R v Farhad Qaumi, Mumtaz Qaumi & Jamil Qaumi (Sentence) - [2017] NSWSC 774

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Farhad Qaumi, Mumtaz Qaumi & Jamil Qaumi (Sentence) [2017] NSWSC 774
Hearing dates: 3, 6, 7 and 26 April 2017, 23 May 2017, 13 June 2017
Date of orders: 16 June 2017
Decision date: 16 June 2017
Before: Hamill J
Decision:
Jamil Qaumi sentenced to imprisonment for 31 years with a non-parole period of 21 years.
Mumtaz Qaumi sentenced to imprisonment for 50 years and 10 months with a non-parole period of 36 years and 10 months.
Farhad Qaumi sentenced to imprisonment for 60 years with a non-parole period of 43 years.

Catchwords:
CRIMINAL LAW – sentence – gangland violence – gun violence – Brothers for Life – spate of shootings arising out of “war” with rival chapter of BFL – “I’m at war” – wanton lawlessness – manslaughter where jury accepted excessive self-defence – hit list – series of attempted murders – shooting in or near people’s homes and in public places – multiple victims – “how hard is it to shoot somebody?” – harebrained plan – shootings in peoples’ homes – shootings in public places – multiple victims – whether maximum penalty appropriate – mitigating features – where offenders scarred by exposure to violence in Afghanistan – psychiatric impact

CRIMINAL LAW – sentence – cold blooded contract killing – whether life sentence without parole appropriate – whether two stage test required by statute – where moral culpability reduced by evidence of traumatic and dislocated childhood experience and evidence of psychiatric conditions – community interest in community protection – where lengthy determinate sentence may be effective life sentence – where offender not eligible for release to parole until his mid-seventies – life sentence not the only way community interest can be met

CRIMINAL LAW – sentence – mitigating features – onerous conditions of incarceration – when capable of being taken into account on sentence – evidence of classification – designation as extreme high risk inmates – grounds upon which decisions as to classification are made – segregation – lack of human contact – whether offenders authors of their own fate – whether double punishment – correct approach to issue – whether prediction can be made as to future conditions – courts reluctance to interfere with management of prisons – offender’s evidence accepted – conditions unduly onerous – in circumstances relevant to length of sentence
CRIMINAL LAW – sentence – contempt in the face of the court – refusal to answer question – refusal to nominate co-offender – where offender concerned he will be labelled a “dog” – where offender fearful of reprisal – act of violence in the dock in the presence of judicial officer – act calculated to intimidate and injure co-accused – co-accused running case of duress – serious example of contempt – consecutive sentences appropriate
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Crime (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW)
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)
Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW)
Firearms Act 1996 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Abbas & Ors v R [2013] NSWCCA 115
Attorney General’s Application No 1 of 2002 [2002] NSWCCA 518
Barton v R [2009] NSWCCA 164
Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 471; [2013] HCA 37
Cahill v R [2015] NSWCCA 53
Clark v Commissioner for Corrective Services [2016] NSWCA 186
Clark v State of New South Wales & Ors [2014] NSWSC 801
DA v R [2014] NSWCCA 306
Dean v R [2015] NSWCCA 307
Dean v R [2016] HCATrans 278
DPP (Vic) v Hunter [2013] VSC 440
Fayad v R [2017] NSWCCA 81
Ghamraoui v R [2009] NSWCCA 111
Glare v R [2015] NSWCCA 194
Green v The Queen, Quinn v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49
JM v R [2014] NSWCCA 297
Kanaan and Ors v R [2006] NSWCCA 109
Kearsley v R [2017] NSWCCA 28
Kelleher v Commissioner, Department of Corrective Services [1999] NSWSC 86
Kennedy v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 260
Knight v R [2006] NSWCCA 292
Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606; [1984] HCA 46
McIntosh v R [2015] NSWCCA 184
Majid v R [2010] NSWCCA 121
Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25
May v R [2012] NSWCCA 111
Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39
Olbrich v The Queen (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54
Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295; [2011] HCA 49
R v AC; AC v R [2017] NSWCCA 20
R v Adams (No 7) [2017] NSWSC 179
R v Burnes [2007] NSWCCA 53
R v Cardoso [2003] NSWCCA 15
R v Dang [1999] NSWCCA 42
R v Do (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 512
R v Durocher-Yvon (2003) 58 NSWLR 581; [2003] NSWCCA 209
R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67
R v FQ (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 28 May 1998, unrep)
R v Halloun [2014] NSWSC 1705
R v Hamzy [2016] NSWSC 1512
R v Hines (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 1273
R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255
R v Johnson [2003] NSWCCA 129
R v Lauritsen (2000) 114 A Crim R 333
R v Merritt [2004] NSWCCA 19
R v Miles [2002] NSWCCA 276
R v MJB [2014] NSWCCA 195
R v MM; R v WK [2017] NSWCCA 19
R v Mostyn [2004] NSWCCA 97
R v NK [2015] NSWSC 1281
R v NK (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1257
R v Oinonen [1999] NSWCCA 310
R v Pennisi [2001] NSWCCA 326
R v Pennisi [2003] NSWSC 892
R v Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76
R v Qaumi & Ors (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 15
R v Qaumi & Ors (No 25) [2016] NSWSC 514
R v Qaumi & Ors (No 55) [2016] NSWSC 1068
R v Qaumi & Ors (No 57) [2016] NSWSC 1157
R v Qaumi & Ors (No 62) [2016] NSWSC 1215
R v Qaumi & Qaumi [2016] NSWSC 1473
R v Qaumi & Qaumi (No 12) [2017] NSWSC 134
R v Ryan & Coulter [2011] NSWSC 1249
R v Sumpton (No. 4) [2015] NSWSC 684
R v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182
R v Totten [2003] NSWCCA 207; 145 A Crim R 304
R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398
Smith v R [2015] NSWCCA 193
Smith v The Queen (1991) 25 NSWLR 1
Sumpton v R [2016] NSWCCA 162
The Queen v Kilic [2016] HCA 48
Veen v R (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465
Vinter and Others v The United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application Nos 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, 9 July 2013)
Category: Sentence
Parties: Regina
Farhad Qaumi
Mumtaz Qaumi
Jamil Qaumi
Representation:
Counsel:
K McKay & P Hogan (Crown)
J Stratton SC & M Curry (F Qaumi)
P Young SC (M Qaumi)
N Carroll (J Qaumi)
A Francis (J Qaumi, on contempt proceedings)
D Kell, Crown Advocate (amicus curiae on contempt proceedings)
Solicitors:
Solicitor for the NSW DPP(Crown)
Archbold Legal (F Qaumi)
George Sten & Co (M Qaumi)
Bannisters Lawyers (J Qaumi)
NSW Crown Solicitors (amicus on contempt proceedings)

File Number(s): Farhad Qaumi - 2014/6809; 2014/315201; 2014/315252Mumtaz Qaumi – 2014/6813; 2014/315251; 2014/315260Jamil Qaumi - 2013/336086; 2014/18164; 2014315253

Judgment

Three brothers, Farhad Qaumi, Mumtaz Qaumi and Jamil Qaumi, stand for sentence in relation to a number of offences arising out of their involvement in the activities of a criminal organisation known as the Brothers for Life at Blacktown (BFL Blacktown). A jury determined the guilt of the offenders in relation to most of the offences following a trial that proceeded between April and November 2016. The jury returned its verdicts on 8 November 2016 and was discharged when it was unable to agree, or reach a majority verdict, in relation to a number of offences charged against two co-accused (MK and MZ) [1] and one offence in relation to Mumtaz Qaumi. The jury trial was largely concerned with five shooting incidents that took place between 28 October and 28 November 2013. One person was killed, several others injured and the lives of at least 10 people placed in jeopardy. These five shootings occurred in the context of differences between the BFL Blacktown, led by Farhad Qaumi, and a rival group called the Brothers for Life at Bankstown (BFL Bankstown), led by Mohammed Hamzy. In addition to the offences arising out of the shootings, the offenders were also convicted of supplying a large commercial quantity of drugs, participating in a criminal group by directing its activities, and possession of the firearms that were used in the shootings. In the course of the jury trial, Jamil Qaumi pleaded guilty to three counts of contempt and Mumtaz Qaumi pleaded guilty to one count of contempt. The most serious offence, the murder of Joseph Antoun by Farhad and Mumtaz Qaumi on 16 December 2013, was subject to a separate Judge alone trial. [2] That trial came to a conclusion on 28 February 2017. [3]
1. Each has a re-trial listed later this year so I will not refer to them by name.
2. See R v Qaumi & Ors (No 3) (Severance and separate trial) [2016] NSWSC 15; R v Qaumi & Qaumi [2016] NSWSC 1473.
3. R v Qaumi & Qaumi (No 12) [2017] NSWSC 134.
At times in the course of this judgment, for convenience and while intending no disrespect, I will refer to the offenders by their first names.

THE FACTS OF THE OFFENCES

I will set out the facts of the offences in chronological order. These factual findings are made to the criminal standard of proof, guided by and consistent with the verdicts of the jury and based on the evidence adduced in the course of the two trials.

The Hamzy Shooting at Revesby Heights on 29 October 2013

The first shooting incident took place at Revesby Heights on 29 October 2013. Each of the offenders was convicted of conspiracy to murder Mohammed Hamzy (count 3), the manslaughter of Mahmoud Hamzy (an alternative to count 1 charging murder) and causing grievous bodily harm to Omar Ajaj with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (count 2).
On the afternoon of the shooting, Farhad received information from Witness M that Mohammed Hamzy intended to kill him. Farhad then asked Witness M to repeat the allegation to several other members of the group. There was conflict between the witnesses as to precisely what was said and I am certain that Witness M understated what she told the group. I accept, and the jury must have accepted, that the offenders were told that Mohammed Hamzy made an earlier, foiled, attempt to execute Farhad Qaumi and then took out a contract on his (Farhad’s) life. While I accept that there was pre-existing rivalry between the two chapters of the Brothers For Life, the idea of killing Mohammed Hamzy arose because of the information provided by Witness M on the afternoon of 29 October 2013. There is no evidence upon which I am prepared to act to suggest that the plot to kill the rival gang leader was formulated, or even contemplated, before the day of the shooting.
There were a number of meetings over the next few hours and a conspiracy was entered between the three offenders and a number of other members of the BFL Blacktown to murder Mohammed Hamzy that night. The jury’s verdicts establish that the offenders believed this action was necessary to defend Farhad Qaumi from Hamzy’s plan to kill him. The verdicts also show that the jury found beyond reasonable doubt that this was not a reasonable response to the circumstances as the offenders perceived them.
Three handguns were obtained and members were assigned different tasks. Witness M offered to be the driver when another member was reluctant to undertake that role. Witness M knew the address and the time that Hamzy was required to be home under a court-imposed curfew. Witness M played an active role in the events as they unfolded. Jamil Qaumi, Witness L and a third member of the group were provided with the handguns. There were two 0.38 calibre revolvers and a 0.45 calibre pistol. Each of those guns was discharged in the course of the incident. There was controversy as to the identity of the third shooter (who used what I will describe as the second 0.38 calibre revolver). For the purpose of sentencing the three offenders, it is unnecessary to make a finding as to the third shooter’s identity. The jury was unable to reach agreement in the case of a co-accused who the prosecution asserts is the third shooter. This co-accused will be re-tried later this year and it is undesirable to make any further comment as to the problems confronting the prosecution in establishing his identity beyond reasonable doubt. There was also a dispute as to whether it was Witness L or Jamil Qaumi who carried and used the first 0.38 calibre revolver. The significance of that dispute is that the first 0.38 revolver was the gun that was used to shoot Mahmoud Hamzy three times in the head at relatively close range. These were the shots that killed him.
Witness M drove the three shooters to the Hamzy residence. There were a number of people, including Mohammed Hamzy’s wife, present in the house. The information provided by Witness M was that Mohammed Hamzy would be in the garage. Before they set out, Farhad provided the shooters with a description of the target. That description was dangerously vague and based, in part, on the clothing Hamzy was wearing earlier in the day. The three shooters entered the garage. Four men were present. Jamil Qaumi and Witness L opened fire on two of them while the other two, including Mohammed Hamzy, escaped through a door into the house. Omar Ajaj received serious injuries from two gunshot wounds. The target’s cousin, Mahmoud Hamzy, received multiple gunshot wounds from the 0.45 calibre pistol and a 0.38 revolver. This included the three head shots fired from close range from the first 0.38 calibre revolver. The shooters mistakenly believed this was Mohammed Hamzy because, amongst other things, he was wearing a cap consistent with the description provided by Farhad before they set out. The shooters ran from the garage and, as they departed, the third shooter fired into the garage causing damage to a wall. Witness M drove the three shooters from the scene.
Meanwhile, Farhad and Mumtaz Qaumi travelled to the Coolibah Hotel in Merrylands. There is CCTV footage of them playing the poker machines there and interacting with a doorman. This was calculated to distance themselves from the shooting and to establish an alibi. There is CCTV footage of Witness L arriving at the hotel after the shooting and evidence of him trying to locate Farhad and Mumtaz after the shooting.
I am unable to resolve the question of whether Witness L or Jamil Qaumi fired the headshots that killed Mahmoud Hamzy. [4] Witness L gave evidence that he had the 0.45 calibre pistol and gave graphic evidence of Jamil Qaumi firing the 0.38 calibre revolver at the head of Mahmoud Hamzy while the victim was lying helpless on the ground. Witness J gave evidence that he saw Farhad Qaumi hand the 0.45 pistol to Witness L. That evidence supports the Crown case that it was Jamil Qaumi who fired the headshots. On the other hand, Jamil Qaumi gave evidence that the headshots were fired by Witness L. Witness L’s evidence of the number of bullets in the gun was more consistent with it being the 0.38 revolver. The evidence of the position of the shooters within the garage, and the CCTV footage of the order in which the three men entered and left the garage, also creates a doubt about Witness L’s evidence. The jury’s verdicts do not resolve this question. If the matter were to be resolved on the balance of probabilities, I would act on the combination of the evidence of Witness L and Witness J. However, because the matter may aggravate the objective criminality of Jamil Qaumi, and also be used against him on the question of future dangerousness, it is an issue upon which the criminal standard of proof applies. [5] I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Jamil Qaumi fired the 0.38 revolver at the head of Mahmoud Hamzy. In view of the evidence of the respective capacity of the two guns and the number of bullets fired, along with the position of the three men at critical times, I am not prepared to act on this part of the evidence of Witness L even though it receives some inferential support from Witness J.
4. Cf Olbrich v The Queen (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54 at [16]-[18].
5. Again, see Olbrich v The Queen.
The Crown case against each accused was based on the existence and execution of a joint criminal enterprise. Accordingly, precisely who fired each shot, who carried which gun and the exact role of each offender is not as significant than would be the case if Jamil Qaumi was charged simply as a principal in the first degree. The fact is that each participant entered into a criminal agreement to kill Mohammed Hamzy and that Witness L and Jamil Qaumi shot at Mahmoud Hamzy with an intention to kill him. Each participant is criminally responsible for the act of the man who fired the fatal shots.
The impact of this crime on the victims was horrendous. There was medical evidence of the injuries suffered by Omar Ajaj and Mahmoud’s sister, Hassnah Hamzy, provided a victim’s impact statement. [6]
6. Ex S-J.
The facts of the Hamzy shooting constitute criminality of a very high order. The shooting was premeditated and reasonably well planned, even though the wrong man was shot and the planning and premeditation took place over a number of hours (not days or weeks). It was carried out in a suburban home where the conspirators and principals did not know who might be present but did know, or ought to have known, that people other than the intended target would be put in danger. It involved the use of three handguns that the offenders were able to obtain quickly. It was part of an ongoing and organised criminal enterprise undertaken in a violent gangland setting. I do not accept the Crown’s submission that the motive for these crimes was to execute and eliminate a rival gang member although that would have been the fortuitous consequence (from the offenders’ perspective) had the correct target been killed. That submission was based almost entirely on the evidence of Witness M, whose evidence I am unable to accept on critical issues unless it is supported by other evidence.
The shooting was carried out because of a genuine belief in each of the offenders that it was necessary to kill Mohammed Hamzy in order to protect Farhad Qaumi’s life. That is the only possible basis upon which the jury could have acquitted each accused of the murder charge. The jury’s verdict on the three charges shows that it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused’s conduct was not a reasonable response to the circumstances as each of them perceived them. I am bound by that finding but, in any event, I am also satisfied of that fact beyond any reasonable doubt.
In the aftermath of the Hamzy shooting, members of the BFL Blacktown were concerned that the BFL Bankstown may seek retribution. It was in that context that the next three shooting offences occurred over the following week or so. Luckily – nobody else was killed but an innocent teenage girl suffered awful injuries, three men received gunshot wounds and a number of lives were placed in peril.

Offences to be taken into account in Jamil Qaumi’s case

Jamil Qaumi has asked that three offences be taken into account in sentencing him for the manslaughter of Mahmoud Hamzy. These offences were part of one criminal escapade committed on 14 October 2013. The offences are (1) specially aggravated break and enter (the circumstance of special aggravation being the use of a pistol), (2) using a pistol without a licence and (3) demanding property with menaces. The facts of the offences are set out in Ex S-G and involve Jamil attending residential premises with a number of other gang members and attempting to extort money from a person who was trying to buy a car from an associate (Witness E). A gun was discharged by Witness L who shot a dog. When the initial plan failed, an attempt was made to extort Witness E by having him give the car to the gang members.
The offences to be taken into account are serious offences. Standing alone they would warrant the imposition of a substantial custodial sentence. However, because they are dealt with under s 32 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, they will not be subject to any separate sentence and it is incorrect to consider what sentence may have been imposed and increase the current sentence by that measure or by some notional amount. However, the procedure means that the weight to be given to retribution and personal (or specific) deterrence will be greater in sentencing Jamil Qaumi for the manslaughter of Mahmoud Hamzy. [7] The sentence for the manslaughter offence will inevitably be longer because those offences are taken into account. However, it will not be nearly as long as if the charges were the subject of separate sentences.
7. Attorney General’s Application No 1 of 2002 [2002] NSWCCA 518 at [42] as explained in Abbas & Ors v R [2013] NSWCCA 115, for example at [22] – [24] (Bathurst CJ).

The Shooting of Michael Odisho on 3 November 2013

There were a number of meetings after the Hamzy shooting and, on 2 November 2013, members of the BFL Blacktown, including the three offenders, attended the Star City Casino. Farhad Qaumi spoke with two members of the BFL Bankstown and (it seems) learned that the rival gang suspected or believed that Farhad and the BFL Blacktown were responsible for the Hamzy shooting. There was a great controversy in the trial as to whether there was a further meeting of a smaller group of members after the group left the casino. I am satisfied there was such a meeting. This finding is based on the testimony of Witness L and the support it receives from telephone cell tower records that place, at least generally, the telephones of relevant participants in the area of Woolloomooloo or the area of the Domain near Mrs Macquarie’s chair and the Royal Botanic Garden. Other telephone records, and a police stop, show that Farhad and Mumtaz Qaumi did not travel home to the central coast for some hours after leaving the casino. The finding is also consistent with the jury verdicts. At this meeting Farhad Qaumi identified a number of members of the BFL Bankstown who were to be targeted for assassination. This included Michael Odisho and Masood Zakaria, two of Mohammed Hamzy’s trusted lieutenants. The jury’s verdicts suggest that it was also satisfied that this meeting took place.
On the evening of 3 November 2013, Michael Odisho was shot in his home in the presence of his mother. The jury found the three offenders guilty of soliciting the murder of Odisho (count 4) and attempting (shooting with intent) to murder him (count 5).
The evidence established that Witness C was the driver and the shooters were Witness I (armed with a revolver) and Witness D (armed with a shotgun). When Odisho came to the front door of the house, both men opened fire upon him. The ballistic and forensic examination suggests that around 7 shots were fired. Odisho received serious injuries comprised of gunshot wounds to his left elbow, left thigh and the back of his left leg. These required surgical intervention.
The jury accepted beyond reasonable doubt that the offenders solicited other members of the gang to carry out this attempted murder. The jury must have rejected various assertions made by, or on behalf, of the offenders in the course of the trial. These included that Farhad was not involved at all, that the plan was formulated by Witnesses L and I who feared that they were being blamed for the Hamzy shooting, and that the plan involved no more than shooting at Odisho’s house as a warning. The jury also rejected the suggestion that the act was carried out as some kind of pre-emptive self-defence.
These two offences are serious offences of their kind. They were planned and pre-meditated. They involved gangland violence, the use of guns and were carried out in the victim’s home. Judging from his appearance and performance on a current affairs programme, discussed in an earlier judgment,[8] Mr Odisho appears to have recovered well from his injuries. He refused to appear at the trial, threatening to disrupt the proceedings if he was compelled and, as I understand it, is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment. The fact that the victim was another gang member, and apparently quite a disreputable fellow, does not mitigate the seriousness of the offence.
8. R v Qaumi & Ors (No 25) [2016] NSWSC 514.

The Zakaria Shooting on 4 November 2013

The next night, 4 November 2013, there was a shooting at the Zakaria home in Blacktown. The target of the shooting was Masood Zakaria but a teenage girl (H) was shot when MK discharged a shotgun into the home. Once again, Witness C was the driver. Witness D was directed to lure Masood out of the house because he knew him. MK and Witness I were designated to be the shooters.
The jury found Farhad and Jamil Qaumi guilty of soliciting the murder of Masood Zakaria (count 7), not guilty of attempted murder (count 8) but guilty of the alternative count of causing grievous bodily harm to H with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm (count 9). The jury was unable to agree upon its verdict for Mumtaz Qaumi on count 7, found him not guilty of count 8 but guilty of count 9.
The verdicts in respect of the charges arising out of the Zakaria shooting demonstrated the jury’s careful discernment between the counts and the cases made against each accused. The evidence of what (if anything) Mumtaz Qaumi said and did around the Zakaria shooting was inconsistent and weak. Further, the jury asked a question in the course of its deliberation as to whether the Crown relied on joint criminal enterprise in respect of the charge of solicit to murder Masood Zakaria. The answer to that question was “no”. [9] Accordingly, the jury accepted that Mumtaz was a party to the joint criminal enterprise but did not accept that he directly solicited the shooters to kill Masood Zakaria. These findings, and the consequent verdicts, were consistent with the quality of the evidence tendered against Mumtaz Qaumi.
9. See MFI 252, Transcript of Summing Up (SU) at 424.
The jury acquitted MK of count 8 and could not agree on a verdict for MK on count 9. His case involved two different propositions. The first was that when he discharged the firearm, he did not have the specific intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm. The second was that he was acting under duress. MK’s acquittal on count 8 suggests that the jury were not satisfied that he formed the intention to kill at the time he discharged the shotgun or had a reasonable doubt about the issue of duress. The failure to reach a verdict on count 9 for MK, considered with the conviction of Farhad and Jamil Qaumi of that count, suggests that the jury was divided on the issue of duress in MK’s case. The Crown case against the offenders on count 8 was based on joint criminal enterprise. It was required to prove that the shooter (MK) carried out the shooting with intent to kill. The acquittals on count 8 suggest that the jury had a doubt about this.
Consistent with the jury’s verdicts, the evidence established that Farhad identified Masood Zakaria as a target in the meeting that occurred after the visit to the Star City Casino on 2 November 2013. On the day of the shooting Farhad and Jamil Qaumi gave directions to MK and Witnesses C, D and I as to how the shooting was to be carried out. They provided the shooters with the guns that were to be used. Mumtaz Qaumi was present and participating in the enterprise but did not give any instructions to those directed to carry out the shooting. There was evidence that Farhad was angry at the failed attempt on Odisho’s life the night before, saying something to the effect of “How hard is it to shoot somebody?”
In compliance with those directions, Witness C drove the other three men to the Zakaria residence and Witness D attempted to lure Zakaria out of the house. MK then opened fire with a shotgun. Witness I, armed with a revolver, did not fire his weapon. That was his evidence and it was supported by the absence of forensic or ballistic evidence that a revolver was discharged. All of the damage to the house, and H’s injuries, were consistent with the use of a shotgun. This part of the evidence provided support for the Crown’s submission that the jury should reject the defence case that the Zakaria shooting was the brainchild of Witness I. Witness C drove the other three men from the scene and they made their escape.
The jury rejected the defence case that Witness I and others were the instigators of this shooting or that the only plan of which the offenders were aware involved shooting at the house as a warning.
H was left with devastating injuries. A large number of shotgun pellets could not be removed from her body and she has elevated lead levels as a result. Her capacity to become pregnant, and to carry a baby to full term, has been compromised.
These offences are extremely serious. They formed part of an ongoing criminal enterprise being played out in a gangland setting and involved the premeditated and reasonably well-planned employment of violence. The offences involved the use of guns, took place in the victim’s home and demonstrated an utter disregard for the safety of those in the vicinity. The impact on the primary victim, an innocent teenage child, is horrific.

The Chokolatta Café Shooting on 7 November 2017

On 7 November 2013 the spate of shootings continued. This shooting took place outside of the Chokolatta Café in Bankstown. The target was a man called Abdul Abu-Mahmoud. He was targeted while sitting in a car outside the café with two other men. Mumtaz and Jamil Qaumi were found guilty of soliciting the murder of Mr Abu-Mahmoud (count 10) and three counts of shoot with intent to murder (counts 11, 13 and 15). There was no evidence that Farhad Qaumi was complicit in these offences and, at the conclusion of the prosecution case, I directed the jury to find him not guilty of counts 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16. [10]
10. R v Qaumi & Ors (No 57) [2016] NSWSC 1157.
The motive for this shooting was bizarre. There was no evidence that Farhad Qaumi nominated Abu-Mahmoud as a target and, according to Witness M, specifically ruled him out. Farhad Qaumi left Australia shortly after the Zakaria shooting leaving Mumtaz Qaumi in charge. Mr Abu-Mahmoud was not a member of the BFL Bankstown but was believed to have some association with members of that group. Mumtaz was concerned that he may have access to the addresses of the leaders of the BFL Blacktown and might provide those addresses to the BFL Bankstown. Accordingly, he formulated a harebrained plan to kill Abu-Mahmoud.
There was evidence that Witness M and others attended the Chokolatta Café on the early evening of the shooting so that M could identify Abu-Mahmoud to those engaged to carry out the shooting. There were telephone intercepts in which Jamil Qaumi gave various directions to Witness I and text exchanges between Jamil and Witness M. [11] Meanwhile, Mumtaz Qaumi travelled from his home on the central coast to Sydney. While Mumtaz’s attendance on the earlier visit to the café could not be sustained on the cell tower evidence of his movements, the jury accepted that he and Jamil solicited the murder of Abu-Mahmoud.
11. Ex FFFFFF.
Ultimately, the offenders directed Witness I to drive the shooters to the restaurant at around closing time and to block Abu-Mahmoud’s car when the target left the café. As it happened, Abu-Mahmoud got into his car along with two other men and all three men were sitting in the car when the shooting occurred. Witness I blocked the car and MK (armed with a 0.38 calibre revolver) and Witness D (armed with a shotgun) opened fire on and into the car. Two of the occupants received gunshot wounds although both were expected to make a full recovery. The ballistics evidence showed that projectiles fired from the shotgun struck the top of the back of the driver’s seat. It was dumb luck that the projectile did not enter the back of the head and kill Mr Khalil who was sitting there. The ballistics evidence supported MK’s case that he fired the revolver into the side of the car and not at the three victims sitting inside the car.
The jury was unable to agree upon verdicts in respect of MK on the counts arising out of the Chokolatta Café shooting. It may be that some members of the jury doubted whether he had the intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm or whether duress had been negatived beyond reasonable doubt. Resolution of those matters, which involve a degree of speculation, is not necessary to understand the guilty verdicts reached in relation to Mumtaz and Jamil Qaumi. There was no doubt that at least one of the shooters (Witness D) fired his weapon with intention to kill.
The offences arising out of the Chokolatta Café shooting are obviously extremely serious. They involved a plot to take the life of one man, endangered the lives of three men directly and were carried out in a public place with no regard for the safety of the public. They constituted a continuation of a violent, underworld rampage in which a number of guns were readily accessed and discharged in or near people’s homes and public places.

The Greenacre shooting on 28 November 2013

On 28 November 2013, Farhad and Mumtaz Qaumi directed Witnesses L and M to carry out what was described as a “drive-by” shooting at premises in Greenacre. Witness L was provided with a 0.45 calibre pistol for this purpose. The plan was to shoot at the house occupied by the mother of Mohammed Hamzy. However, when they arrived at the scene, Witness L was concerned because there were women and children in the vicinity of Mrs Hamzy’s home. He returned to the car, where Witness M told Witness L that a group of men nearby were members of the Bankstown BFL and suggested that Witness L shoot at them. Witness L did this by firing the gun around five or six times. One of the bullets struck Anthony Elkadi and another struck a dwelling.
Farhad and Mumtaz Qaumi were found guilty of an offence of firing at a dwelling house in the course of criminal activity with reckless disregard for safety (count 18). The offenders did not intend that any person be shot and they are not to be sentenced for the injury suffered by Mr Elkadi.
This offence was part of the gangland war being fought between the two chapters of the Brothers For Life. It was part of an ongoing and organised criminal activity. It involved the use of a firearm in a public place and directed at private home. The danger to innocent bystanders was obvious and the offence was committed with disregard for public safety. While this was the least serious of the convictions for shooting offences, it remains an extremely serious offence of its kind.

Guns, drugs and criminal group

In addition to the offences arising out of the five shootings directed at the members and associates of the BFL Bankstown, the jury also found the offenders guilty of possession of some of the firearms used in those offences. Farhad Qaumi was convicted of possessing a 0.45 calibre pistol (count 19). That pistol was never recovered but ballistics evidence suggested that the same 0.45 calibre pistol was used in the Hamzy shooting as well as the “drive-by” shooting at Greenacre (count 18). [12] All three offenders were convicted of possessing a prohibited firearm (a Mossberg sawn-off pump action shotgun) (count 21) and possessing a pistol (a Smith & Wesson 0.38 calibre revolver) (count 22). Those two guns were located in a bag that also contained drugs. There was a deal of evidence in the trial of attempts by the offenders to recover this bag in the latter part of 2013. The Mossberg shotgun was used in the Zakaria shooting. The Smith & Wesson revolver was used in the Hamzy shooting.
12. See Ex AAAA.
The three offenders were also convicted of the supply of a large commercial quantity of a prohibited drug (count 20). The evidence suggested that one of the core businesses of the BFL Blacktown was the supply of various drugs. The offenders are not to be sentenced for those activities. However, there was evidence of their involvement in the possession of a bag that contained the two guns subject of counts 21 and 22 along with a quantity of tablets containing a drug called N-(2-methoxylbenzl)-2,5-dimethoxy-4-iodophenethylamine. The quantity of drugs in the bag was 1,894.4 grams. The large commercial quantity prescribed for this drug in the Schedule to the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) is 2 grams. An expert certificate was tendered on sentence. [13] It established that the drug is a “relatively new psychoactive substance” and that there is a lack of comprehensive data on its effects. It has hallucinogenic effects similar to LSD and can cause severe agitation and confusion, severe psychological and behavioural changes, aggression and unpredictable violent episodes.
13. Ex S-F.
The three offenders were also convicted of directing the activities of a criminal group (count 23). This is the aggravated form of the offence provided for in s 93T(1A) Crimes Act1900 (NSW) and carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. The particulars of the activities of the group provided by the prosecution in relation to this count were the same activities covered by the offences in the indictment. In sentencing for most of the individual offences, one of the aggravating features is the fact that the offences were part of an organised criminal activity. In those circumstances the only appropriate exercise of discretion is to make the sentence for the criminal group charge either wholly or largely concurrent with the other sentences. Because of his unquestioned leadership role, the objective criminality of Farhad Qaumi is far greater than the other offenders in relation to this offence. Even when Mumtaz Qaumi was placed in charge, he was clearly motivated to do Farhad’s bidding.

The contract killing of Joseph Antoun on 16 December 2013

After a trial by Judge alone, Farhad and Mumtaz Qaumi were convicted of the murder of Joseph Antoun on 16 December 2013. The facts are set out in some detail in my judgment explaining the reasons for finding each offender guilty. [14]
14. See R v Qaumi & Qaumi (No 12) (supra).
The two offenders accepted a contract from Les Elias to organise the murder of Mr Antoun. They were paid at least $80,000, and possibly $100,000, to do this. It may be that they were promised $190,000 and that some of the money remains outstanding. The precise terms of the contract were unknowable due to the coded communications surrounding the transaction, the use of other business transactions to hide the true reason for the transfer of money and the predictable absence of evidence from those involved in organising the contract.
The two accused approached Witness L who had carried out two previous shootings on their behalf – the Hamzy shooting and the drive-by shooting at Greenacre. I am unable to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the offenders threatened him and his daughter as Witness L alleged, but there is no doubt that the offenders engaged him to carry out the killing. On 11 December 2013, the offenders showed Witness L the house where Mr Antoun lived with his wife and two daughters and, on the day of the killing, they provided him with a 0.38 calibre snub nose revolver. The offenders offered to pay Witness L part of the proceeds of the contract but never did so.
On the day of the murder, the offenders engaged Witness C to drive Witness L to the premises although they did not tell him the true purpose of the journey. After Witness L picked up the weapon from his home, Witness C drove Witness L to the residential premises of the victim. There is CCTV footage showing Witness L firing a number of shots at Mr Antoun who was standing at the front door. Teagan Mullens provided a chilling description of what she saw as the father of her twin daughters was executed in cold blood in her presence. At least one of the five bullets penetrated Mr Antoun’s heart and he died quickly at the scene. Witness L ran from the premises and Witness C, who heard the gunshots and was now aware of the true purpose of the trip, drove Witness L from the scene.
After the shooting, Witness L showed the offenders where he had hidden the murder weapon and, after Witness L was arrested for breach of parole, Farhad Qaumi took steps to dispose of the gun. To this end, he used the services of Witness K, his young cousin and fellow BFL Blacktown member. Farhad was under surveillance at this time and Witness K was arrested shortly after he took possession of the gun. It was subsequently identified as the gun that killed Mr Antoun.
In the days following the murder, there was further surveillance of the offenders. There were meetings with Elias and also a gangland figure called Pasquale Barbaro. Barbaro had previously expressed strong and adverse opinions of Mr Antoun and he may also have been involved in the plot to engage the Qaumi brothers.

Teagan Mullens and the victim’s brother Nemer both gave evidence of the impact of the offence on the family of Mr Antoun. Short and moving letters written by Mr Antoun’s twin daughters were tendered and read by their mother. The impact on the family is unfathomable.
The seriousness of this offence speaks for itself and raises the question whether the level of culpability is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met by the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. [15]
15. Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 61.
Farhad Qaumi was also convicted of possession of the 0.38 calibre snub nose revolver. This offence encompassed his control over the weapon when it was in the possession of others (Witnesses L and K) and for the short period in which he had actual custody of the weapon. There is no evidence Farhad owned the weapon and the most likely source of the weapon was Witness M who had family connections with access to guns and who was involved in the preparation for the shooting.

The contempt offences

Refusal to answer questions

Jamil Qaumi gave evidence in the trial. On 23-24 August 2016, on four occasions, he refused to answer relevant questions in spite of being directed to do so. He was charged with contempt on each occasion although he was not required to enter a plea at that stage. [16] Subsequently, the learned Crown Advocate appeared as amicus and the charges as originally formulated were amended. Two charges of contempt were substituted. The first charge covered two instances of refusing to answer questions on 23 August 2016 during evidence in chief. The second charge covered refusal to answer questions on 24 August 2016 in cross-examination. Jamil was invited to plead to these charges on 6 October 2016 and entered a plea of guilty to each charge.
16. R v Qaumi & Ors (No 62) [2016] NSWSC 1215.
A peculiar aspect of the first charge is the fact that the question was asked in chief by the offender’s own counsel in circumstances where it was (or should have been) known that Jamil would refuse to answer the question. The question was not withdrawn and the offender was directed to answer it. He refused. After a brief adjournment allowing counsel to advise their client, the offender was given the opportunity to answer the question and purge his contempt. He refused again after being directed to answer. The following day, the Crown Prosecutor asked similar questions and twice the offender refused to answer in spite of being directed to do so.
All four refusals to answer came in response to what was, essentially, the same question. That question was this: who was the third shooter in the Hamzy shooting. This was a critical piece of information to both the Crown and the man accused by the Crown. By refusing to answer this question, Jamil Qaumi acted with flagrant disregard to the interests of justice and the interests of the parties. At worst, he may have denied an innocent man the opportunity to establish his defence.
On the other hand, I accept that part of Jamil’s Qaumi’s evidence when he said:

“Well, if I answer that question everyone’s going to call me a dog. I’m in gaol and my life’s going to be in danger in gaol.” [17]
17. T 5,973.

He later said:

“Yeah, I am very sorry, your Honour, but I can’t answer that question. I am in gaol. My life is going to be in danger if I answer that question.” [18]
18. T 6,106.

I accept that this is the true explanation for the offender’s refusal to answer the questions and, while they do not purge the contempt or justify it, they provide a proper context and a degree of mitigation.

Assaulting a co-accused in the dock

On 14 October 2016 Jamil and Mumtaz Qaumi each pleaded guilty to one count of contempt arising out of an act of violence upon their co-accused (MK) that was committed in my presence and while the Court was sitting in the absence of the jury. The incident took place on 1 August 2016.
The facts of the incident are described in my judgment R v Qaumi and Ors (No 55) [19] and the background to the incident is set out at [4]–[10] of that judgment. The incident was captured on CCTV installed in the courtroom and this footage was tendered in the course of the sentencing proceedings. [20] However graphic that footage is, it does not capture the full extent of the brief but violent confrontation. Members of my staff and others present in court were greatly shaken by the incident.
19. [2016] NSWSC 1068 at [2]-[3].
20. Ex S-H.
Nothing in the background to the incident justified what appeared to be a calculated attempt to injure and intimidate a co-accused. The timing of the incident, which occurred almost instantly upon the door behind the jury being closed, suggests that offenders planned the attack in advance. Farhad Qaumi’s reaction suggested that he was unaware of the plan. Following the incident, both MK and the other co-accused sought to be removed from the dock asserting that they felt unsafe in the face of such violence. Ultimately, a Perspex [21] wall was constructed within the dock separating the three offenders from their co-accused. The Court was unable to sit while the wall was constructed and the jury was asked to disperse for a number of days.
21. Or similar material.
I am prepared to accept that the pressure of the extremely long trial and the stress and anxiety caused by the proceedings, played a part in causing the accused to conduct themselves as they did. As I commented more than once over the 18 months of the trial, the conduct of the accused was, on the whole, very good in spite of those pressures and anxieties. Even allowing for these pressures, the behaviour constituted a serious contempt of the Court.

The attitude of Courts to gangland violence

All of the offences arose because the offenders were the leaders (or, in Jamil’s, case the brother of the leaders) of a criminal gang that acquired a reputation for violence and indulged in a “war” with a rival criminal gang. When he gave evidence on the issue of his conditions of incarceration, Farhad Qaumi said:

“They tried to kill me.
…
I mean, it’s not a secret, I’m at war. That’s what the proceedings is about here. There’s casualties in war.” [22]
22. T (23 May 2017) 27.

It is worth noting that a number of the casualties in this so called “war” were completely innocent victims caught in the cross-fire. Examples are Mahmoud Hamzy (who is dead), the child H (who may never be able to fall pregnant) and the people shot outside the Chokolatta Café.
While the Antoun murder was not part of this “war”, I draw the inference that Farhad Qaumi was approached to organise the killing because of the reputation for violence he had earned in the criminal underworld and his capacity to direct others to carry out murderous acts of gun violence.
In cases involving a sustained, even if relatively brief, course of conduct involving gangland violence, the Courts have made it clear that the conduct cannot be tolerated and must be met with punishment that denounces the crime and deters others from acting in a similar way. It is unnecessary to recount cases in which such statements have been made.

the charges and applicable penalties

Farhad Qaumi is to be sentenced for 15 offences. Table A at the end of this judgment sets out those offences, along with the applicable maximum penalties and standard non-parole periods. He faces two offences carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, [23] seven offences carrying 25 years and a number of other offences carrying 14 years or more. The offences attract standard non-parole periods of 20 years, 15 years, 10 years (4), 7 years (3) and four years (4).
23. Although I find that the drug offence is towards the bottom of the range of serious for offences of its kind.
Mumtaz Qaumi is to be sentenced for 17 offences. Table B sets out the offences, the maximum penalties and standard non-parole periods. This includes the murder which carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and standard non-parole period of 20 years. There are nine offences carrying a maximum penalty of 25 years and seven attracting a standard non-parole period of 10 years. All of the offences are serious.
Jamil Qaumi is to be sentenced for 18 offences. Table C sets out the details and applicable penalties. The drug offence carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment although that is one of the less serious offences he faces. There are eleven offences carrying a maximum penalty of twenty five years and other offences carrying a standard non-parole period of 10 years.
One only has to state those maximum penalties and standard non-parole periods to realise the situation of each of these offenders is dire.
In sentencing the offenders, I must always keep in mind the maximum penalties prescribed by the Parliament (or the common law in the case of the contempt charges) and consider any relevant standard non-parole periods as guideposts to the relative seriousness with which the law treats the various offences. In many cases, the Crown has submitted that the maximum penalty should be imposed. The High Court indicated recently that a sentencing Judge should avoid expressing an opinion that a particular offence is “in the worst category of offence”. [24] Rather, an assessment is to be made whether it is appropriate to impose the maximum penalty and to explain the reasons for that conclusion. That conclusion is based ultimately on a consideration of the seriousness of the offending and the personal circumstances of the offender.
24. The Queen v Kilic [2016] HCA 48 at [17]-[20].
The standard non-parole period applies to an offence falling in the middle range of objective seriousness and the correct approach to the standard non-parole period has been explained in a number of cases, most authoritatively by the High Court in Muldrock v The Queen. [25] While it is an important legislative yardstick to the appropriate sentence, the standard non-parole period does not replace the judicial task of synthesising all of the many factors that are relevant to sentencing and instinctively determining the weight that should be given to those factors in deciding on a proper and appropriate sentence. [26] Whether an offence falls within the middle range of objective seriousness is to be assessed “without reference to matters personal to the particular offender or class of offenders”. [27]
25. (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39.
26. Muldrock at [26] and see Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 at 378 [51]; [2005] HCA 25.
27. Muldrock at [27].

the personal (OR SUBJECTIVE) cases

The offenders are brothers and parts of their personal cases are similar. Each of them has lived a life of dislocation and trauma. Their family is from Afghanistan and was forced to flee that country as a result of the military conflict, civil war and internal disruptions and persecutions in which that country was mired in the 1980s and 1990s. Their father was psychologically scarred as a consequence and this impacted on the boys’ lives in various ways over many years. This background explains to some degree the paths that the offenders’ lives took and provides a context in which their offending behaviour is to be evaluated. Their involvement in crime and willingness to resort to violence, particularly gun violence, cannot be divorced from their personal histories and exposure to such violence (either directly or vicariously) in their formative years. It is difficult for those fortunate to grow up in a peaceful society, largely unaffected by war and terrorism, to understand the impact on those whose lives have been damaged or destroyed by the scourge of systematic violence, brutality and dislocation.

Farhad Qaumi

Farhad Qaumi’s personal case was established through a report prepared by Dr Kerri Eagle, forensic psychiatrist. It received support from material tendered on behalf of Mumtaz Qaumi and in a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1998. [28] He has a troubling criminal history of some significance in a determination of the appropriate sentence.
28. R v FQ (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 28 May 1998, unrep).
Farhad is 34 years old and has 3 children between the ages of 3 and 5 years. His marriage broke down when he was remanded in custody in 2015 for these offences. He was born in Afghanistan and had a chaotic, traumatic and disrupted childhood. At the age of six or seven, his primary school was bombed and his teacher and best friend were both killed. His family fled Afghanistan due to the ongoing civil war and turmoil. They went to India in 1988 before migrating to Australia in 1993. The family experienced difficulties in adjusting to their new life in Australia.
The psychiatric report refers to the opinion of the offenders’ sister that their father suffered from “war depression” and inflicted “frequent harsh physical discipline” on Farhad. Compounding this, Farhad witnessed a further violent death (of a fellow school student) during his early adolescence whilst in attendance at Canley Vale Behaviour School.
The offender resorted to drugs for a sustained period in an attempt to “avoid” feelings of “fear and anger” arising from years of sustained traumatic experiences. His drug use commenced at the age of 13 years. His substance abuse, especially his use of cannabis, increased during his adolescence and he committed robberies to sustain this habit. He told the psychiatrist that he was using “three to four ounces” of cocaine during a “session” in the period leading up to the present offending. A “session” might last from a Friday through to Monday. This is an extraordinary amount of cocaine to consume and speaks to either a raging drug habit or an exaggeration of his use in his interview with the psychiatrist. In either case, it is well established that drug addiction is not a mitigating feature unless it can be clearly related to matters outside an offender’s control, such as where an offender has become addicted to drugs in the course of medical treatment. The drug use in this case is more likely to be the result of self-indulgence although I do not discount the possibility that the use of drugs at a young age arose from an attempt to escape a dysfunctional and brutalised childhood. He also told the psychiatrist that he was using anabolic steroids on and off from 2002 and that he would get a “bit of ‘roid rage’”. He told Dr Eagle that his steroid use caused mood swings. There was some evidence in the trial, particularly in the form of recorded telephone calls, that supported the proposition that Farhad’s mood was unpredictable and that he became enraged with little warning and over the smallest sight.
Dr Eagle diagnosed Farhad with a complex post-traumatic stress disorder and substance use disorder as well as an anti-social personality disorder. The latter diagnosis was based on a “pervasive pattern of disregard for the rights of others”. He was exposed to severe violence and death from a very young age and the repeated exposure “re-traumatising him and thus exacerbating existing trauma related symptoms”. The report suggests that the offender’s experience of trauma has “altered his perspective of the world, such that he views the world as an unsafe and terrifying place” and resulted in “persistent feelings of fear and anger”. The offender’s life experiences and the psychological conditions resulting from this trauma have played a role in a life caught in the cycle of violence and criminality.
I accept that the experience of trauma may have altered Farhad Qaumi’s perspective of the world. While the seriousness of the offending means that nothing can excuse the choices that he has made, his early life as a traumatised child and the post-traumatic stress disorder that has resulted is an important consideration in settling on the weight to be afforded to general deterrence and in determining whether his moral culpability is diminished as a result. [29]
29. R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398 at 400; R v Lauritsen (2000) 114 A Crim R 333 at [43]-[51]; R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255 at [21]-[26]; Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 471; [2013] HCA 37 at [37]; DA v R [2014] NSWCCA 306; Kearsley v R [2017] NSWCCA 28.
The judgment of Carruthers J in R v FQ confirms the significant parts of the offender’s personal and psychiatric history. In particular, there was a report before the Court (in 1998) that Farhad was “exposed to horrific and extensive war related trauma and carnage”. Reference was made to the death of his friend in the school bombing. His post-traumatic stress disorder was said to be “lessening”. A worrying aspect of the 1998 report was that some of his personality traits were “described as almost psychopathic in nature”.
Farhad’s criminal history spans over 20 years with his first conviction recorded in June 1996 at the age of 13. The convictions are for a diverse range of offending including driving while disqualified, aggravated robbery, possession of an unregistered firearm and causing grievous bodily harm to a person with intent to murder. While he has previously been sentenced to terms of imprisonment, nothing in his criminal history approaches the gravity of the crimes he committed between October and December 2013 for which he is now to be sentenced. His criminal history, at least, disentitles him to leniency. It also raises real questions as to his future dangerousness and whether the record should be treated as a circumstance of aggravation. [30]
30. See s 21A(2)(d) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act and Veen v R (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14.
I return to the observation in the earlier report suggesting Farhad’s personality traits were “almost psychopathic”. The pattern of conduct demonstrated in the cases before me suggests some form of psychopathic disorder as that term is generally understood. Apart from him readily resorting to extreme violence and the methods he used to control his fellow gang members, a particularly disturbing aspect of his conduct was the use of people like Witness D and Witness K to do his bidding. Witness D was a young Hazara man whose performance in the witness box showed that he was “slow” to the point of having some form of intellectual disability. He was often confused and did not understand the questions. He was literal in his responses. He sometimes smiled at the men in the dock as if to seek their approval and reassurance. His description of his induction into the gang (when he was hugged as a brother) was chilling because it was clear he was being manipulated and used. [31] There was a silence in the court room as he gave his evidence and the mood in the trial changed. His evidence was compelling. He was a soft target for Farhad. Witness K was Farhad’s young cousin who had a job and appeared to have his life in order away from the criminal milieu. In spite of this, Farhad used him to move the murder weapon after the Antoun shooting. This explained his brother’s (Witness J’s) anger in his recorded conversations with Farhad on 4 January 2014. [32]
31. T 4,186 – 4,187.
32. These are set out in R v Qaumi & Qaumi (No 12) at [155]-[164].
Farhad’s subjective case presents a conundrum. I accept that his exposure to violence in Afghanistan and his dislocated family life caused the psychiatric conditions described by Dr Eagle. I accept that this explains his conduct and diminishes his moral culpability to a degree. I accept it plays a role in assessing the extent to which general deterrence should guide the proper exercise of the sentencing discretion. However, the evidence also creates the kind of situation in which the offender’s mental condition or personality disorder gives rise to concerns as to his capacity to rehabilitate and the danger he presents to the community. Accordingly, the protection of the community must play a significant, if not dominant, role in the assessment of an appropriate sentence. [33]
33. See, for example, R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67.

Mumtaz Qaumi

Mumtaz Qaumi tendered a psychiatric report under the hand of Dr Olav Nielssen dated 29 March 2017. He also tendered testimonials from his wife (Wasillah Qaumi) and his mother (Gulmaki Qaumi).
Mumtaz is 32 years old, married with 4 children. The youngest child was born after the offender was taken into custody. Mumtaz was born in Afghanistan and spent his early childhood in the midst of the Afghan war. The family fled Afghanistan to India and eventually Australia, after his father was kidnapped and a number of his mother’s relatives were killed. [34]
34. Exhibit SM1 p 2.
Dr Nielssen diagnosed Mumtaz with an anxiety disorder, based on a “history of typical panic attacks, and features consistent with post traumatic anxiety” and a depressive illness, in partial remission. [35] The report lists a number of factors contributing to his development of anxiety and depression, including a family history of psychotic illness, the effects of exposure to traumatic events in early childhood, the hardship he experienced as a refugee and “the effects of witnessing the immediate aftermath of the homicide of his aunt by his mentally ill cousin”. [36] The report suggests the offenders clinical condition meant that there was an “increased perception of threat associated with having an anxiety disorder” and noted, the alleged “real threats from the deceased and his associates”. [37] The offender also reported what appeared to be “realistic anxiety for his own safety, based on having received plausible threats.” [38] I interpolate that these findings are particularly relevant to the manslaughter charge and conspiracy to murder Mohammed Hamzy but are also relevant to the series of shootings directed against other members of the BFL Bankstown. On the other hand, Joseph Antoun – the victim of the most serious offence – represented no threat, real or imagined, to the offender or his family. He was killed for money.
35. Ex SM1 p 8.
36. Ex SM1 p 8.
37. Ex SM1 p 9.
38. Ex SM1 p 8.
While Mumtaz Qaumi denies any involvement in the criminal activity of the Brothers For Life group, he asserts that his involvement in the offences was prompted after receiving a phone call from his brother Farhad, who believed his own life was threatened. The offender allegedly returned to Sydney to “help protect his brother”. [39] This must be a reference to the Hamzy shooting.
39. Ex SM1 p 2.
The report states the offender felt “a lot of sympathy for the victim and his wife” and stated that he could “feel their pain”. [40] It is not clear whether this relates to the Hamzy or the Antoun shooting. In any event, in light of the conduct of the proceedings, and the hearsay nature of this assertion, I am unable to place very much, if any, weight on this self-serving expression of contrition although it may well be genuine.
40. Ex SM1 p3
Mumtaz reported regular use of cannabis between 2010 and 2013, which he explained helped him to control his anxiety. However, he denied any substance use at the time of the commission of the offences. [41] The offender has been in the past, and remains, medicated for this anxiety disorder with a combination of an antidepressant and a sedating antipsychotic medication. [42]
41. Ex SM1 p 3.
42. Ex SM1 p 5.
Wasillah Qaumi said that Mumtaz was a very supportive husband and a “great” father. They met in the city of Quetta in Pakistan in 2007. Mumtaz remained with her as she waited for her visa to be approved to come to Australia, despite suffering from anxiety attacks and living in “constant fear of being kidnapped and held for ransom” as a “foreigner”. They arrived in Sydney in 2008 and Mrs Qaumi said that in 2011 Mumtaz’s physical health deteriorated due to a damaged disk in his lower back. He was in a great deal of pain. This “took a toll on himself and his family, as he started changing”. Mrs Qaumi reported “mood swings” from medication prescribed, regular use of marijuana (to “ease the pain”), and “regular panic attacks”. Mrs Qaumi reported her husband was “depressed and rarely left the house to engage in social activity”. By 2013, her husband was happier, began socialising and purchased a kebab shop in Erina. However, by November of that year, she noticed a “change in his behaviour” as he appeared “in constant fear of his and his family’s safety”. Upon hearing his brother Jamil had been arrested, Mumtaz told his family that “there were people who wanted to harm him and his brothers” and suggested they move to Brisbane as Sydney was “no longer safe”. Mrs Qaumi reports that they were in “the process of moving” when Mumtaz was arrested.
Gulmaki Qaumi is the mother of all three offenders. She described the “horrifying conditions” she and her children were subjected to during their time in Afghanistan. She describes how she still remembers her children’s “hearts thumping” in her ears and how they would “shiver, scream and cry in fear each time a bomb hit or shots were fired nearby”. After escaping to India, day-to-day life was very difficult for the family. Mrs Qaumi noted that there were no counselling services available to them at this time. Life remained difficult when the family arrived in Australia in 1993 and Mrs Qaumi described the impact her husband’s depression had on her children. Mrs Qaumi described how although they “survived the war”, they “remained impacted by it”.
Mumtaz has a criminal history. [43] This commenced in the Children’s Court where he was placed on a control order for offences of detain for advantage and robbery committed when he was 16 years of age. As an adult, he had numerous driving offences and some serious offences of violence for which he was sentenced to imprisonment. This included demanding property by force, stealing from the person and assault police, a series of crimes for which he was sentenced to more than two years imprisonment in 2005. He had no convictions between 2006 and the commission of the present offences. That gap in his criminality is of some significance. However, since his arrest, he was sentenced to possession of a mobile telephone and SIM card while being in custody and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. While Mumtaz Qaumi’s criminal history disentitles him to the leniency that would be afforded to a first offender, it does not constitute an aggravating feature or engage the principles discussed by the High Court in Veen (No 2).
43. Ex SE at 5-7.
In Mumtaz Qaumi’s case, the psychiatric evidence and the history of trauma and dislocation are of some significance to an assessment of the proper sentence. [44] They receive support from the evidence of his wife and mother. The psychiatric issues pre-date the commission of the current offences. I accept Dr Nielssen’s conclusions as to the connection between his anxiety disorder and the offences arising out of the dispute with BFL Bankstown. This impacts on his moral culpability and the weight to be afforded to general deterrence. I am not satisfied on balance that his time in custody is more onerous due his mental health issues although I accept Dr Nielssen’s assessment that the conditions of his incarceration are very onerous, a matter which became a focus of attention late in the course of the sentencing hearing.
44. See the cases referred to in note [26] above.
The long gap in Mumtaz’s criminal history (2006-2013), the support he has from his wife, the incentive to reform represented by his infant children and Dr Nielssen’s opinion that his anxiety disorder is “generally quite responsive to treatment” lead me to conclude (as did Dr Nielssen) that Mumtaz Qaumi has “reasonable prospects for longer-term rehabilitation”.

Jamil Qaumi

Jamil Qaumi tendered a report prepared by a psychologist (Ann-Marie De Santa Brigida) and testimonials from his older sister and his wife.
Jamil was born in 1992 and was 21 years old at the time of the offences and 25 years old at the time of sentence. He married shortly before the offences. Apart from a common assault and failing to leave the restricted area of a railway station, for which he was fined a total of $700, he has no prior convictions. The absence of a significant criminal record is a mitigating feature. However, since being taken into custody he has been sentenced for assaulting two prisoner officers by throwing water on them, pretending it was urine. He received a two month sentence for that offence.
He was born in India and so was not directly exposed to the horrors of the Afghan war. However Ms Brigida refers to the possibility of “inter-generational transmission of trauma”. Given the post-traumatic stress suffered by his older brothers and father, I am prepared to accept this possibility although the report does not suggest any particular link between that vicarious condition and the offending. Of more significance is his exposure to violence in the form of a “drive-by” shooting when he was 13 years of age and his “allegiance” to his brothers. He has a history of substance abuse.
Jamil’s sister (Shaista Amin) described Jamil as “very family oriented” and a “very caring person”. When Mrs Amin was diagnosed with gestational diabetes during her fifth pregnancy in 2013, Jamil “took responsibility” for her children and helped Mrs Amin with domestic life. Mrs Amin states that Jamil “made sure my [her] kids were always safe and happy”. She also described Jamil going “out of his way” to help an elderly neighbour suffering from cancer. Mrs Amin believes that Jamil committed the offences for which he is now to be sentenced “out of fear” triggered by a drive-by shooting at their home in 2006. She thinks Jamil feared that he would “lose family members for no reason”. Mrs Amin believes her brother is “deeply remorseful” for “his involvement in the death of Mahmoud Hamzy” and describes how he “sincerely regrets his offences and what he has put the victims, his own wife and our [the] family through”.
Jamil’s wife (Farishta Qaumi) described a supportive husband and a man that had “a lot of love for his family and everyone around him”. The pair married in Islamabad, Pakistan in 2013 and remained there for 5 months until Farishta’s Australian visa was granted. Mrs Qaumi described “behavioural changes” in the weeks before his arrest. Her husband became “over protective … fearing something that he never spoke about”. Mrs Qaumi stated that she and Jamil’s family did not attend the trial as “Jamil thought it wasn’t safe”. Mrs Qaumi said that her husband “regrets his involvement in the death of Mahmoud Hamzy” and that he “feels terrible about what happened”.
I accept the evidence of Jamil’s sister and wife and the opinions stated by the psychologist. I accept that Jamil was under the influence of his elder brothers, particularly Farhad, and that he became involved in the BFL Blacktown as a result of that connection. I am not prepared to act on the hearsay expressions of contrition and remorse. In spite of his offending since being incarcerated, misgivings arising from the various counts of contempt and the grave offending for which he is to be sentenced, his youth and family support satisfy me that he has some prospects of rehabilitation.

Approach to the subjective cases

While family and subjective circumstances such as those I have just described are extremely moving, it is important not to lose sight of the gravity of the offending in this case. The sad personal circumstances of the offenders and their families cannot lead the court to impose a sentence that is unduly disproportionate to the crimes. Also, it is important not to forget the impact of the crimes on the individual victims and on the community more generally. I have no doubt that the number and frequency of the shootings in late 2013 caused fear in the community and did violence to people’s right to feel safe and secure as they go about their business. It is important then to record the impact on the victims and it is to that subject that I now turn.

the impact on the victims

Many people’s lives have been affected by the outlandish and lawless violence in which these three offenders were involved over a one to two month period in latter part of 2013. Two men are dead and it is pure good fortune that more people were not killed. Many people were exposed to the gangland and gun violence instigated by the offenders. In some cases, the impact of the offenders’ conduct on the victims and their loved ones is devastating. In saying this, it must be remembered that Jamil Qaumi is not to be punished for the killing of Joseph Antoun and Farhad Qaumi is not responsible for those wounded in the Chokolatta Café shooting.
Hassnah Hamzy is the sister of Mahmoud Hamzy. She provided a victim’s impact statement that explained her whole family’s loss and grief. [45] She told me her brother was a beautiful soul who wouldn’t hurt a fly and that he was killed by people who didn’t even know his name because he was in the wrong place at the wrong time. Since her brother’s homicide, Hassnah has trouble coping and becomes very emotional and breaks down over little things. She says she will never be the same person she was before. She said her parents have changed and that nobody in the family will ever be the same. The family treats their lives as “before” and “after” the killing of Mahmoud. Not only have they lost their loved one, but their shared memories have been destroyed because of the way Mahmoud was killed. The family no longer enjoys family trips away, and does not celebrate religious holidays because Mahmoud’s absence is so palpable and painful. They cannot bear it.
45. Ex S-J.
Omar Ajaj sustained two gunshot wounds, one to the right upper leg in the thigh region and one to the right hand side of his abdomen. A bone in his right leg was fractured. Mr Ajaj was treated by paramedics, taken to Liverpool Hospital and was not discharged until 5 November 2013. There was no issue at the trial, and the jury found, that his injuries constituted grievous bodily harm.
Michael Odisho suffered gunshot wounds described earlier. He required surgery and appears to have made a good recovery.
In addition to the physical injuries suffered by Mr Odisho, his mother was present when her son was shot. She gave evidence in the trial and was obviously distressed and greatly affected by the experience of a gunman coming to her home and shooting her son.
The injuries to H (an innocent fourteen year old child) were potentially life threatening. Many hundreds of shotgun pellets were left in her body and doctors were unable to remove all of the pellets. This resulted in lead poisoning that may affect her ability to conceive a child or to carry a pregnancy to full term. Her demeanour when giving evidence, while courageous and at times feisty, showed that she was traumatised by the incident. A number of other people, including the proposed target and his family, were present when the shotgun was fired at or into their home. Again, while no evidence was adduced, it is reasonable to assume that being exposed to a shooting attack in the place they were entitled to feel safe has had an impact on each of them.
In the Chokolatta Café shooting, two men received shotgun injuries. Abdul Abu-Mahmoud suffered “injuries caused by shotgun pellets and associated shrapnel”. These injuries were to the back of his head, neck and shoulder. The injuries were not life threatening but required surgical intervention to remove the shotgun pellets. Hassan Souid received injuries to the back of the scalp, right biceps and the back of the shoulder. [46]
46. T 4960-49645 (Dr Fuentes)
Four victim’s impact statements were read explaining the devastation wrought on the family of Joseph Antoun. [47] His partner, Teagan Mullins, read her own statement and also those of her two daughters. His brother, Nemer Antoun, also read a statement.
47. Ex S-K, S-L, S-M and S-N.
Ms Mullens spoke of the bond between Mr Antoun and the twins and how Joe would come home every night to spend time with the girls. She has been left financially ruined and emotionally traumatised. She gave an emotional account of watching her husband die and her little girls waving as the ambulance took their father away. She suffers panic attacks and her health has been greatly affected. She and Joe were to get married the year after he was killed. The twins were to be the flower girls at the wedding. They will never have their father at school assemblies when they receive awards and will not have the example of their parents’ loving relationship to learn from and to emulate.
The simple and moving testimonies of the little girls spoke for themselves. They miss their Dad who gave the “best cuddles”, always let them choose the movies and came home to put them to bed each night. They miss him in the morning and when they come home from school. They said it is not fun to see their mum “all emotional” when they visit their Dad at the cemetery.
Nemer Antoun spoke of his brother who was nicknamed the White Rooster. He remembers jumping the fence with Joe to watch the Rabbitohs. He spoke of the family bond, the weekly visits Joe would make to his elderly mother and the loss to the twins. He spoke of Joe’s relationship with the Thungutti community near Kempsey where Joe was welcomed as a brother. The people there held a service for Joe after he died. Joe was murdered in cold blood in front of his wife and children and Nemer asked “For what?” and “who has the right to kill for no reason and take a man from his children or a boy from his mother?” Nemer is on a crusade for justice.
I am grateful to the family of Joseph Antoun for their courage and openness in reading their statements to the Court. What you have told me will be taken into account in accordance with the law.
The Crown made an application under s 28(4) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act which provides:

“A victim impact statement given by a family victim may, on the application of the prosecutor and if the court considers it appropriate to do so, be considered and taken into account by a court in connection with the determination of the punishment for the offence on the basis that the harmful impact of the primary victim’s death on the members of the primary victim’s immediate family is an aspect of harm done to the community.”

The difficulties in the application of this section, in the face of the fundamental principles that all human life is sacred and that all people are equal under the law, have been discussed in a number of cases. [48] In R v Halloun McCallum J said of s 28(4):

“I would construe the new provision as an important mechanism for ensuring that the evidence of family victims is placed before the court to give texture to the undoubted proposition that every unlawful taking of a human life harms the community in some way. In that way, the provision serves the purposes of sentencing stated in s. 3A of the Act, one of which is to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.”
48. See, for example, R v Hines (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 1273 (Hamill J) at [77] - [85]; R v Do (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 512 (Davies J); R v Halloun [2014] NSWSC 1705 (McCallum J); R v Sumpton (No. 4) [2015] NSWSC 684 at [36] – [44]; Sumpton v R [2016] NSWCCA 162. See also the comments pre-dating the section made by Hunt CJ at CL in R v Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76 and Adams J in R v Dang [1999] NSWCCA 42.

That comment was approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Sumpton v R, an appeal from a sentencing decision in which I applied her Honour’s statement of principle. On that basis, I consider it appropriate to take into account the victim’s impact statements of Hassnah Hamzy and the family of Joseph Antoun in determining the appropriate penalty on the basis that the harm done to them is an aspect of harm done to the community.

PRINCIPLES of sentencing

The common law has developed a unified set of principles guiding the exercise of the sentencing discretion. Those principles are well established and it is not necessary to set out each and every one of them in order to satisfy the primary purpose of a judgment (or remarks) on sentence, which is to explain to the offender, the community and those affected by the crimes why a particular sentence is being imposed. Legislation in relation to sentencing makes the task more technical and complex, especially in a case like this where there are so many different offences. Even so, sentencing ought not to descend into the application of “some sort of checklist”. [49] For example, I do not propose to go through all of the offences, addressing each and every aggravating and mitigating factor in s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. It will be clear from these remarks the matters that are aggravating and those that are mitigating. Even so, it is appropriate that I set out some of the important legal principles and to explain how I have applied those principles to the particular facts and circumstances of the present case. It is also necessary to attempt to comply with the technical aspects of the sentencing legislation.
49. Ghamraoui v R [2009] NSWCCA 111 at [23].

I will adopt the same approach to the contempt charge as I did with Jamil Qaumi. However, the charge arising from the attack on the co-accused will attract a longer fixed term because Mumtaz Qaumi was the instigator of that ugly incident.
Again, before I impose sentence, I am required to make findings as to whether the offences carrying a standard non-parole period fall in the middle range of objective seriousness and to indicate the sentences that would be imposed for each offence if an aggregate sentence was not imposed. For the most part, the indicative sentences are similar to those imposed on Jamil Qaumi. Some of the sentences are slightly longer for reasons that are apparent from the things I have said in the judgment. In the case of the Zakaria shooting, the indicative sentence is shorter because of the lesser role played by Mumtaz Qaumi in the lead up to that shooting.

In relation to count 1, the manslaughter of Mahmoud Hamzy, I indicate a sentence of 12 years.

In relation to count 2, grievous bodily harm of Omar Ajaj, the offence is in the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 8 years with a non-parole period of 6 years.

In relation to count 3, conspiracy to murder Mohammed Hamzy, the offence is in the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 10 years with a non-parole period of 7½ years.

In relation to count 4, soliciting the murder of Michael Odisho, the offence is in the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 10 years with a non-parole period of 7½ years.

In relation to count 5, the attempted murder of Michael Odisho, the offence is in the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 10 years with a non-parole period of 7½ years.

In relation to count 9, grievous bodily harm of H with intent, the offence is in the middle of range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 8 years with a non-parole period of 6 years.

In relation to count 10, soliciting the murder of Abdul Abu-Mahmoud, the offence is above the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 12 years with a non-parole period of 9 years.

In relation to count 11, the attempted murder of Abdul Abu-Mahmoud, the offence is above the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 12 years with a non-parole period of 9 years.

In relation to count 13, the attempted murder of Khalil Khalil, the offence is just above the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 12 years with a non-parole period of 9 years.

In relation to count 15, the attempted murder of Hassan Soueid, the offence is just above the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 12 years with a non-parole period of 9 years.

In relation to count 18, aggravated shooting at a dwelling house, the offence is in the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 6 years with a non-parole period of 4½ years.

In relation to count 20, the large commercial supply of drugs, the offence is well below the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of four years with a non-parole period of three years.

In relation to count 21, the possession of the Mossberg sawnoff shotgun, the offence is in the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 4 years with a non-parole of 3 years.

In relation to count 22, the possession of the 0.38 calibre Smith & Wesson revolver, the offence is in the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 4 years with a non-parole of 3 years

In relation to count 23, directing the activities of a criminal group, I indicate a sentence of 3 years.

In relation to the murder of Joseph Antoun, the offence is well above the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 38 years with a non-parole period 26 years. The length of the non-parole period reflects the finding of special circumstances I have made in determining the appropriate aggregate sentence. The total sentence is three years more than the indicative starting point for Witness L.

Mumtaz Qaumi, I will now impose sentence:

For the offence of contempt of court on 14 October 2016, you are sentenced to a fixed term of 10 months commencing 9 February 2014 and expiring on 8 December 2014. I do not propose to fix a non-parole period due to the aggregate sentence I am about to impose.

For the murder of Joseph Antoun and the offences in counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22 and 23 on the indictment before the jury, you are sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 50 years. I find special circumstances under s 44(2B) in your prospects of rehabilitation, your young family, the desirability that you have incentive to behave well in custody and the benefit of a long period on parole in which to re-integrate into the community. You are sentenced to a non-parole period of 36 years to commence on 9 December 2014 and to expire on 8 December 2050 with a balance of term of 14 years to commence on 9 December 2050 and to expire on 8 December 2064. You will be eligible for release on parole at the conclusion of the non-parole period.

Mumtaz Qaumi, I am required to inform you that the Crime (High Risk Offenders) Act applies to a number of the offences for which you have been sentenced. Your lawyers will no doubt explain the implications of that.
Mr Mumtaz Qaumi can be removed from the dock.

SENTENCING FARHAD QAUMI

Farhad Qaumi faces sentences in relation to 15 offences. This is less offences than Jamil (18 offences) and Mumtaz (17 offences). He is not charged with any of the contempt offences and was found not guilty (at my direction) of all (10) offences arising out of the Chokolatta Café shooting. However, as I have already said, principles of proportionality mean that his brothers must receive a less severe sentence than Farhad Qaumi.
There are several reasons for this. The first is the fact that his criminal history is worse. However, the main distinguishing feature is the role Farhad played in the group. The evidence given by various of the informants, and some of the recordings tendered in evidence, leaves no doubt that Farhad was the undisputed, and feared, leader of the BFL Blacktown. It was his decision to organise the attempted assassination of Mohammed Hamzy and his decision to target a number of other members of the BFL Bankstown in the aftermath of that shooting. There seems to be little doubt that Farhad’s reputation for violence, and his capacity to direct others to carry out shootings on his behalf, is what led those plotting against Joseph Antoun to approach the BFL Blacktown. It was Farhad who was feted (and then shot at) on the Oscar II motor vessel. It was Farhad who Les Elias and Pasquale Barbaro socialised with in the aftermath of the Antoun murder. More often than not, he used others to do his bidding. This included his young cousin (Witness K), his twenty one year old brother (Jamil) and the young and vulnerable Witness D. Some of the evidence established that he also had Mumtaz making calls and organising things on his behalf. This included the attempts toward the end of 2013 to obtain the bag containing the drugs subject of count 20 and the guns subject of counts 21 and 22. There was evidence that he aspired to “take over Sydney”. While there was an element of grandiosity in such statements, it is clear that Farhad Qaumi’s ambition was to expand his criminal empire, the core businesses of which were the distribution of drugs, extortion and, upon his acceptance of the contract to kill Joseph Antoun, contract killing.
As I evaluate the material, and putting aside (as I must) the philosophical question of whether such a sentence should ever be imposed, there are three matters that militate against the imposition of a life sentence. First, Farhad’s personal history of dislocation and trauma as a child growing up in war torn Afghanistan, explains to a very large degree how he came to resort with such apparent readiness to violence, and in particular gun violence. Second, the imposition of determinate sentences on Mumtaz Qaumi and Witness L may give rise to unreasonable disparity if a life sentence is imposed on Farhad. Third, the evidence of the harsh conditions of custody, and the absence of evidence that these are likely to be ameliorated in the near future, means that a life sentence will weigh more heavily upon this particular offender. I have considered those three matters closely along with the extreme culpability involved in the cold blooded murder of Joseph Antoun for money.
The history of trauma and its psychological impact on the offender cuts two ways in the present case. While it may diminish the weight to be afforded to general deterrence and impact on an assessment of moral culpability, it heightens the need for the protection of the community. There is no evidence before the Court that would justify a finding that Farhad Qaumi has any reasonable prospect of rehabilitation in the short term. However, the kind of determinate sentence that would be imposed would involve a total term that would not expire until he is in his late eighties or early nineties and a non-parole period that would not expire until he was in his mid to late seventies. Whether he is released at that time, and under what conditions of parole, would turn on an assessment of the danger he represented to the community. For those reasons, while recognising the danger to the community that Farhad currently represents, I satisfied that the community interest in the protection of the community can be met by an extremely long determinate sentence.
As to the question of parity, the different criminal histories and Farhad Qaumi’s leadership role are significant differences that justify a far greater sentence than that imposed on his co-accused. However, the fact that both the shooter and Mumtaz Qaumi were sentenced to determinate sentences is a matter that militates against a finding that the only way the community interest can be met is by the imposition of a life sentence.
The conditions of incarceration are a matter of concern but the evidence on that subject is such that it is impossible to predict how far into the future his incarceration will remain as onerous as it is today. As I have said, I give the matter some weight but I am not satisfied that this mater, by itself, would result in a finding that the prerequisites in section 61 are not satisfied.
Against those matters, I have considered the criminal history of the offender, the spate of earlier shootings in relation to which his guilt was determined by the jury in November last year and the extreme criminality involved in organising the contract killing of another human being.
I return to Farhad Qaumi’s personal history. I have already referred to this but I should revisit it to explain the decision to which I have come. The evidence of his mother and sister corroborates the history in Dr Eagle’s report. The history was largely consistent with the material described by the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1998. He was exposed to extraordinary trauma as a child growing up in Afghanistan. Not many people living in the comfort of Australia could have any real comprehension of this. His school was bombed and his teacher and best friend were killed. The family fled the violence, lived for a while as refugees in India and ended up in Australia. However, his father (himself traumatised by events in Afghanistan) was violent, hitting his oldest son with a belt or a wire. I have no doubt that these experiences had a major impact on Farhad Qaumi’s development and desensitised him to violence. I accept Dr Eagle’s diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and that his “experience of trauma has altered his perspective of the world, such that he sees the world as an unsafe and terrifying place.” I accept Dr Eagle’s opinion that:

“This has resulted in persistent feelings of fear and anger that have resulted in hyper-vigilance and aggression. In order to avoid these feelings, he has used substances. The trajectory of his life suggests that, as a result of his experiences, he appears to have become caught in a cycle of violence and criminal behaviour.”

In Bugmy v The Queen, the High Court recognised that “social disadvantage … frequently … precedes the commission of crime.”[108] The same must be true of the kind of exposure to war, violence and dislocation suffered by Farhad Qaumi. These matters, and their psychiatric impact, diminish the offender’s culpability. [109] It is relevant to an assessment of the “level of culpability” referred to in s 61(1).
108. Bugmy v The Queen at [37] quoting Simpson J (as her Honour then was) in Kennedy v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 260 at [53].
109. See Bugmy at [40] cited above at [124]-[125].
In spite of the extreme nature of the criminality involved in the killing of Mr Antoun – considered along with Farhad’s criminal history, leadership of a violent criminal gang and the spate of shooting offences in 2013 – the personal background, parity issue and conditions of incarceration, satisfy me that imposing a sentence of life imprisonment is not the only way that the community interest can be met. However, the determinate aggregate sentence that will be imposed will mean that he will be around 75 years of age before he is even eligible for release to parole. At that time, he will only be released if it is determined that he no longer represents a danger to the community. I am conscious that this may represent an effective life sentence, and have made a slight adjustment to the non-parole period as a result, but the criminality is such that no lesser aggregate sentence or non-parole period can be justified. [110] I am satisfied that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can be met by the aggregate sentence that I will presently impose.
110. Barton v R [2009] NSWCCA 164 at [16]-[17].
For the purpose of the application of the standard non-parole, it is again necessary to record my assessment of where each offence falls relative to the putative “middle range of seriousness”. Because of his leadership role, Farhad Qaumi’s criminality is higher than that of his brothers in each offence. This is reflected in the individual sentences and in the aggregate sentence. I am required to indicate the putative or indicative sentences that would be imposed if an aggregate sentence was not imposed:

In relation to count 1, the manslaughter of Mahmoud Hamzy, I indicate a sentence of 14 years.

In relation to count 2, grievous bodily harm of Omar Ajaj, the case is in the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 10 years with a non-parole period of 7½ years.

In relation to count 3, conspiracy to murder Mohammed Hamzy, the offence falls in the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 12 years with a non-parole period of 9 years

In relation to count 4, soliciting the murder of Michael Odisho, the offence is above the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 12 years with a non-parole period of 9 years.

In relation to count 5, the attempted murder of Michael Odisho, the offence is above the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 12 years with a non-parole period of 9 years.

In relation to count 7, soliciting the murder of Masood Zakaria, the offence is above the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 12 years with a non-parole period of 9 years.

In relation to count 9, grievous bodily harm of H with intent, the offence is well above the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 10 years with a non-parole period of 7½ years.

In relation to count 18, aggravated firing at a dwelling house, the offence is above the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 6 years with a non-parole period of 4½ years.

In relation to count 19, possession of a 0.45 calibre pistol, the offence is in the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 4 years with a non-parole period of 3 years.

In relation to count 20, supplying a large commercial quantity of a prohibited drug, the case falls below the middle range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 6 years with a non-parole period of 4½ years.

In relation to count 21, possession of a Mossberg sawn off shotgun, the offence is in the middle of the range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 4 years with a non-parole period of 3 years.

In relation to count 22, possession of a 0.38 calibre Smith & Wesson revolver, the case is in the middle of the range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 4 years with a non-parole period of 3 years.

In relation to count 23, directing the activities of a criminal group, I indicate a sentence of 8 years.

In relation to count 2 on the second indictment, the possession of a 0.38 snub nose revolver, the offence is in, or just above, the middle of the range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 6 years with a non-parole period of 4½ years.

In relation to the murder of Joseph Antoun, the sentence is well above the middle of the range of objective seriousness and I indicate a sentence of 45 years with a non-parole period of 33 years and 9 months.

I find special circumstances in the fact that by the expiration of the non-parole period, the offender will be in his mid to late seventies and that a failure to make some slight adjustment will convert a determinate sentence into an effective life sentence. I have reduced the non-parole period by only 2 years. I have concluded that the totality of criminality cannot result in an aggregate non-parole period of any shorter duration. The length of the aggregate balance of parole is ample to foster Farhad Qaumi’s reintegration into the community if the relevant authorities allow him to be released on parole.
Farhad Qaumi, for all of these offences you are sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 60 years. There will be an aggregate non-parole period of 43 years commencing on 9 January 2014 and expiring on 8 January 2057. There will be a balance of term of 17 years commencing 9 January 2057 and expiring on 8 January 2074.
You will become eligible for release to parole at the expiration of the non-parole period.
I am required to inform you that the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act applies to a number of the offences for which you have been sentenced.

TABLE A – FARHAD QAUMI

Count

Offence

Maximum Penalty

Standard Non-parole Period

Section 54D Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

1.

1.

(Altern-ative)

Manslaughter of Mahmoud Hamzy

25 years

Section 24 Crimes Act

Nil

2.

2.

Grievous bodily harm of Omar Ajaj with intent to cause grievous bodily harm

25 years

Section 33(1)(b) Crimes Act

7 years - item 4

3.

3.

Conspiracy to murder Mohammed Hamzy

25 years

Section 26 Crimes Act

10 years - item 2

4.

4.

Soliciting the murder of Michael Odisho

25 years

Section 26 Crimes Act

10 years - item 2

5.

5.

Intent to murder Michael Odisho

25 years

Section 29 Crimes Act

10 years - item 3

6.

7.

Soliciting the murder of Masood Zakaria

25 years

Section 26 Crimes Act

10 years - item 2

7.

9.

Grievous bodily harm to H with intent to cause grievous bodily harm

25 years

Section 33 (1)(b) Crimes Act

7 years- item 4

8.

18.

Firing a firearm at a dwelling-house in the course of criminal activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others

16 years

Section 93G(1B) Crimes Act

6 years - item 10P

9.

19.

Possessing a 0.45 calibre pistol, not being authorised to do so by a licence or permit

14 years

Section 7(1) Firearms Act 1996

4 years - item 20

10.

20.

Supply of a large commercial quantity of a prohibited drug

A fine of 5000 penalty points or imprisonment for life or both

Sections 25(2) and 33(3)(a) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985

15 years - item 19

11.

21.

Possessing a prohibited firearm, not being authorised to do so by a license or permit

14 years

Section 7(1) Firearms Act

4 years - item 20

12.

22.

Possessing a Smith & Wesson 0.38 special calibre revolver, not being authorised to do so by a license or permit

14 years

Section 7(1) Firearms Act

4 years - item 20 Crimes

13.

23.

Directing the activities of a criminal group

15 years

Section 93T(4A) Crimes Act

NIL

14.

1.

Murder of Joseph Antoun

Life or 25 years

Section 18(1)(a) Crimes Act

20 years – item 1

15.

2.

Possessing a 0.38 calibre snub nose revolver, not being authorised to do so by a licence or permit

14 years

Section 7(1) Firearms Act

4 years - item 20

TABLE B – MUMTAZ QAUMI

Count

Offence

Max Penalty

Standard Non-parole Period

Section 54D Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

1.

1.

(Alternative)

Manslaughter of Mahmoud Hamzy

25 years

Section 24 Crimes Act

Nil

2.

2.

Grievous bodily harm of Omar Ajaj with intent to cause grievous bodily harm

25 years

Section 33(1)(b) Crimes Act

7 years - item 4

3.

3.

Conspiracy to murder Mohammed Hamzy

25 years

Section 26 Crimes Act

10 years - item 2

4.

4.

Soliciting the murder of Michael Odisho

25 years

Section 26 Crimes Act

10 years - item 2

5.

5.

Intent to murder Michael Odisho

25 years

Section 29 Crimes Act

10 years - item 3

6.

9.

Grievous bodily harm to H with intent to cause grievous bodily harm

25 years

Section 33(1)(b) Crimes Act

7 years- item 4

7.

10.

Soliciting the murder of Abdul Abu-Mahmoud

25 years

Section 26 Crimes Act

10 years - item 2

8.

11.

Shooting at Abdul Abu-Mahmoud with intent to murder Abdul Abu – Mahmoud

25 years

Section 29 Crimes Act

10 years - item 3

9.

13.

Shooting at Khalil Khalil with intent to murder Khalil Khalil

25 years

Section 29 Crimes Act

10 years - item 3

10.

15.

Shooting at Hassan Soueid with intent to murder Hassan Soueid

25 years

Section 29 Crimes Act

10 years - item 3

11.

18.

Firing a firearm at a dwelling-house in the course of criminal activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others

16 years

Section 93G(1B) Crimes Act

6 years - item 10P

12.

20.

Supply of a large commercial quantity of a prohibited drug

A fine of 5000 penalty points or imprisonment for life or both

Sections 25(2) and 33(3)(a) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985

15 years - item 19

13.

21.

Possessing a prohibited firearm, not being authorised to do so by a license or permit

14 years

Section 7(1) Firearms Act

4 years - item 20

14.

22.

Possessing a Smith & Wesson 0.38 special calibre revolver, not being authorised to do so by a license or permit

14 years

Section 7(1) Firearms Act

4 years - item 20

15.

23.

Directing the activities of a criminal group

15 years

Section 93T(4A) Crimes Act

Nil

16.

1.

Murder of Joseph Antoun

Life or 25 years

Section 18(1)(a) Crimes Act

20 years – item 1

17.

Contempt (act of violence towards co-accused in the face of the court) on 1 August 2016

At large

Common law[111]

Nil

111. See, for example, Smith v The Queen (1991) 25 NSWLR 1 at 15.

TABLE C – JAMIL QAUMI

No. of Offences

Count

Offence

Max Penalty

Standard Non-parole Period

Section 54D Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

1.

1.

(alternative)

Manslaughter of Mahmoud Hamzy

25 years

Section 24 Crimes Act

Nil

2.

2.

Grievous bodily harm of Omar Ajaj with intent to cause grievous bodily harm

25 years

Section 33(1)(b) Crimes Act

7 years - item 4

3.

3.

Conspiracy to murder Mohammed Hamzy

25 years

Section 26 Crimes Act

10 years - item 2

4.

4.

Soliciting the murder of Michael Odisho

25 years

Section 26 Crimes Act

10 years - item 2

5.

5.

Intent to murder Michael Odisho

25 years

Section 29 Crimes Act

10 years - item 3

6.

7.

Soliciting the murder of Masood Zakaria

25 years

Section 26 Crimes Act

10 years - item 2

7.

9.

Grievous bodily harm to H with intent to cause grievous bodily harm

25 years

Section 33(1)(b) Crimes Act

7 years- item 4

8.

10.

Soliciting the murder of Abdul Abu-Mahmoud

25 years

Section 26 Crimes Act

10 years - item 2

9.

11.

Shooting at Abdul Abu-Mahmoud with intent to murder Abdul Abu – Mahmoud

25 years

Section 29 Crimes Act

10 years - item 3

10.

13.

Shooting at Khalil Khalil with intent to murder Khalil Khalil

25 years

Section 29 Crimes Act

10 years - item 3

11.

15.

Shooting at Hassan Soueid with intent to murder Hassan Soueid

25 years

Section 29 Crimes Act

10 years - item 3

12.

20.

Supply of a large commercial quantity of a prohibited drug

A fine of 5000 penalty units or imprisonment for life or both

Sections 25(2) and 33(3)(a) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985

15 years - item 19

13.

21.

Possessing a prohibited firearm, not being authorised to do so by a license or permit

14 years

Section 7(1) Firearms Act

4 years - item 20

14.

22.

Possessing a Smith & Wesson 0.38 special calibre revolver, not being authorised to do so by a license or permit

14 years

Section 7(1) Firearms Act

4 years - item 20

15.

23.

Directing the activities of a criminal group

15 years

Section 93T(4A) Crimes Act

Nil

16.

Contempt (refusal to answer questions) on 23 August 2016

At large

Nil

17.

1.

Contempt (refusal to answer questions) on 24 August

At large

Nil

18.

1.

Contempt (act of violence towards co-accused in the face of the court) on 1 August 2016

At large

Common law[112]

Nil

112. Ibid.

**********

Endnotes

Decision last updated: 16 June 2017

Medium Neutral Citation:	R v Farhad Qaumi, Mumtaz Qaumi & Jamil Qaumi (Sentence) [2017] NSWSC 774
Hearing dates:	3, 6, 7 and 26 April 2017, 23 May 2017, 13 June 2017
Date of orders:	16 June 2017
Decision date:	16 June 2017
Before:	Hamill J
Decision:	Jamil Qaumi sentenced to imprisonment for 31 years with a non-parole period of 21 years. Mumtaz Qaumi sentenced to imprisonment for 50 years and 10 months with a non-parole period of 36 years and 10 months. Farhad Qaumi sentenced to imprisonment for 60 years with a non-parole period of 43 years.
Catchwords:	CRIMINAL LAW – sentence – gangland violence – gun violence – Brothers for Life – spate of shootings arising out of “war” with rival chapter of BFL – “I’m at war” – wanton lawlessness – manslaughter where jury accepted excessive self-defence – hit list – series of attempted murders – shooting in or near people’s homes and in public places – multiple victims – “how hard is it to shoot somebody?” – harebrained plan – shootings in peoples’ homes – shootings in public places – multiple victims – whether maximum penalty appropriate – mitigating features – where offenders scarred by exposure to violence in Afghanistan – psychiatric impact CRIMINAL LAW – sentence – cold blooded contract killing – whether life sentence without parole appropriate – whether two stage test required by statute – where moral culpability reduced by evidence of traumatic and dislocated childhood experience and evidence of psychiatric conditions – community interest in community protection – where lengthy determinate sentence may be effective life sentence – where offender not eligible for release to parole until his mid-seventies – life sentence not the only way community interest can be met CRIMINAL LAW – sentence – mitigating features – onerous conditions of incarceration – when capable of being taken into account on sentence – evidence of classification – designation as extreme high risk inmates – grounds upon which decisions as to classification are made – segregation – lack of human contact – whether offenders authors of their own fate – whether double punishment – correct approach to issue – whether prediction can be made as to future conditions – courts reluctance to interfere with management of prisons – offender’s evidence accepted – conditions unduly onerous – in circumstances relevant to length of sentence CRIMINAL LAW – sentence – contempt in the face of the court – refusal to answer question – refusal to nominate co-offender – where offender concerned he will be labelled a “dog” – where offender fearful of reprisal – act of violence in the dock in the presence of judicial officer – act calculated to intimidate and injure co-accused – co-accused running case of duress – serious example of contempt – consecutive sentences appropriate
Legislation Cited:	Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) Crime (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) Firearms Act 1996 (NSW)
Cases Cited:	Abbas & Ors v R [2013] NSWCCA 115 Attorney General’s Application No 1 of 2002 [2002] NSWCCA 518 Barton v R [2009] NSWCCA 164 Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 471; [2013] HCA 37 Cahill v R [2015] NSWCCA 53 Clark v Commissioner for Corrective Services [2016] NSWCA 186 Clark v State of New South Wales & Ors [2014] NSWSC 801 DA v R [2014] NSWCCA 306 Dean v R [2015] NSWCCA 307 Dean v R [2016] HCATrans 278 DPP (Vic) v Hunter [2013] VSC 440 Fayad v R [2017] NSWCCA 81 Ghamraoui v R [2009] NSWCCA 111 Glare v R [2015] NSWCCA 194 Green v The Queen, Quinn v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49 JM v R [2014] NSWCCA 297 Kanaan and Ors v R [2006] NSWCCA 109 Kearsley v R [2017] NSWCCA 28 Kelleher v Commissioner, Department of Corrective Services [1999] NSWSC 86 Kennedy v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 260 Knight v R [2006] NSWCCA 292 Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606; [1984] HCA 46 McIntosh v R [2015] NSWCCA 184 Majid v R [2010] NSWCCA 121 Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25 May v R [2012] NSWCCA 111 Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 Olbrich v The Queen (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54 Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295; [2011] HCA 49 R v AC; AC v R [2017] NSWCCA 20 R v Adams (No 7) [2017] NSWSC 179 R v Burnes [2007] NSWCCA 53 R v Cardoso [2003] NSWCCA 15 R v Dang [1999] NSWCCA 42 R v Do (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 512 R v Durocher-Yvon (2003) 58 NSWLR 581; [2003] NSWCCA 209 R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67 R v FQ (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 28 May 1998, unrep) R v Halloun [2014] NSWSC 1705 R v Hamzy [2016] NSWSC 1512 R v Hines (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 1273 R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255 R v Johnson [2003] NSWCCA 129 R v Lauritsen (2000) 114 A Crim R 333 R v Merritt [2004] NSWCCA 19 R v Miles [2002] NSWCCA 276 R v MJB [2014] NSWCCA 195 R v MM; R v WK [2017] NSWCCA 19 R v Mostyn [2004] NSWCCA 97 R v NK [2015] NSWSC 1281 R v NK (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1257 R v Oinonen [1999] NSWCCA 310 R v Pennisi [2001] NSWCCA 326 R v Pennisi [2003] NSWSC 892 R v Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76 R v Qaumi & Ors (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 15 R v Qaumi & Ors (No 25) [2016] NSWSC 514 R v Qaumi & Ors (No 55) [2016] NSWSC 1068 R v Qaumi & Ors (No 57) [2016] NSWSC 1157 R v Qaumi & Ors (No 62) [2016] NSWSC 1215 R v Qaumi & Qaumi [2016] NSWSC 1473 R v Qaumi & Qaumi (No 12) [2017] NSWSC 134 R v Ryan & Coulter [2011] NSWSC 1249 R v Sumpton (No. 4) [2015] NSWSC 684 R v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182 R v Totten [2003] NSWCCA 207; 145 A Crim R 304 R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398 Smith v R [2015] NSWCCA 193 Smith v The Queen (1991) 25 NSWLR 1 Sumpton v R [2016] NSWCCA 162 The Queen v Kilic [2016] HCA 48 Veen v R (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 Vinter and Others v The United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application Nos 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, 9 July 2013)
Category:	Sentence
Parties:	Regina Farhad Qaumi Mumtaz Qaumi Jamil Qaumi
Representation:	Counsel: K McKay & P Hogan (Crown) J Stratton SC & M Curry (F Qaumi) P Young SC (M Qaumi) N Carroll (J Qaumi) A Francis (J Qaumi, on contempt proceedings) D Kell, Crown Advocate (amicus curiae on contempt proceedings) Solicitors: Solicitor for the NSW DPP(Crown) Archbold Legal (F Qaumi) George Sten & Co (M Qaumi) Bannisters Lawyers (J Qaumi) NSW Crown Solicitors (amicus on contempt proceedings)
File Number(s):	Farhad Qaumi - 2014/6809; 2014/315201; 2014/315252Mumtaz Qaumi – 2014/6813; 2014/315251; 2014/315260Jamil Qaumi - 2013/336086; 2014/18164; 2014315253

Count	Offence	Maximum Penalty	Standard Non-parole Period Section 54D Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
1.	1. (Altern-ative)	Manslaughter of Mahmoud Hamzy	25 years Section 24 Crimes Act	Nil
2.	2.	Grievous bodily harm of Omar Ajaj with intent to cause grievous bodily harm	25 years Section 33(1)(b) Crimes Act	7 years - item 4
3.	3.	Conspiracy to murder Mohammed Hamzy	25 years Section 26 Crimes Act	10 years - item 2
4.	4.	Soliciting the murder of Michael Odisho	25 years Section 26 Crimes Act	10 years - item 2
5.	5.	Intent to murder Michael Odisho	25 years Section 29 Crimes Act	10 years - item 3
6.	7.	Soliciting the murder of Masood Zakaria	25 years Section 26 Crimes Act	10 years - item 2
7.	9.	Grievous bodily harm to H with intent to cause grievous bodily harm	25 years Section 33 (1)(b) Crimes Act	7 years- item 4
8.	18.	Firing a firearm at a dwelling-house in the course of criminal activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others	16 years Section 93G(1B) Crimes Act	6 years - item 10P
9.	19.	Possessing a 0.45 calibre pistol, not being authorised to do so by a licence or permit	14 years Section 7(1) Firearms Act 1996	4 years - item 20
10.	20.	Supply of a large commercial quantity of a prohibited drug	A fine of 5000 penalty points or imprisonment for life or both Sections 25(2) and 33(3)(a) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985	15 years - item 19
11.	21.	Possessing a prohibited firearm, not being authorised to do so by a license or permit	14 years Section 7(1) Firearms Act	4 years - item 20
12.	22.	Possessing a Smith & Wesson 0.38 special calibre revolver, not being authorised to do so by a license or permit	14 years Section 7(1) Firearms Act	4 years - item 20 Crimes
13.	23.	Directing the activities of a criminal group	15 years Section 93T(4A) Crimes Act	NIL
14.	1.	Murder of Joseph Antoun	Life or 25 years Section 18(1)(a) Crimes Act	20 years – item 1
15.	2.	Possessing a 0.38 calibre snub nose revolver, not being authorised to do so by a licence or permit	14 years Section 7(1) Firearms Act	4 years - item 20

Count	Offence	Max Penalty	Standard Non-parole Period Section 54D *Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999*
1.	1. (Alternative)	Manslaughter of Mahmoud Hamzy	25 years Section 24 Crimes Act	Nil
2.	2.	Grievous bodily harm of Omar Ajaj with intent to cause grievous bodily harm	25 years Section 33(1)(b) Crimes Act	7 years - item 4
3.	3.	Conspiracy to murder Mohammed Hamzy	25 years Section 26 Crimes Act	10 years - item 2
4.	4.	Soliciting the murder of Michael Odisho	25 years Section 26 Crimes Act	10 years - item 2
5.	5.	Intent to murder Michael Odisho	25 years Section 29 Crimes Act	10 years - item 3
6.	9.	Grievous bodily harm to H with intent to cause grievous bodily harm	25 years Section 33(1)(b) Crimes Act	7 years- item 4
7.	10.	Soliciting the murder of Abdul Abu-Mahmoud	25 years Section 26 Crimes Act	10 years - item 2
8.	11.	Shooting at Abdul Abu-Mahmoud with intent to murder Abdul Abu – Mahmoud	25 years Section 29 Crimes Act	10 years - item 3
9.	13.	Shooting at Khalil Khalil with intent to murder Khalil Khalil	25 years Section 29 Crimes Act	10 years - item 3
10.	15.	Shooting at Hassan Soueid with intent to murder Hassan Soueid	25 years Section 29 Crimes Act	10 years - item 3
11.	18.	Firing a firearm at a dwelling-house in the course of criminal activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others	16 years Section 93G(1B) Crimes Act	6 years - item 10P
12.	20.	Supply of a large commercial quantity of a prohibited drug	A fine of 5000 penalty points or imprisonment for life or both Sections 25(2) and 33(3)(a) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985	15 years - item 19
13.	21.	Possessing a prohibited firearm, not being authorised to do so by a license or permit	14 years Section 7(1) Firearms Act	4 years - item 20
14.	22.	Possessing a Smith & Wesson 0.38 special calibre revolver, not being authorised to do so by a license or permit	14 years Section 7(1) Firearms Act	4 years - item 20
15.	23.	Directing the activities of a criminal group	15 years Section 93T(4A) Crimes Act	Nil
16.	1.	Murder of Joseph Antoun	Life or 25 years Section 18(1)(a) Crimes Act	20 years – item 1
17.	Contempt (act of violence towards co-accused in the face of the court) on 1 August 2016	At large Common law[111]	Nil

No. of Offences	Count	Offence	Max Penalty	Standard Non-parole Period Section 54D Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
1.	1. (alternative)	Manslaughter of Mahmoud Hamzy	25 years Section 24 Crimes Act	Nil
2.	2.	Grievous bodily harm of Omar Ajaj with intent to cause grievous bodily harm	25 years Section 33(1)(b) Crimes Act	7 years - item 4
3.	3.	Conspiracy to murder Mohammed Hamzy	25 years Section 26 Crimes Act	10 years - item 2
4.	4.	Soliciting the murder of Michael Odisho	25 years Section 26 Crimes Act	10 years - item 2
5.	5.	Intent to murder Michael Odisho	25 years Section 29 Crimes Act	10 years - item 3
6.	7.	Soliciting the murder of Masood Zakaria	25 years Section 26 Crimes Act	10 years - item 2
7.	9.	Grievous bodily harm to H with intent to cause grievous bodily harm	25 years Section 33(1)(b) Crimes Act	7 years- item 4
8.	10.	Soliciting the murder of Abdul Abu-Mahmoud	25 years Section 26 Crimes Act	10 years - item 2
9.	11.	Shooting at Abdul Abu-Mahmoud with intent to murder Abdul Abu – Mahmoud	25 years Section 29 Crimes Act	10 years - item 3
10.	13.	Shooting at Khalil Khalil with intent to murder Khalil Khalil	25 years Section 29 Crimes Act	10 years - item 3
11.	15.	Shooting at Hassan Soueid with intent to murder Hassan Soueid	25 years Section 29 Crimes Act	10 years - item 3
12.	20.	Supply of a large commercial quantity of a prohibited drug	A fine of 5000 penalty units or imprisonment for life or both Sections 25(2) and 33(3)(a) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985	15 years - item 19
13.	21.	Possessing a prohibited firearm, not being authorised to do so by a license or permit	14 years Section 7(1) Firearms Act	4 years - item 20
14.	22.	Possessing a Smith & Wesson 0.38 special calibre revolver, not being authorised to do so by a license or permit	14 years Section 7(1) Firearms Act	4 years - item 20
15.	23.	Directing the activities of a criminal group	15 years Section 93T(4A) Crimes Act	Nil
16.	Contempt (refusal to answer questions) on 23 August 2016	At large	Nil
17.	1.	Contempt (refusal to answer questions) on 24 August	At large	Nil
18.	1.	Contempt (act of violence towards co-accused in the face of the court) on 1 August 2016	At large Common law[112]	Nil