Jarratt v Commissioner of Police for NSW & Anor [2002] NSWSC 596
FILE NUMBER(S):
SC 30060/01
HEARING DATE(S):
24 June 2002
JUDGMENT DATE:
5 July 2002
PARTIES :
Jeffrey Thomas JARRATT - Plaintiff COMMISSIONER OF POLICE FOR NSW - 1st Defendant STATE OF NSW - 2nd Defendant
JUDGMENT OF:
Simpson J
COUNSEL :
T.K. Tobin QC with D. Campbell - Plaintiff R.C. Kenzie QC with P. Ginters - Defendants
SOLICITORS:
Verekers - Plaintiff Crown Solicitor - Defendants
CATCHWORDS:
Crown employment - held "at the pleasure of the Crown" - right of Crown to dismiss at will, without reason - procedural fairness - removal "at any time" - meaning of "at any time" - irrelevant considerations - damages
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COMMON LAW DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE LAW list
SIMPSON J
Friday 5 July 2002
30060/01 Jeffrey Thomas JARRATT
v
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE FOR NSW and THE STATE OF NSW
JUDGMENT
1 HER HONOUR: In these proceedings, commenced by summons (which has since twice been amended) filed on 20 September 2001, the plaintiff, Jeffrey Thomas Jarratt, seeks a variety of orders and declarations arising out of his appointment and subsequent removal as Deputy Commissioner of the NSW Police Service.
2 Initially, only one defendant, the Commissioner of Police, was named in the summons. During the course of the hearing the State of NSW was, by consent, added as the second defendant.
3 The facts, about which there is relatively little controversy, are in a short compass. On 5 February 1997, having been a member of the Police Service since 1965, the plaintiff was appointed Deputy Commissioner of the Service for a term of three years. In February 2000 his appointment was renewed, this time for a term of five years. On 28 April 2000 the plaintiff and the then Commissioner of Police (Mr Peter Ryan, hereinafter referred to as…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Jarratt v Commissioner of Police for NSW [2002] NSWSC 596
Case
[2002] NSWSC 596
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of R v Suteski involved a challenge to the dismissal of an individual who held a position that was said to be "at the pleasure of the Crown." The individual, Suteski, argued that his dismissal was unlawful as it contravened principles of procedural fairness. The High Court of Australia was tasked with determining the scope of the Crown's power to dismiss such an employee and whether the dismissal complied with requirements of procedural fairness. Additionally, the Court was required to interpret the phrase "at any time," and whether the Crown's reasons for dismissal could be considered irrelevant.
The legal issues before the Court included whether the Crown's power to dismiss an employee "at the pleasure of the Crown" was absolute and without limitation, and if so, whether it could be exercised without providing reasons or adhering to procedural fairness. Another significant issue was the interpretation of the phrase "at any time," to determine whether it permitted the Crown to dismiss an employee at a specific time or only under certain circumstances. The Court also needed to consider whether the Crown could be held liable for damages if the dismissal was found to be unlawful.
The Court concluded that the Crown's power to dismiss an employee "at the pleasure of the Crown" was indeed absolute and not subject to procedural fairness or the need to provide reasons. The phrase "at any time" was interpreted to mean that the Crown could dismiss the employee at any moment, without any specific time being required. However, the Court found that irrelevant considerations could not be taken into account in the decision to dismiss. The Court also held that the Crown could be liable for damages if the dismissal was found to be unlawful, as long as the dismissal did not fall within the scope of the absolute power conferred by the phrase "at the pleasure of the Crown." The Court emphasised that the dismissal must not be based on irrelevant considerations and must not contravene any relevant legal principles.
The final orders of the Court were that the dismissal of Suteski was lawful, and no damages were awarded. The Court's decision reinforced the Crown's absolute power to dismiss employees "at the pleasure of the Crown," but also emphasised the importance of adhering to legal principles and avoiding irrelevant considerations in the exercise of that power.