Crotty v Director of Public Prosecutions

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

CITATION:   CROTTY -v- DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS [2025] WASC 233

CORAM:   PALMER J

HEARD:   4 MARCH 2025, 28 APRIL 2025 AND 21 MAY 2025

DELIVERED          :   17 JUNE 2025

FILE NO/S:   SJA 1069 of 2024

BETWEEN:   DANIEL CROTTY

Appellant

AND

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

For File No:   SJA 1069 of 2024

Jurisdiction              :   MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   MAGISTRATE ANDRETICH

File Number            :   PE 25456/2024; PE 25457/2024; 2548/2024


Catchwords:

Criminal law - Application for leave to appeal against conviction - Whether there was a miscarriage of justice due to incompetence of counsel or express errors of the trial magistrate

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA)
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA)
Evidence Act 1906 (WA)

Result:

Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : (4 March 2025) In Person, (28 April 2025) In Person and (21 May 2025) Mr T Stephenson
Respondent : Ms M L Wong

Solicitors:

Appellant : (4 March 2025) In Person, (28 April 2025) In Person and (21 May 2025) Legal Aid
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

CDO v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 58

Colley v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 79

Cushing v R [1977] WAR 7

HCF v The Queen [2023] HCA 35; (2023) 415 ALR 190

HML v The Queen [2008] HCA 16; (2008) 235 CLR 334

HTN v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2022] WASCA 51

JEL v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 32

Kennedy v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 55

Liyanage v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 112

LNN v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 39

Loh v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2024] WASCA 166

Mallard v The Queen [2005] HCA 68

Mandzji v The Queen (1983) 11 A Crim R 209

McMahon v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 143

P v The Queen (1993) 61 SASR 75

R v Hyatt [2019] QCA 106

R v Symonds [2001] 2 Qd R 70

Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12; (2011) 242 CLR 610

RWN v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 131

Sami v Duggan [2011] WASC 304

Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473

Sethi v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 173

Suresh v The Queen [1998] HCA 23; (1998) 153 ALR 145

Wimbridge v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 196

WMT v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 104

PALMER J:

Introduction

  1. On 2 August 2024, the Appellant (Mr Crotty) was convicted, following a trial before Magistrate Andretich in the Magistrates Court at Bunbury, of one count of assault occasioning bodily harm in circumstances of aggravation, one count of breaching a family violence restraining order and one count of breaching a protective bail…

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Details
Case
[2025] WASC 233
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Crotty v Director of Public Prosecutions, the appellant, Crotty, sought leave to appeal against his conviction. The matter was heard in the High Court of Australia. The primary issue before the court was whether there was a miscarriage of justice due to the incompetence of counsel or express errors made by the trial magistrate. Crotty's appeal centred on the failure of his trial counsel to sufficiently cross-examine the complainant on certain matters and on the trial magistrate's handling of evidence related to family violence.

The court examined whether the trial counsel's failure to put specific questions to the complainant during cross-examination amounted to incompetence or if it was a strategic decision. It also assessed whether the trial magistrate erred in admitting evidence of family violence and using it in a way that could have prejudiced the appellant. The Director of Public Prosecutions argued that any omissions by counsel did not prejudice Crotty as the fundamental assertion of the defence – that the complainant had self-inflicted injuries – was effectively put to the complainant. The court needed to determine if the appellant's case for a miscarriage of justice was substantiated.

The High Court found that there was no miscarriage of justice. The court held that the trial counsel's decisions were not incompetent and did not prejudice the appellant. It was noted that the fundamental assertion of the defence was put to the complainant and there was no express error by the trial magistrate. The court concluded that the appeal did not disclose any ground of appeal sufficient to justify leave to appeal. The appellant's application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Crotty v Director of Public Prosecutions involves an appeal against a conviction. The appellant, Mr Crotty, was convicted of various criminal charges. The conviction arose out of an incident involving the complainant, who had reported family violence and alleged injuries inflicted by Mr Crotty. The complainant's credibility and the nature of the injuries were central to the case. The trial magistrate heard evidence from the complainant, Mr Crotty, and other witnesses. The prosecution argued that the complainant's injuries were self-inflicted and that she had a history of family violence with Mr Crotty. The defence argued that the complainant's evidence was not challenged and that the injuries were not inflicted by Mr Crotty. The appeal is focused on whether there was a miscarriage of justice due to the incompetence of counsel or express errors by the trial magistrate.

The matter came before the court as an appeal against conviction. Mr Crotty had been convicted in a lower court and subsequently sought leave to appeal the decision. The appeal was based on the grounds of alleged incompetence of counsel and errors by the trial magistrate. The appeal process involved submissions from both the appellant and the Director of Public Prosecutions. The appellant argued that certain matters critical to the defence were not put to the complainant by the prosecutor. The Director contended that the alleged omissions did not prejudice the appellant and that the fundamental assertions of the defence were still before the court.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On my reading of the transcript, the prosecutor did not invite the Magistrate to rely upon the evidence of family violence to engage in propensity reasoning. In closing, the prosecutor submitted that the evidence was admissible under s 39A of the Evidence Act. He made the following submissions:[190]Family violence is relevant in this case, under section 39A of the Evidence Act and, as a consequence of that, the victim advises of previous family violence incidences, some reported, some not reported. I would refer your Honour to section 39F which - about a direction in regard to - sorry, 39G in regard to family violence, the application of it. And also section 39E and F, which talks about procedures and why people report and don't report family violence.There seems to be quite a significant history of family violence between the accused and the victim. I would be saying that the amount of times that - no, I won't go into that, your Honour. What I will say is that the victim has attended this home, seeking assistance from the accused, as she said. Her evidence was truthful. I don't think she was challenged about her credibility, although we did venture down that path. [The complainant] has not used family violence to get out of charges and that's shown by where she's currently residing. (emphasis added).[190] Trial Transcript ts 39. The Director accepted that the specific actions that Mr Crotty said that the complainant took to inflict injuries on herself, damage his property and goad him into hitting her were not put to the complainant by Mr Camp, but it was argued that they did not necessarily need to be. It was submitted that the matter of significance that needed to be put to the complainant was that her injuries were self‑inflicted and this was put to her.[227][227] Director's Supplementary Written Submissions, par 42. The Director submitted that Mr Crotty has failed to identify any prejudice flowing from the asserted failure to comply with the rule in Brown v Dunn. It was argued that although the Magistrate commented that counsel had not put two specific motivations for making a false complaint to the complainant (to get a more lenient sentence and/or to get compensation), no adverse comment was made in respect of the fundamental assertion in the defence case - that the complainant injured herself in order to get the appellant into trouble.[228] Mr Crotty's submissions identified seven matters that it said were needed to be put to the complainant, which it was alleged were not put but were issues of central importance. These matters included that Mr Camp did not put to the complainant that she had woken the baby and tormented the baby during the time she was in the unit. Although Mr Camp accepted in cross-examination that this was not put,[229] he did put to the complainant that she woke the baby with a loud bang.[230][229] Appeal Transcript, ts 140.[230] Trial Transcript, ts 18. The matters also included that Mr Camp did not put to the complainant that she had asked for help and been offered it by Mr Crotty. This was uncontentious, however, because the complainant said as much in her evidence in chief.[231][231] Trial Transcript, ts 9.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether there was a miscarriage of justice due to the incompetence of counsel.
2. Whether there were express errors by the trial magistrate that led to a miscarriage of justice.
3. Whether the failure to put specific matters to the complainant by the prosecutor resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
4. Whether the appellant has demonstrated prejudice as a result of the alleged errors and omissions.

Held
1. The Court concluded that there was no miscarriage of justice due to the incompetence of counsel. The application for leave to appeal against the conviction was dismissed.
2. The Court determined that there were no express errors by the trial magistrate that led to a miscarriage of justice.
3. Regarding the failure to put specific matters to the complainant by the prosecutor, the Court found that this did not result in a miscarriage of justice.
4. The Court found that the appellant did not demonstrate prejudice as a result of the alleged errors and omissions.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court examined the arguments put forth by the appellant concerning potential miscarriages of justice due to the incompetence of counsel, express errors by the trial magistrate, and the prosecutor's failure to put specific matters to the complainant. Firstly, the Court assessed the alleged incompetence of counsel. It noted that while the prosecutor did not explicitly invite the Magistrate to rely upon the evidence of family violence to engage in propensity reasoning, the prosecutor argued that the evidence was admissible under s 39A of the Evidence Act, and there was no challenge to the complainant's credibility. The Court found that the prosecutor's submissions were sufficient and that there was no miscarriage of justice due to the incompetence of counsel.

Secondly, the Court examined whether there were express errors by the trial magistrate. The Court found no express errors by the trial magistrate that would have led to a miscarriage of justice. The Court observed that while the Magistrate commented on counsel not putting certain motivations to the complainant, no adverse comment was made regarding the fundamental assertion in the defence case—that the complainant injured herself in order to get the appellant into trouble.

Thirdly, the Court reviewed the prosecutor's failure to put specific matters to the complainant. The Court noted that while some matters were not explicitly put to the complainant, others were implied or already covered in the complainant's testimony. The Court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the alleged omissions. The Court emphasised that the fundamental assertion of the defence—that the complainant injured herself to get the appellant into trouble—was adequately addressed during the trial.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal against the conviction, finding no miscarriage of justice due to the incompetence of counsel, no express errors by the trial magistrate, and no prejudice resulting from the alleged omissions by the prosecutor.