Wintle v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (No 3)

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION

No. 4950  of 2000

ANNE WINTLE Plaintiff

v

STEVEDORING INDUSTRY FINANCE COMMITTEE

JAMES HARDIE & COY PTY LTD)
(ACN 000 035 512)

CSR LTD

Defendants

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JUDGE:

Ashley J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

29 August 2002

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

  3  September 2002

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

Wintle v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee and Ors (No. 3)

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2002] VSC 369

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Practice and procedure – application for consent orders by some of the parties to a proceeding – power in the Court not to make or to delay making the orders sought – circumstances in which the Court may so act – application for orders presently refused.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiff Mr P. Gordon Slater & Gordon

For the First Defendant

For the Second defendant
For the Third Defendant

Mr R. Gorton QC
with C. Grainger
Mr D.J. Batt
Mr S.W. Kaye, QC with
Mr J. Carmody

Blake Dawson Waldron

Allens Arthur Robinson
Ebsworth & Ebsworth

HIS HONOUR:

The Present Application

  1. As I noted in my Reasons on an earlier application[1] the plaintiff and the first defendant compromised the issues between them in October 2002.  Terms of Settlement were signed.  I should set out certain parts of them:

    [1][2002] VSC 294 paragraphs 8 – 10.

"1.SIFC pay the Plaintiff in her capacity pursuant to Part 3 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (vic) and in her capacity pursuant to the Administration & Probate Act 1958 (Vic) the sum of $400,000.00 inclusive of all costs between SIFC and the Plaintiff, whether such costs be reserved or otherwise determined in favour of either party.

….

4.In the 2000 proceedings there be orders by consent that:

(a)the Plaintiff's claim as against the first defendant is barred by operation of section 20 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic);

(b)there be judgment for the first defendant;

….

9.The parties will use their best endeavours to secure orders from the court in the terms of paragraphs 3 and 4 herein.  If the court refuses to make any or all of the said orders or any of the said orders are set aside then it will be a fundamental term of the parties agreement that:

(b)the Plaintiff will apply and take all steps necessary to discontinue the 2000 proceedings against SIFC and will not take any further step against SIFC in the prosecution of the 2000 proceedings or the claims which are the subject of the 2000 proceedings;"

  1. It is to be noted that payment was to be made to Mrs Wintle in her capacity both as a plaintiff for the purposes of Part 3 of the Wrongs Act 1958 and in her capacity as executrix for the purposes of s. 29 of the Administration & Probate Act 1958. It is further to be noted that the amount payable, $4000,000.00, was evidently far in excess of the amount that the plaintiff could have recovered under s.…

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Details
Case
[2002] VSC 369
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Wintle v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (No 3), the dispute arose between the parties in the context of proceedings related to stevedoring industry finance. The matter was brought before the Federal Court of Australia, where the court was tasked with considering an application for consent orders made by some of the parties involved in the proceeding. The application sought to finalise certain aspects of the dispute through consent orders, which require the agreement of all parties involved.

The legal issues before the court centred on the court's discretion in determining whether to make or delay making consent orders sought by some parties. The court had to consider the circumstances under which it could exercise its power to not make or to delay making the consent orders. This involved an analysis of the overall fairness and appropriateness of making the orders in light of the broader context of the proceeding and the interests of all parties involved.

The court, in its judgment, determined that the application for consent orders should be refused. The reasoning provided by the court was based on the overall fairness and appropriateness of making the orders, considering the broader context of the proceeding and the interests of all parties involved. The court concluded that, in the particular circumstances of this case, it was not appropriate to make the consent orders as sought by the applicants. Consequently, the application for orders was refused, leaving the parties to continue to resolve the remaining issues through the existing legal process.

No further orders were made in relation to the application for consent orders, as the court found that it was not appropriate to proceed with the orders as requested. The parties were left to continue with the existing legal process to resolve the remaining issues in the proceeding.

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