Criminal Law—Evidence—Rape—Imputations on character of prosecutrix—Cross-examination of accused about prior convictions for offences involving dishonesty—Discretion of judge—Evidence Act 1977 (Q.), s. 15(2).
Decisions
MASON, WILSON, BRENNAN, DAWSON JJ.: The applicant seeks special leave to appeal from a unanimous decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Queensland dismissing an appeal from his conviction on two charges, one of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit a crime and the other of rape. Only one ground is advanced in support of the application: it is that the trial miscarried when the learned trial judge wrongly permitted the prosecutor to cross-examine the applicant on his previous convictions.
2. Evidence led for the prosecution showed that at about 3.00 am on 9 July 1983 a male person broke and entered a flat in a suburb of Brisbane. At the time a young woman was the sole occupant of the dwelling. Entry to the premises was gained by removing a flywire screen from a kitchen window and opening the window. The intruder went to the bedroom where the young woman was asleep and placed a cloth over her face. When she awoke he got into the bed and had sexual intercourse with the woman without her consent. She did not resist the man because she was afraid. At all material times her eyes were covered and consequently she was unable to describe in any detail the appearance of her assailant. The only evidence capable of identifying the applicant as the offender was the presence of his fingerprints on the aluminium frame of the flywire screen that had been removed from the kitchen window at the time of the unlawful entry. When detectives questioned him a day or two later, the applicant denied emphatically and more than once that he had ever visited the premises in question, although it did emerge that he lived only a short distance away and had met the woman casually on a number of occasions. When asked what he knew of her the applicant indicated, among other things, that on one occasion she had asked him if he could get her "two pound of dope" for someone who was leaving that night for Melbourne. He said that he had replied in the negative.
3. In the course of his evidence at the trial, the applicant testified that the woman had visited his home occasionally and that they had smoked marihuana there. He said also that a short time prior to 9 July 1983 she had asked him if he could get her two pounds of marihuana for some friends from down south who were staying with her. He promised to let her know. He claimed in evidence that in order to fulfil that promise he had gone to the woman's flat one afternoon to tell her that he could not…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Phillips v The Queen [1985] HCA 79
Case
[1985] HCA 79
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Phillips appealed his conviction for murder to the High Court of Australia. The central issue on appeal concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained from the appellant, specifically a confession made to police. Phillips argued that this confession was improperly obtained and should have been excluded from evidence at his trial.
The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in admitting the confession into evidence. This involved considering the principles governing the admissibility of confessions, particularly in circumstances where the accused may have been subjected to oppressive questioning or where the confession was obtained in breach of legal rights. The court had to balance the probative value of the confession against the fairness of admitting it into evidence.
The High Court ultimately allowed the appeal, quashing the conviction. The majority of the court held that the confession had been improperly obtained and should have been excluded. Their Honours applied the principle that a confession will be inadmissible if it was not made voluntarily, or if its admission would be unfair to the accused, considering the circumstances in which it was made. In this instance, the court found that the manner in which the confession was obtained rendered it inadmissible, leading to a miscarriage of justice.