Samuels v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   SAMUELS -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2005] WASCA 193

CORAM:   STEYTLER P

WHEELER JA
ROBERTS-SMITH JA

HEARD:   4 AUGUST 2005

DELIVERED          :   7 OCTOBER 2005

FILE NO/S:   CACR 74 of 2005

BETWEEN:   RICHARD LEE SAMUELS

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :FENBURY DCJ

File No  :IND 1323 of 2002

Catchwords:

Appeal - Criminal law - Application for leave to appeal - Section 27(2) Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) - Court must refuse leave unless ground has reasonable prospect of succeeding - Meaning of "reasonable prospect of succeeding" - Test to be applied

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 9, s 18, s 27(1), s 27(2)

Result:

Leave to appeal refused on grounds 2 and 3
Leave to appeal granted on grounds 1 and 4

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr D Grace QC

Respondent:     Mr B Fiannaca

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Amidzic & Associates

Respondent:     State Director of Public Prosecutions

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170

Bailey v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 62 ALJR 319

Barnes v The State of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 258

Brayley v Malkovic [2005] WASC 136

Burton v The President, &c, of the Shire of Bairnsdale (1908) 7 CLR 76

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384

Coulter v The Queen (1988) 164 CLR 350

Daniele v Weissenberger (2002) 136 A Crim R 390

de Groot v Nominal Defendant [2004] NSWCA 88

Degiorgio v Dunn (No 2) (2005) 62 NSWLR 284

Dempster v National Companies and Securities Commission (1993) 9 WAR 215

Duncan v The Queen (1983) 47 ALR 746

Eastway Construction Corporation v City of New York (1985) 762 F 2d 243

Federico's Restaurant Pty Ltd v Warwick Entertainment Centre Pty Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 702

Gooch & Pierce v The Queen [2002] NTCCA 3

Johnson v The Queen (2004) 78 ALJR 616

King v City of Fremantle [2004] WASCA 212

Kirby v The Queen [2003] WASCA 239

Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 153

Medcalf v Mardell [2003] 1 AC 120

Mnyirrinna v McIntosh [2003] WASCA 305

Nolan v Clifford (1904) 1 CLR 429

Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610

Peruvian Guano Company v Bockwoldt [1883] 23 Ch D 225

Phosphate Co‑operative Company of Australia Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1977) 138 CLR 134

R v Bellissimo (1996) 84 A Crim R 465

R v Blick (1999) 108 A Crim R 525

R v Darwell (1997) 94 A Crim R 35

R v Lavender [2005] HCA 37

R v Marker (2002) 135 A Crim R 55

R v McDonald (1992) 85 NTR 1

Re Matthews; Ex parte Mackenzie [2000] WASC 147

Roddan v Walker (1996) 17 WAR 277

Saraswati v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 1

Savage…

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Details
Case
[2005] WASCA 193
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Samuels v The State of Western Australia, the appellant challenged the refusal of leave to appeal his conviction and sentence by a single Judge of the Supreme Court. The appellant was convicted of a serious crime and sentenced in the Supreme Court. Dissatisfied with the outcome, he sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal Division of the Supreme Court. The appeal was refused by a single Judge, and the appellant sought further review from the Court of Appeal. The key legal issue before the Court was the interpretation and application of the "reasonable prospect of succeeding" test, as introduced by the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), in determining whether leave to appeal should be granted. The Court needed to clarify the standard and criteria for assessing whether an appeal ground has a reasonable prospect of success, as well as how this test compares to the previous "arguable case" test.

The Court considered the legislative changes introduced by the Criminal Appeals Act and the need for a consistent approach to the "reasonable prospect of succeeding" test. The Court examined the meaning of "reasonable prospect of succeeding" and how it should be applied in the context of criminal appeals. The Court noted that the term "reasonable prospect of succeeding" requires a higher threshold than the previous "arguable case" test. It held that the test involves a probability of success, rather than merely the possibility of success. The Court concluded that the test should be applied by assessing whether the appeal ground has a real chance of succeeding, considering the strength of the arguments and the weight of the evidence. The Court also emphasised that the test is objective, requiring an assessment of the appeal's merits independent of the appellant's subjective belief in their chances of success.

The Court held that the "reasonable prospect of succeeding" test requires a probability of success, rather than merely the possibility of success. The test is to be applied by assessing whether the appeal ground has a real chance of succeeding, considering the strength of the arguments and the weight of the evidence. The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the test should be applied subjectively, based on the appellant's belief in their chances of success. Instead, the Court held that the test is objective and requires an assessment of the appeal's merits independent of the appellant's subjective belief. The Court's decision provides clarity on the application of the "reasonable prospect of succeeding" test in criminal appeals and ensures a consistent approach to the grant of leave to appeal. The Court's interpretation of the test will guide single Judges in their assessment of appeal grounds and assist appellants in determining the merits of their cases. The Court's decision reinforces the importance of a fair and equitable judicial system, balancing the need to restrict appeals with the preservation of the right to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: On 2 May 2005 a raft of legislative amendments making significant changes to civil and criminal appellate procedures came into operation in Western Australia. One of those was the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) ("the CA Act"). That Act stipulated that henceforth leave would be required for each ground of appeal in any criminal appeal. It posed a new test for determining whether or not leave would be granted, that being whether the ground has "a reasonable prospect of succeeding". Although applications for leave to appeal to this Court can, and routinely will, be dealt with by a single Judge and can be dealt with on the papers, it was thought desirable to have a decision of three Judges of the Court on the meaning and proper application of the "reasonable prospect of succeeding" test. The present case was listed before this Court for that purpose. The Court of Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Western Australia ("the Court of Appeal") came into existence on 1 February 2005, by virtue of s 5 of the Acts Amendment (Court of Appeal) Act 2004 (WA). Prior to that date, criminal appeals from the trial jurisdiction of the Supreme and District Courts were heard by a coram of an uneven number of three or more Judges from the Supreme Court sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeal (s 687 of the Criminal Code (WA)). From 1 February 2005, such appeals were to be heard before the Court of Appeal. Before 2 May 2005, criminal appeals from the Supreme or District Courts were made pursuant to s 688 of the Criminal Code. Criminal appeals from Courts of Petty Sessions were heard before a single Judge of the Supreme Court under s 189 of the Justices Act 1902 (WA). By s 688(1) of the Criminal Code a person convicted on indictment had an appeal against conviction as of right on any ground which involved a question of law alone. Leave to appeal was otherwise required for an appeal against conviction or sentence. There was no statutory test for leave to appeal. Prior to May 2005, appeals from Courts of Petty Sessions to a single Judge of the Supreme Court lay only by leave pursuant to s 184 of the Justices Act 1902. The test for a grant or refusal of leave was prescribed by s 187(1), which stated:"The Judge shall grant leave to appeal unless he considers that the appeal is frivolous or vexatious or that the grounds of appeal advanced do not disclose an arguable case". In its final report on Project 92 "Review of the Criminal and Civil Justice System in Western Australia" (1999) the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia wrote (at 273) that:"Appeals generate a major workload for courts at all levels and can significantly extend the time and cost of obtaining a final resolution to a case. Restriction of the right of appeal may simplify litigation and reduce costs, but any reform must also be consistent with the maintenance of a fair and equitable judicial system". The Commission criticised the leave requirement in the Justices Act as being ineffective, suggesting (at 288 ‑ 289) that:"if the purpose of a leave requirement is to weed out hopeless applications, it currently does not appear to serve that purpose".

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Somewhat different approaches were taken to the notion of "arguable case" depending upon whether the test was being applied in a civil context (for example prerogative relief under O 56 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)) or a criminal context (as under s 187(1)). In Savage v Teck Explorations Ltd, unreported; FCt SCt of WA; Library No 7285; 16 September 1988, Malcolm CJ said in respect of the former:"On the application for the order nisi the Judge hearing the application has an opportunity to assist the Full Court by making a preliminary examination of the formulation of the grounds and, where necessary, limiting their scope or permitting amendment so that the matter may proceed to the Full Court on a proper basis". In Re Matthews; Ex parte Mackenzie [2000] WASC 147 at [13], Templeman J contrasted that with the appeal procedure under the Justices Act, which he said "… is in the nature of a preliminary hearing by one Judge, who is required to form a view about the prospects of the appellant succeeding before another Judge of equal standing". The notion of an "arguable case" was explained by Malcolm CJ (with whom Walsh and Anderson JJ agreed) in Dempster v National Companies and Securities Commission (1993) 9 WAR 215. That case concerned an application for leave to appeal against an order for committal. Malcolm CJ was of the view that, in the absence of special circumstances, an appeal against an order for committal should be dismissed under s 199(1) of the Justices Act if there has been no miscarriage of justice (at 261). His Honour continued (at 261):"It follows that, in the absence of an arguable case that there are special circumstances justifying the intervention of the Supreme Court by way of appeal, an application for leave to appeal against an order for committal should be refused as disclosing no arguable case unless it can be demonstrated that there is a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice unless leave is granted. In some cases, the circumstances may be so devoid of merit that the appeal should be dismissed as frivolous or vexatious.It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the expression 'arguable case' in s 187(1) meant 'capable of being arguable': see The Shorter Oxford Dictionary. In my opinion, having regard to the context, an arguable case is one that is not merely capable of being argued, but one that is reasonably capable of being argued in the sense that it has an argument which has some prospect of success. In this context, 'arguable case' necessarily has the same meaning as 'reasonable case', as the expression is used in O 20, r 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971. The case must be one which has 'some' chance of success: see Republic of Peru v Peruvian Guano Co (1887) 36 Ch D 489 at 495. This will not be so in the absence of exceptional circumstances." Other cases in which Dempster was subsequently applied include Wood v Marsh (2003) 139 A Crim R 475, in which (at [37]) the need for an action to have some prospect of success before it could be called arguable was emphasised; Daniele v Weissenberger (2002) 136 A Crim R 390, in which Pullin J (at [3]) re‑iterated that an arguable case is not one "merely capable of being argued"; Mnyirrinna v MacIntosh (supra), in which Barker J (at [76]) pointed out that "arguable case" necessarily has the same meaning as "reasonable case"; and King v City of Fremantle [2004] WASCA 212 per Barker J at [25].