Smith v Aircraft Maintenance Services Australia (AMSA) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Smith v Aircraft Maintenance Services Australia (AMSA) Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 264

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Smith v Aircraft Maintenance Services Australia (AMSA) Pty Ltd [2017] FCCA 1846
File number: QUD 403 of 2017
Judge: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 9 March 2018
Catchwords: EVIDENCE – exclusion of evidence at trial under s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – whether primary judge erred in excluding affidavit – whether primary judge should have considered whether misleading, confusing or prejudicial effect could be overcome by the trial judge adjusting weight to be given to the evidence – application for leave to appeal and appeal allowed – application remitted to Federal Circuit Court
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 63, 135, 192

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 44, 45, 357 and 570

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Cases cited:

ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1269

ACE Insurance Ltd v Trifunovski (2013) 209 FCR 146

Australian Mutual Provident Society v Chaplin (1978) 18 ALR 385

Citibank Ltd v Liu [2003] NSWSC 569

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Data Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Fair Work Ombudsman v Ecosway Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 296

Hollis v Vabu Pty Limited (2001) 207 CLR 21

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564

Maviglia v Maviglia [1999] NSWCA 188

NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 435

Ordukaya v Hicks [2000] NSWCA 180

Park v Brothers (2005) 222 ALR 421

R vSuteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182

Samsung Electronics Co Limited v Apple Inc [2013] FCAFC 138

Date of hearing: 20 November 2017
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 48
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Rawlings with Ms L Barnes
Solicitor for the Applicant: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A Herbert
Solicitor for the Respondent: McCullough Robertson

ORDERS

QUD 403 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BRIAN SMITH BY HIS LITIGATION GUARDIAN, MATTHEW SMITH

Applicant

AND:

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE SERVICES AUSTRALIA (AMSA) PTY LTD

Respondent

JUDGE:

RANGIAH J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 MARCH 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant has leave to appeal.

2.The appeal is allowed.

3.The applicant’s application for the admission of his affidavit into evidence is remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for determination.

4.There will be no order as to the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

5.The title of the applicant is amended to “Brian Smith by his litigation guardian, Matthew Smith”.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RANGIAH J:

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal against an interlocutory judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 31 July 2017.  The primary judge ordered, in…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 264
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Smith v Aircraft Maintenance Services Australia (AMSA) Pty Ltd, the appeal was brought by the appellant, Brian Smith, represented by his litigation guardian, against the respondent, AMSA. The appellant, who had suffered a stroke, alleged that he had been employed by the respondent as an aircraft maintenance engineer under a contract of service, rather than as an independent contractor. The primary judge had admitted the appellant’s affidavit under s 63 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), as the appellant was not available to give oral evidence due to his incapacity. However, the primary judge subsequently excluded the affidavit under s 135 of the Act, leading the appellant to argue that this was an error on the part of the primary judge. The appeal sought to challenge the exclusion of the affidavit.

The legal issues at hand were whether the primary judge erred in excluding the affidavit and whether the primary judge should have considered whether the misleading, confusing, or prejudicial effect of the evidence could be overcome by adjusting the weight to be given to the evidence. The appellant contended that the primary judge failed to assess the affidavit's probative value before weighing it against the potential dangers outlined in s 135 of the Evidence Act. However, the Court found that no argument had been made before the primary judge that s 135 should be applied on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis, and the Court could not entertain a different case on appeal.

The Court found that the appellant should be granted leave to appeal, and the appeal should be allowed. The judgment of the primary judge should be set aside, and the matter should be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for determination. The Court also noted that the primary judge had already expressed a firm view on the admissibility of the affidavit, so it would be preferable for the application to admit the evidence to be considered by a different judge. As for the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal, there would be no order, given the limitations imposed by s 570 of the Fair Work Act.

In conclusion, the appeal was allowed, and the case was remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for the determination of the appellant's application for the admission of his affidavit into evidence. No order was made as to the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal. The title of the applicant was amended to "Brian Smith by his litigation guardian, Matthew Smith."

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant has leave to appeal.

2. The appeal is allowed.

3. The applicant’s application for the admission of his affidavit into evidence is remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for determination.

4. There will be no order as to the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

5. The title of the applicant is amended to “Brian Smith by his litigation guardian, Matthew Smith”.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The primary judge held that the appellant’s affidavit was admissible under s 63 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) as the appellant lacks capacity to give oral evidence, but then excluded the affidavit under s 135 of that Act. The appellant submits that his Honour erred in refusing to admit the affidavit into evidence.Background In the principal proceeding, the appellant alleges that he worked as an aircraft maintenance engineer for the respondent at the Coolangatta airport from 2003 until 2015. Each year he would execute a document called a “Subcontract Agreement” which set out the terms and conditions of his engagement, including his remuneration. Despite that, the appellant alleges that the totality of the terms, conditions and circumstances of his engagement demonstrates that he was in fact employed by the respondent under a contract of service. The appellant alleges that in the period from 2010 to 2015, the respondent should have paid him the wages required by the relevant Award and provided him with annual leave and long-service leave. He alleges that the respondent contravened ss 44, 45 and 357 of the Fair Work Act by its failure to do so. It may be seen that the main issue in the principal proceeding is whether the appellant was an employee of the respondent or an independent contractor. In February 2015, the appellant suffered a stroke. At that stage he was well enough to instruct solicitors, who commenced the proceeding on 20 May 2015. The appellant’s health then declined. Initially, the medical evidence was equivocal as to whether the appellant had capacity to give oral evidence and make decisions as to the conduct of the trial, and the trial was set down for four days commencing on 31 July 2017. However, in the week before the trial, a doctor examined the appellant and formed the view that he no longer had capacity. The primary judge then made an order appointing the appellant’s son as his litigation guardian. The appellant had affirmed an affidavit on 19 September 2016, setting out in substantial detail the circumstances under which he came to be engaged by the respondent, the nature, terms and conditions of his engagement thereafter and various other matters relevant to the case. The application before the primary judge On the first day of the trial, the appellant’s litigation guardian applied to the Court for an order that the appellant’s affidavit be admitted into evidence at the trial. The application relied on s 63 of the Evidence Act. Under that section, the hearsay rule does not apply to a document so far as it contains a representation if the person who made the representation is “not available to give evidence” because the person is, relevantly, “mentally or physically unable to give the evidence and it is not reasonably practicable to overcome that inability”: see cl 4(1)(c) of Pt 2 of the Dictionary for the Evidence Act. It was not in dispute before the primary judge that the appellant was “not available to give evidence” and his Honour decided that the appellant’s affidavit was admissible under s 63 of the Evidence Act. That ruling is not in issue in the application for leave to appeal.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 135 of the Evidence Act provides:135 General discretion to exclude evidenceThe court may refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might:(a) be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or(b) be misleading or confusing; or(c) cause or result in undue waste of time. The expression “probative value” is defined in the Dictionary for the Evidence Act as meaning “the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.” Section 192 of the Evidence Act provides:192 Leave, permission or direction may be given on terms(1)If, because of this Act, a court may give any leave, permission or direction, the leave, permission or direction may be given on such terms as the court thinks fit.(2)Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to give the leave, permission or direction, it is to take into account:(a)the extent to which to do so would be likely to add unduly to, or to shorten, the length of the hearing; and(b)the extent to which to do so would be unfair to a party or to a witness; and(c)the importance of the evidence in relation to which the leave, permission or direction is sought; and(d)the nature of the proceeding; and(e)the power (if any) of the court to adjourn the hearing or to make another order or to give a direction in relation to the evidence. I understand Ground 2 of the appellant’s proposed grounds of appeal to assert that the primary judge erred by excluding the whole of Mr Smith’s affidavit from evidence, whereas uncontroversial representations in the affidavit ought not to have been excluded. The difficulty with Ground 2 is that no argument was addressed to the primary judge that s 135 of the Evidence Act ought to be applied to the affidavit on a paragraph by paragraph basis. Rather, counsel who represented the appellant before the primary judge argued only that the affidavit as a whole should not be excluded. His Honour approached his ruling on that basis. There can be no error in his Honour failing to adopt a course which was never contended for by the appellant. Further, as a general rule, a party is bound by the conduct of his or her case and a different case cannot be run on appeal: see, for example, Park v Brothers (2005) 222 ALR 421 at [34]-[35]. Accordingly, Ground 2 cannot succeed. In the course of the hearing, counsel now appearing for the appellant submitted that the primary judge had failed to commence by assessing the affidavit to ascertain its probative value, including by reference to uncontested matters, before weighing that probative value against the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial or be misleading or confusing. Counsel for the respondent objected to that submission being made on the basis that it was not reflected in the grounds of appeal. Counsel for the appellant argued that Ground 2 should also be understood to encompass the issue, but I rejected that argument. The appellant’s Counsel, on instructions, declined to apply for leave to amend Ground 2 to reflect the issue. Accordingly, I ruled that the argument was not one that was able to be raised in the application for leave to appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I do not think that the passage extracted above can be read as his Honour as having reached a conclusion as to the ultimate issue for trial. Again, the judgment was given ex tempore and some allowance must be made for infelicity of expression. I consider that his Honour meant no more than that the circumstances explained why the respondent intended to contract the work out. There seems to be no controversy as to what was the respondent’s intention, but only whether that intention had been achieved. Further, the proceeding concerns the position in the period from 2010 onwards, so that his Honour’s statement about position in 2003 could not have reflected a view as to the position seven years later. In addition, his Honour said later at [31] that “the major question here is whether the applicant was truly an employee or whether he was a contractor”. This indicates that his Honour was well aware that this question fell to be determined following a trial. For these reasons, the appellant’s fifth ground cannot succeed.Conclusion For the reasons I have given, the appellant should be granted leave to appeal and the appeal should be allowed. The judgment of the primary judge should be set aside. The parties did not submit that I should proceed to decide whether the affidavit should be excluded under s 135 of the Evidence Act in the event that I allowed the appeal. The matter should therefore be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for determination. As the primary judge has already expressed a firm view as to the admissibility of the affidavit, it would be preferable for the application to admit the evidence to be considered by a different judge. The jurisdiction of the Court to award costs is limited by s 570 of the Fair Work Act. There will be no order as to the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.