Wintle v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee

Link copied
Case Copied 20 min read
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

No. 4590 of 2000

ANNE WINTLE Plaintiff
v

STEVEDORING INDUSTRY FINANCE COMMITTEE

JAMES HARDIE & COY PTY LTD 
(ACN 000 035 512)

CSR LTD

Defendants

---

JUDGE:

Ashley J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

21 February 2002

DATE OF RULING:

1 March 2002

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

Wintle v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee and Ors

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2002] VSC 39

---

BIAS – Apprehended bias – Judge previously counsel appearing against Defendants to present proceeding – Basis for disqualification not disclosed in the circumstances.

---

APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiff Mr J.R.C. Gordon Slater & Gordon
For the First Defendant Mr M. Richardson

Blake Dawson Waldron

For the Second Defendant Mr D.J. Batt

Allen Arthur Robinson

For the Third Defendant Mr S.W. Kaye, QC
with Mr A. Noonan
Ebsworth & Ebsworth

HIS HONOUR:

  1. On 25 March certain issues in this litigation are fixed for hearing by me. They include applications by the plaintiff, Anne Wintle, for extension of time under both s. 23A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 and s. 20(2) of the Wrongs Act 1958.

  1. Counsel for the second and third defendants, James Hardie and Coy Pty Ltd (“Hardie”) and CSR Ltd (“CSR”), have applied that I disqualify myself from hearing and determining these issues.  They have done so on the ground of apprehended bias.  Any suggestion of actual bias has been disavowed. 

  1. CSR’s application that I disqualify myself, with which I shall first deal, was supported by the affidavit of Mr Philip Rowell, solicitor for CSR, sworn 1 February this year.  That affidavit refers to two affidavits sworn in connection with the issues for hearing on 25 March – one, for the plaintiff, sworn on 3 August 2000 by Mr Peter Gordon, solicitor; and the other, sworn 1 September 2000, by Mr Rowell.  I have carefully read, and re-read, all three affidavits. 

  1. Notwithstanding the apparent breadth of the grounds for disqualification set out in Mr Rowell’s affidavit of 1 February, Mr Kaye of Queens Counsel who appeared with Mr Noonan for CSR advanced quite specific and limited contentions.  He did not argue that, because I had appeared as counsel for a number of plaintiffs in asbestos litigation before my appointment in August 1990 – whether against CSR, its subsidiary, Midalco Pty Ltd (formerly Australian Blue Asbestos Ltd and conveniently called ABA), or any other defendant – I was disabled from sitting in asbestos litigation against his client.  He rather submitted that it is necessary to look to the circumstances of the particular case before the court.  Here, those circumstances dictated disqualification.[1]

    [1]In a memorandum, agreed upon by the plaintiff's solicitors, Mr Rowell indicated that he was unaware of CSR having made any previous application for a judge to disqualify himself or herself in an asbestos related disease case 'involving it or Midalco Pty Ltd.'  I readily accept that such is the position.  But the opportunities for raising objection must…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Wintle v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2002] VSC 39
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Wintle v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee involved a dispute between the plaintiff, Wintle, and the defendants, the Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee. The plaintiff sought to disqualify a judge from hearing the case on the grounds of apprehended bias, as the judge had previously acted as counsel for the defendants in a presentation related to the proceeding. The basis for the disqualification was not disclosed in the circumstances.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the judge's prior involvement as counsel for the defendants constituted a ground for disqualification due to apprehended bias. The court had to determine if the plaintiff's concerns were substantiated and whether the judge's previous role could influence their impartiality in the current case.

The court considered the matter of apprehended bias in the context of the judge's prior role as counsel. It assessed whether there was a real likelihood of bias based on the circumstances presented. The court concluded that the judge's prior involvement did not establish a basis for disqualification as the circumstances did not reveal any specific reasons why the judge's impartiality would be compromised. The apprehension of bias was deemed unfounded, and the application to disqualify the judge was dismissed.

The court's final orders confirmed the dismissal of the application to disqualify the judge. The case proceeded with the original judge hearing the matter, as no valid grounds for disqualification were established. The court maintained that the apprehension of bias must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, which was not provided in this instance.