SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Criminal Appeal)
R v THOMPSON
[2018] SASCFC 104
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Justice Vanstone, The Honourable Justice Peek and The Honourable Justice Hinton)
11 October 2018
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - SEXUAL OFFENCES - INDECENT ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENCES
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - TRIAL HAD BEFORE JUDGE WITHOUT JURY - GENERALLY
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL - MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS - STATEMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - MATTERS RELATING TO PROOF - STANDARD OF PROOF - CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE - GENERALLY
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE
Appeal against convictions of Indecent Assault.
The appellant was found guilty by a District Court Judge sitting alone of two counts of aggravated indecent assault of the complainant, J, contrary to s 56 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). He was acquitted of two further counts on the basis that the Judge was not satisfied that the relevant acts were assaults or had a sexual connotation.
At the time of the offending, J was 12 years old and the appellant was 45 years old. Count 2 occurred in mid-December 2015 when J’s family was staying at the appellant’s home in Mount Barker; J gave evidence that during the course of a piggyback ride, the appellant touched her vagina. Count 5 occurred in January 2016 when the appellant’s family was staying with J’s family at their home in Morgan; J gave evidence that during the course of ostensible “horseplay” the appellant exposed her vagina. The appellant gave evidence and denied any touching or exposure of the vagina.
Held per Peek J (Vanstone J agreeing) dismissing the appeal:
1. A review of all of the evidence demonstrates that neither verdict was unreasonable. M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 applied.
2. The Judge’s reasons adequately exposed the reasoning process linking his factual findings to his conclusions on counts 2 and 5. The Judge properly considered and resolved the various conflicts in the evidence. DL v The Queen (2018) 356 ALR 197 followed.
3. J and her father gave evidence that on the night of count 2 the appellant said to J that he was sorry; the appellant denied that he had said this. Having found that the appellant had made that statement, it was open to the Judge to find, as he did, that it constituted an admission that the appellant had touched J’s vagina earlier that day. The Judge was not obliged to give a post-offence conduct direction in the circumstances.
4. The Judge did not fail to consider and determine the issue of J’s reliability. His Honour specifically directed that he was required to consider reliability as well as credibility; his finding that the complainant told “the truth” was a finding that he accepted that J was…
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- R v Thompson [2018] SASCFC 104
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- [2018] SASCFC 104
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the appellate court concerned the sufficiency and reliability of the evidence presented at trial, particularly in relation to count 2, the "piggyback incident." The court was required to determine whether the evidence, when considered as a whole, established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether any inconsistencies or discrepancies in the complainant's evidence, as highlighted during cross-examination, rendered the conviction unsafe. The court also considered the potential corroborative value of certain evidence and the risk of reconstruction in the complainant's testimony.
The appellate court, comprising Vanstone, Peek, and Hinton JJ, allowed the appeal in relation to count 2. While acknowledging that the complainant's evidence regarding the "piggyback incident" was given shortly after the event and that the trial judge had found inconsistencies to be within expected bounds, the court found that it could not be satisfied of the appellant's guilt on count 2 beyond a reasonable doubt without having had the opportunity to observe and hear the witnesses directly. The court noted that the appellant's evidence and the cross-examination of the complainant revealed significant discrepancies regarding the nature and extent of the alleged touching during the "piggyback incident," including the number of occasions and the duration of contact.
Consequently, the court quashed the conviction on count 2 and directed that the appellant be retried on that count. The decision did not address count 5 in detail, implying that the appeal in relation to that count was either dismissed or not pursued on the same grounds.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
I first make some observations concerning matters raised in submissions and then turn to the matters referred to in the particulars. Potential corroboration? The assertion at paragraph [62] of the submissions that “the offending was uncorroborated” is incorrect. As to count 2, if one harks back to the days of practically mandatory corroboration warnings in South Australia, a Judge at that time would have left to the jury the evidence of J’s father concerning the alleged apology by the appellant to J as being potentially corroborative of her evidence as to count 2;[9] and if the jury found count 2 proven, that finding was potentially corroborative of her evidence as to count 5.[10] It is also probably the case that the matter of the appellant sending the video of J under the sprinkler to his business phone (which event the appellant admitted) would have been left as being potentially corroborative of her evidence as to both counts. One might discuss these matters at some length, but there is no point in doing so. Suffice it to say that the appellant has nothing to gain by opening up a debate as to corroboration.[9] “Potentially corroborative” in the sense that it was for the Judge to rule as to whether a particular item of evidence was potentially corroborative and for the jury to find whether it was corroborative in fact.[10] See, for example, B v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 599; Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 106.Young witness with a risk of reconstruction? – the complaint evidence As to the assertion of “a risk of reconstruction” at paragraph [66] of the appellant’s submissions, this was not a case involving a complaint (and hence a trial) long after the alleged date of the subject charge; nor was complaint first made after a series of offences had already allegedly occurred with a consequent risk of a blurring between the various charges. Here, J’s complaint to her mother as to the count 2 event was made shortly after on the same day; and, as to the later count 5 event, the complaint was again made to her mother shortly after on the same day, with the formal police complaint being made later that same month. I would add that although complaint evidence has only limited uses, and clearly does not constitute corroboration in the legal sense, both J and her mother gave clear evidence of very recent complaint and, in my view, the complaint evidence as presented here does fall at the stronger end of the spectrum of such evidence as is generally encountered. The Judge’s finding that any inconsistencies between J’s and her mother’s in this regard were no more than might be expected in the circumstances was well open to him.Evidence of a background of previous horseplay (innocuous interactions) The appellant relies on a body of evidence of previous apparently innocuous interactions between himself and children, including J herself. He stated that he often gave his own children piggybacks, and had also given J a piggyback when the two families were looking at display homes.[11] He gave evidence that he had “probably” given a “front wedgie” to his children before, but that they would be “very rare”. His wife gave similar evidence. The appellant did not think that he had given J a wedgie previously. He agreed that whether a wedgie is inappropriate depends “on the context … and situation”, and that “some parents might” complain if their child was given a wedgie by another adult. [11] The appellant’s daughter, JT, also gave evidence of that fact: T363.