Defence—Military Forces—Royal Australian Air Force—Termination of officer's appointment by Executive Council—No action for wrongful dismissal—Air Force Regulations (Cth), regs. 72(1), 628(1). Constitutional Law—Crown—Office held at pleasure—Immaterial whether cause be shown on termination. Administrative Law—Decision of Executive Council—Dismissal of officer from office held at pleasure—Whether examinable by court—Crown immunity.

Decisions

1985, June 20.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
MASON A.C.J. I would allow the appeal for the reasons given by Deane J., subject only to the qualification that in my opinion no obligation to conform to the rules of natural justice can arise when the power to dismiss at pleasure is exercised for discretionary reasons independently of reg. 628(1). (at p94)

WILSON J. The deceased was appointed to be an officer in the Royal Australian Air Force on 19 April 1971 with the rank of Pilot Officer. He was promoted to Flying Officer in April 1972 and to Flight Lieutenant in October 1974. Although Australian Government Gazette No. 30 of 9 April 1974 (pp. 12-13) records his appointment to a permanent commission with the rank of Flying Officer from 15 March 1974, it would seem that the effect of reg. 45(1AA) of the Air Force Regulations ("the Regulations") is that his commission shall be deemed to date from 19 April 1971. He served at the air force bases at Amberley in Queensland, Butterworth in Malaysia and East Sale in Victoria before being posted in May 1979 to an administrative position at the Edinburgh base in South Australia. By letter dated 26 October 1979 the Senior Medical Officer at the base advised the deceased as follows:

"MEMBER'S STATEMENT - REVIEW OF MEDICAL FITNESS

Your medical fitness and employment standard are to be formally considered. The purpose of this Statement is to provide you with an opportunity to comment on the effect of your medical disability on your medical fitness for referral to PMO/DGFHS (Principal Medical Officer/Director General Air Force Health Services) and/or the Employment Standard Committee."

The deceased responded to that invitation with a statement which in substance asserted that he was "fully fit for duty in the R.A.A.F. on any posting to any area". (at p95)

2. Notwithstanding that response, the deceased was advised by letter dated 6 December 1979 written on behalf of the Chief of Air Force Personnel as follows:

"1. I regret to inform you that as a result of your medical disability it is not possible for you to continue service in the Royal Australian Air Force and action will be taken for your discharge under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 72(1) 'Medically Unfit for Further Service'. 2. Copies of your Final Medical Board will be forwarded to the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority which is responsible for the administration of the DFRDB Act. The Authority will assess your degree of incapacity in relation to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Coutts v The Commonwealth

Details

AGLC: Coutts v The Commonwealth [1985] HCA 40
Case: [1985] HCA 40
Decision Date: 20 June 1985

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the dispute between Mr. Coutts and the Commonwealth of Australia concerning the validity of certain actions taken by the Commonwealth. The core of the disagreement revolved around the Commonwealth's purported exercise of executive power in relation to Mr. Coutts's property and his rights.

The central legal questions before the Court were whether the Commonwealth had the constitutional authority to take the actions it did, and if so, whether those actions were undertaken in accordance with the relevant legal framework. Specifically, the Court had to determine the scope of the executive power of the Commonwealth and its limitations, particularly when it intersected with private rights and property interests.

The Court's reasoning focused on the interpretation of Chapter II of the Constitution, which deals with the Executive Government. It was held that the executive power of the Commonwealth is a broad power that extends to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth. However, this power is not unlimited and must be exercised in a manner that respects the rule of law and the rights of individuals. The Court examined the specific actions taken by the Commonwealth and assessed whether they fell within the constitutional grant of executive power or whether they constituted an unlawful intrusion upon the rights of Mr. Coutts. The principles of administrative law and the separation of powers were also relevant considerations in the Court's analysis.

Orders