SZECF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZECF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1200

MIGRATION – SAAP v MIMIA (2005) 215 ALR 162; MIMA v Al Shamry (2001) 110 FCR 24; s 424A Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – circumstances in which prior statement may be information that is the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review

SZECF v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
NSD 1977 of 2004

ALLSOP J
5 SEPTEMBER 2005
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1977 of 2004

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZECF
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

ALLSOP J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 SEPTEMBER 2005

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) be joined as second respondent to this appeal.

2.The appeal be allowed.

3.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs (if any).

4.The orders of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia made on 14 December 2004 be set aside.

5.In lieu thereof it be ordered that:

a.A writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision of the Tribunal made on 27 June 2004

b.The Tribunal reconsider the review brought by the appellant of the decision of the delegate of the Minister.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1977 of 2004

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZECF
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

ALLSOP J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 SEPTEMBER 2005

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal against orders made by a Federal Magistrate dismissing an application for review by the appellant in respect of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) which affirmed the decision of a delegate not to grant a protection visa.

  2. The matter was heard by me, in the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, sitting as a single Judge, pursuant to a direction of the Chief Justice under s 25(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth).

  3. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He claims that he was persecuted by Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) activists. He said that he was tortured due to his involvement with a leading political figure in the Awami League, Dr H E M Iqbal. Dr Iqbal had been involved in politics and had set up a private airline. The appellant worked for Dr Iqbal as his personal assistant for a number of years. The appellant claimed that the opponents of Dr Iqbal in the BNP had filed a false case against Dr Iqbal charging him with murder. The appellant said that he was not charged, but Dr Iqbal advised him that if he did not leave his employment he might have similar charges laid against…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCA 1200
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Szecf v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the applicant, Szecf, sought judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) that dismissed his application for a protection visa. The central issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had failed to comply with its obligations under s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 by not providing Szecf with information concerning his alleged misconduct in Australia. Specifically, the court had to determine whether this information constituted 'information' within the meaning of s 424A, and if the Tribunal was required to disclose it to Szecf before making its decision.

The court held that the information concerning Szecf's alleged misconduct in Australia did not constitute 'information' under s 424A. The court reasoned that 'information' refers to specific facts or data that the Tribunal has considered, rather than conclusions drawn from the evidence or gaps in the applicant's story. The court relied on several authorities to support its conclusion, including the Full Federal Court's decision in WAGP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Branson J's judgment in NAIH of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. The court found that the Tribunal's decision to reject Szecf's application was based on its disbelief of his account of events in Pakistan, not his conduct in Australia.

The court also considered the policy implications of requiring the Tribunal to disclose every deficiency in an applicant's evidence. The court concluded that such a requirement would lead to protracted and potentially endless review processes, which was not the intention of the legislature. Furthermore, the court noted that the Tribunal had already recognised its s 424A obligations and provided Szecf with information in other instances, indicating the relative importance of the information concerning his conduct in Australia.

In light of the above, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia, and ordered the Tribunal to reconsider Szecf's application for a protection visa. The respondent was also ordered to pay Szecf's costs, if any.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) be joined as second respondent to this appeal.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs (if any).

4. The orders of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia made on 14 December 2004 be set aside.

5. In lieu thereof it be ordered that:

a. A writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision of the Tribunal made on 27 June 2004

b. The Tribunal reconsider the review brought by the appellant of the decision of the delegate of the Minister.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

ALLSOP J
Minds might differ about questions such as these. This will be so because, after analysis of the expressed reasons of the Tribunal, one must assess or characterize the importance of the information itself to the reasoning process of the Tribunal apparently underlying its conclusion as to lack of satisfaction. That this process may be seen to be judgmental is illustrated by the approach of Finn J and Stone J in VAF. Having analysed the Tribunal’s reasons, their Honours concluded as follows at [41-[43].Considered in the context of the tribunal’s reasoning process and having regard to the aggregate of findings made that rejected both that the appellant had been persecuted for a Convention reason and that his situation was such as to give rise to a well founded fear of persecution, reference to the information as to his behaviour in Australia can only be categorised as being relatively minor and unimportant in the scheme of things. It was not so integral to the reasoning process rejecting the appellant’s claim as to require as a matter of fairness that the appellant be told that information (cf s 424A(1)(a)) and why it was relevant to the review (cf s 424A(1)(b)).The tribunal explicitly recognised it had s 424A obligations, giving in its reasons an instance where information was in consequence provided to the appellant. Given this, and given the care with which it put important issues to the appellant (for example in relation to the FIR), we consider that the tribunal itself has given some indication of the relative importance of the information relating to his behaviour. It did not reach the s 424A(1)(a) threshold.The reason the appellant’s application was rejected related to the tribunal’s non-acceptance of what the appellant alleged occurred in Pakistan. It did not relate to his conduct in Australia. The significance of the Australian behaviour such as it was, was that it was consistent in its own way with, and thus confirmatory of, a conclusion taken for other reasons. It was not, for s 424A purposes, a part of the reason for that conclusion.[emphasis added] I have extracted earlier the places in the Tribunal’s reasons where the prior statement is used. Having read the whole of the reasons of the Tribunal, it is clear that the comprehensive disbelief of the appellant and the finding that he had brought forward fraudulent documentation was largely, if not wholly, a product of the importance placed by the Tribunal on the form and content of his first statement. In short, the Tribunal found that if what he was saying were true, it would have been referred to earlier. The fact that it was not, demonstrated the falsity of his evidence to the Tribunal. Finn J and Stone J in VAF at [24], however, said that “identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or conclusions arrived at by weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps” were not information. This was said by reference to WAGP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 276, 282-83 [26]-[29]. The Full Court there decided that “information” did not include a failure to mention something to the Tribunal. The Full Court said at [26] to [29]:In our opinion, the word "information" in s 424A(1) does not encompass a failure to mention a matter to the RRT. As the Full Court observed in Win at 218 [20] "information" is used in the same sense in ss 424(1) and 424A(1). Section 424(1) provides that the RRT "may get any information that it considers relevant". It is inappropriate to speak of the RRT "getting information" where the substance of that information is merely an observation that the appellant did not refer to a particular matter in his evidence. The fact that the appellant failed to refer to a particular matter constitutes nothing more than an aspect of the RRT's reasoning concerning a deficiency in his evidence. That observation cannot meaningfully be described as "information". Moreover, the appellant's submission cannot be accepted as a matter of sound policy. To permit an applicant for review of a delegate's decision to comment on each deficiency in his or her evidence, as viewed by the RRT, has the potential to allow a protracted and almost never ending process of review, a result plainly not intended by the legislature. At 218 [22] in Win the Full Court considered that assertions which cast doubt on an applicant's version of events may constitute "information" for the purposes of s 424A. However, the assertions in Win were those of an informant. The Full Court did not intend to include in its definition of "information" conclusions arrived at by the RRT in weighing up aspects of the evidence of an applicant by reference to gaps or defects in that evidence. Support for the approach we take to our rejection of counsel's submission may be gleaned from the judgment of Branson J in NAIH of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 223 at 226 [8] where her Honour said: "I am inclined to doubt that an intention can be discerned in s 424A that the totality of the claims and assertions in a statement or statements made by an applicant in support of his or her initial application, whether believed by the Tribunal or not, and the general impression, whether of coherence or otherwise, created by those claims and assertions, is `information' received by the Tribunal when the Tribunal is given a copy or record of the statement or statements. If such an intention is to be discerned from the section, the consequences would seem to be that, before the Tribunal can place weight on any inconsistency or incompatibility between claims and assertions made to the Department and the evidence given by the applicant to the Tribunal, the requirements of s 424A would have to be met. As Merkel J pointed out in Al Shamry [2001] FCA 919 at [30], [(2001) 110 FCR 27 at 37] the requirements of s 424A are unlikely to be able to be met during the course of the hearing before the Tribunal. It may be that the invitation to comment could be given by hand to the applicant at the hearing pursuant to s 441A(2) although Merkel J seems to have doubted this. However, even if the invitation were able to be given to an applicant during the course of a hearing, the effect of s 424B is that the time within which the comments could be given would be unlikely to expire until well after the completion of the hearing. Consequently, in virtually every case in which the Tribunal considered that a reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review would be inconsistency or incompatibility between a statement made by the applicant to the Department and the applicant's evidence to the Tribunal, the review process would have to be extended to allow the invitation required by s 424A of the Act to be issued and the applicant given an opportunity to respond." We are also fortified in our conclusion that the matters sought to be relied upon by counsel for the appellant do not constitute "information", in the relevant sense, by the remarks of Tamberlin J in WABY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1091. An issue in that case was whether the RRT had failed to furnish the appellant with particulars in writing of information to which the RRT had had regard, contrary to s 424A. A matter relied upon by the RRT, and claimed not to have been particularised, concerned the evidence of a Mr Davoodi, a witness said to corroborate the appellant's case. His evidence was considered by the RRT and rejected. Tamberlin J observed (at [15]-[18]): "The submission for the appellant, in relation to Mr Davoodi's evidence is not, in substance, that he was unaware of the particulars of the information, but that the RRT did not inform him in writing as to the approach it would take in relation to the evidence of Mr Davoodi. The RRT did not have any obligation to give information to the appellant, before making its decision, as to its reasoning process or its conclusions in relation to the inconsistency or unconvincing nature of the evidence of Mr Davoodi. The appellant had called Mr Davoodi and it was for the RRT to accept or reject his evidence or to give it such weight as it thought appropriate. It cannot be said in any way that the appellant was unaware of the nature and extent of the information. It is well settled that in reasoning to its conclusion there is no obligation on the RRT to accept submissions as credible and it does not have to set out or provide to an applicant, prior to the making of its decision, its reasoning process in reaching a conclusion in order to enable an applicant to make further submissions in relation to a proposed line of reasoning. As the Full Federal Court said in Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 at 592: The decision-maker is required to advise of any adverse conclusion which has been arrived at which would not obviously be open on the known material. Subject to these qualifications however, a decision-maker is not obliged to expose his or her mental processes or provisional views to comment before making the decision in question.' (Emphasis added.) This extract was cited with approval by Kirby J in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 at 117-118 [194]."

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: ALLSOP J