previous directions and the practitioner's submission that his belief was genuine and mistaken.

The court examined the legal definition of recklessness, focusing on whether the practitioner was indifferent to or had a conscious disregard for the risk that the affidavit might include information contrary to the Tribunal's orders. The practitioner argued that the facts were consistent with the decision in a previous case where it was concluded that the practitioner's belief about the use of the protected information was genuine, and he had considered whether the use was permitted by the Tribunal's orders. The practitioner's submissions posited that there was no evidence of indifference or conscious disregard in the facts, hence a finding of recklessness was not supported. The court considered the arguments and the established facts to determine the appropriate characterisation of the practitioner's conduct.

The court concluded that the practitioner's conduct, while negligent, did not meet the threshold of recklessness. The practitioner's belief, though mistaken, was genuinely held, and there was no evidence of indifference or conscious disregard for the Tribunal's orders. Therefore, the court found the conduct to be grossly careless rather than reckless. As a result, the court dismissed the allegation of recklessness and upheld the finding of gross carelessness. The orders made by the Tribunal were affirmed, reflecting the characterisation of the misconduct.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The conduct involved is set out in Schedule A - Statement of Agreed Facts (Agreed Facts), a copy of which is annexed to both these reasons and to our orders. In our view, there is no need for us to address the conduct or proposed orders the subject of grounds two or three. What follows is limited to ground one. Ground one alleges that the practitioner was grossly careless in permitting his client to affirm an affidavit which contained information obtained as a result of Tribunal proceedings and which was subject to orders limiting the extent to which that information could be used (Protected Information) in circumstances where:(a)Prior to the affidavit being affirmed, a senior associate at the practitioner's firm (SA) queried with the practitioner whether, given the Tribunal's orders, the Protected Information could be included in the affidavit;(b)The practitioner indicated to the SA that the Protected Information could be included in the affidavit because he genuinely, but mistakenly, believed that the affidavit was being used for a purpose permitted by the Tribunal's orders;(c)In reaching that view, the practitioner:(i)did not carry out, and did not cause to be carried out, any research to confirm his belief;(ii)had no reasonable grounds for his belief; and(iii)did not cause an application to be brought to the Tribunal for a variation of the orders. On 15 December 2023, we listed the matter for directions at which we raised with the parties our concern that, in those circumstances, it might be said that the conduct involved was reckless, rather than grossly careless. As a result of the directions hearing on 16 February 2024, submissions were filed on behalf of the practitioner (Submissions) and, on 20 February 2024, the applicant advised that it had nothing to add to those Submissions, thereby adopting them. The Submissions are focused on the judicial test for recklessness and whether or not the facts fall within that definition. The Submissions submit, correctly in our view, that the relevant test for recklessness in the present circumstances is whether the practitioner was indifferent to, or had a conscious disregard for, the risk that the affidavit might include information the inclusion of which was contrary to the Tribunal's orders.[1] [1] Giudice v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2014] WASCA 115 Giudice). The language of indifference is used by Martin CJ at [44] and Edelman J at [130]. Buss P uses the language of conscious indifference: at [95]. We have proceeded on the basis that there is no material difference between the two approaches. As to the application of that definition to the facts in this case, the Submissions say that:(a)the Agreed Facts as described above at para 11 are 'consistent with' the decision of Pritchard P in CD who:(i)was not persuaded that the practitioner's belief about the use to which the Protected Information could be put was not genuine; and(ii)accepted that the practitioner had turned his mind to the question whether the use to which the Permitted Information could be put was permitted by the Tribunal's orders and concluded that it was.[2](b)there is nothing in the Agreed Facts (or, it is implied, in the findings of Pritchard P in CD) to suggest 'indifference to, or actual conscious disregard of, the risks created by the respondent's conduct' and, therefore, 'a finding of recklessness is not open on the facts before the Tribunal'.[3][2] Submissions, para 12.[3] Submissions, para 13.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established