Farrant v Westpac Banking Corporation
[2024] WASCA 157
•13 DECEMBER 2024
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: FARRANT -v- WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION [2024] WASCA 157
CORAM: MITCHELL JA
VAUGHAN JA
HEARD: 13 DECEMBER 2024
DELIVERED : 13 DECEMBER 2024
PUBLISHED : 13 DECEMBER 2024
FILE NO/S: CACV 50 of 2024
BETWEEN: MEHRZAD FARRANT
Appellant
AND
WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: ACTING MASTER MCDONALD
Citation: WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION -v- FARRANT [2024] WASC 300
File Number : CIV 1316 of 2023
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: ACTING MASTER MCDONALD
Citation: WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION -v- FARRANT [2024] WASC 300 (S)
File Number : CIV 1316 of 2023
Catchwords:
Appeal - Practice and procedure - Whether appeal should be dismissed if no grounds have reasonable prospect of success - Default in mortgage - Where mortgagor alleges mortgage invalid as not properly executed - Where master alleged to lack jurisdiction - Turns on its own facts - Appeal dismissed
Legislation:
National Credit Code, s 53(2)
Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WAS), r 43(2)(g)(i)
Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA), s 130
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| Respondent | : | C M Guy |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| Respondent | : | TG Legal & Technology |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
In de Braekt v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2016] WASC 220
Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473
Westpac Banking Corporation v Farrant [2024] WASC 300
Westpac Banking Corporation v Farrant [2024] WASC 300 (S)
REASONS OF THE COURT:
Overview
This matter came before the court on 13 December 2024 pursuant to a Registrar's Notice to Attend dated 15 October 2024. The notice raised for consideration:
1.Whether the court should strike out any ground of appeal.
2.Whether the appeal should be dismissed on the basis that none of the grounds of appeal has a reasonable prospect of succeeding.
After hearing from the appellant, and considering the appellant's case, we were satisfied that the appeal should be dismissed. We made orders accordingly and said that we would provide written reasons for those orders as soon as practicable. These are our reasons for the orders made dismissing the appeal.
Background
By a writ of summons dated 30 March 2023 the respondent bank commenced mortgage recovery proceedings against the appellant. The respondent sought delivery up of vacant possession of a property owned by the appellant in Ednah Street, Como. The respondent claimed that, by a mortgage registered on 19 July 2011, the appellant mortgaged the property as security for the repayment of two loans. The first loan was pleaded to have originally been in an amount of $217,000 pursuant to a written agreement dated 29 June 2011. The second loan was pleaded to have originally been in an amount of $218,000 pursuant to a further written agreement dated 29 June 2011. The loan agreements were varied in 2015 and 2020. Defaults were alleged to have occurred in January and February 2023 following which the total owing under the loan agreements became immediately due and payable on 22 February 2023.
According to the respondent bank, as of 23 March 2023 the amount owing by the appellant to the respondent was $502,037.66 ‑ $232,331.96 under the first agreement as varied and $269,705.70 under the second agreement as varied.
The appellant filed a defence and counterclaim dated 21 April 2023. It is not necessary to set out the details of the alleged defence. The matters that the appellant relies on by way of defence appear sufficiently from the appellant's grounds of appeal. The respondent bank took the view that the defence and counterclaim did not disclose a triable issue. Accordingly, by chamber summons dated 11 May 2023 the respondent applied for summary judgment pursuant to O 14 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC). The appellant responded with a defendant's application for summary judgment under O 16 RSC, filed on 18 May 2023, and an application dated 21 May 2023 to stay the respondent's proceedings. Numerous affidavits were filed by the appellant[1] and the respondent bank.[2]
[1] The appellant relied on her affidavits affirmed 18 May 2023, 24 May 2023, 19 June 2023, 2 August 2023 and 22 May 2024.
[2] The respondent relied on affidavits of Quang Xuan Ho affirmed 11 May 2023, 8 June 2023 and 24 May 2024.
All three applications came before Acting Master McDonald for hearing.
The master delivered written reasons dismissing the appellant's applications and granting the respondent bank's summary judgment application: Westpac Banking Corporation v Farrant.[3] On 29 August 2024 the master made orders that:
1.[The appellant's] application for a stay of proceedings be dismissed.
2.[The defendant's] application for summary judgment be dismissed.
3.[The defendant's] counterclaim be dismissed.
4.[The respondent's] application for summary judgment is granted.
5.[The appellant] deliver up to [the respondent] vacant possession of the property …
[3] Westpac Banking Corporation v Farrant [2024] WASC 300.
There is no need to rehearse the entirety of the master's careful and considered reasons for decision. The master summarised the materials before her [1] ‑ [10] and the pleaded claim dealing, where appropriate, with the documentary evidence relied on by the respondent bank [13] ‑ [48]. The master was conscious of the appellant's status as a self‑represented litigant and the flexibility that should be afforded to the appellant as a self-represented litigant [11]. The master then dealt, in the following order, with the appellant's stay application [49] ‑ [81], the appellant's summary judgment application [82] ‑ [100] and the respondent's summary judgment application [101] ‑ [114]. In supplementary reasons the master explained that, by parity of reasoning from the earlier reasons, the appellant's counterclaim was doomed to fail and should be dismissed: Westpac Banking Corporation v Farrant (S).[4]
[4] Westpac Banking Corporation v Farrant [2024] WASC 300 (S) [12].
The master held that the pleaded case advanced by the respondent bank was duly verified by its affidavit evidence [109]. In that respect the transaction histories were not disputed; nor did the appellant deny receipt of the funds advanced under the loan agreements [106]. There was also prima facie evidence of the defaults under the loan agreements and the mortgage [112].
In connection with each of the stay application, the O 16 application and the O 14 application the appellant relied on the absence of any affixation of respondent bank's common seal to the mortgage. The appellant referred to each of s 130 of the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA), s 127 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9 and s 10 of the Property Law Act 1969 (WA) and s 53 of the National Credit Code. The argument, in substance, was that so far as those provisions provided for how a corporation may legally execute a mortgage, a document or a deed, the absence of the affixation of the respondent's common seal to the mortgage meant that the mortgage was void, unenforceable and not legally binding.
The master held that the appellant's contention proceeded on a misapprehension that the respondent bank was obliged to execute the mortgage [67]. The master held, contrary to the appellant's contention, that the respondent was not required to execute the mortgage [70] ‑ [71], [73], [77]. It was enough that the mortgage was validly executed by the appellant, as mortgagor, and registered against the title of the property [70] ‑ [71]. In that respect the appellant accepted that she entered into the mortgage and thereby mortgaged the property as security for the $435,000 advanced under the two loans [107] ‑ [108].
In any event, the master reasoned that: s 130 of the Transfer of Land Act was facilitative not mandatory [72]; it was unclear how any failure to meet the requirements of s 127 of the Corporations Act impacted the validity or enforceability of the mortgage [74]; and the requirements of s 9 and s 10 of the Property Law Act did not have application to the respondent [77]. Moreover, the allegation based on s 53 of the National Credit Code fell away so far as it was premised on the asserted failure to lawfully execute the mortgage by reference to the requirements of s 130 of the Transfer of Land Act, s 127 of the Corporations Act or s 9 and s 10 of the Property Law Act [80].
The master was satisfied that none of the matters raised by the appellant gave rise to a triable issue [104].
The appeal
The appellant appealed by a notice of appeal dated 30 August 2024. The parties agreed to a seven‑day extension for the filing of the appellant's case. The appellant's case was filed on 10 October 2024. It contains 15 grounds of appeal.
The grounds of appeal are not easily summarised. It is convenient to reproduced them in full in the annexure to these reasons.
The appellant's case contains written submissions in support of the grounds of appeal. They comprise 20 pages. At the hearing pursuant to the Registrar's Notice to Attend the appellant handed up another set of written submissions. They comprised 46 pages, much of which repeated matters contained in the written submissions in the appellant's case. We will refer to the appellant's written submissions, as necessary, when addressing the grounds of appeal. The appellant was given the opportunity to develop her written submissions at the hearing on 13 December 2024. Again, to the extent necessary, we will refer to those oral submissions in addressing the grounds of appeal.
The nature of the hearing
The Registrar's Notice to Attend invoked r 43(2)(f) and r 43(2)(g)(i) of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA). Those rules confirm the court's jurisdiction:
(f)to strike out any ground of appeal that does not have a reasonable prospect of succeeding or does not comply with these rules or any order made under them;
…
(g)to dismiss the appeal if:
(i)none of the grounds of appeal has a reasonable prospect of succeeding[.]
The purpose of these rules is to weed out unmeritorious appeals: In de Braekt v Legal Profession Complaints Committee.[5] In that respect both rules are directed to grounds of appeal that do not have a 'reasonable prospect of succeeding'.
[5] In de Braekt v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2016] WASC 220 [47].
A ground of appeal has a reasonable prospect of succeeding if it has a rational and logical prospect of succeeding, ie it would not be irrational, fanciful or absurd to envisage the ground succeeding. In short, the ground must have a 'real prospect' of success: Samuels v The State of Western Australia;[6] In de Braekt v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [47]. If the court is to strike out a ground as not having a reasonable prospect of succeeding, or is to dismiss an appeal on the basis that none of the grounds has a reasonable prospect of succeeding, the court must be positively satisfied that the ground, or all of the grounds, lacks or lack a rational and logical prospect of succeeding.
[6] Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473 [56].
A ground of appeal does not have a reasonable prospect of succeeding simply because, standing alone, it might be upheld. Often grounds of appeal allege non-material error such that, even if the ground of appeal is upheld, that success of itself would not result in any appellate disturbance of the judgment or order the subject of the appeal. A ground of appeal will only have a reasonable prospect of succeeding where, if upheld, the ground - either itself or in combination with other grounds that have a rational and logical prospect of succeeding - would result in the primary court's judgment or order being disturbed.
Disposition
Each ground of appeal must be considered on its merits. There are, however, common features between some grounds which mean that it is convenient to group various grounds together. Running across many of the grounds of appeal is a matter of form that may be noted and put to one side. The appellant states many of the grounds of appeal in the form of a question rather than asserting error. That is a mere infelicity in expression which would not justify this court exercising its jurisdiction under either r 43(2)(f) or r 43(2)(g)(i).
Grounds 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8: alleged errors based on execution of the mortgage
The respondent bank relied on a mortgage of the property dated 29 June 2011. A copy of the original executed mortgage was verified as attachment 'WBC-11' to the affidavit of Quang Xuan Ho affirmed 11 May 2023. Also attached to that affidavit, marked as 'WBC-12', was a copy of the Landgate registered copy of the mortgage - Mortgage L684005 registered on the certificate of title in respect of the property under the Transfer of Land Act. Registration was effected on 19 July 2011.
The mortgage is in a form approved under the Transfer of Land Act. It provides for a mortgage of the fee simple estate in the property by the appellant, as mortgagor, in favour of the respondent, as mortgagee, incorporating the terms of Memorandum of Provisions L380817. The mortgage is duly signed by the appellant before a witness. There is no execution of the mortgage by or on behalf of the respondent. That latter feature of the mortgage provided the basis for grounds 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 and a number of the other grounds of appeal.
For example, by ground 1, the appellant referred to s 130 of the Transfer of Land Act and contended that it 'imposes a requirement' that a mortgage involving a corporation be executed by the corporation by affixing its common seal. The appellant's contention requires consideration of s 130. Section 130 provides:
130Seal of corporation substitute for signature
(1)A corporation for the purpose of transferring or otherwise dealing with any land under the operation of this Act or any lease mortgage or charge may in lieu of signing and obtaining the attestation of the instrument for such purpose required affix thereto its common seal.
(2)The seal of the attorney of any corporation whose chief or head office of business shall be out of Western Australia whether such attorney shall have been already constituted or shall hereafter be constituted by a power of attorney under a seal purporting to be the common seal of the corporation giving the power shall be deemed to be the common seal of such corporation within the meaning and for the purposes of this section.
Section 130(1) is, as the master correctly held, facilitative in nature. It provides a means by which a corporation may deal with any land under the Act or any lease mortgage, mortgage or charge. It is not, however, the exclusive means by which a corporation may do so. Other legal means of execution remain available. For example, pt VI of the Transfer of Land Act, dealing with powers of attorney, will commonly be availed of by corporations for the purpose of transferring or dealing with any land under the Act or any lease mortgage, mortgage or charge. Other legal means of execution will also be available.
In this respect ground 1 is wholly misconceived and does not have a reasonable prospect of succeeding.
In any event, as the master again noted correctly, the appellant's argument based on s 130 of the Transfer of Land Act (and the other statutory provisions) was premised on an assumption that the respondent was required to execute the mortgage. There is no such requirement. Rather, in terms of s 105 of the Transfer of Land Act, the proprietor of land under the Act may mortgage land (s 105(1)(a)). The mortgage must be in an approved form (s 105(2)).[7] The approved mortgage form required that only the mortgagor is to sign the mortgage - there was no requirement for execution by or on behalf of the mortgagee.[8] This is consistent with historical practice - at all material times the Land Titles Registration Practice Manual noted that the Registrar of Title's approved form for a mortgage required 'that only the mortgagor is to sign the mortgage'.[9] Having been signed by the appellant as proprietor of the land, once registered, the mortgage was deemed to have the same efficacy as if under seal and was valid and effectual to all intents and purposes for conferring the mortgage interest created by the instrument: Transfer of Land Act s 85. This too is a complete answer to ground 1. It also answers ground 2.
[7] There are also requirements under reg 3 of the Transfer of Land Regulations 2004 (WA). But these requirements were met. One of those requirements is that the signature of any party to the document is to be in ink. However, for reasons explained in [27] above, the appellant was the only party to the document - and the mortgage did contain the appellant's signature.
[8] There are other requirements in s 105(4) but that sub-section is not presently applicable. See s 105(3)((b)(i) and (ii)).
[9] See eg MR Crane Land Titles Registration Practice in Western Australia (7.02 ed, 2002) [2.6.1].
Ground 5 asserts a similar contention to ground 1 but does so in the context of s 9 and s 10 of the Property Law Act. So too, in making another like argument, ground 6 relies on s 127 of the Corporations Act. It is not necessary to reproduce the further statutory provisions. Like ground 1, neither ground 5 nor ground 6 can succeed where - as here - the mortgage was not executed by the respondent and was not required to be executed by the respondent. In any case, s 127 of the Corporations Act is merely facilitative and s 9 and s 10 of the Property Law Act is concerned with deeds rather than mortgages under the Transfer of Land Act.
Ground 7 is dependent on one or more of grounds 1, 2, 5 or 6. The argument is that: (a) the default powers in Memorandum of Provisions L380817 depend on the legality of the mortgage for their efficacy; and (b) by reason of the respondent's non‑compliance with s 130 of the Transfer of Land Act, s 9 and s 10 of the Property Law Act and s 127 of the Corporations Act the respondent 'vacated and forfeited' its powers of default in relation to the mortgage. There is no need to examine the correctness of the initial proposition - it should, however, be observed that the appellant omits consideration of the effect of the general provisions in div 3 of pt IV of the Transfer of Land Act (see in particular s 106, s 107, s 108, s 110, s 111, s 112, s 113 and s 116). It is enough to say that ground 7 must necessarily fail given the failure of grounds 1, 2, 5 and 6: the non‑execution of the mortgage by the respondent by affixation of its common seal does not mean that the mortgage is invalid or unenforceable.
Ground 8 rolls up and repeats the substance of the contentions advanced by grounds 1, 2, 5 and 6 - it fails for the same reasons as those grounds fail.
None of grounds 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 or 8 has a reasonable prospect of succeeding.
Ground 3: failure to produce original registered mortgage
Ground 3 alleges a miscarriage of justice by the master's alleged failure to consider the respondent's refusal and ability to produce the original registered mortgage. The ground has no reasonable prospect of succeeding. The appellant did not dispute executing the mortgage. The copy of the original mortgage as registered, introduced into evidence through Mr Ho's affidavit affirming its execution and authenticity, was not put in issue. Nothing arose from any refusal or inability on the part of the respondent to produce the original registered mortgage. Ground 3 goes nowhere; it could not, even if upheld, result in the master's orders being disturbed on appeal.
Ground 4: alleged error in stating that mortgage not a deed
Ground 4 contends that the master erred in stating that the mortgage was not a deed within the meaning of s 9 and s 10 of the Property Law Act.
The ground is misconceived. It is true that the master expressed a 'preliminary view' that the mortgage was not a deed [78]. Earlier, however, the master had said that she did not need to consider whether the mortgage was a deed. This was because the requirements of s 9 and s 10 of the Property Law Act had no application to the respondent and did not impose a requirement that the respondent execute the mortgage [77] ‑ [78]. Accordingly, in expressing the preliminary view the master clarified that she was not determining the issue [78].
There was no error in terms of ground 4. The master did not determine the point. Moreover, the point did not inform the master's conclusion. Even if ground 4 was upheld it would not alter the outcome and result in the appeal being upheld. So understood ground 4 does not have a reasonable prospect of succeeding.
Ground 9, 10, 11: the grounds relying on the National Credit Code
Grounds 9, 10 and 11 rely on the National Credit Code either expressly in the terms of the ground or in the written submissions in support of the ground.
Ground 9(a), in alleging a breach of s 53(2) of the National Credit Code, relies on the alleged operation of one or more of s 130 of the Transfer of Land Act, s 9 and s 10 of the Property Law Act or s 127 of the Corporations Act as invalidating the mortgage. In that respect ground 9(a) is dependent on one or more of grounds 1, 2, 5 or 6. As those ground fail so too does ground 9(a).
In any case s 53(2) provides:
A credit provider must not enter into a mortgage that is void or unenforceable, or that includes a provision that is void or unenforceable, because of this Division.
Criminal penalty: 50 penalty units.
The appellant has not sought to explain how the mortgage, or a provision of the mortgage, is void or unenforceable, because of div 1 to pt 3 of the National Credit Code - instead the appellant's argument relies on the specified provisions of the Transfer of Land Act, the Property Law Act and the Corporations Act.
Ground 9(b) alleges that the master failed to consider and determine various of the appellant's arguments in relation to the effect of s 53 of the National Credit Code. Those arguments, as outlined in the appellant's written submissions, are to the effect that the loan agreements provide for the invalidation of any term imposing an obligation prohibited by the National Credit Code. The appellant then says that identified terms of the loan agreements required entry into the mortgage and, as the mortgage was invalid for want of compliance with one or more of s 130 of the Transfer of Land Act, s 9 and s 10 of the Property Law Act or s 127 of the Corporations Act, those terms were invalid meaning that the loan agreements were illegal, void and unenforceable.
We do not accept that the master failed to consider and determine these arguments. They were subsumed within the master's broader rejection of the appellant's case based on s 130 of the Transfer of Land Act, s 9 and s 10 of the Property Law Act and s 127 of the Corporations Act. In any event success in the appeal based on ground 9(b) is again dependent on one or more of grounds 1, 2, 5 or 6 succeeding. As with ground 9(a), as each of grounds 1, 2, 5 and 6 fail, so too does ground 9(b).
Ground 10 is concerned with the master's finding that the appellant had defaulted. The appellant's submissions in support of ground 10 are difficult to understand. The suggestion appears to be that the 2020 variations were new credit contracts entered into in breach of the responsible lending obligations under the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth). Even if this had substance it would not answer the master's unchallenged finding that there was a default under the mortgage. Ground 10 does not allege a material error that could result in the appeal succeeding.
Ground 11 challenges a finding by the master that:
[the respondent] did not provide credit by accepting, drawing, discounting or endorsing a bill of exchange or promissory note [97].
The finding was only relevant to whether the National Credit Code applied by virtue of s 6(7) because the transaction concerned the provision of credit arising out of a bill facility. As the master observed, correctly, the critical question was not whether the National Credit Code applied but whether the appellant had identified a triable issue as to some breach of the National Credit Code which would entitle the appellant to unconditional leave to defend [98]. The master's conclusion, unchallenged by any ground of appeal, was that the appellant had not done so. So understood ground 11 does not allege a material error that could result in the appeal succeeding.
None of grounds 9, 10 or 11 has a reasonable prospect of succeeding.
Ground 12, 13: the assertions that the master lacked jurisdiction
Grounds 12 and 13 assert that the master lacked jurisdiction. Ground 12 is in the context of the appellant's stay application. Ground 13 is in the context of the respondent's summary judgment application. Each ground relies on the alleged invalidity of the mortgage. In that respect, for the reasons already given explaining why grounds 1, 2 5 and 6 must necessarily fail, neither ground 12 nor ground 13 has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. Indeed, even if - contrary to what we have previously found - the mortgage was invalid, it could not be said that the master lacked jurisdiction. A mortgage recovery action in respect of land situated in Western Australia is plainly within the Supreme Court's general jurisdiction under s 16 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA).
Ground 14: the master's reliance on the appellant's acknowledgements in relation to the mortgage and the loan agreements
Ground 14 alleges that: (a) the master erred in fact in stating the appellant's various acknowledgements in 2011; and (b) the master further erred in determining that those acknowledgments should contribute to summary judgment in favour of the respondent.
The acknowledgments referred to were [110]:
1.an acknowledgement that [the respondent] recommended to [the appellant] that she obtain legal advice in respect to the 2011 Loan Agreements and the Mortgage, but she elected not to, signed by [the appellant] and dated 29 June 2011;
2.an acknowledgement that [the respondent] recommended to [the appellant] that she obtain financial advice in respect to the 2011 Loan Agreements and the Mortgage, but she elected not to, signed by [the appellant] and dated 29 June 2011;
3.a mortgagor's certificate that states [the appellant] read all the terms and conditions of the 2011 Loan Agreements and that she understood the nature and effect of the 2011 Loan Agreements and her obligations under them, signed by [the appellant] and dated 29 June 2011; and
4.a cross collateralisation acknowledgement that the 2011 Loan Agreements are covered by the Mortgage signed by [the appellant] and dated 29 June 2011. (citations omitted)
There was no factual error in finding that the appellant made the various acknowledgements. Each acknowledgement is made out by the documentary references noted by the master. The appellant's real complaint appears to be that the acknowledgements ought not to have been relied on in determining that summary judgment should be entered in favour of the respondent against the appellant. However, the master did not reason that the acknowledgments led to the respondent having satisfied its case for summary judgment. The master simply referred to the acknowledgments because counsel for the respondent bank referred the master to those matters [110]. In recounting that aspect of the respondent's argument the master did not erroneously reason that the acknowledgments referred to by the respondent's counsel in argument should contribute to summary judgment in favour of the respondent.
Otherwise the appellant submits that the acknowledgements cannot assist the respondent if the mortgage is invalidated (referring, again, to s 53 of the National Credit Code and inferentially to the statutory provisions relied on in support of grounds 1, 2, 5 and 6). So much may be accepted. But the submission takes the appellant nowhere in establishing appellable error in terms of ground 14.
Ground 14 does not have a reasonable prospect of succeeding.
Ground 15: the history of the appellant's dealings with the respondent bank
What is intended by ground 15 is elusive. The appellant relies on her factual submissions in relation to the history of the respondent's contracts with the appellant over the past 25 years. No error is identified by the ground. Nor is the matter elucidated in the appellant's written submissions in support of ground 15. Ground 15 does not have a reasonable prospect of succeeding.
Conclusion and orders
For these reasons we made orders that:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.Paragraph 1 of the orders of the court made 6 September 2024 is discharged.
Paragraph 1 of the orders of the court made 6 September 2024 was an order suspending enforcement of the order for delivery up of vacant possession of the property pending the hearing and determination of the appeal.
Annexure: the grounds of appeal
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
CG
Associate to the Hon Justice Vaughan
13 DECEMBER 2024
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