R v Adams (No 7) - [2017] NSWSC 179

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Adams (No 7) [2017] NSWSC 179
Hearing dates: 17 February 2017
Decision date: 03 March 2017
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Button J
Decision:
Sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years to date from 11 June 2016 and expire on 10 June 2036, comprised of a non-parole period of 15 years followed by a balance of the term of sentence of 5 years. The first date upon which the offender will become eligible for possible release to parole is 10 June 2031.

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – remarks on sentence – verdict of guilty of murder after trial by judge alone – constructive murder – offence committed in 1983 – consideration of sentencing practices in and since 1983 – delay in sentencing – no evidence on behalf of offender – role of age of offender
Legislation Cited: Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), s 61
Cases Cited: AJB v R (2007) 169 A Crim R 32; [2007] NSWCCA 51
Magnuson v R [2013] NSWCCA 50
Power v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 623; [1974] HCA 26
R v Fleming [2007] NSWSC 673
R v Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76
R v Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517
Sabra v R [2015] NSWCCA 38
Category: Sentence
Parties: Regina
Robert John Adams
Representation:
Counsel:
M Hobart SC (Crown)
P Lange (Offender)
C Parkin (Offender)
Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Murphy’s Lawyers (Offender)

File Number(s): 2013/382738
Publication restriction: Nil

Judgment

Introduction

On 4 November 2016, after a lengthy trial by judge alone, I found Robert John Adams (the offender) guilty of the murder of Mary Louise Wallace (the deceased), that offence having been committed on or about 24 September 1983.
The matter was stood over for receipt of evidence and submissions on sentence on 17 February 2017, and thereafter for imposition of sentence today.
The maximum penalty for the offence of murder, as at the date of the commission of the offence, was imprisonment for life, and it remains so today. It was agreed by both counsel – each of whom is very experienced in criminal law – that, as at September 1983, that sentence was a mandatory one for all murders. But they also agreed, for a number of reasons, that I should not approach my task as being nothing more than to impose a mandatory life sentence. Furthermore, they helpfully provided me with a detailed joint position as to how I should approach the whole question of sentencing for a murder committed in 1983. That is a topic that is not without its complications, and to which I shall return later in these remarks.
The maximum penalty as it existed in 1983 (and indeed as it exists today) speaks for itself with regard to the gravity with which the unlawful taking of the life of a fellow human being, in the most serious circumstances known to law, was and is assessed by Parliament, and the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Adams (No 7)

Details

AGLC: R v Adams (No 7) [2017] NSWSC 179
Case: [2017] NSWSC 179
Decision Date: 03 March 2017

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The respondent was found guilty of murder after a trial by judge alone, where the offence of constructive murder was committed in 1983. The court was required to decide on the appropriate sentence, taking into account the delay in sentencing, the absence of evidence on behalf of the offender, and the age of the offender. The court considered the sentencing practices in and since 1983, and the role of the age of the offender in determining the appropriate sentence.

The court held that the delay in sentencing did not affect the appropriate sentence to be imposed, as the delay was not caused by any action of the offender. The court also held that the absence of evidence on behalf of the offender did not prevent it from considering the offender's age as a mitigating factor. The court held that the offender's age at the time of the offence was a relevant consideration in determining the appropriate sentence, and that the offender's age at the time of sentencing was also a relevant consideration.

The court held that the appropriate sentence in this case was life imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 20 years. The court held that the offender's age at the time of the offence was a mitigating factor, but that the seriousness of the offence and the need for deterrence and denunciation outweighed this factor. The court held that the offender's age at the time of sentencing was also a relevant consideration, and that the appropriate sentence should reflect this fact.

The final orders of the court were that the offender be sentenced to life imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 20 years. The court held that this sentence reflected the seriousness of the offence, the need for deterrence and denunciation, and the mitigating factor of the offender's age at the time of the offence and at the time of sentencing.

Orders