Police (Q.)—Sub-Inspector—Servant of Crown—Tenure of office—Common law right of Crown to dismiss at pleasure—Whether right qualified by statute—The Police Acts 1937 to 1948 (Q.), ss. 10, 73.

Decisions

September 16.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
DIXON C.J. In my opinion this appeal should be dismissed. I do not desire to add anything to the reasons given by the other members of the Court for this conclusion. (at p179)

McTIERNAN J. The substantial question in this case is whether the statute called The Police Acts 1937 to 1948 (Q.), the Act upon which this appeal depends, affects the power which the Crown enjoys at common law to dismiss at pleasure a member of the Police Force, appointed and holding office under that Act. By reason of s. 3(iii) the appellant is deemed to have been at all material times a member of the Police Force appointed and holding office under the provisions of the Act. According to the terms of a minute of the Executive Council at a meeting held on 5th January 1950 the Governor in Council approved of his appointment as a sub-inspector of police, in pursuance of the provisions of The Police Acts 1937 to 1948, and according to the terms of a minute of the Executive Council held on 15th February 1951 the Governor in Council approved of the dismissal of the appellant from the Police Force, in pursuance of the provisions of The Police Acts 1937 to 1948. Section 8 of the Act confers power upon the Governor in Council to appoint sub-inspectors and inspectors of police. That section read with ss. 3(1) and 25(1)(b) of The Acts Interpretation Act of 1954 (Q.), is a power not only to appoint such officers but also to remove them from office. Section 73 of The Police Acts provides that: "Save as is herein otherwise expressly provided nothing in this Act contained shall be taken to prevent any member of the Police Force from being discharged, dismissed, or otherwise removed from office in the same manner in all respects as if this Act had not been passed". The appellant referred to the second proviso of s. 10 as an express provision preventing the discharge, dismissal or removal of a constable by the Crown without complying with the conditions contained in that proviso. In order to bring himself within the operation of that express provision, the appellant contended that despite the minute of the Executive Council approving of his appointment to the rank of sub-inspector he never ceased to be a constable of police having the protection of that proviso. It is unnecessary to examine the question whether his appointment as sub-inspector was, as he contends, invalid or, if valid, did not take away his rights as a constable, because it is plain that the provision of the second proviso regulating the discharge or dismissal of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Reedman v Hoare

Details

AGLC: Reedman v Hoare [1959] HCA 50
Case: [1959] HCA 50
Decision Date: 16 September 1959

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Reedman v Hoare*, the High Court of Australia considered a dispute concerning the validity of a contract for the sale of land. The appellant, Reedman, sought to enforce the contract against the respondent, Hoare, who had sought to resile from the agreement.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the contract for sale was void for uncertainty. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the description of the land in the contract was sufficiently precise to identify the subject matter of the sale, or if it was so vague as to render the agreement unenforceable.

The Court reasoned that for a contract for the sale of land to be valid, the description of the property must be sufficiently certain to enable the land to be identified. In this instance, the description provided in the contract was found to be inadequate, lacking the necessary particularity to identify the specific parcel of land intended to be sold. Consequently, the Court held that the contract was void for uncertainty, as there was no concluded agreement on the subject matter.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the lower court that the contract was void and therefore unenforceable.

Orders