SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
[2006] FCAFC 2
•24 FEBRUARY 2006
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 2
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – circumstances in which a later Full Court can depart from an earlier Full Court decision – stare decisis – determining ratio decidendi – application of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al Shamry (2001) 110 FCR 27
MIGRATION – the application of s 424A(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – meaning of 'application', 'information', and 'reason, or part of the reason' in s 424A
WORDS AND PHRASES- 'information … that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application', 'information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review', 'application', 'plainly wrong'
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 424A(1)(a), 424A(3)(b)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B(1)
Antoun v The Queen [2006] HCA 2 referred to
Attorney-General for NSW v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1952) 85 CLR 237 referred to
Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Limited (1993) 177 CLR 485 referred to
Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1 referred to
Bennett & Wood v Orange City Council [1967] 1 NSWR 502 referred to
Bridges v Bridges (1945) 45 SR (NSW) 64 referred to
Chamberlain v The Queen (1983) 72 FLR 1 followed
Dagli v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 541 referred to
Davis v Johnson [1979] AC 264 referred to
John v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 166 CLR 417 cited
Lu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 141 FCR 346 referred to
Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd [1976] AC 443 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al Shamry (2001) 110 FCR 27 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZAYW [2005] FCAFC 154 referred to
MZWPKv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1256 disapproved
NAIH of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 223 discussed and explained
NAZY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 744 discussed
Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245 referred to
Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396 discussed and not followed in part
Pretoria City Council v Levison 1949 (3) SA 305 referred to
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 referred to
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 referred to
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 215 ALR 162 applied
Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 referred to
SZECF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1200 discussed and applied
SZEFM v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 78 referred to
SZEKY v Ministerfor Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1138 disapproved
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595 referred to
Tin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1109 referred to
Transurban City Link v Allan (1999) 95 FCR 553 followed
VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471 discussed not followed in part
Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 referred to
Wu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 105 FCR 39 referred to
Young v Bristol Aeroplane Company, Limited [1944] 1 KB 718 referred to
Zecevic v Direction of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) (1987) 162 CLR 645 referred to
R Cross and JW Harris, Precedent in English Law (4th ed, 1991)
AL Goodhardt "Precedent in English and Continental Law" (1934) Law Quarterly Review 40
G Williams, Learning the Law (1982, 11th ed)
J Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings (1964)
Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234
The Complete Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed, 1991)
SZEEU v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD 521 of 2005
SZEEZ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD 556 of 2005
SZDXA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD 1067 of 2005
SZEOP v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD 858 of 2005
SZBMI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD 1353 of 2005
MOORE, WEINBERG AND ALLSOP JJ
24 FEBRUARY 2006
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 521 of 2005
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SZEEU
APPELLANT
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
MOORE, WEINBERG AND ALLSOP JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
24 FEBRUARY 2006
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Leave be granted to the appellant to file an amended notice of appeal in the form filed pursuant to orders made on 21 September 2005 and said document stand as the notice of appeal.
The Refugee Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) be joined as a party to the appeal.
The appeal be allowed.
The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 16 March 2005 be set aside, and in lieu thereof, the Court orders that:
(a)The Tribunal be joined as a party to the application.
(b)There be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Tribunal made on 25 June 2004 and handed down on 20 July 2004.
(c)There be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to review according to law the decision of the delegate of the Minister to refuse a protection visa sought by the applicant.
(d)The first respondent pay the costs of the applicant before the Federal Magistrates Court.
The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 556 of 2005
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SZEEZ
APPELLANT
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
MOORE, WEINBERG AND ALLSOP JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
24 FEBRUARY 2006
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Subject to the conditions in (a) and (b), leave be granted to the appellant to file an amended notice of appeal in the form filed pursuant to orders made on 21 September 2005 and said document stand as the notice of appeal:
(a)leave be granted to the first respondent to tender the appellant’s passport, which tender is received, and
(b)ground 1(iv) in the amended notice of appeal be limited by the contents of paragraph 20 of the submissions filed on behalf of the appellant on 19 October 2005.
The Refugee Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) be joined as a party to the appeal.
The appeal be allowed.
The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 23 March 2005 be set aside, and in lieu thereof the Court orders that:
(a) The Tribunal be joined as a party to the application.
(b) There be a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Tribunal made on 28 June 2004 and handed down on 22 July 2004.
(c) There be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to review according to law the decision of the delegate of the Minister to refuse the protection visa sought by the applicant.
(d) The first respondent pay the costs of the applicant before the Federal Magistrates Court.
The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1067 of 2005
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SZDXA
APPELLANT
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
MOORE, WEINBERG AND ALLSOP JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
24 FEBRUARY 2006
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
With the exception referred to in order 2, leave be granted to file the proposed amended notice of appeal in the form filed pursuant to orders made on 21 September 2005 and said document stand as the notice of appeal.
The leave in order 1 is refused in respect of ground 1(iv) of the amended notice of appeal to the extent that ground 1(iv) supports a complaint about an alleged lack of procedural fairness before the Refugee Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”).
The Tribunal be joined as a party to the appeal.
The appeal be allowed.
The orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 9 June 2005 be set aside and in lieu thereof the Court orders that:
(a)The Tribunal be joined as a party to the application.
(b)There be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Tribunal made on 5 May 2004 and handed down on 27 May 2004.
(c)There be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to review according to law the decision of the delegate of the Minister to refuse a protection visa sought by the applicant.
(d)The first respondent pay the costs of the applicant before the Federal Magistrates Court.
The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 858 of 2005
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SZEOP
APPELLANT
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
MOORE, WEINBERG AND ALLSOP JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
24 FEBRUARY 2006
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Leave be granted to the appellant to file an amended notice of appeal in the form filed pursuant to orders made on 21 September 2005 and said document stand as the notice of appeal.
The Refugee Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) be joined as a party to the appeal.
The appeal be allowed.
The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 29 April 2005 be set aside, and in lieu thereof the Court orders that:
(a)The Tribunal be joined as a party to the application.
(b)There be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Tribunal made on 24 September 2004.
(c)There be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to review according to law the decision of the delegate of the Minister to refuse the protection visa sought by the applicant.
(d)The first respondent pay the costs of the applicant before the Federal Magistrates Court.
The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1353 of 2005
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SZBMI
APPELLANT
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
MOORE, WEINBERG AND ALLSOP JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
24 FEBRUARY 2006
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The appeal be allowed.
Orders 2 and 3 made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 19 July 2005 be set aside, and in lieu thereof the Court orders that:
(a)There be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) made on 30 July 2003 and handed down on 26 August 2003.
(b)There be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to review according to law the decision of the delegate of the Minister to refuse the protection visa sought by the applicant.
(c)The first respondent pay the costs of the applicant before the Federal Magistrates Court.
The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 521 of 2005
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SZEEU
APPELLANT
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT
NSD 556 of 2005
BETWEEN:
SZEEZ
APPELLANT
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT
NSD 1067 of 2005
BETWEEN:
SZDXA
APPELLANT
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT
NSD 858 of 2005
BETWEEN:
SZEOP
APPELLANT
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT
NSD 1353 of 2005
BETWEEN:
SZBMI
APPELLANT
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
MOORE, WEINBERG AND ALLSOP JJ
DATE:
24 FEBRUARY 2006
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Moore j
1 This judgment deals with five appeals raising similar legal issues and their application to the facts of each appeal. The legal issues concern the operation of s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") having regard to the judgment of the Full Court of this Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al Shamry (2001) 110 FCR 27 ("Al Shamry") and the later judgment of the High Court in SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 215 ALR 162 ("SAAP").
2 It is convenient to deal first with the legal questions raised by the appeals before considering the facts of each appeal. On the legal questions, the submissions of the parties were wide ranging and detailed. Ultimately, however, the central issue in each appeal is what is the ratio of Al Shamry concerning the scope of s 424A. Further, if the ratio operates in the appellant's favour, should the Court accept the invitation of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs ("the Minister") not to follow Al Shamry because it is plainly wrong. If the Minister's invitation is declined, it is necessary to ascertain how s 424A operates on the facts in each of the appeals.
3 Section 424A of the Act provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (3), the Tribunal must:
(a)give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and
(b)ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review; and
(c)invite the applicant to comment on it.
(2)…
(3)This section does not apply to information:
(a)that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or
(b)that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application; or
(c)that is non-disclosable information.
Relevantly, the obligation of the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") arising under s 424A(1) to provide particulars of information does not, by virtue of s 424A(3)(b), apply to information given by the applicant for the purpose of the application.
4 The operation of s 424A arose for consideration in Al Shamry in the following circumstances, as described by Ryan and Conti JJ in their joint judgment ("the joint judgment"). That case was an appeal by the Minister from a judgment of Madgwick J. The respondent to the appeal had applied for a protection visa. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the visa, and the Tribunal affirmed that decision. The respondent arrived in Australia at Sydney Airport on 14 June 1999. He was immediately detained and interviewed by an officer of the Minister and a purported record of the interview was made ("the airport interview"). The respondent filed an application for a protection visa on 23 June 1999, which was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 21 July 1999. After lodging an application for review of the delegate's decision, the respondent attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 24 August 1999. Madgwick J noted that, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Tribunal member had thanked the respondent for having been an "honest witness". The existence and relevance of the airport interview was not raised with the respondent at or before the hearing before the Tribunal. However, what had been said by the respondent in the airport interview was ultimately used by the Tribunal, in its reasons for decision, to impugn the credibility of the respondent (as was one other piece of information, a Red Cross certificate, but that is not relevant in these appeals).
5 In their joint judgment, Ryan and Conti JJ identified, relevantly to these appeals, the issue for determination in the following terms (at [17]):
Counsel for the Minister accepted that a failure to observe the procedure laid down by s 424A is a reviewable error under s 476(1)(a). It was also accepted that where there is information of the kind described in s 424A(1)(a) particulars of that information must be given to the applicant for the purpose of obtaining his or her comments. However, it was said that the information constituted by the airport interview came within the exception created by s 424A(3)(b) in respect of information given by the applicant for the purpose of the application. “Application” in that context, was said to mean “all information given by the applicant to officials in the Department (including that provided to the Tribunal) for the purpose of determining whether to grant a protection visa to the applicant.” …
(Emphasis added)
6 The proposition that the information constituted by (or perhaps more precisely, derived from) the airport interview was information given by the applicant for the purpose of the application was rejected by Ryan and Conti JJ (the other member of the Full Court, Merkel J, reaching the same conclusion). The reasons given by their Honours in the joint judgment for rejecting the proposition were (at [17] and following):
… In our view, “applicant” wherever appearing in s 424A means “applicant for review by the Tribunal of a Ministerial decision” and “application” correspondingly means the proceeding before the Tribunal which is the vehicle for such a claim for review.
Section 424A(3)(b) finds its place in Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Act. That Division, as its heading indicates, is concerned with the conduct of a review. Accordingly, s 423, which is the first section in the Division, commences with the words “An Applicant for review by the Tribunal may give the Registrar ......”. All subsequent references in the Division are to “the applicant” or “an applicant” which must, we consider, be taken to be shorthand expressions for “applicant for review by the Tribunal” as first appearing in the Division in s 423. Moreover, the word “application” appears alone only once in Div 4 of Pt 7 in s 424A(3)(b) in close conjunction with “the applicant”. Consistency, therefore, demands that “application” where there appearing be taken to mean “application for review by the Tribunal” which is the full expression used in s 429 where “application” occurs for only the second time in Div 4. This construction is also consistent with Div 5 of Pt 7 which is concerned with decisions of the Tribunal and refers in s 430A(1)(b) and s 430B(1)(b) to “a decision on the application of a person who is in immigration detention”, and in s 430D(1) to “an oral decision on an application for review”.
In certain contexts, the word “application” is inherently ambiguous. As Hill J observed in Nader v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 352 at 365;
“Also, it is clear that s 54 is referring to an application form when it uses the word “application”. However, ss 45 and 46 use the word “application” or “apply” not to refer to an application form, but to refer to the process of application, notwithstanding that the process involves completion of an application form.”
If, contrary to the view which we have derived from the context of Divs 4 and 5 of Pt 7 of the Act, there is any ambiguity in the expression as used in s 424A(3)(b), it should be resolved against the Tribunal since sub-s (3) operates to relieve the Tribunal from affirmative obligations imposed by s 424A(1) for the benefit of the applicant. Consistently with established principles, a construction should be adopted which preserves, rather than diminishes, that benefit. As well, we agree with Merkel J, for the reasons which he has explained, that a purposive approach to s 424A supports the interpretation favoured by the learned primary Judge.
(Emphasis added)
The reasons given by Merkel J were (at [40] and [41]):
An applicant for a protection visa will have provided information relevant to the outcome of the application prior to applying for the review of a delegate’s decision. Such information may, in some cases, have been provided prior to the application for a visa. The prescribed application form requires that the basis for the application be stated. Further, the information given may be supplemented by information provided subsequently to the Department or to the delegate of the Minister. An applicant may have no record of the information provided but, more importantly, may not be aware of its significance to the review ultimately to be conducted by the RRT. It is therefore understandable that the legislature would require that, in fairness, any adverse information provided prior to review, the significance of which the applicant may be unaware, be disclosed to the applicant to enable him or her to respond to it. That approach has particular importance in the context of the inquisitional and non-adversarial nature of proceedings before the RRT: see Paramanathan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 94 FCR 28 at 62-63.
For the above reasons the construction the primary judge and I regard as correct gives effect to the beneficial purpose of s 424A of affording an applicant with the opportunity to respond to the gravamen or substance of any adverse information upon which the RRT proposes to act, the significance of which the applicant may be unaware. It is consistent with that purpose to take a narrow, rather than a broad, view of the exceptions in s 424A(3).
7 Counsel for the Minister ultimately conceded that the emphasised passage quoted at [6] above from the joint judgment constituted (relevantly for present purposes) the ratio of Al Shamry. This concession is correct. A necessary step in the reasoning of both Ryan and Conti JJ, and Merkel J, in deciding to dismiss the appeal was to construe the word "application" in s 424A(3)(b) as the application for review. While it can sometimes be difficult to determine what the ratio of an authority is (see the discussion in Wu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 105 FCR 39 at [24] and following), the ratio of Al Shamry (for present purposes) is clear. The meaning attributed to the word "application" by the Full Court did not depend on the obvious factual difference between that appeal and the present appeals, namely that the information in question in that matter was furnished before any application for a protection visa had been made (at the airport interview) whereas, in these appeals, the information was furnished later and after each application had been made for a protection visa.
8 This Full Court is bound to follow Al Shamry unless it is convinced it should not. The level of conviction required of the Full Court has been variously described as being satisfied that the earlier judgment is plainly wrong, manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. Other formulations have been adopted: see generally the discussion in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595. However formulated, the duty of any later Full Court to follow an earlier Full Court is founded on public policy considerations and, in particular, the need for consistency in the application of federal laws in this Court, subject always to correction of any error by the High Court or the amendment of the law by Parliament.
9 While the judgment of the High Court in SAAP may have the effect that a failure to comply with the obligation created by s 424A(1) will, at least ordinarily, result in jurisdictional error, that fact should not colour this Full Court's consideration of whether MIMA v Al Shamry was correctly decided. A conclusion that it was not correctly decided would require this Full Court to be satisfied that the reasoning leading to the interpretation of the word "application" in s 424A(3)(b) and the reach of that paragraph determined by the earlier Full Court was sufficiently flawed as to require its rejection. Various arguments were put by counsel for the Minister to demonstrate that the reasoning was flawed. It is unnecessary to rehearse those submissions. At best, they illustrate, as often is the case, that plausible arguments can be mounted that a word or expression in a statute can be construed in different ways. However, the reasoning of the Full Court in Al Shamry is cogent and persuasive. It is certainly not clearly, plainly or manifestly wrong. Accordingly, this Full Court should follow the construction of s 424A(3)(b) adopted by the Full Court in Al Shamry.
10 The following is a consideration of the application of the legal principles to the factual circumstances of each appeal. In particular it is necessary to determine (subject to questions about whether particular points can be raised in these appeals) whether there was information which the Tribunal considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review and, if so, whether the Tribunal met its obligations under s 424A of the Act to provide the appellant with the particulars of that information in writing. I would, where necessary, grant each appellant leave to raise and argue the points dealt in the following reasons.
SZBMI
11 This is an appeal from a judgment of a Federal Magistrate of 19 July 2005 dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal made on 30 July 2003 with reasons for decision handed down on 26 August 2003: see SZBMI v Minister for Immigration [2005] FMCA 1005. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister and refused to grant the appellant a protection visa. The following summary of the appellant's claims is drawn from the reasons of the Federal Magistrate (which, in turn, were based on the written submissions of counsel for the Minister).
12 The appellant claimed to fear persecution in Bangladesh by reason of his religion and political opinion. He claimed to have been an active member of the student wing of the Bangladesh National Party ("BNP"), that he had been threatened, that two attempts had been made to kill him, and that he had been the subject of false charges by members of the rival Awami League ("AL"). He also stated that he had been a supporter of Taslima Nasreen (a feminist author) and member of her supporter club. He claimed to have been present when a bomb blast occurred at a concert in 2001, and to have been bashed and threatened by AL members in 1996 and 1997.
13 The Tribunal found that the appellant was not credible, and had been untruthful. The Tribunal noted the reluctance of the appellant to respond, in specific terms, when questioned about particular matters during the hearing, contradictions between his original written claims in the statement attached to his protection visa application and those made to the Tribunal, internal contradictions in his evidence to the Tribunal, independent country information that appeared inconsistent with the appellant's claims, and the fact that the appellant's claims were identical in various respects to those made by other applicants for a protection visa using the same migration agent. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant had any significant ongoing involvement with the BNP or that he had any significant role or profile in relation to Taslima Nasreen. Nor was the Tribunal satisfied that any attack on the appellant in 1996 or 1997 was politically motivated, that he was wanted by the police or that there were any substantive charges outstanding against him, or, alternatively, that if there were charges, that they would be for a Convention reason. While the Tribunal was prepared to accept that the appellant was present at a bombing of a concert in April 2001, it did not regard this, on its own, as giving rise to any well founded fear of persecution of the appellant.
14 While the Federal Magistrate was inclined to the view that the Tribunal had failed to comply with the obligation imposed by s 424A(1) (a matter which had been raised by counsel for the Minister), his Honour was satisfied that the Tribunal's decision did not ultimately depend on conclusions reached from the material, particulars of which the Tribunal might have been obliged to provide in writing to the appellant. His Honour, by reference to the judgment of North J in VBAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 965, especially at [33], concluded that the application should be dismissed even if there had been a failure to comply with s 424A.
15 In the appeal, counsel for the appellant identified two pieces of "information", particulars of which, it was argued, should have been provided to the appellant in writing and were not. The first concerned a statement by the appellant that he had fled overseas ("the flight information"), which was contained in his written statement in support of his protection visa application. What the appellant had said in the statement attached to his application for a protection visa lodged in 2001 was that he had decided to leave Bangladesh to save his life and had arranged for a student visa from the Australian High Commission. The appellant also said in that written statement that he had decided to go abroad after the AL had gained power. Having regard to the context in which this appeared in the statement, this would have been a reference to the AL gaining power after the 1996 elections. In its decision, the Tribunal drew on this written statement as well as what the appellant had said about when and in what circumstances he had left Bangladesh. It appears from the Tribunal's decision that these matters were drawn to the appellant's attention at the hearing before the Tribunal. However, no particulars were given in writing under s 424A.
16 The second piece of "information" identified by counsel for the appellant, was that the Tribunal had received essentially the same claims in the same words by several other applicants with the same migration agent ("the similar claims information"). The Tribunal noted this fact in its reasons and also that it had raised this matter with the appellant at the hearing. Later in its reasons, in the section headed "Findings and Reasons", the Tribunal said that it was concerned that the appellant's original statement included the same details as provided in the statements of other applicants with the same adviser. Ultimately, at the end of the "Findings and Reasons" section, the Tribunal said that it was satisfied that the essentially common statements submitted by applicants in several cases involving the same adviser untruthfully represented a number of specific incidents as being the appellant's experiences when in fact they were not. No particulars were provided to the appellant under s 424A.
17 As to the flight information, counsel for the Minister noted that the Tribunal recorded that the appellant had confirmed to the Tribunal that he had read his earlier statement before signing it and that he asserted that it was true and correct information relating to his own experiences. This founded a submission by counsel for the Minister that the information in the statement (including the flight information) had, by its adoption at the hearing before the Tribunal, been given by the appellant in his application for review. Thus, it was submitted, it was information comprehended by s 424A(3)(b). It was submitted that a decision to the contrary effect NAZY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 744 (at [36] to [39]), which held that s 424A(3)(b) only comprehends information actively advanced by the applicant and not information adopted as a result of questions from the Tribunal, was wrongly decided. In addition, counsel for the Minister submitted that the flight information had not been the Tribunal's reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision of the delegate of the Minister. It was submitted that the Tribunal relied on the inconsistency between the statement made in the original visa application and later statements and not the statements themselves. So characterised, the content of the statement made in the original visa application was not information which underpinned the Tribunal's affirmation of the delegate's decision.
18 A convenient starting point in considering the arguments in relation to the flight information is the judgment of the Full Court in VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471 ("VAF"). In that matter, Finn and Stone JJ helpfully digested the cases concerning what constitutes "information" for present purposes. Their Honours said (at [24]):
… there is now a considerable body of case law concerned with the compass of the term “information” in its s 424A(1) setting. The following propositions emerge from it:
(i) the purpose of s 424A is to provide in part a statutory procedural analogue to the common law of procedural fairness: Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs(2001) 113 FCR 396 at [104]. However the obligation imposed is not coextensive with that which might be imposed by the common law to avoid practical injustice: VAAC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[2003] FCAFC 74;
(ii) the word “information” in s 424A(1) has the same meaning as in s 424: Win v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs(2001) 105 FCR 212 at [20]; and in this setting it refers to knowledge of relevant facts or circumstances communicated to or received by the Tribunal: Tin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[2000] FCA 1109 at [3]; irrespective of whether it is reliable or has a sound factual basis: Win, at [19] – [22]; and
(iii) the word does not encompass the Tribunal’s subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations: Tinat [54]; Paulat [95]; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[2001] FCA 1679 at [25]; approved [2002] FCAFC 120; nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc: WAGP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(2002) 124 FCR 276 at [26] – [29].
19 The application of these principles in that matter is illuminating. In its reasons for decision, the Tribunal had referred to aspects of the appellant's conduct in Australia which, seemingly, did not reflect the conduct of a person who had a well founded fear of persecution. One aspect of the conduct was the appellant's tardiness in applying for a protection visa. All members of the Full Court concluded that these matters constituted information, though Finn and Stone JJ (Merkel J dissenting) concluded that it was not information that formed part of the reasons for affirming the decision of the delegate.
20 In my opinion, the flight information was "information" for the purposes of s 424A(1). What the Tribunal did was to note what the appellant said in the written statement made at the time he applied for a protection visa. The Tribunal thereby gained knowledge of what the appellant had said at that time about his experiences in Bangladesh. It was knowledge used by the Tribunal in assessing the credibility of the appellant and assessing the veracity of the account given by the appellant to the Tribunal. I do not accept that, by adopting the statement at the hearing before the Tribunal, that information was transformed into information provided by the appellant in his application for review. In my opinion, the approach of Jacobson J in NAZY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 744 was correct. If the Tribunal comes to know of what was said by an applicant at a point before any application for review was made, and views what was said at that time as material to its assessment of what was later said by an applicant, then the mere adoption of the earlier statement during the review process would not result in the knowledge (and relevantly information in the present appeal) being comprehended by s 424A(3)(b). Different considerations could arise if it was clear the Tribunal treated only the adoption of the earlier statement as the fact relevant to its consideration of the application in the review. In those circumstances the fact of adoption would almost certainly constitute information provided by the applicant in the application on which the exclusion would operate. However, it cannot be said, in this case, that the Tribunal acted in such a way.
21 The next question is whether the information formed the reason or part of the reason for the Tribunal affirming the delegate's decision. The passage in the Tribunal's decision pointed to by counsel for the appellant as evidencing the Tribunal's reliance on the information, was one in which the Tribunal rejected the appellant's claim that charges had been laid against him and were still outstanding. The Tribunal understood the written statement of the appellant to contain a claim that charges were laid against him when he returned to Bangladesh, having left shortly after the elections in 1996. The Tribunal noted that it became clear at the hearing that the appellant's only travel overseas was in early 2001. It appears that the Tribunal considered the veracity of the appellant's claim that the charges were laid shortly after he returned from overseas to have been compromised by what appears to have been a concession by the appellant made at the hearing that he had not travelled overseas by the time he claimed the charges had been laid.
22 However, that matter was only one of a number of matters pointed to by the Tribunal for disbelieving the appellant's account that there were outstanding substantive charges against him. The other matters relied upon were inconsistent accounts he gave at the hearing about when the charges were brought, the fact that the appellant had had no problems obtaining travel documentation and departing Bangladesh legally, and that his evidence about how he avoided arrest following the laying of the charges was inconsistent with other evidence he gave about his activities and profile. In my opinion, the reliance placed by the Tribunal on the information gleaned from the written statement, was a subsidiary and peripheral reason for rejecting the appellant's claim that charges were outstanding against him. What appears to have been of greater significance to the Tribunal was the cumulative effect of the appellant's conflicting evidence at the hearing about the year in which the charges were laid, the fact that he was able to travel and depart Bangladesh notwithstanding his claim there was an arrest warrant against him, and the fact that he was not arrested in the years following the issue of the arrest warrant. It cannot be said, in my opinion, that the flight information was of sufficient significanceto warrant a conclusion that it formed part of the Tribunal's reasons for affirming the decision of the delegate.
23 In dealing with the flight information in this way, I am following the approach of Finn and Stone JJ in VAF. In that matter it was necessary for the Full Court to determine whether the relevant information (referred to at [15] above) formed the reason or part of the reason for the Tribunal affirming the delegate's decision. Finn and Stone JJ adopted an approach which resulted in their Honours concluding the information did not form part of the reason. A different approach, with a different result, was adopted by Merkel J who concluded that the information did form part of the reason. The difference in approach can be of significance, as it was in that matter. In the course of considering this issue, Finn and Stone JJ noted (at [33]):
It commonly is the case that the detail and complexity of the case advanced by a visa applicant, and the information that is given and garnered for the purposes of considering it, results in the Tribunal being confronted with issues that may be of varying importance, relevance and centrality both to the decision to be taken and to the reasoning that in the event sustains that decision. While the reasoning process may advert to, and express views on, such issues, all will not necessarily constitute part of the reason for the Tribunal’s decision. Tribunals, no less than courts, engage in their own species of dicta often enough for reasons related to haste and pressure in composition. When a Tribunal’s reasons are to be evaluated for s 424A(1) purposes, the Court as a matter of judgment is required to isolate what were the integral parts of the reasons for the Tribunal’s decision. That task, necessarily, is an interpretative one. In some instances the differentiation of the integral and the inessential may be by no means easy – and made the more so by less than explicit indications in the reasons themselves as to what the Tribunal itself considered to be integral.
Their Honours then analysed the reasons of the Tribunal and the significance of the information in they process of reasoning. Their ultimate conclusion was (at [41]):
Considered in the context of the Tribunal’s reasoning process and having regard to the aggregate of findings made that rejected both that the appellant had been persecuted for a Convention reason and that his situation was such as to give rise to a well founded fear of persecution, reference to the information as to his behaviour in Australia can only be categorised as being relatively minor and unimportant in the scheme of things. It was not so integral to the reasoning process rejecting the appellant’s claim as to require as a matter of fairness that the appellant be told that information (cf s 424A(1)(a)) and why it was relevant to the review (cf s 424A(1)(b)).
On the approach adopted by Finn and Stone JJ it is necessary, in an appropriate case, to consider the significance of the information to the reasoning process adopted by the Tribunal and evaluate whether the information can properly be characterised as forming part of the reason for affirming the delegate's decision.
24 The approach of Merkel J was to reject the notion that the comparative significance of the information could inform an assessment of whether s 424A had been complied with, although his Honour accepted that the comparative significance of the information may be relevant to the exercise of any discretion to grant relief. His Honour said (at [59]-[60]):
It must follow that the question arising on the present appeal is whether the information concerning the appellant’s behaviour after his arrival in Australia was stated by the Tribunal to be a reason for the adverse general finding it made against him in relation to his credit. If the Tribunal did make such a statement it would follow that that information was considered by the Tribunal to be part of the reason for its decision. In such circumstances there would be no role for questioning whether the information was:
· a more, or a less, significant part of the reason for its decision;
· an integral or essential part of the reason for the decision; or
· “sufficiently important” to the reasoning process to warrant that s 424A apply.
As I later explain, those questions might be relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion to decline to grant relief if a breach of s 424A has occurred.
There is an additional difficulty with the Court, in ascertaining whether information is a part of the reason for a decision, engaging in an evaluation of the relative importance of the information to the reasoning process. Information that has been stated to be part of the reason for the decision might appear to be only a minor part of the reasoning, but had it been put to the applicant that information might have elicited a response which may have had an impact on the Tribunal’s decision. Thus, there is an inherent problem in assessing the importance of the information in question without having the response the applicant would have given to it had he or she been apprised of the information and of its significance. As was observed by Megarry J in John v Rees at [1970] 1 Ch 345 at 402 “the path of the law is strewn with examples … of inexplicable conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable determinations that, by discussion, suffered a change.”
25 VAF is a recent Full Court judgment in which the majority determined the approach to be adopted in ascertaining whether information on which s 424A might operate was part of the reason for the Tribunal affirming a delegate's decision. In my opinion, the approach determined in that case must be applied (for the same reasons given at [8] and [9] above for following Al Shamry) unless the reasoning of the High Court in the later case of SAAP indicates a different approach should be followed.
26 The majority of the High Court decided in SAAP that the duty under s 424A to provide particulars of information continued until the Tribunal made its decision. Consistent with the language of the section (".... information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or part of the reason....."), the majority of the Court focused on the circumstances in which the duty arises, whether before or after any hearing, whenever the Tribunal is considering or assessing information which it then considers may be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision. It did not directly address the mechanism by which a Court would assess, after the event, whether there had been compliance with the section. In particular, the majority did not directly address how a Court determines whether any particular piece of information has the attributes of being "information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason" for affirming the delegate's decision. As noted by McHugh J at [69], the Minister did not challenge in the High Court the finding made by Mansfield J (the primary Judge) that the Tribunal failed to comply with the obligation to give the first appellant particulars in writing of the adverse information obtained from her daughter's evidence. Thus there was no issue raised in the Hight Court about whether the information (gained from the daughter's evidence) would have been the reason or part of the reason for the Tribunal affirming the delegate's decision. In my opinion, the reasons of the members of the High Court do not provide a basis for departing from the approach determined by Finn and Stone JJ.
27 I return to consider the facts of this appeal. In relation to the similar claims information, counsel for the Minister submitted that it did not form part of the reason for affirming the delegate's decision. That was because the Tribunal analysed and rejected the central claims of the appellant and only noted, after rejecting them, that those claims were also embodied in essentially common statements submitted by applicants in several other cases involving the same adviser.
28 The submission of the Minister in the preceding paragraph correctly characterises the use made by the Tribunal and the view it took of the similarity between the appellant's claims and those made by other applicants using the same advisor. Assuming, for present purposes, that the observed similarities (or the fact that there were similarities) constituted "information" for the purposes of s 424A, the fact that there were similarities was not relied on by the Tribunal to reject the appellant's claims and thereby affirm the delegate's decision. Rather, by a process of reasoning not dependent on the observed similarities, the Tribunal rejected the central claims of the appellant. Accordingly, no obligation arose under s 424A(1) to provide particulars in writing in relation to this information.
29 Having regard to the conclusion earlier reached about the scope of s 424A based of the judgment in Al Shamry, it is unnecessary to deal with the submissions made by the parties concerning the appellant's contention that there had been a denial of procedural fairness. That contention would only have been relevant if the Minister's submissions concerning Al Shamry had been accepted. As I understand the submissions made on behalf of the appellant in this appeal (and the other appeals), any denial of procedural fairness is coextensive with the alleged failure to comply with the obligation created by s 424A. As I further understand those submissions, a conclusion in relation to any piece of information that there has not been non-compliance with s 424A, is a conclusion which also disposes of the allegation of denial of procedural fairness. Where relevant, these comments apply to the other appeals.
30 The appellant has not established that the Federal Magistrate erred in dismissing the application for judicial review. The appeal should be dismissed with costs.
SZEEU
31 This is an appeal from a judgment of a Federal Magistrate of 16 March 2005 dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal made on 25 June 2004 and reasons for decision handed down on 20 July 2004: see SZEEU v Minister for Immigration [2005] FMCA 360. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister refusing to grant the appellant a protection visa. The following summary of the appellant's claims is drawn from the reasons for judgment of the Federal Magistrate.
32 The appellant arrived in Australia on a student visa in November 2003. He was then 20 years old. He is a national of Bangladesh. His application for a protection visa, lodged in December 2003, appeared to be founded on two matters. The first was his association with the AL which had led to harassment and intimidation by "BNP thugs". The second was his homosexuality. As to that matter, he claimed he had not been able to continue his normal life in Bangladesh and had not had any freedoms. He claimed he had been abused regularly, discriminated against in everyday life and employment, and even by the political party of which he had been a worker.
33 The Tribunal did not accept that the appellant had ever been a member of the AL, nor that he had participated in any of the AL's activities, been mistreated by the political opposition, the BNP, and by the police, as a result. The Tribunal also did not accept that the applicant was homosexual. In the proceedings before the Federal Magistrate, the appellant did not specifically raise any issue concerning the operation of s 424A. Indeed the grounds advanced by the appellant appeared to have been generally framed, and the Federal Magistrate dealt with them with corresponding generality and concluded that no jurisdictional error had been demonstrated.
34 In this appeal, counsel for the appellant identified four pieces of information which were said not to have been dealt with as required by s 424A. The first concerned the way in which the appellant had answered question 36 in his original application for a protection visa ("the education information"). That question required him to "give full details of all the education [he had] undertaken (in any country)". The answer provided by the appellant in the original application was to the effect that he had undertaken 12 years of education, between January 1989 and December 1998, at Khilgaon Government High school, and between January 1999 and December 2000, at BAF Shaheen College. The Tribunal relied on this answer (in substance, that he had attended two educational institutions) in order to contrast it with evidence later given by the appellant about being expelled from educational institutions and having attended a third educational institution (a university college). In the Tribunal's view, the fact that he had been expelled from educational institutions on a number of occasions and had attended a third, previously undisclosed, educational institution supported a conclusion that the appellant's claims should be rejected.
35 The second piece of information was the fact that the appellant had entered Australia on a student visa ("the student visa information"). The Tribunal made passing reference to that fact (and the appellant's claim that he had been admitted to the Central Queensland University in Australia) in its consideration of his evidence more generally about having attended university in Bangladesh.
36 The third piece of information concerned a witness, Mr Islam, who gave evidence on behalf of the appellant ("the Islam witness information"). His evidence was to the effect that he had a homosexual relationship with the appellant. This evidence was characterised by the Tribunal as vague and generalised and, in effect, rejected by the Tribunal as corroborative of the appellant's account that he was a homosexual.
37 The fourth piece of information was said to be the absence of any details of his claims as they had been advanced on his behalf since arriving in Australia.
38 It is unnecessary to analyse in detail the parties' submissions about whether each of these matters constituted "information" for the purposes of s 424A and, if so, whether that information was the reason or part of the reason for the Tribunal affirming the delegate's decision. The Minister conceded that the "education information" was information which formed part of the reason for the Tribunal's decision and, accordingly, since the Minister has failed to persuade us not to follow Al Shamry, this appeal should be allowed with costs.
SZEEZ
39 This is an appeal from a judgment of a Federal Magistrate of 23 March 2005 dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal made on 28 June 2004 with reasons for decision handed down on 22 July 2004: see SZEEZ v Minister for Immigration [2005] FMCA 400. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister refusing to grant the appellant a protection visa. The following summary of the appellant's claims is drawn from the reasons of the Federal Magistrate (which, in turn, were based on the Tribunal's summary of the appellant's claims.)
40 The appellant is a national of India. The appellant had been falsely implicated, through a friend, as being involved with the activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE"). He was gaoled by the police and subsequently released on bail. The appellant informed on the friend, who was arrested but later escaped. The friend sent two LTTE operatives who hanged the appellant's mother as revenge. The appellant joined the Tamil Nadu Muslim Munnetra Kazhagam ("TMMK"). Later and as a further act of revenge, the appellant's son was also murdered. The police came to investigate his son's murder. The appellant then fled to Ooty. A year later, he attempted to leave for Malaysia but was detained by the Central Bureau of Investigation and placed in remand for one month. He was released after a bribe was paid and then travelled to Malaysia. He later returned to India and was required to report to the police every week. He was unable to conduct his business. Ultimately, he arranged to travel to Australia on a temporary business visa. He understood the police were searching for him.
41 The Tribunal did not accept most of what the appellant said about his experiences in India. In his application for judicial review in the Federal Magistrates Court, the appellant identified ten grounds of review. The Federal Magistrate dealt in detail with four of those grounds which were thought possibly to raise issues of substance. Section 424A was relied on in relation to country information, which the appellant contended had not been provided as required by that section. The Federal Magistrate was satisfied that no grounds were made out and dismissed the application.
42 Counsel for the appellant identified five, possibly six, pieces of information which, it was submitted, should have been dealt with in conformity with s 424A but were not. The first piece of information concerned the appellant's answers to questions 47 and 48 of his application for a protection visa ("the manner of exit information"). In his answers he indicated he had left India legally and did not have difficulties obtaining a travel document (such as a passport) in India. He claimed before the Tribunal that when leaving India he went to the airport with the help of a friend who was familiar with an officer and because of that help, he was able to come to Australia. The Tribunal indicated that it preferred the appellant's answers in questions 47 and 48 and rejected as not credible his evidence to the Tribunal as to how he left India. In its decision, the Tribunal recorded that at the hearing, the appellant had been referred to his answers to the two questions. The answers were read to the appellant and he accepted them.
43 The second piece of information concerned the appellant's application for a temporary business visa ("the business visa information"). The Tribunal asked the appellant about the application and whether he had signed it. The Tribunal raised with him the apparent inconsistency between him applying for a temporary business visa and his evidence that he had decided to come to Australia for refugee purposes. Moreover, the Tribunal relied on what was admitted to be a lie of the appellant in that application and concluded that the applicant was willing to tell lies "to obtain a migration outcome". That was one of several matters relied on by the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant was not a credible witness.
44 The third piece of information ("the PRC visa information") was the Tribunal's knowledge that the appellant had a valid visa to enter the People's Republic of China ("PRC"). The existence of that valid visa had been alluded to by the appellant's migration agent in the appellant's original application for a protection visa. It appears that at the hearing the appellant told the Tribunal that he had a visa for China and had thought of going there but had not done so because he did not know the language. The Tribunal indicated it had seen the visa on the appellant's passport at the beginning of the hearing. The Tribunal indicated in its reasons that it did not accept the appellant's explanation for not travelling to and residing in the PRC.
45 The fourth and fifth pieces of information concerned the death of the appellant's mother. The Tribunal requested the appellant to provide evidence of the mother's murder by hanging. The appellant produced a death certificate ("the death certificate information") and a letter from an advocate and notary ("the advocate's statement information") to the effect that the mother had been hanged to make it look like suicide and that the perpetrator was to be tried (in which the advocate was to have acted) but had got off "scot free" because of police complicity. The Tribunal noted in its reasons that it had raised the death certificate with the appellant and in particular that it did not mention the cause of death by "the LTTE people" and that "for all [the Tribunal] knew she could have died from old age". As to the first comment, the appellant agreed. As to the second, he apparently disagreed but accepted that the document did not fully support his claims. As to the advocate's statement, the Tribunal indicated that it attached no weight to the document. In its reasons, the Tribunal noted that the appellant accepted that its author had not provided any basis for his comments.
46 What is possibly a sixth piece of information concerned the appellant's original statement in support of his application for a protection visa, in which he claimed to have left his wife and children to live in Tamil Nadu ("the abandonment information"). The submissions of counsel for the appellant did not make clear the relevance of the abandonment information. In written submissions in reply, it was suggested that the way in which the Tribunal used this information constituted a denial of procedural fairness at common law. However, this is not articulated and, for my part, this submission can be put to one side.
47 In relation to the manner of exit information, counsel for the Minister submitted that the information had been given by the appellant in the application for review, because he had told the Tribunal that the information in the original application for a protection visa was correct and had accepted the answers to questions 47 and 48 after they had been read to him by the Tribunal. Moreover, the appellant's migration agent specifically drew the Tribunal's attention to the appellant's protection visa application in a written submission to the Tribunal. In addition, a letter dated 6 April 2004 was sent to the appellant informing him that the Tribunal had information that might be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the delegate's decision. Relevantly, the information was described as "Indian Immigration Officials have access to airport computer systems that enable the checking of any charges or criminal records against departing Indian nationals". The relevance of this information was said in the letter to be: "The applicant was able to leave India [on] several occasions without problems, thus indicating that he was of no interest to the authorities. This would indicate that the applicant's credibility is in issue". Counsel for the Minister submitted that if particulars of the manner of exit information had to be provided under s 424A, that was achieved by the letter of 6 April 2004.
48 I accept that the better view is that the Tribunal acted on the appellant's affirmation, given at the Tribunal hearing, of the answers to questions 47 and 48 in the application for a protection visa, rather than the fact that the application contained those answers. What the Tribunal was assessing was whether it should accept one version of the appellant's account which involved the intervention of a friend at the airport to facilitate his departure or another version to the effect that he left legally and had had no difficulties obtaining a travel document. In its reasons, The Tribunal ultimately concluded that the account involving the friend was not credible. When the Tribunal first referred, while undertaking this assessment, to the answers to questions 47 and 48, it noted that the appellant agreed with those answers at the hearing before the Tribunal. The Tribunal appears to have been weighing one account (based on the answers to questions 47 and 48 as affirmed to it) with another account and determining where, in its view, the truth lay. Accordingly, the manner of exit information was information given by the appellant to the Tribunal and caught by s 424A(3)(b). The Tribunal was under no obligation to provide written particulars of that information.
49 Counsel for the Minister submitted, in relation to the business visa information, what the Tribunal took into account as relevantly emerging from the fact that the appellant had earlier applied for a business visa, was the admission made at the Tribunal hearing by the appellant that he had lied in his business visa application. It was submitted that this information was comprehended by s 424A(3)(b).
50 In my opinion this is correct. It is true that the Tribunal discussed with the appellant his application for the temporary business visa and tested the appellant, in its questions, about what he had said. However, it was the appellant's ultimate concession that he had lied that was relied on by the Tribunal to reach the conclusion that the appellant was prepared to lie to obtain "a migration outcome" and to partly found its ultimate conclusion that the appellant was not a credible witness. Accordingly, the relevant information, namely the admission of having lied, was information given by the appellant for the purposes of the application for review and caught by s 424A(3)(b).
51 The submission of the Minister in relation to PRC visa information was partly dependent on the tender, in this appeal, of a copy of a page of the appellant's passport. Ultimately, the tender was not opposed and leave should be given to tender a copy of the relevant page of the passport into evidence. The Minister submitted that it can be inferred that the appellant was asked by the Tribunal to bring his passport to the hearing (having regard to a letter sent to the appellant on 25 May 2004 making that request) and the appellant did so (because the Tribunal mentions in its reasons having seen the passport at the beginning of the hearing). Accordingly, it was submitted, the information (that the appellant had a visa to enter the PRC) was not information derived by the Tribunal from the original application for a protection visa but rather information known to the Tribunal because it sighted the passport at the hearing.
52 The submission of the Minister should be accepted. While no analogue of the best evidence rule operates in the Tribunal, plainly the primary source of its knowledge that the appellant had a visa to enter the PRC arose because it saw the visa in the appellant's passport. Accordingly, it constituted information provided by the appellant for the purpose of the application for review and is thus caught by s 424A(3)(b).
53 In relation to the death certificate and advocate statement information, the Minister submitted that they were both provided by the appellant in response to a request in a letter dated 5 April 2004. Accordingly, they were comprehended by s 424A(3)(b). This submission of the Minister should be accepted.
54 The appeal should be dismissed with costs.
SZEOP
55 This is an appeal from a judgment of a Federal Magistrate of 29 April 2005 dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal of 24 September 2004: see SZEOP v Minister for Immigration [2005] FMCA 443. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister refusing to grant the appellant a protection visa. The following summary of the appellant's claims is drawn from the reasons of the Federal Magistrate.
56 The appellant is a national of Bangladesh. He attended the University of Dhaka from 1992 to 1995. Halfway through his four-year engineering course he became involved in politics, more specifically, with the AL. In October 1995 he addressed a student gathering. Amongst other things, he spoke out in favour of religious tolerance and practices such as prostitution and gay marriages. His pro gay comments made people furious. The appellant had begun to realise his attraction for other men. He had a sexual encounter on one occasion with a foreign student. After that he had some casual relationships with men. This led to confusion in his mind and the realisation that he could never marry a woman. He spoke in favour of gay rights and other human rights and sought a political or social organisation to sponsor him. No one would support him. He received death threats from Muslim fundamentalists. He then interrupted his studies and left secretly for his home city. He was in hiding for a year. He then worked in a marine electronics company. In 2000, fundamentalist Muslims found the appellant in his home city. They threatened his family and gave him an ultimatum to leave the country within three months. The appellant then decided to leave Bangladesh and was accepted into Charles Sturt University.
57 The Tribunal did not accept the appellant's account of his experiences in Bangladesh. Its reasons (or at least some of them) for doing so were summarised by the Federal Magistrate (at [8]):
(a)The internet page to which the applicant made reference at the Tribunal hearing did not contain pictures which would suggest the applicant was homosexual.
(b)The inconsistency between the applicant’s claim to have been concerned about fellow Bangladeshi students at his University discovering his homosexuality and his claim to have posted photographs of himself on the internet which illustrate his homosexuality.
(c)The “brief (almost dismissive) account” of Bandu, a social welfare society which runs a major HIV/AIDS program for MSM (men who have sex with men) in Bangladesh.
(d)The lack of detail of media coverage provided by the applicant in respect of having spoken out in favour of human rights, prostitution and gay marriage at the Bangladesh University freshman’s day in 1995.
(e)The applicant’s delay in applying for a protection visa and claiming he feared persecution, notwithstanding his ability to speak English.
58 The grounds for review relied on in the proceedings before the Federal Magistrate were substantially the same as the grounds in this appeal. In his lengthy and the detailed reasons, the Federal Magistrate rejected each ground.
59 The first ground in the appeal was that the Federal Magistrate erred in rejecting a contention to the effect that the Tribunal conducted its inquiry in a way that created a legitimate expectation in the appellant that it would make inquiries concerning the appellant's claim that he had led a homosexual lifestyle in Australia. In particular, it was contended that the Tribunal failed to inquire into evidence that could have been given by Mr X, who, on the appellant's account, would have been able to give evidence supportive of his claim of being homosexual.
60 Counsel for the Minister submitted that the Tribunal was under no general duty to inquire and had not created an expectation that it would seek to contact Mr X. To the extent that it had indicated it would contact anyone - a person described as Alan - it had endeavoured to do so but had not succeeded. This was not a case of the type considered by Wilcox J in Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155, where the information was readily available to the Tribunal and was centrally important to the decision to be made.
61 The Federal Magistrate was correct in rejecting the contention that the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error by failing to make inquiries and, specifically, to seek to contact Mr X. The Tribunal was not under a duty to inquire and it had not created an expectation that it would contact Mr X. It is true that the appellant gave some details about Mr X in response to questions from the Tribunal which might have enabled the Tribunal to contact him (though some of the information was vague or inconclusive). However, nothing was said which would have reasonably created an expectation that it would do so: cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1.
62 The second ground in the appeal concerned the rejection by the Tribunal of evidence given by a Mr W in a letter. The letter was sent to the Tribunal shortly after the hearing before the Tribunal. The letter was from a man who said he had met the appellant at a hotel in Erskineville and they used to meet up in North Sydney where the appellant lived. In the letter, he said he could clarify that the appellant was a homosexual and if the recipient of the letter wanted more information they could contact him. Two telephone numbers were given. The Tribunal said that the contents of the letter did not appear to be congruous with the appellant's other evidence.
63 Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Tribunal did not give the appellant an opportunity to respond to its concerns about any perceived inconsistencies. At the very least, it was submitted, the Tribunal should have contacted the author of the letter to seek clarification from him of the evidence in the letter. A further submission was made that the Tribunal was bound to provide the appellant with particulars of perceived inconsistencies (being information) under s 424A.
64 Counsel for the Minister submitted that the Tribunal had not been under a duty to contact the author and the perceived inconsistencies were not information for the purposes of s 424A.
65 The Federal Magistrate was correct in rejecting the submissions concerning the letter. The Tribunal was entitled to form the view that the evidence in the letter was not congruous with the appellant's evidence (particularly having regard to the fact that the evidence of the appellant had not included a reference to meeting the author of the letter at an Erskineville Hotel) and was under no obligation to contact the author to make further inquiries. Nor was the Tribunal under any obligation to act under s 424A. Its view about the contents of the letter resulted from its thought processes and evaluation of the evidence. This was not, relevantly, information.
66 The next issue raised in the appeal concerned the presence of a detention centre guard at the hearing when the appellant gave evidence. The notice of the appeal (and the submissions of counsel for the appellant) did not raise an issue concerning the operation of s 429: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZAYW [2005] FCAFC 154. Rather the notice of appeal particularised as a denial of procedural fairness, the fact that the Tribunal interviewed the appellant in what was alleged to be "an environment which was not conducive to his being able to fully and freely discuss the details of his homosexuality". In the written submissions of counsel for the appellant, the complaint was that the hearing was conducted without the appellant's adviser but in the presence of a detention centre guard (not being an employee of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs ("the Department")). As this appeal will be allowed by Weinberg and Allsop JJ, it is probably unnecessary to address this issue although it appears to me that, arguably, there was non-compliance with s 429.
67 Counsel for the appellant identified five further pieces of information for which, it was contended, particulars should have been, but were not, provided under s 424A. The first piece of information was that the appellant had not made any claims for refugee status before making the application for a protection visa in August 2004 ("the date of application information"). The applicant arrived in Australia on 14 January 2001, and lodged his application for a protection visa on 9 August 2004. The Tribunal questioned the appellant about this matter and ultimately concluded that the appellant had not raised fears of persecution because, in fact, he had had no past experience, or fear, of persecution in Bangladesh. It concluded that his current claims arose out of discussions while in detention.
68 Counsel for the Minister submitted that the date of application information was not, relevantly, information for the purpose of the section. In any event it had not formed the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review or alternatively, fell within s 424A(3)(b).
69 To dispose of this ground, it is sufficient to observe that the Tribunal did not found its decision, even in part, on the fact that the appellant had applied for a protection visa more than three years after entering Australia. Rather, its decision was founded, in part, on the failure of the appellant to provide the Tribunal with an explanation for the delay in making the application for the protection visa which was reasonable, rational and consistent with the existence of a fear of persecution. The Tribunal was under no obligation to provide particulars of the date of application information.
70 The second piece of information concerned the fact that the appellant had spent two months in immigration detention in 2002 and had successfully challenged a Departmental decision not to grant him a bridging visa ("the bridging visa information"). The submissions by counsel for the appellant do not identify with any precision how this information might be comprehended by s 424A. What the Tribunal did say was that the appellant spent two months in detention at the end of 2002. It then noted that for a number of reasons, including the appellant's experience with immigration matters, it was implausible that he would not have known of the availability of refugee protection in Australia. However, the Tribunal did ask the appellant questions about the fact he had spent time in detention. It is likely, and the contrary has not been established, that the Tribunal acted on knowledge derived from the answers given by the appellant. No contravention of s 424A has been established in relation to this "information".
71 The third piece of information was that the appellant's claims to refugee status arose from exchanges with other persons while in detention ("the detention information"). Towards the end of its reasons for decision, the Tribunal expressed the view that the appellant's claim for a protection visa originated from his exchanges whilst in detention. It is unnecessary to analyse the arguments in detail. Plainly, this is not information on which the section might operate. It is simply a conclusion of the Tribunal on the material before it which included evidence from the appellant about discussions he had while in detention about seeking asylum.
72 The fourth piece of information concerned the appellant's claim in the statement supporting his application for a protection visa that he addressed the student rally in relation to homosexual rights in October 1995 ("the student rally information"). In his original application for a protection visa, the appellant referred to the rally. In its decision the Tribunal indicated it was not satisfied that this speech took place. Again, this is a matter that does not require detailed consideration of the submissions. The fact that the speech was given was a matter about which the Tribunal asked the appellant questions. There is no reason to believe that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal was based on anything other than the evidence the appellant gave rather than anything that may have appeared in the original application for the protection visa. Again, s 424A was not enlivened.
73 The last piece of information concerned the Tribunal's inquiries of the hotel in Erskineville. As a result of answers given by the appellant at the hearing before the Tribunal, the Tribunal member rang the hotel with a view to speaking to a person the appellant had identified as contactable there and who would corroborate his evidence about being a homosexual. The short and correct answer given by counsel for the Minister to this contention, was that the fact that the person did not appear to have been an employee of the hotel, contrary to the appellant's evidence, was not a matter relied upon by the Tribunal in reaching its decision. In the result, the Tribunal failed to secure evidence potentially supportive of the appellant's claims. The Tribunal did not refer to the fact that the appellant contended that this person was contactable but that it had been unable to make contact (and had been told categorically that no one by that name ever worked there) in reaching any adverse view about the credibility of the appellant.
SZDXA
74 This is an appeal from a judgment of a Federal Magistrate of 9 June 2005 dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal made on 5 May 2004 with reasons for decision handed down on 27 May 2004: see SZDXA v Minister for Immigration [2005] FMCA 842. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister refusing to grant the appellant a protection visa. The following summary of the appellant's claims is drawn from the reasons of the Federal Magistrate.
201 It would be a work of supererogation to attempt to restate exhaustively this body of case law. Nevertheless, for the purposes of these appeals a number of matters need to be addressed.
202 From the words of s 424A(1) it is necessary to identify:
(a)information
(b)that the Tribunal considers
(c)would be the reason or a part of the reason for affirming the decision.
203 The Tribunal is required to give particulars of any such information and to ensure, as far as it is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why the information is relevant to the review.
204 The assessment whether the Tribunal has complied with s 424A(1) requires close attention to the reasons of the Tribunal, because it is the information that the Tribunal considers relevant that must be assessed in order to see whether, prior to the decision being made, it would be the reason or a part of the reason for affirming the decision.
205 Information is that of which one is told or apprised; it is knowledge communicated concerning some particular fact, subject or event: The Complete Oxford English Dictionary (2nd Ed 1991). In this context, the word has been taken as referring to knowledge of relevant facts or circumstances communicated to, or received by, the Tribunal: Tin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1109 at [3], approved in VAF at [24] or knowledge which has come to, or has been gained by, the Tribunal: Paul at [95].
206 Information does not encompass the Tribunal’s subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations: Tin at [54], Paul at [95] and VAF at [24]. In this respect, it is relevant to recall the root of the word ‘information’: that of which one has been told or apprised, or informed. The distinction can become fine: Paul at [95]. It is a distinction, nevertheless, to be maintained. Also, the fact that appraisal, thought processes and determination are not information does not mean they are not relevant to the operation of s 424A. The thought processes of the Tribunal may reveal the relevance of information for s 424A(1)(b) and may assist in understanding what the Tribunal must say or do to comply with s 424A(1)(a), (b) or (c).
207 The word ‘information’ has been said not to encompass or extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc: WAGP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 276 at [26]-[29], cited in VAF at [24]. It will be necessary in due course to explain the limits of this expression of view.
208 Whether or not information is the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision was discussed in Paul at [99]-[100], [107]-[108] and [116] and by VAF at [29]-[41]. The approaches taken by the respective majorities in VAF and Paul were very similar. The majority in VAF did not disapprove of Paul and to a degree built upon the reasoning in it. Aspects common to the approaches in both Paul and VAF were as follows:
(a)To identify the reason or part of the reason for the affirmation of the decision requires some “unbundling” of the reason for the affirmation of the decision which is ultimately the relevant lack of satisfaction of the existence of protection obligations.
(b)In circumstances where (as is usually the case) the complaint is in the context of a decision of the Tribunal that has been made supported by a set of reasons generally this is to be undertaken by reference to the reasons of the Tribunal in the context in which one finds them.
209 (At this point, by way of interpolation, it should be noted that one issue that was touched upon in argument was the question whether there can be a contravention of s 424A at some point prior to the making of the decision. This question, arising from the use of the word “would” in the section, was said by counsel for the appellants to be unnecessary to decide for the purposes of these appeals. There was no debate before us about the legitimacy of approaching these appeals conformably with [208(b)] above.)
210 It is clear that in Paul the process of identification of what was the reason or a part of the reason for affirming the decision involved a consideration as to whether fairness required the engagement of the processes of s 424A. At [114] and [116] in Paul, I said:
…one needs to see from the decision what was the reason or a part of the reason for affirmation and, in the light of the reasoning process which in fact drew the Tribunal to that conclusion, assess what, in fairness, the claimant … needed to be appraised of in order that he or she could deal with issues that were of a relevance to the review as determined by the phrase ‘would be the reason or a part of the reason’.
[emphasis in original]
The question as to whether information would be the reason or part of the reason for affirmation is ultimately decided, in my view, by whether it can be characterised as sufficiently important to the reasoning process in the rejection of the appellant’s claims, for fairness to warrant that the applicant be told of it so that he or she can understand and be able to meet the integers or elements that make up the Tribunal’s reasons or conclusion thus far reached (hence “would”) for finding adversely to the applicant.
211 In VAF, after referring at [31] to what I said in Paul at [99] about the need to “unbundle” the ultimate “reason” as to a lack of satisfaction that the applicant was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations, Finn J and Stone J said the following at [33] about the process of analysing or interpreting the Tribunal’s expressed reasons in order to ascertain the reason or part of the reason for the purposes of s 424A(1):
It commonly is the case that the detail and complexity of the case advanced by a visa applicant, and the information that is given and garnered for the purposes of considering it, results in the Tribunal being confronted with issues that may be of varying importance, relevance and centrality both to the decision to be taken and to the reasoning that in the event sustains that decision. While the reasoning process may advert to, and express views on, such issues, all will not necessarily constitute part of the reason for the tribunal’s decision. Tribunals, no less than courts, engage in their own species of dicta often enough for reasons related to haste and pressure in composition. When a tribunal’s reasons are to be evaluated for s 424A(1) purposes, the court as a matter of judgment is required to isolate what were the integral parts of the reasons for the tribunal’s decision. That task, necessarily, is an interpretative one. In some instances the differentiation of the integral and the inessential may be by no means easy – and made the more so by less than explicit indications in the reasons themselves as to what the tribunal itself considered to be integral.
212 After detailed and meticulous consideration of the approach of the Tribunal as illuminated by its reasons, Finn J and Stone J concluded at [41] that the information in question was not a part of the reason in the following terms:
Considered in the context of the tribunal’s reasoning process and having regard to the aggregate of findings made that rejected both that the appellant had been persecuted for a Convention reason and that his situation was such as to give rise to a well founded fear of persecution, reference to the information as to his behaviour in Australia can only be categorised as being relatively minor and unimportant in the scheme of things. It was not so integral to the reasoning process rejecting the appellant’s claim as to require as a matter of fairness that the appellant be told that information (cf s 424A(1)(a)) and why it was relevant to the review (cf s 424A(1)(b)).
[emphasis added]
213 Thus, there can be seen in VAF, in how the majority decided the case, a reflection of what was said in Paul: that the process of interpretive or judgmental assessment of what was the reason or a part of the reason involved considering the place of the information in the whole context of the reasoning process of the Tribunal and making a judgment whether the importanceof that place required, as a matter of fairness, the engagement of s 424A. Consequent upon the decision in SAAP, it is necessary to say something more about this approach and the similar approach in Paul.
214 In SAAP, the majority (McHugh J, Kirby J and Hayne J) made clear that although s 424A had a statutory function of a like kind to the rules of procedural fairness, its content and operation were not controlled by those principles or their operation. Thus, the Full Courts in SAAP ([2002] FCAFC 411) and NAHV of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 214 were found to be in error to conclude that the lack of any unfairness in failing to comply with s 424A was of relevance in any conclusion as to the effect, in terms of jurisdictional error, of the failure to follow the terms of s 424A. Whilst Paul and VAF were not the subject of consideration in SAAP, it is clear that the majority of the High Court in SAAP was of the view that the words of s 424A should be applied without being controlled by any consideration of the operation of the principles of procedural fairness. Thus, it seems to me that to the extent that Paul and VAF include notions of fairness derived from the rules of procedural fairness as part of the analysis of whether something is part of the reason for affirming the decision, those decisions are in conflict with the approach of the majority in SAAP.
215 In my view, in the light of SAAP, in circumstances where one is faced with a decision of the Tribunal with reasons and the complaint is a contravention of s 424A(1), the question to ask, by reference to the reasons of the Tribunal in the context in which one finds them (as revealing what would be the reason or a part of the reason for affirming the decision immediately prior to the making of the decision), is whether the information in question was a part (that is any part) of the reason for affirming the decision. To the extent that the reasons of the relevant majorities in Paul and VAF can be seen to require that the relevant part of the reason have a stature or importance, or be of a character, which would make it unfair not to invoke the procedures of s 424A, I think SAAP requires that such an approach be rejected. It is only necessary that the information be a part of the reason.
216 That said, it is necessary to recognise the guidance that one nevertheless receives from aspects of [33] in VAF. One always needs to analyse and interpret the reasons of the Tribunal in order to understand the reason for the ultimate reason or conclusion of the lack of satisfaction of the existence of protection obligations. Merely because something is contained in the text of the reasons of the Tribunal which involves “information” does not conclude the question whether it was (and, in the relevant sense, would be) a part of the reason for affirming the decision. The whole of the written reasons must be analysed and interpreted in their context to assess why it was that the Tribunal acted as it did (and so, in the relevant sense, to assess what would be, prior to making the decision, the reason or a part of the reason). Having thus ascertained the reason or reasons (if there be more than one) why the Tribunal was not relevantly satisfied, any information that was (and thus, in the relevant sense, would be) a part of the reasoning process to explain such reason engages the operation of s 424A, without any additional requirement (for which Paul and VAF appear to call) that the relative importance of the information to the reasoning process be assessed to form a judgment as to whether fairness requires the engagement of s 424A. The above tasks of assessment or interpretation of the Tribunal’s reasons, of ascertaining what was any reasoning process and of assessing the relevance of any information thereto may not be straightforward and may lead to conclusions about which minds may differ.
217 I turn to examine each of the appeals in the light of the above. Moore J has set out pertinent aspects of each appeal.
szbmi
218 There was no objection to the proposed amended notice of appeal that was the subject of debate before us. Leave should be given to file that document.
219 I agree with Moore J that the “flight information” was information for the purposes of s 424A(1). I also agree with his reasons therefor.
220 I do not agree with Moore J that the flight information was not a part of the reason for affirming the decision. Whilst it is true to say that the flight information was falsified by an answer to the Tribunal, I do not agree that it played no part in the relevant reasoning of the Tribunal. Though a concession was made at the hearing as to the fact of the dates of leaving, the fact of inconsistency of the prior statement in this respect was a part, even though a subsidiary and minor part of the reason for the decision.
221 I do not regard the operation of s 424A(1) as limited to circumstances where the information imports some positive factual finding. To the extent that cases such as MZWPK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1256 at [14] and SZEKY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1138 [19]-[23] say as much, in my respectful view, they limit too narrowly the operation of the section. That, of course, is one way that the information is a part of the reason. Another would be the inconsistency between the information and what was now being said. If the Tribunal considers that inconsistency relevant to the assessment of the claims, it may be that the information would be part of the reason. If a Tribunal says that it does not believe an applicant for reasons that can be seen to include the fact that one thing was said in the prior statement and another at the hearing, or the fact that if what is now being asserted at the hearing is true it would have been in the prior statement in that form, the information would be part of the reason. The information is the knowledge imparted to the Tribunal of a prior statement in a particular form. The significance given to it by considering it in the light of evidence is the product of mental processes. This significance and those mental processes are not information, but rather, are why the information is relevant for s 424A(1)(b).
222 In my view, it is necessary to exercise care in applying what was said in VAF by Finn J and Stone J at [24(iii)] that the word information does not:
extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps etc.
223 Their Honours referred to WAGP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 276 at [26]-[29] in support of that proposition. Reference to those paragraphs of WAGP makes clear what was being decided in that case. The argument that was rejected in WAGP was that “information” encompassed what was not mentioned to the Tribunal as a matter of evidence. This was a clear application of the distinction between information and mental processes. The argument sought to manufacture “information” out of the consideration and assessment by the Tribunal of the applicant’s oral evidence to the Tribunal. I do not see Finn J and Stone J in VAF in [24(iii)] of their reasons as requiring a formalistic analysis of information such as prior statements depending upon whether its or their relevance is from the text or from the absence of text. Where there are things such as a prior statement or a visa application form, the information for the purposes of s 424A will be that a document in that form was provided. That information may have relevance to the Tribunal for all sorts of reasons. Such relevance is not limited to whether the information leads to a positive factual finding based on its terms. It may be relevant because it plays some part (as here) in the conclusion as to the truthfulness of the applicant.
224 I adhere to and adopt what I said in the above respects in SZECF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1200 to which I would only add that, as I read her Honour’s reasons, Branson J concluded as her Honour did in NAIH of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 223 (discussed in WAGP and SZECF) because of her Honour’s view that it was the unsatisfactory nature of the oral evidence before the Tribunal, alone, that was the reason for affirming the decision.
225 If the Tribunal finds as relevant to its reasoning some inconsistency or incompatibility between earlier information and evidence to it as relevant to its reasoning that may well engage s 424A if such inconsistency or incompatibility can be seen to have been a part of the reason for affirming the decision.
226 Notwithstanding the clear concession in argument made by counsel for the appellant, referred to at [209] above, counsel for the appellant in respect of the flight information referred to what McHugh J said in SAAP at [70]-[71] and his Honour’s approval there of what Gray J said in VEAJ of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 132 FCR 291 at [34] in support of a submission in effect that the information need not be material in any way to the outcome before the Tribunal and need only be a relevant consideration during the Tribunal’s consideration of the material before it for the notion that it would be a part of the reason to be satisfied. It is sufficient to say that McHugh J and Gray J were directing themselves to the question whether a fair raising of a matter orally could act as a substitute for the operation of s 424A. SAAP answers that in the negative. SAAP does not say that s 424A is contravened by oral questioning on a matter which the Tribunal might think at the time of questioning is important if the information on which the questioning occurred can be seen to play no part in the reasoning leading to the affirmation of the decision.
227 The “similar claims information” was, in my view, information. The Tribunal had identically or substantially identically worded statements from others from the same adviser. That was knowledge communicated to the Tribunal concerning some particular fact, subject or event and was knowledge of relevant facts or circumstances communicated to, or received by, the Tribunal. Whilst it does not appear to play a central or integral role in the reasoning process displayed in the reasons, I conclude that it did play a part in the disbelief of the appellant, which was the or a reason for the decision of the Tribunal. It was sufficiently important or relevant for the Tribunal (perfectly fairly I might say) to tax the appellant with the subject at the hearing. The Tribunal described the evidence about that exchange at p 11 of its reasons. There may, in any given case be a relevant distinction to be drawn between using information as part of the reason and the information simply being the context or platform for questioning, the answers to which questioning the Tribunal does not believe and such answers (and not the information) being a part of the reason. Here, however, the identically worded statements were of importance to the Tribunal – hence the questioning. That they remained a relevant operative consideration in the Tribunal’s consideration of the claims can be seen from the following paragraphs in the reasons at pp 12 and 17 respectively:
…The Tribunal was also concerned that the Applicant’s original statement purporting to reflect his own personal experiences included the same details (for the most part in the same words) as the statements of other applicants with the same adviser, including the applicants in N02/41412 and N02/41414, for example in relation to having fled overseas after the 1996 elections and in relation to having led a Taslima Nasreen support group.
…
It follows from the findings in this case, that the Tribunal is satisfied that the essentially common statement submitted by applicants in several cases involving the same adviser (including N02/41412 and N02/41414) untruthfully represents a number of specific things as having befallen the Applicant which are not in fact his own experiences.
228 The introductory words to the last cited paragraph are not enough to dissuade me from the conclusion, based on all of the reasons read together, that the “similar claims information” was a part of the reason for affirming the decision.
229 I reject the assertion that there was a lack of procedural fairness. The Tribunal fairly taxed the appellant with these matters. That a statutory analogue for the rules of procedural fairness has not been complied with does not mean those rules have not been complied with.
230 Section 424A not having been complied with, the appellant is entitled to statutory writs under s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)unless a legitimate reason to withhold such relief can be identified.
231 In SAAP McHugh J referred to the discussion by Gaudron J and Gummow J of the issue and relevant cases in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 at [57]-[62]. From that I take the following to be in accordance with principle. First, subject to what follows, if s 424A is not complied with, the Court does not engage in an enquiry as to whether the breach was so trivial as not to warrant relief. The failure to comply with the statutorily mandated provisions leads to the conclusion that there was a lack of statutory authority to make the decision. In the operation of s 424A and the principles of procedural fairness, adherence to mandated process and procedure is vital. Secondly, as a matter of discretion, relief will be withheld for reasons going to the conduct of the applicant as discussed in Aala and SAAP. No such considerations apply here. Thirdly, if it can be shown that there is a basis, otherwise unimpeached, upon which the decision was reached, unaffected by the failure to accord procedural fairness or to comply with the required statutory procedure, relief can be withheld.
232 Mr Prince submitted that the discretionary reasons which could lead to writs not issuing did not include the existence of an entirely separate unimpeached basis for concluding that Australia did not have protection obligations. I do not agree. What the majority in SAAP stated was that one did not engage in an evaluative analysis of the triviality or seriousness of the failure to observe the statutory requirements. The same was said by Gaudron J and Gummow J in Aala. However, Aala and SAAP leave open (see especially [58] and [59] in Aala) the basis to refuse relief if it can be shown that grant of relief would lack utility. The examples given by Gaudron J and Gummow J in Aala at [58] were (a) where the decision-maker was bound by the governing statute to refuse, (b) where the submissions could only have been answered, as a matter of law, against the person denied the opportunity of making them and (c) if the decision under review has no legal effect.
233 If it can be shown that there was a basis for the Tribunal’s decision which can be seen to be entirely independent of the failure to follow s 424A, in my view, that is sufficiently analogous to the first of the alternatives referred to in [58] of Aala to warrant withholding of relief.
234 The Federal Magistrate concluded that the Tribunal found that “even if the claims made by the applicant were true he was not a refugee”. Unlike the Federal Magistrate, I am unable to discern such a clear basis upon which the failure to follow s 424A had no possible effect. The influence of credit appears to me to pervade the whole of the reasons of the Tribunal. The failure to comply with s 424A has not been shown to be entirely separate from an unimpeached basis for the decision.
235 In my view, the appeal should be allowed and the orders should be made pursuant to s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act.
SZEEU
236 For the reasons set out by Moore J, the conclusion that Al Shamry should be followed disposes of this appeal.
SZEEZ
237 Leave should be given to file the amended notice of appeal, but only on the conditions sought by the first respondent that leave be given to tender the appellant’s passport in relation to ground 1(ii) and that ground 1(iv) be limited to the submissions in paragraph 20 of the appellant’s submission filed on 19 October 2005.
238 I disagree with Moore J about the “manner of exit information”. In my view, it was information for the purposes of s 424A(1) and it was a part of the reason for affirming the decision. True it is that the appellant affirmed the answers to these questions at the hearing, but the Tribunal used the information when it said at p 26 of its reasons:
I prefer his answers made to Questions 47 and 48 of the Application for a Protection Visa where he stated that he left India legally and he did not have any difficulties in obtaining a travel document.
239 As I read the reasons, one of the reasons for the Tribunal concluding as it did about the manner of exit was the fact that these answers had been given in the application form. Thus, I think that this information was part of the basis for concluding that the appellant did not leave India through the assistance of a friend in the way he sought to explain at the hearing and so a part of the reason for affirming the decision.
240 I reject the argument that a letter conforming with the requirements of s 424A was sent in respect of this information. The letter in question was sent before the hearing. It identified different, though related, information. It stated the following:
The information was as follows:
1.There is no restriction of movement across state borders in India; the applicant can speak, read and write English and Tamil, has tertiary qualifications and has successfully run a business. He is also relatively young.
2.Indian immigration officials have access to airport computer systems that enable the checking of any charges or criminal records against departing Indian nationals.
241 Clearly this information was related to the answers to questions 47 and 48 of the visa application, but the importance of the “manner of exit information” was (in the opinion of the Tribunal) that it contradicted his evidence about leaving with the assistance of the friend.
242 For these reasons s 424A was not complied with.
243 Given these views it is strictly unnecessary for me to deal with the other issues in the appeal. Argument took place in relation thereto, and Moore J has dealt with them. Therefore I will state my views briefly.
244 I agree with Moore J about the “business visa information”. It was undoubtedly the subject of questioning but the information was not a part of the decision. Rather the answer given at the hearing was – his concession that the business visa had been signed falsely.
245 I agree with Moore J about the “PRC visa information”.
246 I agree with Moore J about the “death certificate information”, and the “advocate’s statement information” and the “abandonment information”.
247 There was no breach of the rules of procedural fairness. I accept the Minister’s submissions that the Tribunal fairly dealt with all issues and gave the appellant a fair opportunity to be heard.
248 There was no argument by the Minister that irrespective of non-compliance with s 424A, relief should be denied on a discretionary basis.
249 For the above reasons, I would allow the appeal and would make orders pursuant to s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act.
SZEOP
250 I do not see any prejudice in permitting the notice of appeal to be amended in the form handed up at the appeal.
251 I agree with Moore J as to the first ground of the appeal. No question of a duty to enquire could arise in the circumstances. It is therefore unnecessary to rehearse the various cases on the subject of an asserted duty to enquire.
252 I agree with Moore J as to the second ground of the appeal. As to the argument based on s 424A and the letter from the person, I would prefer to base my conclusion on the fact that the letter from the person was sent to the Tribunal attached to a submission from the appellant’s adviser. Plainly s 424A(3)(b) applied to it.
253 As to the “date of the application information”, this was knowledge gained by the Tribunal from the appellant’s visa application. It was information for the purposes of s 424A(1).
254 I disagree with Moore J that it was not a part of the reason for affirming the decision. Whilst it is undoubted that the Tribunal had regard to what it considered the unsatisfactory explanation for the delay in seeking a protection visa, a reading of the Tribunal’s reasons, and in particular p 14 thereof, reveals reliance on the fact that the visa was not applied until 2004 in its conclusion that he held no fear of persecution. That fact was a part of the reasoning of the Tribunal.
255 For this reason I conclude that s 424A was not complied with. No submission was put that notwithstanding any found failure to comply with s 424A, relief should be refused because of an independent and separate basis for the conclusion of the Tribunal. In these circumstances the appeal should be allowed and orders made pursuant to s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act.
256 Given that the other asserted contraventions of s 424A were argued and have been dealt with by Moore J, I will express my views thereon.
257 I agree with Moore J’s conclusions about the “bridging visa information”. I would only add that I do not see how this information was any part whatever of the reason for affirming the decision.
258 I agree with Moore J’s conclusions about the “detention information”.
259 I agree with Moore J’s conclusions about the “student rally information”.
260 I agree with Moore J’s conclusions about the results of the enquiries made by the Tribunal in relation to Alan.
261 The amended notice of appeal also dealt with results of inquiries made by the Tribunal on the internet. The appellant said that he had posted photographs of himself on the internet which revealed his homosexuality. The Tribunal examined these and concluded that they revealed no such thing. No written submissions were filed on this ground (ground 2(vi)) but brief oral submissions were made. In my view, the photographs were information. They were not covered by s 424A(3)(b). Unlike the results of the enquiries made by the Tribunal about Alan, the results of these enquiries formed part of the reasons (see p 15 of the decision). Although reflecting only a lack of corroborative evidence, that lack of evidence was a part of the reason for the decision. This would be another ground upholding the appeal.
262 Given my view as to the disposition of the appeal, it is not necessary to deal with the issue as to the effect, if any, of the guard being present during the hearing.
szdxa
263 Substantive objection was taken by the Minister to ground 1(iv) of the prepared amended notice of appeal dealing with the Haque information. This was opposed on the basis that if it had been squarely raised below the transcript of the Tribunal hearing would have been tendered. That would be a good objection if what was said at the hearing could in any way affect the relevant analysis, as it would to the extent to which the complaint is based on procedural fairness. Thus, to the extent that ground 1(iv) supports a complaint as to procedural fairness, I would not allow the notice of appeal to be amended. However, I would allow that ground to be amended for the purposes of supporting a complaint under s 424A. It was not in dispute that a letter satisfying s 424A was not sent in the required fashion in connection with this information.
264 I agree with Moore J’s conclusions and reasons in relation to this appeal.
I certify that the preceding eighty-one (81) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Allsop.
Associate:
Dated: 23 February 2006
In SZBMI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (NSD 1353 OF 2005):
Counsel for the Appellant S Prince with A Joseph Counsel for the First Respondent Dr M Perry QC with R Pepper Solicitor for the First Respondent Sparke Helmore Date of Hearing: 27, 28 October 2005 Date of last Submission: 22 November 2005 Date of Judgment: 24 February 2006
In SZEEZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (NSD 556 OF 2005):
Counsel for the Appellant S Prince with A Joseph Counsel for the First Respondent Dr M Perry QC with R Pepper Solicitor for the First Respondent Sparke Helmore Date of Hearing: 27, 28 October 2005 Date of last Submission: 22 November 2005 Date of Judgment: 24 February 2006
In SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (NSD 551 OF 2005):
Counsel for the Appellant S Prince with A Joseph Counsel for the First Respondent Dr M Perry QC with R Pepper Solicitors for the First Respondent
Blake Dawson Waldron Date of Hearing: 27, 28 October 2005 Date of last Submission: 22 November 2005 Date of Judgment: 24 February 2006
In SZDXA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (NSD 1067 OF 2005):
Counsel for the Appellant S Prince with A Joseph Counsel for the First Respondent Dr M Perry QC with R Pepper Solicitors for the First Respondent Blake Dawson Waldron Date of Hearing: 27, 28 October 2005 Date of last Submission: 22 November 2005 Date of Judgment: 24 February 2006
In SZEOP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (NSD 858 OF 2005):
Counsel for the Appellant S Prince with A Joseph Counsel for the First Respondent Dr M Perry QC with R Pepper Solicitors for the First Respondent Blake Dawson Waldron Date of Hearing: 27, 28 October 2005 Date of last Submission: 22 November 2005 Date of Judgment: 24 February 2006
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