Criminal Law—Evidence—Cross-examination of accused—Questions tending to show previous convictions of accused—"Nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution"—Denial by accused of making admissions to police—Crimes Act 1958 (Vict.), s. 399 (e) (ii).*
Decisions
November 23. The following written judgements were delivered:- DIXON C.J. This application for special leave to appeal involves two questions. One concerns the manner in which the Supreme Court has applied the expression in par. (e)(ii) of the proviso to s. 399 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vict.), namely "the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution". The other question relates to the use to which the discretion arising under the proviso to that paragraph was put by the judge at the trial. The applicant labours under the disadvantage of having suffered many convictions for larceny and for other offences usually taken to betoken a life of crime. His conviction on the occasion with which we are concerned was for an offence that he might well regard as assigning him an unusual second place, namely of being an accessory after the fact, the fact itself being the breaking and entering of a dwelling-house and stealing therein. Perhaps the applicant's claim to the exercise by this Court of its special discretion to admit an appeal may be considered by some as too handicapped by his lack of apparent merit and the fact that he is threatened with no hardship to which he has not long since been inured, but after all, justice for everyone must be done according to law and for my part I think that there were, in his case, departures from the law which make it proper for us to intervene. (at p5)
2. The applicant was in my opinion entitled to the protection which the general rule expressed by s. 399 gives him against cross-examination as to previous convictions; he did not fall within the exception which exposes him to cross-examination of that kind if the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the witnesses for the prosecution. Moreover if that be wrong, then I think that the prisoner was entitled to an exercise by the judge of his discretion to disallow such a cross-examination. Further the questions appear to me to possess a sufficient degree of general importance to come within the general principle which governs the granting of special leave to appeal. (at p6)
3. The applicant, a man of thirty years of age, was seen by police who were on patrol duty about 1 o'clock in the morning of Sunday, 9th April 1961, in Wellington Street, St. Kilda. He was sitting in a car parked…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Dawson v R [1961] HCA 74
Case
[1961] HCA 74
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In *Dawson v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Dawson, against his conviction for murder. The dispute centred on the admissibility of certain evidence and the directions given to the jury by the trial judge.
The primary legal issues before the High Court were whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence obtained from the applicant under duress, and whether the judge’s summing up to the jury adequately explained the concept of reasonable doubt and the onus of proof.
The Court held that the evidence obtained from the applicant was inadmissible because it was procured under circumstances that amounted to duress, rendering it involuntary. The judges reasoned that the admission of such evidence would be contrary to the principles of fairness and justice. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial judge’s directions to the jury on reasonable doubt were insufficient, failing to properly convey the high standard of proof required for a criminal conviction. The jury should have been more clearly instructed that the onus rested entirely on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, without any burden on the accused to establish innocence.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.