| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
No. 4590 of 2000
| ANNE WINTLE | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| STEVEDORING INDUSTRY FINANCE COMMITTEE JAMES HARDIE & COY PTY LTD CSR LTD | Defendants |
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JUDGE: | Ashley J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 21 February 2002 | |
DATE OF RULING: | 1 March 2002 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Wintle v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee and Ors | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2002] VSC 39 | |
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BIAS – Apprehended bias – Judge previously counsel appearing against Defendants to present proceeding – Basis for disqualification not disclosed in the circumstances.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr J.R.C. Gordon | Slater & Gordon |
| For the First Defendant | Mr M. Richardson | Blake Dawson Waldron |
| For the Second Defendant | Mr D.J. Batt | Allen Arthur Robinson |
| For the Third Defendant | Mr S.W. Kaye, QC with Mr A. Noonan | Ebsworth & Ebsworth |
HIS HONOUR:
On 25 March certain issues in this litigation are fixed for hearing by me. They include applications by the plaintiff, Anne Wintle, for extension of time under both s. 23A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 and s. 20(2) of the Wrongs Act 1958.
Counsel for the second and third defendants, James Hardie and Coy Pty Ltd (“Hardie”) and CSR Ltd (“CSR”), have applied that I disqualify myself from hearing and determining these issues. They have done so on the ground of apprehended bias. Any suggestion of actual bias has been disavowed.
CSR’s application that I disqualify myself, with which I shall first deal, was supported by the affidavit of Mr Philip Rowell, solicitor for CSR, sworn 1 February this year. That affidavit refers to two affidavits sworn in connection with the issues for hearing on 25 March – one, for the plaintiff, sworn on 3 August 2000 by Mr Peter Gordon, solicitor; and the other, sworn 1 September 2000, by Mr Rowell. I have carefully read, and re-read, all three affidavits.
Notwithstanding the apparent breadth of the grounds for disqualification set out in Mr Rowell’s affidavit of 1 February, Mr Kaye of Queens Counsel who appeared with Mr Noonan for CSR advanced quite specific and limited contentions. He did not argue that, because I had appeared as counsel for a number of plaintiffs in asbestos litigation before my appointment in August 1990 – whether against CSR, its subsidiary, Midalco Pty Ltd (formerly Australian Blue Asbestos Ltd and conveniently called ABA), or any other defendant – I was disabled from sitting in asbestos litigation against his client. He rather submitted that it is necessary to look to the circumstances of the particular case before the court. Here, those circumstances dictated disqualification.[1]
[1]In a memorandum, agreed upon by the plaintiff's solicitors, Mr Rowell indicated that he was unaware of CSR having made any previous application for a judge to disqualify himself or herself in an asbestos related disease case 'involving it or Midalco Pty Ltd.' I readily accept that such is the position. But the opportunities for raising objection must…
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- Case
- [2002] VSC 39
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the judge's prior involvement as counsel for the defendants constituted a ground for disqualification due to apprehended bias. The court had to determine if the plaintiff's concerns were substantiated and whether the judge's previous role could influence their impartiality in the current case.
The court considered the matter of apprehended bias in the context of the judge's prior role as counsel. It assessed whether there was a real likelihood of bias based on the circumstances presented. The court concluded that the judge's prior involvement did not establish a basis for disqualification as the circumstances did not reveal any specific reasons why the judge's impartiality would be compromised. The apprehension of bias was deemed unfounded, and the application to disqualify the judge was dismissed.
The court's final orders confirmed the dismissal of the application to disqualify the judge. The case proceeded with the original judge hearing the matter, as no valid grounds for disqualification were established. The court maintained that the apprehension of bias must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, which was not provided in this instance.
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