| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
No. 4950 of 2000
| ANNE WINTLE | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| STEVEDORING INDUSTRY FINANCE COMMITTEE JAMES HARDIE & COY PTY LTD) CSR LTD | Defendants |
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JUDGE: | Ashley J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 25 March 2002 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 1 July 2002 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Wintle v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee and Ors | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2002] VSC 265 | |
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Limitation of actions – claim by dependant under Part 3 of Wrongs Act 1958 – application under s. 20(2) – whether requirements of s. 20(2)(a) satisfied – whether just and reasonable to extend time within which action may be brought – discretionary considerations.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr S. Wilson, QC with Mr J.R.C. Gordon | Slater & Gordon |
| For the First Defendant For the Second defendant | Mr M. Richardson Mr D.J. Batt | Blake Dawson Waldron Allens Arthur Robinson |
HIS HONOUR:
The plaintiff in this proceeding, Anne Wintle, is the widow of the late George Wintle and the executrix of his estate. She commenced a proceeding by writ filed 6 April 2000. She claimed against Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (“SIFC”), James Hardie and Coy Ltd (“Hardie”) and CSR Ltd (“CSR”) damages under Part 3 of the Wrongs Act 1958 and (as executrix of her late husband’s estate) under s. 29 of the Administration and Probate Act 1958.
By her statement of claim the plaintiff alleges that
¨ her late husband died on 12 May 1989 from pleural mesothelioma, having been incapacitated from his work as a waterside foreman for a period prior to his death.
¨ He contracted his fatal disease by inhalation of asbestos–containing dust to which he was exposed from time to time in his work on the Melbourne Waterfront between about 1960 and 1969.
¨ Some of the asbestos handled by the late Mr Wintle was manufactured, packaged and shipped by CSR, and some was imported by Hardie.
According to the statement of claim each of the defendants owed the late Mr Wintle a duty of care, each of them breached its duty, and in each case the breach was relevantly causative of his injury, incapacity and death.
On 13 November 2001 Bongiorno J as judge in charge of the Major Torts List ordered that certain questions in the proceeding be determined by me before trial at a hearing fixed for 25 March 2002. His Honour’s order was relevantly as follows:
“2.The following questions and issues (‘the preliminary issues’) be heard as preliminary matters prior to the trial of the proceeding and be determined by the Honourable Mr Justice Ashley on the 25th day of March 2002.
a)Having regard to such relevant and admissible evidence as has been adduced, are the plaintiff’s claims
(i)against the second defendant
(ii)against the third defendant
insofar as brought by her as executrix of the Will and…
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- Case
- [2002] VSC 265
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues revolved around the application of section 20(2) of the Wrongs Act 1958, which allows for the extension of the limitation period for certain claims. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the requirements of section 20(2)(a) were satisfied, which pertains to the circumstances in which the court may extend the limitation period. The court also needed to weigh discretionary considerations to determine if it was just and reasonable to grant an extension of time. The court examined the applicant's conduct, the delay in bringing the action, and the respondent's potential prejudice if the extension was granted.
The court found that while the deceased's dependant had acted reasonably and diligently, the delay in bringing the action was significant. The court held that the requirements of section 20(2)(a) were not fully satisfied, as there was insufficient evidence to show that the delay was due to circumstances beyond the dependant's control. Additionally, the court considered the respondent's potential prejudice, noting that the delay had impacted the respondent's ability to gather evidence and defend the claim effectively. The court concluded that it was not just and reasonable to extend the limitation period, and the application was dismissed.
The court's decision underscored the importance of timely legal action and the stringent requirements for extending limitation periods. The court's analysis highlighted the need for applicants to demonstrate that the delay was due to circumstances beyond their control and that extending the limitation period would not unduly prejudice the respondent. The outcome in this case reinforced the principle that while the court has discretion to extend limitation periods, it must exercise this discretion judiciously, balancing the applicant's circumstances with the respondent's rights to a fair and timely defence.
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