ACC v Mental Health Tribunal - [2025] WASCA 79

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION:   ACC -v- MENTAL HEALTH TRIBUNAL [2025] WASCA 79
CORAM:   MITCHELL JA
VAUGHAN JA

HEARD:   23 MAY 2025
DELIVERED          :   23 MAY 2025
PUBLISHED           :   23 MAY 2025
FILE NO/S:   CACV 1 of 2025
BETWEEN:   ACC
Appellant
AND
MENTAL HEALTH TRIBUNAL
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
Coram:   JUDGE H JACKSON, DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Citation: ACC and MENTAL HEALTH TRIBUNAL [2024] WASAT 120
File Number            :   MHA 4 of 2024

Catchwords:

Mental health - Administrative review of involuntary treatment order - Whether inpatient treatment order ceased to have effect when a community treatment order was made - Whether State Administrative Tribunal has power to dismiss a review application, which was validly instituted, in respect of an inpatient treatment order that has ceased to operate since the review application was instituted - Whether a properly instituted review application in the State Administrative Tribunal can be dismissed on the basis that it is frivolous, misconceived or lacking in substance once the decision under review has ceased to have any operative effect

Legislation:

Mental Health Act 2014 (WA), s 21, s 22, s 23, s 24, s 25, s 86, s 87, s 88, s 89, s 90, s 386, s 390, s 395, s 494, s 503, s 504
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27, s 47, s 105

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant	:	In person
Respondent	:	No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant	:	In person
Respondent	:	No appearance

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Farrant v Westpac Banking Corporation [2024] WASCA 157

REASONS OF THE COURT:

At a hearing on 23 May 2025, we made an order dismissing this appeal. We said that we would publish written reasons for making that order later. These are our reasons for making that order.

Background

On 29 June 2024, a person who purported to be a psychiatrist (first psychiatrist) made an inpatient treatment order in relation to the appellant, pursuant to the Mental Health Act 2014 (WA) (MH Act). Pursuant to the terms of that inpatient treatment order, the appellant was held as an involuntary patient in a hospital. The inpatient treatment order was expressed to expire on 20 July 2024. On 19 July 2024, a second psychiatrist determined that the inpatient treatment order should continue until 19 October 2024.
On 22 July 2024, the Mental Health Tribunal (MHT) reviewed and affirmed the inpatient treatment order pursuant to the provisions of the MH Act.
On 7 August 2024, the appellant applied to the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) for a review of the MHT's decision to affirm the inpatient treatment order (review application).
On 9 August 2024, the first psychiatrist made a community treatment order in relation to the appellant. That order recorded the psychiatrist's view, among other things, that:
(a)treatment in the community could reasonably be provided to the appellant;

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2025] WASCA 79
Decision Date: 23 MAY 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal before the court involves the appellant, who is challenging a decision made by the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) regarding her involuntary treatment order. The appellant, self-represented, contends that the SAT erred in dismissing her review application of the inpatient treatment order on the basis that it had ceased to have effect upon the issuance of a community treatment order. The appeal raises two primary issues: the cessation of the inpatient treatment order upon the issuance of the community treatment order, and whether the SAT had the authority to dismiss the review application despite it being validly instituted under the Mental Health Act.

The court was required to determine whether the inpatient treatment order ceased to have effect when the first psychiatrist issued the community treatment order. Additionally, the court needed to decide if Section 47 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act empowered the SAT to dismiss the review application, which was validly instituted under Section 494 of the Mental Health Act, on the basis that the inpatient treatment order had ceased to operate since the review application was instituted. These issues hinge on the interpretation of the Mental Health Act and the interplay between inpatient and community treatment orders.

In evaluating these issues, the court found that the inpatient treatment order indeed ceased to have effect upon the issuance of the community treatment order, a conclusion explicitly supported by Section 88(a) of the Mental Health Act. The court also determined that the SAT did not have the authority to dismiss the review application, as it was validly instituted under the Mental Health Act. The decision underscored that the grounds of appeal did not present a reasonable prospect of success, particularly given the clear statutory provisions that governed the cessation of the inpatient treatment order and the validity of the review application.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that none of the grounds presented a reasonable prospect of success. The inpatient treatment order's cessation upon the issuance of the community treatment order was deemed correct under the Act, and the dismissal of the review application by the SAT was found to be without proper statutory basis. The decision reinforced the importance of statutory interpretation and the limitations on the SAT's powers in the context of mental health review applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 2 January 2025, the appellant commenced the current appeal to this court. As the appeal was commenced out of time, an extension of time is required. The right of appeal is provided for by s 503 of the MH Act in the following relevant terms:(1)In this section -decision or order means a decision or order of the [SAT] in the exercise of its jurisdiction under this Act.(2)A person in respect of whom a decision or order is made who is dissatisfied with the decision or order may appeal, without leave, under [s 105 of the SAT Act] against the decision or order. Under s 504 of the MH Act, the grounds of appeal can include, relevantly, that the SAT made an error of law or of fact or that there is another sufficient reason for hearing an appeal against the decision or order. Therefore, unlike an ordinary appeal to this court under s 105 of the SAT Act, the appellant in this case does not require leave to appeal and the appeal is not confined to questions of law. After some delay, the appellant, who is self‑represented, filed her appellant's case in the appeal on 13 April 2025. The appellant filed an amended appellant's case on 19 May 2025. Leave to amend in those terms was granted at the hearing on 23 May 2025. She appeals against the SAT's decision on six grounds, which, although sometimes inelegantly expressed, in essence raise the following two issues:1.Did the inpatient treatment order made in respect of the appellant cease to have effect when the first psychiatrist made the community treatment order on 9 August 2024?2.Did s 47 of the SAT Act empower the SAT to dismiss the review application, which was validly instituted under s 494 of the MH Act, on the basis that the inpatient treatment order had ceased to operate since the review application was instituted? On 16 April 2025, the acting Court of Appeal registrar issued a notice for the parties to attend on 23 May 2025 for the court to consider whether, relevantly, the appeal should be dismissed on the basis that none of the grounds of appeal has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. The principles governing the exercise of this court's jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal which has no reasonable prospect of succeeding were summarised in Farrant v Westpac Banking Corporation.[7] As we noted in that case, a ground of appeal has a reasonable prospect of succeeding if it has a rational and logical prospect of succeeding and, if upheld, the ground - either itself or in combination with other grounds that have a rational and logical prospect of succeeding - would result in the primary court's judgment or order being disturbed.[7] Farrant v Westpac Banking Corporation [2024] WASCA 157 [17] - [20]. In our view, the SAT was plainly correct to hold that the inpatient treatment order made in relation to the appellant ceased to operate when the first psychiatrist made the community treatment order on 9 August 2024. Deputy President Jackson saw this result as implicit in the terms of the MH Act. However, it is unnecessary to rely on an implication in this case as s 88(a) of the MH Act, properly construed, expressly provided for the inpatient treatment order to cease to operate at that time.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The principles governing the exercise of this court's jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal which has no reasonable prospect of succeeding were summarised in Farrant v Westpac Banking Corporation.[7] As we noted in that case, a ground of appeal has a reasonable prospect of succeeding if it has a rational and logical prospect of succeeding and, if upheld, the ground - either itself or in combination with other grounds that have a rational and logical prospect of succeeding - would result in the primary court's judgment or order being disturbed.[7] Farrant v Westpac Banking Corporation [2024] WASCA 157 [17] - [20]. In our view, the SAT was plainly correct to hold that the inpatient treatment order made in relation to the appellant ceased to operate when the first psychiatrist made the community treatment order on 9 August 2024. Deputy President Jackson saw this result as implicit in the terms of the MH Act. However, it is unnecessary to rely on an implication in this case as s 88(a) of the MH Act, properly construed, expressly provided for the inpatient treatment order to cease to operate at that time. Section 21 of the MH Act provides that an involuntary patient is a person who is under an involuntary treatment order, which is an inpatient treatment order or a community treatment order. Section 4 defines an involuntary inpatient to mean a person who is under an inpatient treatment order. Under s 22(1) of the MH Act, an inpatient treatment order is:an order in force under this Act under which a person can be admitted by a hospital, and detained there, to enable the person to be provided with treatment without informed consent being given to the provision of the treatment. By contrast, under s 23(1) of the MH Act, a community treatment order is:an order in force under this Act under which a person can be provided with treatment in the community without informed consent being given to the provision of the treatment. Under s 24(1) of the MH Act, only a psychiatrist may make an involuntary treatment order. Section 4 of the MH Act defines a 'psychiatrist' to be a medical practitioner who is:(a)a Fellow of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists; or(b)a person, or a person in a class of person, prescribed by the regulations for this definition[.] Under reg 4A(2) of the Mental Health Regulations 2015 (WA), the following classes of person are prescribed for the purposes of the definition of 'psychiatrist' in s 4 of the MH Act:(a)a medical practitioner who holds specialist registration under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Western Australia) in the specialty of psychiatry;(b)a medical practitioner who holds limited registration under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Western Australia) that enables the medical practitioner to practise in the specialty of psychiatry. Before making an inpatient treatment order, the psychiatrist must be satisfied, having regard to the criteria specified in s 25(1), that the person is in need of an inpatient treatment order.[8] One of the criteria specified in s 25(1) is that treatment in the community cannot reasonably be provided to the person.[9] Under s 24(6), an inpatient treatment order must be in force for as brief a period as practicable, be reviewed regularly and be revoked as soon as practicable after the person no longer meets the criteria for the order.[8] See s 24(3) of the MH Act.[9] See s 25(1)(d) of the MH Act.