Criminal Law—Murder—Malice aforethought—Recklessness—Knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm will probably result from act—Direction as to murder by recklessness—Whether appropriate—Whether sufficient—Likelihood of death or grievous bodily harm ensuing—Probability—Possibility—Standard of proof—Guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Decisions
October 8. The following written judgments were delivered: - BARWICK C.J. The applicant for special leave to appeal was charged before the Supreme Court of Victoria at Shepparton on 5th December 1975, with the murder on 14th September 1975, at Mount Beauty in that State of his brother, Kevin. After a trial of four days, the applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for the term of his natural life. He unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal against his conviction. (at p65)
2. The circumstances of the case out of which the charge arose are both simple and contained in a small compass. The applicant, David, at twenty-four years of age was the eldest of four brothers, the others being Kevin (the deceased) twenty-one, Peter seventeen and Adrian eleven at that time. They were all in the loungeroom of their parents' home on the afternoon of Sunday, 14th September, watching television, their parents having been absent during that day. David went through the front door to the verandah of the house. Words arose between him and the deceased relating to David's conduct on the verandah. The deceased latched the flyscreen door, thus excluding David from entry through it to the loungeroom. David went to the rear of the house, went to his bedroom, obtained and loaded his .22 automatic rifle with a single round; entered the loungeroom carrying the rifle pointed in the general direction of the deceased, then reclining on a couch or settee. As he entered, David said to the deceased, "I am going to bloody put a hole in you". David brushed aside the effort of Adrian to dissuade him, and upon the deceased rising and walking awkwardly, because of an ankle injury, towards him, David released the safety catch and discharged the rifle. The bullet passed near to the deceased's heart. He died very shortly thereafter. (at p66)
3. There is a full, accurate and clearly expressed statement of the facts evidenced before the jury in the reasons for judgment of Lush J. given in the Court of Criminal Appeal. I include it here as being adequate for the purposes of these reasons of mine:
"The evidence may be summarised as follows. The day of the killing was a Sunday, and the accused, the deceased and two other brothers, Peter and Adrian, were on that day living at their father's house at Mount Beauty. During the morning the applicant, the deceased and Adrian went shooting together, after some bickering between the deceased and the applicant over matters connected with the shooting excursion. After shooting, they went to a gathering apparently organised by…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
La Fontaine v The Queen [1976] HCA 52
Case
[1976] HCA 52
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In *La Fontaine v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal against a conviction for murder. The appellant, La Fontaine, had been found guilty of murder by a jury in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and sentenced to death. The central dispute revolved around the admissibility of certain evidence and the fairness of the trial proceedings.
The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior convictions and prior convictions of a co-accused, and whether the summing up to the jury was adequate and fair. Specifically, the court had to consider the principles governing the admission of evidence of prior convictions, particularly when such evidence might be prejudicial to the accused, and whether the judge's directions to the jury sufficiently mitigated any potential prejudice.
The Court held that the admission of evidence of the appellant's prior convictions was a material misdirection, as it was not relevant to any issue in the trial and was highly prejudicial. The Court also found that the admission of the prior convictions of the co-accused, without proper direction, was similarly prejudicial. The reasoning applied was that evidence of prior convictions is generally inadmissible unless it has a direct bearing on a fact in issue in the current proceedings, and its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect. The summing up was found to be deficient in adequately directing the jury on the limited use they could make of such evidence, thereby failing to ensure a fair trial.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.