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Seymour v R

Seymour v R

Case [2006] NSWCCA 206 18 July 2006

Criminal Liability

Miscarriage of Justice

Admissibility of Evidence

Criminal Law

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Reported Decision:
162 A Crim R 576

New South Wales

Court of Criminal Appeal

CITATION: Seymour v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 206

HEARING DATE(S): 9 February 2006

JUDGMENT DATE:
18 July 2006

JUDGMENT OF: Hunt AJA at [1], [71]; Simpson J at [69]; Rothman J at [70]

DECISION: 1. The appeal is upheld and the conviction is quashed.; 2. A new trial is to be held.

CATCHWORDS: Accused charged with detain female for advantage, namely to assault her - his counsel allows evidence of his response to the complainant's plea to be allowed to leave, that he had "just got out of gaol five days ago, you'll dog me to the cops" - counsel elicits evidence of accused's criminal record to prove that he had no convictions for violence towards women, emphasising the length of his record, his lack of success as a criminal and his propensity for street offences, and describing him as a "property crim" - no rational or reasonable explanation for eliciting more than no such convictions and reasons for being in gaol (for only two weeks following a conviction for shoplifting) - trial necessarily unfair - miscarriage of justice. - Prasad direction - co-accused acquitted by jury - danger of giving direction in circumstances where there may be a problem for the jury in understanding the real nature of the Crown case.

LEGISLATION CITED: Crimes Act 1900
Criminal Appeal Act 1912
Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Evidence Act 1995

CASES CITED: Ali v The Queen (2005) 214 ALR 1
Dawson v The Queen (1961) 106 CLR 1
DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421
Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 106
Hall v Braybrook (1955) 95 CLR 620
Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495
M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487
Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1
MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606
Mraz v The Queen (1955) 93 CLR 493
New South Wales v Bujoso (2005) 222 ALR 663
Nudd v The Queen (2006) 225 ALR 161
Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297
Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461
Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45
Regina v Aziz [1996] AC 41
Regina v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131
Regina v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677
Regina v Ensor [1989] 1 WLR 497
Regina v Falealili [1996] 3 NZLR 664
Regina v Knape [1965] VR 469
Regina v Macraild, Court of Criminal Appeal (BC9707215), 18 December 1997, unreported
Regina v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450
Regina v Miletic [1977] 1 VR 593
Regina v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191
Regina v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161
Regina v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182
Scott v The Queen [1989] AC 1242
The Queen v Duke (1979) 22 SASR 46
TKWJ v The Queen (2002) 212 CLR 124
Wilde v The Queen (1988) 164 CLR 365

PARTIES: Michael Peter Seymour v Regina

FILE NUMBER(S): CCA 2005/1685

COUNSEL: SE O'Connor - Appellant
S Kavanagh -…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Seymour v R

Details

AGLC: Seymour v R [2006] NSWCCA 206
Case: [2006] NSWCCA 206
Decision Date: 18 July 2006

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The accused in the matter of Seymour v R faced charges related to detaining a female for his advantage, with the specific intent to assault her. During the trial, the court was presented with evidence of the accused's response to the complainant's plea to be allowed to leave, where he stated, "just got out of gaol five days ago, you'll dog me to the cops." The accused's counsel elicited evidence of the accused's criminal record to demonstrate that he had no convictions for violence towards women, focusing on the length of his criminal history, his lack of success as a criminal, and his tendency for street offences. The counsel described the accused as a "property crim." However, there was no rational or reasonable explanation for eliciting more than the absence of convictions for violence against women and the reasons for his recent incarceration (which was for only two weeks following a conviction for shoplifting). The trial was deemed unfair, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The legal issues the court had to decide involved whether the accused's counsel's actions during the trial were appropriate and whether the evidence presented affected the fairness of the trial. The primary concern was whether the trial was conducted in a manner that ensured the accused received a fair hearing and whether the evidence presented was relevant and necessary. The court had to determine if the accused's criminal record, which did not include convictions for violence towards women, should have been presented to the jury in such detail and whether this affected the fairness of the trial.

The court found that the accused's counsel's actions in eliciting extensive details of the accused's criminal record were not justified and had potentially prejudiced the jury. The court emphasised that the only relevant information should have been the absence of convictions for violence towards women and the reasons for the accused's recent incarceration. The court concluded that the trial was necessarily unfair due to the manner in which the evidence was presented, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Additionally, the court noted the risk of giving a Prasad direction in circumstances where there may be a problem for the jury in understanding the real nature of the Crown case, especially since the co-accused was acquitted by the jury.

Orders