NOMINAL DEFENDANT, Police-Police officer-Tenure of office-At the pleasure of the Crown-Police Regula-
tion Act 1899-1935 (N.S.W.) (No. 20 of 1899-No. 13 of 1935), secs. 6, 9, 10, 12-Police Regulation (Appeals) Act 1923 (N.S.W.) (No. 33 of 1923), secs. 6, Interpretation Act 1897 (N.S.W.) (No. 4 of 1897), sec. 30.
Neither the rules providing for the general government and discipline of the police force made under sec. 12 of the Police Regulation Act 1899-1935 (N.S.W.), nor the Police Regulation (Appeals) Act 1923 (N.S.W.) control or restrict the power of the Executive Government to dismiss an officer of the police force
Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Full Court): Fletcher V. Nott, (1937) 37 S.R. (N.S.W.) 430 54 W.N. (N.S.W.) 138, affirmed.
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
In an action brought in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against Melville Charles Nott, as nominal defendant on behalf of the Government of New South Wales, the plaintiff, Ernest Harold Fletcher, claimed the sum of £10,000 as damages for wrongful dismissal out of the service of His Majesty as a member of the police force of New South Wales.
Upon the hearing of a demurrer to the pleadings by the plaintiff the parties agreed to state a special case in accordance with the
matter was adjourned, accordingly, and, subsequently, there was filed a special case which was substantially as follows :-
1. The plaintiff, Ernest Harold Fletcher, is the plaintiff in an action wherein he is claiming damages for wrongful dismissal from his office of police constable.
2. Under the provisions of the Claims against the Government and Crown Suits Act 1912, Melville Charles Nott, Under-Secretary of Justice, has been appointed as nominal defendant on behalf of the Government of New South Wales and is, accordingly, the defendant in the action.
3. Prior to the happening of the events hereinafter set out the plaintiff had been duly appointed as a police constable by the Inspector-General of Police in accordance with the Police Regulation Act 1899 and the regulations passed thereunder.
4. On 1st December 1936 the plaintiff was in service as such police constable and in enjoyment of the rights and privileges attached to such position.
5. On 30th November 1936 his Honour Judge Markell, in pursu- ance of a commission, delivered to the Governor a signed report in which the plaintiff was reported to be guilty of having deliberately "framed" a man for a starting-price betting offence and of having given false evidence to procure a conviction for a betting offence.
6. On 1st December 1936 the Chief Secretary, being the Minister referred to in the Act, transmitted the following minute to the then Commissioner of Police Chief Secretary's Department. Report of Royal Commission in relation to Starting-Price Betting. Follow- ing the receipt of the report of the Royal Commissioner, I now direct that the members…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Fletcher v Nott [1938] HCA 25
Case
[1938] HCA 25
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In *Fletcher v Nott*, the plaintiff, Ernest Harold Fletcher, sued the Government of New South Wales for £10,000 in damages for wrongful dismissal from his position as a police constable. The dispute arose after a Royal Commissioner reported that Fletcher had "framed" a man for a betting offence and given false evidence. Following this report, the Chief Secretary directed the plaintiff's suspension and subsequent dismissal from the police force. The Governor-in-Council later confirmed this dismissal. The case was presented to the court via a special case stated, following an agreement between the parties.
The central legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiff's dismissal was wrongful, thereby entitling him to damages. This required the court to determine if the plaintiff held his position at the pleasure of the Crown, meaning he could be dismissed at any time without cause, or if the provisions of the *Police Regulation Act 1899* (NSW) and the rules made thereunder, along with the *Police Regulation (Appeals) Act 1923* (NSW), imposed limitations on the Crown's power of dismissal, thereby creating a right to a formal inquiry and a tenure of office that could not be unilaterally terminated.
The court reasoned that, as a general principle of law, public servants hold their office at the pleasure of the Crown unless a statute clearly indicates otherwise. The court examined the *Police Regulation Act 1899* and the rules made under it, including provisions for disciplinary inquiries and appeals. However, it concluded that these provisions were administrative in nature and did not legally limit the Crown's inherent power to dismiss at pleasure. The court distinguished this case from precedents where statutory provisions were found to be inconsistent with dismissal at pleasure, finding that the rules in question did not confer legal rights on police officers to prevent dismissal without adherence to procedural steps. The court affirmed the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
The court ordered that judgment be entered for the defendant, Melville Charles Nott, as nominal defendant on behalf of the Government of New South Wales, with costs. Consequently, the plaintiff's claim for damages for wrongful dismissal was dismissed.