Ludlow and Legal Practice Board [No 2] - [2025] WASAT 131

JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT 2004 (WA)
CITATION:   LUDLOW and LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD [No 2] [2025] WASAT 131
MEMBER:   PRESIDENT GLANCY
HEARD:   10 NOVEMBER 2025
DELIVERED          :   27 NOVEMBER 2025
FILE NO/S:   VR 47 of 2024
BETWEEN:   JEREMY RICHARD LUDLOW
Applicant
AND
LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD
Respondent

Catchwords:

Application to strike out under s 47 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) - Whether proceedings can be characterised as frivolous, misconceived, or lacking in substance - Application to strike-out granted - Whether proceedings are review proceedings - Where proceedings concern application for review of decision not to grant practising certificate

Legislation:

Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA), s 44(1), s 44(4), s 45(1), s 45(1)(c), s 45(2), s 45(3), s 45(5), s 100, s 100(3)
Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA), s 117(1), s 117(2), s 117(3), s 117(4), s 117(5)
Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Regulations 2022 (WA), reg 37(3)
Legal Profession Uniform Law General Rules 2015 (WA), r 12(2), r 13(1), r 17, r 17(1), r 17(2)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 17, s 27(1), s 27(2), s 29, s 29(1), s 29(3), s 29(5), s 29(9), s 47, s 47(2)

Result:

Proceeding struck out

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	In Person
Respondent	:	Mr S R Pack

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	N/A
Respondent	:	Legal Practice Board of Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

ACC v Mental Health Tribunal [2025] WASCA 79
Carrooda Pty Ltd and City of Gosnells [2021] WASAT 73
Match Group v Metropolitan South West Joint Development Assessment Panel [2014] WASCA 50; (2014) 200 LGERA 227
Middlecoat v Commissioner of Police [2012] WASC 309
Polizzi v Commissioner for Police [2015] WASC 319
Weston v Law Society (NSW) [2013] NSWSC 94

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Background

On 3 December 2023 the Applicant applied to the Legal Practice Board (Board) for the grant of a practising certificate.
On 17 April 2024 the Board refused his application (Decision) and provided the Applicant with reasons for its decision.
On 15 May 2024 the Applicant made an application to the Tribunal for a review of the Board's Decision.
The Applicant has not sought the grant of a practising certificate from the Respondent in the subsequent financial years.
On 8 September 2025 the Board applied to have the review application dismissed pursuant to s 47(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act).[1]
[1] The delay is the result of a combination of factors, including the Applicant being unwell toward the end of 2024, his inability to comply with programming orders including because he was occupied with other proceedings, the Applicant being out of Western Australia at times and the Tribunal being required to deal with another interim application made in the proceeding.

Outcome

For the reasons set out below I have determined that the application to dismiss the review application should be granted pursuant to s 47(2) of the SAT Act.

Documents considered in determining the application

In determining this application, I have had regard to the following material:
(a)Respondent's Interim Application dated 8 September 2025;
(b)Respondent's Submissions in Support of Application to Strike Out Proceedings filed 2 October 2025;
(c)Applicant's Outline of Submissions filed 5 November 2025;
(d)Respondent's Bundle of Documents filed 8 July 2024; and
(e)Oral submissions regarding the application which were heard on 10 November 2025.

Issues

Obviously, the ultimate issue to be determined is whether the review application should be dismissed pursuant to s 47(2) of the SAT Act on the basis that the application is frivolous, misconceived or lacking in substance. But determining that question requires the Tribunal to determine:
1.Whether, in applying for a practising certificate, the application is made in respect of a particular year (or part thereof) or is an application for a certificate to be granted at the date when the Board (or the Tribunal) makes a decision to grant a certificate;
2.Whether, on review, the Tribunal is only determining whether the correct and preferable decision as at the date of the decision on the review is to grant or refuse the certificate for a particular financial year (or part thereof) or whether the Tribunal would be able to grant a certificate which would take effect from the date of the Tribunal's decision upon the review;
3.Whether, if the Tribunal could not grant a practising certificate to the Applicant which would allow him to practice after it is granted, there would nevertheless be some benefit in conducting the review.

Relevant legislation

As can be seen from issues 1 and 2, the Respondent's application is principally one of statutory construction, of the SAT Act as well as the Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA) (Uniform Law), pursuant to which the application for a practising certificate was made, the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA) (Application Act) and the Legal ProfessionUniform General Rules 2015 (WA) (Uniform Rules).

SAT Act

The Tribunal's jurisdiction is conferred by statute - either the SAT Act or a relevant enabling Act, in this case the Uniform Law.
Section 100 of the Uniform Law entitles an applicant for a practising certificate to seek a review of, among other things, 'a decision to grant or refuse to grant or renew the Australian practising certificate'.
A review under s 100 comes within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction: s 17 SAT Act.
Accordingly, the Tribunal's review is conducted as a hearing de novo and is not confined to matters that were before the decision-maker but may involve the consideration of new material whether or not it existed at the time the decision was made: SAT Act s 27(1). The purpose of the review is to produce the correct and preferable decision as at the time of the decision upon the review: SAT Act s 27(2).
The Tribunal's powers on review proceedings are set out in s 29 of the SAT Act. Section 29(1) provides that the Tribunal, when dealing with matters in its review jurisdiction, has functions and discretions corresponding to those exercisable by the decision-maker in making the relevant decision. Pursuant to s 29(3) of the SAT Act the Tribunal may affirm, vary or set aside the decision on review. If it sets aside the decision it may substitute its own decision, send the matter back to the decision-maker for reconsideration in accordance with any directions or recommendations the Tribunal considers appropriate, and in any case may make any orders that it considers appropriate. Section 29(5) of the SAT Act provides that a decision-maker's decision, as affirmed or varied by the Tribunal, or a decision of the Tribunal that substitutes for the decision‑maker's decision:
(a)is to be regarded as, and given effect to as, a decision of the decision-maker; and
(b)unless the enabling Act states otherwise or the Tribunal orders otherwise, is to be regarded as having effect, or having had effect, from the time when the decision reviewed would have, or would have had, effect.
Section 29(9) of the SAT Act provides that, for the avoidance of doubt, it is declared that neither s 29 and s 27 extend to requiring or enabling the Tribunal to deal with a matter that is different in essence from the matter that was before the decision-maker.

Application Act, Uniform Law and Uniform Rules

Section 44(1) of the Uniform Law permits a local regulatory authority (in this case, the Respondent) to, 'on application, grant or renew an Australian practising certificate in respect of a financial year'.
Section 44(4) provides that an application cannot be made in this jurisdiction unless the applicant reasonably intends that this will be his or her principal place of practice during the currency of the certificate or renewal period.
Section 45(1) provides that an application may only be granted if the Respondent is satisfied that the applicant:
(a)is an Australian lawyer;
(b)if required by this law to have professional indemnity insurance ‑ has, or will have on or before the grant or renewal, professional indemnity insurance in accordance with the Uniform Law and the Uniform Rules; and
(c)has indicated in the application that he or she does not hold (and she or he does not have a current application for) another Australian practising certificate that would be in force concurrently with the certificate whose grant or renewal is sought under this section.
Section 45(2) provides that, subject to subsection (4), the decision-maker must not grant or renew a practising certificate if it considers that the applicant is not a fit and proper person to hold the certificate. Section 45(3) provides that in considering the question of whether an applicant is fit and proper, the decision-maker may have regard to the matters specified in the Uniform Rules for the purposes of the section. Those matters are set out in r 13(1) of the Uniform Rules.
Section 117(1) of the Application Act provides that an application for the renewal of an Australian practising certificate under s 44 of the Uniform Law must be made within:
(a)the period prescribed by the local regulations as the standard renewal period; or
(b)the later period prescribed by the local regulations as the late fee period.
Section 117(2) of the Application Act provides that the periods specified for the purposes of s 117(1) must be within the currency of the practising certificate.
Section 117(3) provides that the Board may:
(a)reject an application for renewal made during the late fee period; and
(b)reject an application for renewal that is not made during the standard renewal period or the late fee period unless the application is accepted under subsection (4).
Section 117(4) provides that, despite subsection (1), the Board may accept an application made within 6 months after the end of the late fee period (even after the expiry of the practising certificate to which the application relates) if the Board is satisfied that:
(a)the delay was caused by matters beyond the control of the applicant; or
(b)there are other circumstances warranting acceptance of the application.
Section 117(5) provides that where an application is accepted under s 117(4) after the expiry of the practising certificate to which the application relates, the certificate:
(a)is taken to have continued in force on and from the 1 July immediately following its expiry until the Board renews or refuses to renew the certificate or the applicant withdraws renewal application, unless the certificate is sooner suspended or cancelled; and
(b)if reviewed, is taken to have been renewed on and from that 1 July.
The late fee period ends on 30 June: Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Regulations 2022 (WA), reg 37(3).
Rule 12(2) of the Uniform Rules provides that an application for the grant or renewal of the practising certificate must be accompanied by the fee applicable to the application.
Rule 17(1) of the Uniform Rules provides that a practising certificate is in force:
(a)if granted, from the commencement date specified in it until the end of the following 30 June; or
(b)if renewed, from the date of its renewal until the end of the following 30 June,
unless it is surrendered, cancelled or suspended. Rule 17(2) of the Uniform Rules provides, however, that if an application for the renewal of a practising certificate has been properly made before its expiry but the authority has not determined the application by the following 1 July, the practising certificate is taken to continue in force on and from that 1 July until whichever of the following first occurs:
(a)a decision is made to renew or refuse to renew the certificate; or
(b)the holder withdraws the application for renewal,
unless the certificate is earlier suspended, cancelled or surrendered.
Section 100(3) of the Uniform Law provides, relevantly, that the Tribunal may make any order it considers appropriate on an appeal or review under that section, including an order directing the designated local regulatory authority (in this case the Board) to grant, or to refuse to grant, an application for an Australian practising certificate.

Submissions

Legal Practice Board's/Respondent's submissions

The Respondent accepts that the Tribunal retains jurisdiction to review the decision to refuse to grant to relevant practising certificate notwithstanding the expiry of the 2023/24 financial year.
However, it urges the Tribunal not to exercise its jurisdiction and instead to dismiss the application under s 47 of the SAT Act because:
(a)the application was only for a certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year;
(b)the Tribunal is thus limited to dealing with an application and decision in respect of the grant of a practising certificate for that year; and
(c)consequently, any decision about that will have no operative effect,
such that the proceeding is now frivolous, misconceived or lacking in substance.
The Respondent submits that the Tribunal, on the review proceeding, is limited to dealing with an application and decision in respect of the grant of a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year.
It submits that although it is open to the Tribunal to substitute the decision-maker's decision with a decision granting the Applicant a practising certificate with effect from 4 April 2024 (the date of the decision‑maker's decision), it should not do so because it will have no practical or operative effect for the following reasons:
1.there is no suggestion that the Applicant engaged in legal practice or held himself out as being entitled to engage in legal practice such that a retrospective grant might absolve him of liability for doing so;
2.the 2024/2025 financial year has also passed such that the grant of a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 year would not now allow the Applicant to seek a renewal of a practising certificate; and
3.a decision of the Tribunal based on material which was different from that which was before the decision-maker at the time of its decision would not facilitate any redress which the Applicant may wish to pursue in respect of the Respondent's decision. In making that submission the Respondent relies upon [32] of the Court of Appeal's decision in ACC v Mental Health Tribunal [2025] WASCA 79.
The Respondent accepts that if the Tribunal's decision could have been made within the six months after 30 June 2024, it would have had utility despite the expiry of the period for which the certificate would have been current, because a finding that the certificate ought to have been granted would have allowed the Applicant to apply for a renewal under s 117(4) of the Application Act.
The Respondent says that the Applicant is not left without a remedy because it is open to him to apply for the grant of a practising certificate in the current financial year and seek to have any refusal (should the decision be a refusal) reviewed in a timely fashion in the Tribunal.
The Respondent says that the Tribunal should adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in ACC v Mental Health Tribunal.
The Respondent submits that the Tribunal should not expend its limited resources, or those of the Respondent itself, on conducting a review where no practical result could flow from its success.

Applicant's submissions

The Applicant submits that the application he made on 3 December 2023 was, 'on its proper construction ... at least in essence', an application for a practising certificate which would be valid for the period from the date on which it was granted until the end of the financial year in which it was granted and was not an application for a practising certificate for the 2023/24 financial year.
The Applicant submits that must be the proper construction of his application because an application for a certificate that would expire prior to the date on which he received it would be of no benefit to him.
The Applicant says the form in which he made his application for the practising certificate cannot be relevant to determining the issue because he had no hand in the creation of the standard form which is, from his perspective, a 'form of adhesion'.
The Applicant says the Tribunal has the power to make an order that the correct and preferable decision on the review is to grant him a practising certificate from the date of its decision. When that certificate will end is not then a function of the decision but a consequence of the operation of r 17 of the Uniform Rules.
The Applicant also submits that the Tribunal is unable to deal with a matter which is different in essence from that which was considered by the decision-maker. He says that deciding whether to grant or refuse an application for the grant of a practising certificate for the 2023/24 financial year would be 'different in essence' from his actual application, which was simply for the grant of a practising certificate which would allow him to practise for a period of time after the decision to grant it.
The Applicant also submits that the decision will affect his legal rights in three distinct respects. He identifies those three ways as follows:
1.he has had no certificate at any time since the decision was made;
2.he has had no certificate valid as of May 2024 that he could apply to renew for the year 2024/25 and, therefore, also had no certificate as of May 2025 that he could apply to renew for the year 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026; and
3.if he were to make a fresh application for a certificate, the Respondent would refuse to grant him a certificate on at least essentially the same basis on which it has already decided to refuse to grant him a certificate in the decision the subject of the application for review.
He says, therefore, that his case is different from those relied upon by the Respondent and that there is therefore utility in the Tribunal hearing and determining the review application.

Resolution

I do not accept the Applicant's construction of his application or of what the Tribunal might be able to order on the review if he is successful.
First, his statement that he applied simply for the grant of a certificate that would allow him to practise from the time it was granted until its expiry in accordance with r 17, is not consistent with the application he made which, in its opening words, states:
I, [redacted], apply for a local practising certificate to take effect from Monday 4 December 2023 for the year ending 30 June 2024.
Although the Applicant says he had no say in the framing of his application because he did not have any input into the creation of the application form, he accepted in his oral submissions that he filled in the date of the commencement and cessation of the practising certificate which he sought to have granted in a free text box on the online application form.
Second, it is not consistent with the scheme of the relevant legislation.
Section 44(1) of the Uniform Law together with r 17(1) of the Uniform Rules only permits a practising certificate to be granted in respect of a financial year. Section 44(5) requires that the applicant must intend that, in the relevant financial year, Western Australia will be their principal place of practice. If required, they must also have professional indemnity insurance in place on or before the date of the grant of the certificate. Further, s 45(1)(c) requires the applicant to identify whether they hold, or have applied for, another practising certificate which would be concurrent with the certificate whose grant or renewal is sought. Those matters support the conclusion that the decision-maker can only decide to grant or refuse a practising certificate for the particular financial year concerned. A grant is not open ended and is not limited in time only because of the operation of r 17(1). The Applicant's submission to the contrary is not a correct reading of the relevant provisions. The Respondent is not, in my view, empowered to decide to grant a practising certificate which would be for a financial year other than that applied for in the initial application.

In my view, an application made under s 44 of the Uniform Law can only be for the grant or renewal of a practising certificate which has effect for the relevant financial year irrespective of the subjective intention of an applicant.
In Weston v Law Society (NSW) [2013] NSWSC 94 (Weston), the plaintiff commenced proceedings by summons dated 6 December 2012 in which they sought:
a.an order for the reinstatement of their suspended practising certificate;
b.a declaration that they were a fit and proper person; and
c.damages for past and future economic loss.
The plaintiff's practising certificate had been suspended on 24 October 2010.
On 11 March 2011 the plaintiff had applied to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, Legal Services Division, for orders reinstating the practising certificate and a declaration that they were a fit and proper person to hold the certificate and on 9 June 2011 the Tribunal had dismissed the application for two reasons, one of which was that the application was futile because the year relevant to the practising certificate was at an end. On 13 January 2012 the Court made orders by consent dismissing the plaintiff's application for declarations that they were not a disqualified person and that they have the right to apply for an unrestricted practising certificate upon the basis that they were a fit and proper person to be granted one.
On 3 August 2012 the plaintiff in that case lodged an application for a practising certificate for 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013 which was refused on the basis that he had failed to provide information going to issues including that he was a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.
The plaintiff did not seek a review in the Tribunal and instead filed the Supreme Court proceedings.
In determining as a preliminary issue whether the proceeding should be struck out, Davies J held that the relief for the reinstatement of the suspended practising certificate was misconceived because the practising certificate, which had been suspended in 2010, could not be reinstated given the year in which it would have been valid had been concluded.[2] His Honour stated at [37]:
However, if what the Plaintiff was really intending to achieve was the issue of a practising certificate for the current year, the only way this could be achieved would be to apply for the review available from the Law Society's refusal to grant him a practising certificate on 20 September 2012.
[2] Weston [36].
In my view, while that case concerned the suspension of a practising certificate, and a different statutory regime, the common feature, being the view that a practising certificate is granted for a particular year, means that the view of the value of the reinstatement of a certificate that will (by the time any order is made) be expired, provides a useful comparison in this case.
The Applicant's reliance upon s 29(9) of the SAT Act to say that the Tribunal can, on the review, deal with a matter which is 'in essence' the same as his application, which he says is simply an application for a practising certificate that would allow him to practise when it is granted, is misconceived. Section 29(9) of the SAT Act declares that the Tribunal is not required on a review to deal with a matter which is different in essence from the matter that was before the original decision-maker. What that subsection contemplates is that, in circumstances where, after a decision-maker has refused an application of some kind and the aggrieved applicant for review has amended a proposal, to effectively convert it into a new proposal, the applicant must start again, whereas, if the proposed changes are inconsequential or minor then the proposal remains in substance the same and can be reviewed by the Tribunal.[3]
[3] The issue arises most obviously in planning matters. See for example Match Group v Metropolitan South West Joint Development Assessment Panel [2014] WASCA 50; (2014) 200 LGERA 227 at [18] and Carrooda Pty Ltd and City of Gosnells [2021] WASAT 73 [14] - [17]. Dr Willey in his text Planning and Environmental Law in Western Australia (2021) at [12.130] explains that this policy exists for procedural and practical reasons. Procedurally, it would be unfair not to give the original decision-maker the chance to assess, consult and obtain referral comments about a new proposal. Practically, the Tribunal is itself unable to undertake advertising or referral processes either.
At best, on the review the Tribunal can only set aside the decision of the Respondent and determine that the correct and preferable decision as at the time of the decision on review is that the Applicant should be granted a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year.
If the decision on the review was made before the end of the extended late fee period under s 117(4) (i.e., before 31 December 2024) it would have been open to the Applicant to apply to review his practising certificate for the 2024/2025 financial year, and for the Respondent to consider it. Up until 31 December 2024, therefore, there would still have been utility in a review proceeding in the Tribunal, as the Respondent accepts, because if granted then the Applicant may have been entitled to apply to renew that certificate. However, that time within which a renewal application could have been made has also passed, and we are now in the 2025/2026 financial year. A practising certificate for the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024, even if granted by the Tribunal on the review, will never allow the Applicant to practise. In that sense even a positive decision for the Applicant would be, as submitted by the Respondent, one with no purpose.
In ACC v Mental Health Tribunal the Court of Appeal was concerned with whether the Tribunal had erred in striking out an application for a review of a decision made by the Mental Health Tribunal on the basis that it was frivolous, misconceived or lacking in substance in circumstances where the inpatient treatment order which was the subject of the review had expired after the commencement proceedings for the review of the order in the State Administrative Tribunal. At [33] and [34] of the judgment the Court of Appeal said:
33Once the decision under review has ceased to have any operative effect, the proceedings for review of that decision are properly described as frivolous, misconceived or lacking in substance within the meaning of s 47(1)(a) of the SAT Act …
34Nothing in the text, context or purpose of this provision limits the exercise of the power to a proceeding which was frivolous, misconceived or lacking in substance when it was instituted. There is no proper basis for construing the SAT Act as denying the availability of the power conferred by s 47 where, due to a change in the relevant law or a change in circumstances, a review application which was properly instituted has become frivolous, misconceived or lacking in substance. Parliament cannot have objectively intended to confine the SAT's power to dismiss a proceeding that is frivolous, misconceived or lacking in substance to a proceeding that could be characterised in that way when it was instituted. There is no proper basis for construing the SAT Act as requiring the SAT to continue an exercise which has become pointless.
That case is authority for the proposition that the power in s 47(2) of the SAT Act can be exercised when an application which was not pointless when it was commenced, subsequently becomes pointless.
In Middlecoat v Commissioner of Police [2012] WASC 309 (Middelcoat) the Tribunal had affirmed a decision to revoke a firearms licence. In dealing with an appeal from that decision, Hall J (as his Honour then was) held that an appeal from that decision was pointless because, had the licence not been revoked, it would have expired and the 12 month period within which an application for renewal could be made had passed. At [38] his Honour said:
The effect of this is that any proceedings undertaken by the appellant had to be completed and result in a favourable decision within the 12 month period from expiry of the licence. If that was not achieved the proceedings would become redundant. The appellant suggested that this was an unfair result because it put him in a situation where he would be at the mercy of delays that may occur in the SAT and in the courts. I accept that that is so, but it does not justify coming to a conclusion which would be contrary to the clear terms of the Firearms Act and the SAT Act.
In that case the appeal was dismissed because his Honour concluded that no practical result could flow from its success.
In the present case, although the review may have resulted in the grant of a practising certificate which would have operated for some period of time in 2023/2024 had the review been completed in time, or alternatively may have allowed the applicant to apply for a renewal under s 117(4) and s 117(5) of the Application Act had the review been completed within the time relevant to those sections, given that neither of those things are possible now, the review application would be liable to be struck out under s 47 of the SAT Act as frivolous, misconceived or lacking in substance if there is no other reason to conduct the review.
In Polizzi v Commissioner for Police [2015] WASC 319 (Polizzi) Corboy J reached a different conclusion. That decision concerned an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal on a review from a decision to revoke a firearms licence under s 9A(7) of the Firearms Act 1973 (WA) (Firearms Act). The respondent had sought to have determined as a preliminary issue whether leave to appeal ought to be granted in circumstances, where, relying on Middlecoat, it submitted that there was no utility in the appeal because the licence could not be renewed even if the appeal was allowed because of the time limits imposed by the Firearms Act for renewing a license. Unlike Hall J, his Honour found that an appeal might have utility for reasons which were not raised in Middlecoat. In that case Corboy J found, without deciding the issue, that an appeal which resulted in the Tribunal's decision being set aside might have some practical effect. First, it might remove an impediment to any subsequent application for a firearms licence and secondly, setting aside the decision might 'neutralise any adverse consequences' that might flow generally from a finding that the respondent was not a fit and proper person to hold such a licence.[4] His Honour concluded by saying:[5]
26… It might also be said that the appellant has a wider 'reputational' interest in exposing any error of law by the Tribunal in finding that he was not a fit and proper person to hold firearms licence.
27In my view, it cannot be said that there is 'no prospect that allowing "the error to go uncorrected would impose substantial injustice" ' …
28Accordingly, I do not consider that the appeal necessarily lacks utility merely because the time for applying to renew the license has passed. …
[4] Polizzi [25] - [26].
[5] Polizzi [26].
In Middlecoat the finding was that there was no utility in conducting a review. In my view, the language in s 47(1) of the SAT Act that something must be 'frivolous, misconceived or lacking in substance' allows for the possibility that even something with limited utility can nevertheless, on the facts of the case, properly be regarded as frivolous and/or lacking in substance.
The Applicant says that a review will benefit him because it will find that he was a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate and that any future applications would not then be able to be refused by the Respondent if he continues to behave in the manner which resulted in the finding that he was not fit and proper. That is, that it would neutralise the Respondent's original adverse finding that he was not fit to hold a practising certificate.
In my view, there is limited utility to any such finding in this particular case where the decision would only be concerned with conduct of the Applicant that preceded the date of the decision which is to be reviewed. That is because, in this case the Board, in its disciplinary action which it has brought against the Applicant, has made allegations about other conduct to which it will have regard in determining any future application for a practising certificate which the Applicant might make and which would not be relevant to determining whether the Applicant ought to have been granted a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year.
Determining a review with so little utility, without some other reasons for doing so, would not be an efficient use of the Tribunal's resources or those of the parties.
During the oral hearing on 10 November 2025, the Applicant asserted that I could find that the finding that he was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year may impede his ability to obtain employment as a company director or in disciplines in which those who held practising certificates might otherwise work. The Applicant did not lead any evidence about any attempts to obtain employment which were in fact impeded as a result of that finding. Nor did he give evidence that he was aware that he would be asked about whether any such finding had been made against him should he apply for certain kinds of work. Nor did he adduce any evidence that he would be ineligible for certain work as a result of having been found not to be a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate in the 2023/2024 financial year. In the absence of such evidence, it is difficult to place much weight on that assertion.
In the circumstances of this case, while I accept that there may be some reputational benefit to the Applicant in a successful review, I have come to the conclusion that because:
(a)the Applicant's conception of what can be achieved for him on the review is misconceived;
(b)the benefit to the Applicant of a finding that he was entitled to a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year is so marginal; and
(c)the issues of which he complains are capable of being resolved in a future application,
the application can properly be characterised as frivolous, misconceived and lacking in substance and should be struck out pursuant to s 47 of the SAT Act.
As a final matter, as the Respondent acknowledges, it is regrettable that it took so long before the application to strike out the proceeding under s 47 of the SAT Act was brought by the Respondent. But this matter has an unusual history and the time for which it has been unresolved in the Tribunal has been contributed to by all parties.

Orders

I will make the following order:
1.Pursuant to s 47(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) the application for review is struck out on the basis that it is frivolous, misconceived and lacking in substance.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
HJ
Associate to the Hon Justice Glancy
27 NOVEMBER 2025