| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
No. 4950 of 2000
| ANNE WINTLE | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| STEVEDORING INDUSTRY FINANCE COMMITTEE JAMES HARDIE & COY PTY LTD) CSR LTD | Defendants |
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JUDGE: | Ashley J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 17 February 2003 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 8 April 2003 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Wintle v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee and Ors (No. 4) | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2003] VSC 102 | |
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Contribution – meaning of s. 23B(3), Wrongs Act 1958 – whether expiry of period of time specified by s. 20(1) of Wrongs Act operates to extinguish the right of action created by Part III of that Act, or operates to bar the remedy.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr P. Gordon (solicitor) | Slater & Gordon |
| For the First Defendant For the Third Defendant | Mr R. Gorton QC | Blake Dawson Waldron Ebsworth & Ebsworth |
HIS HONOUR:
Before me is a summons filed 5 February 2003 by Stevedoring Industry (“SIFC”) directed to CSR Ltd (“CSR”). It seeks, in substance, judgment in its favour upon a contribution claim brought against it by CSR, which is defendant to a proceeding brought by Mrs Wintle. Senior counsel for SIFC and CSR, referring to Rule 47.04, agreed that they sought before trial the determination of a question in the proceeding arising between their clients. They stipulated certain facts which should be taken to be established for the purposes of determining that question.
Anyone who is familiar with this litigation knows that it has had a long and tortured history, traceable in part through a series of decisions in this Court: Wintle v Conaust (Vic) Pty Ltd and ors[1], Wintle v SIFC and ors[2], Wintle v SIFC and ors (No. 2)[3], Wintle v SIFC and ors (No. 3)[4]. The trial of the proceeding as between Mrs Wintle and CSR is fixed for 4 June this year. The trial apart, all that remain are certain claims for contribution, including the claim by CSR against SIFC[5]. It is unquestionably desirable, against the background which I have described, that this application be dealt with as the parties asked me to do. I consider that the appropriate course is that I should formally state and then determine the following question under Rule 47.04:
“Upon the facts assumed by SIFC and CSR to be established for the purposes of this application, must the claim for contribution by CSR against SIFC fail upon the proper construction of Parts III and IV of the Wrongs Act 1958?”
[1][1989] VR 951 and [2001] VSC 315.
[2][2002] VSC 265.
[3][2002]VSC 294.
[4][2002] VSC 369.
[5]The totality of the claims for contribution are identified in Wintle (No.3) at para.4.
I acknowledge, in determining to follow this course, the problem of determining a question upon facts which are agreed but which might not necessarily be established at trial. The circumstances of…
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- Case
- [2003] VSC 102
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine the precise legal effect of section 23B(3) in relation to the expiry of the limitation period specified in section 20(1). Specifically, it needed to ascertain whether such an expiry resulted in the loss of the statutory right of action under Part III of the Act or if it simply precluded the pursuit of a remedy. This involved a careful analysis of statutory language, the legislative intent, and the implications of the statutory scheme as a whole.
The court concluded that the expiry of the limitation period specified in section 20(1) did not extinguish the statutory right of action created by Part III of the Wrongs Act 1958. Rather, it merely barred the remedy, meaning that while the plaintiff's right of action remained intact, the remedy was no longer available due to the passage of time. This interpretation was based on the legislative intent to provide a comprehensive scheme for the recovery of damages, while also ensuring that claimants were aware of the time constraints within which they must initiate proceedings.
As a result, the court determined that the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred but not extinguished, allowing for the possibility of alternative remedies or legislative changes in the future. The court's decision provided clarity on the interplay between the limitation period and the statutory right of action, offering guidance for future cases involving similar statutory provisions.
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