JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL
CITATION: NARRIER -v- DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS [2024] WASC 480
CORAM: MCGRATH J
HEARD: 8 NOVEMBER 2024
DELIVERED : 17 DECEMBER 2024
FILE NO/S: SJA 1043 of 2024
BETWEEN: CANDICE LEE NARRIER
Appellant
AND
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Respondent
FILE NO/S: SJA 1044 of 2024
BETWEEN: CANDICE LEE NARRIER
Appellant
AND
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
For File No: SJA 1043 of 2024
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: MAGISTRATE S M DE MAIO
File Number : JO 2716-2719/2022, JO 5678-5679/2022, JO 6172-6173/2022, PE 23003-23007/22, PE 23009-23012/2022, PE 24035-24039/2022, PE 24041-24043/2022, PE 30648-30656, PE 37257-37270/2022, PE 41282-41287/2022, PE 58383/2022, PE 58385/2022, PE 1825-1833/2023, PE 42580-42588/2023
For File No: SJA 1044 of 2024
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: MAGISTRATE S M DE MAIO
File Number : JO 2716-2719/2022, JO 5678-5679/2022, JO 6172-6173/2022, PE 23003-23007/22, PE 23009-23012/2022, PE 24035-24039/2022, PE 24041-24043/2022, PE 30648-30656, PE 37257-37270/2022, PE 41282-41287/2022
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Stealing from the person of another - Breach of conditional suspended imprisonment - Whether imprisonment open for the offence - Proper construction of s 426(4) of Criminal Code (WA)
Legislation:
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA)
Criminal Code (WA)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA)
Result:
SJA 1044 of 2024
Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Terms of imprisonment of 8 months conditionally suspended imposed on charges JO 2716-2719/2022 by Magistrate De Maio set aside and terms of imprisonment of 2 months conditionally suspended imposed on charges JO 2716-2719/2022 in lieu thereof
SJA 1043 of 2024
Leave to appeal not granted on grounds 1, 2, 3 and 4
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
SJA 1043 of 2024
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Ms S H King |
| Respondent | : | Ms M L Wong |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Legal Aid (WA) |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
SJA 1044 of 2024
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Ms S H King |
| Respondent | : | Ms M L Wong |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Legal Aid (WA) |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v National Competition Council (2007) 162 FCR 234
Borsa v The Queen [2003] WASCA 254
Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Cavanough (1935) 53 CLR 220
Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Peters [2010] WASC 139
Dreja v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 151
Dukes v Barrett [2001] WASCA 338
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd & Ors v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR [135]; [2007] HCA 22
Fripp v Carter [2012] WASC 288
Gett v Tabet [2009] NSWCA 76; (2009) 254 ALR 504
Gibson v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 141
Gillespie v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 216
Hancock v Prison Commissioners [1960] 1 QB 117
Kuhnert v Fyneman [2015] WASC 257
Liberti v The Queen (1991) 55 A Crim R 120
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- Case
- [2024] WASC 480
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether the term "an offence under s 378" in section 426(4) of the Criminal Code included offences under s 378 irrespective of the circumstances of aggravation, or whether it only referred to those offences with specific aggravating features that warranted a higher penalty. This interpretation was crucial as it would determine if imprisonment was an open option for the offence in question. The court considered the ambiguity in the statutory language and whether there was a plain reading that could resolve the issue.
The Court of Appeal found that there was ambiguity in the statutory language regarding the meaning of "an offence under s 378" when considering the different penalties applicable under section 378 depending on the circumstances of aggravation. The court acknowledged the reasoning in Dukes v Barrett but did not find it plainly wrong. It was held that while the Parliament might have intended to remove the penalty of imprisonment for smaller thefts, there was no clear evidence from the Second Reading Speeches or Explanatory Memoranda to support this interpretation. Consequently, the court upheld the lower court's decision that the ambiguity necessitated a narrow interpretation that preserved the distinction in penalties as outlined in section 426(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code.
The Court of Appeal confirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant, maintaining that the proper construction of section 426(4) did not include offences under s 378 irrespective of the circumstances of aggravation. The appeal was thus dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Narrier was found guilty of stealing from the person of another and breaching a conditional suspended imprisonment. The trial court had determined that imprisonment was an option for the offence, regardless of the value of the stolen property. Narrier's appeal focused on the interpretation of section 426(4) of the Criminal Code (WA), challenging the trial court's decision to impose imprisonment. The ambiguity in the statute regarding the meaning of 'an offence under s 378', particularly in relation to varying penalties for different circumstances of aggravation, is central to the appeal. This ambiguity arises because section 426(1) distinguishes between offences under section 378 based on different maximum penalties, contingent on whether specific aggravating circumstances apply.
The matter first came before the Magistrates Court of Western Australia, where Narrier was convicted of stealing from the person of another and breaching a conditional suspended imprisonment. Following the conviction, Narrier appealed to the Court of Appeal of Western Australia, challenging the trial court's interpretation of section 426(4) of the Criminal Code (WA). The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether the trial court had correctly interpreted the statute in imposing imprisonment for the offence. This appeal involved a review of the trial court's decision and the statutory interpretation of section 426(4), with a focus on the applicability of imprisonment when the value of the stolen property did not exceed $1,000.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether section 426(4) of the Criminal Code (WA) allows for imprisonment for an offence of stealing from the person of another when the value of the stolen property does not exceed $1,000.
2. What is the proper construction of the phrase 'an offence under s 378' in section 426(4) of the Criminal Code (WA), particularly in relation to varying penalties for different circumstances of aggravation.
Held
1. The court concluded that section 426(4) of the Criminal Code (WA) does not allow for imprisonment for an offence of stealing from the person of another when the value of the stolen property does not exceed $1,000.
2. The court held that the proper construction of the phrase 'an offence under s 378' in section 426(4) of the Criminal Code (WA) means that it refers to any offence under section 378, irrespective of any aggravating features, and that the distinction in penalties should not apply if the value of the property did not exceed $1,000.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In SSZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs,[53] Weinberg J, with whom Allsop J agreed in his reasons,[54] stated that the word 'plainly' does more than simply add emphasis; it suggests that the error must be manifest or, if it does not rise to that level, is at least capable of being easily demonstrated. His Honour said that '[i]n a sense, the error must be so clear as to enable a later court to say that the point is not reasonably arguable'.[55][53] SSZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 2; (2006) 150 FCR 214. [54] SSZEEU [187] - [193].[55] SSZEEU [148]. In Gett v Tabet,[56] Allsop J, Beazley and Basten JJA observed that on a number of occasions the expressions 'plainly' or 'clearly' wrong have been used, and stated that those adverbs do not limit the circumstances of departure to those in which error is patent or obvious or easily perceived; rather they bespeak the quality of the error or the level of conviction of error that must be perceived. Their Honours said that in order for an intermediate appellate court to depart from a previous decision, the later court must have a strong conviction that the earlier judgment was erroneous, not merely that the earlier court exercised an approach which was open to it but was no longer to be preferred, and the nature of the error can be clearly demonstrated.[57] [56] Gett v Tabet [2009] NSWCA 76; (2009) 254 ALR 504.[57] Gett v Tabet [294] - [295]. I do not consider that the reasoning of Hasluck J in Dukes v Barrett is plainly wrong. The appellant's position that there is no ambiguity on the plain reading of the text, and therefore Dukes v Barrett should not be followed, is not accepted. There is clearly ambiguity in s 426(4) of the Criminal Code in relation to the meaning of the words 'an offence under s 378', in circumstances where there is, strictly speaking, only one offence under s 378 but different penalties that apply in the circumstances of aggravation (punishment in special circumstances) described in s 378(1) to (9). The ambiguity arises because s 426(1) draws a distinction between 'an offence under s 378' which depends upon the application of different maximum penalties, depending upon whether particular circumstances of aggravation apply. As Hasluck J held, to construe s 426(4) as applying to any offence under s 378, irrespective of any aggravating features, would undermine the maintenance of the distinction as to the penalties otherwise maintained by s 426(1) and (2). On the other hand, however, it may be that the Parliament intended that the distinction should not apply if the value of the property did not exceed $1,000. The policy rationale for such an approach would clearly be to remove the penalty of imprisonment for the offence when smaller amounts of value are involved. Unfortunately, there is nothing in the Second Reading Speeches or Explanatory Memoranda in relation to s 426 as it stood at the time of Dukes v Barrett, or in amendments to that section since then, which provides guidance as to the proper construction of the section.