David Michael Johnson and Commonwealth of Australia

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IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

NO. QI 159 OF 1994

BETWEEN:
  DAVID MICHAEL JOHNSON

Applicant

AND:
  COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BOULTON J.R.

On 11 August 1994 Spender J. directed, inter alia, that the respondent file and serve its outline of argument on the question whether Division 3 of Part VIA of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (“the Act”) applies to the discharge of a member of the Defence Forces without that member’s consent. On 15 November 1994 I heard argument directed to this issue.

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It is common ground that the applicant was a sailor in the Royal Australian Navy.  He was discharged from service without his consent on 4 June 1994. 

The respondent provided extensive written submissions.  I think I do these submissions justice in saying that three alternative propositions were advanced.  I propose to deal with these below in the form of a traverse of what I take to be presently the legal position.

The legislation relating to naval forces makes separate provision in relation to the engagement of “officers” as opposed to “sailors”.  Officers are appointed to the Navy, whereas sailors enlist in the Navy - Naval Defence Act 1910 ss.20-25. The appointment of an officer is held during the pleasure of the Governor-General - Naval Defence Act 1910 ss.12(1). Appointment as an officer does not create a civil contract between the Commonwealth and the person appointed - Defence Act 1903 s.13. There is no statutory provision similar to either of these provisions in relation to a sailor. In the absence of such a provision, it is necessary to consider the position at common law.

I do not consider it necessary for present purposes to cite the many authorities concerning the position at common law.  Quite a number of

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them relate to civil servants as distinct from military personnel.  Also, the passage of time has meant that in respect of civil servants the common law position has been substantially eroded by legislative intervention.

I start with the remarks of Windeyer J.  in Marks v Commonwealth 111 CLR 549 at 586 where His Honour said “servants of the Crown, civil and military, are by the common law employed only during the pleasure of the Crown. Except when modified by statute that rule has an overriding place in all engagements to serve the Crown.... The commissions of military officers do not .... state expressly that they were held during the Crown’s pleasure. But they were always within the general rule”.

In Coutts v Commonwealth 157 CLR 91, these comments appear

Wilson J. at 98:
           “The fundamental feature of the relationship at common law is that members of the armed services hold their engagement at the pleasure of the Crown”.

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At 99:
           “The passage of time does not appear to have affected the strength of the Crown’s common law prerogatives so far as the armed services are concerned”.

At 103:
           The disposition and membership of the armed services remains…

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Details
Case
[1994] IRCA 187
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Industrial Relations Court of Australia, David Michael Johnson, a former member of the Defence Forces, contested the Commonwealth of Australia over the legality of his discharge without consent. The central issue was whether the Industrial Relations Act 1988 applied to the termination of military personnel employment. The court was required to determine if the common law principle that military personnel serve at the pleasure of the Crown still applied and whether the Act's provisions impliedly or expressly negated this principle. The respondent argued that the Act's termination provisions applied only to employment under contract, and since military service did not constitute such a contract, the Act did not apply.

The court reviewed the statutory provisions and common law precedents that established the nature of military service as not contractual but at the pleasure of the Crown. It examined various judgments to affirm that military service fundamentally differs from employment under a contract with a private employer. The court concluded that unless there was a clear legislative intent to alter the common law position, the Act did not apply to military personnel. The court also noted that the terminology in the Act and the Termination of Employment Convention implied that employment must be under a contract, which military service was not. Therefore, the court found that the Act did not apply to the discharge of a member of the Defence Forces without their consent.

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