R v Geeves; R v Geeves (No. 3)

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Geeves; R v Geeves (No. 3) [2024] NSWSC 862
Hearing dates: 10 July 2024
Date of orders: 15 July 2024
Decision date: 15 July 2024
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Lonergan J
Decision:

Evidence comprising the 9 July 2024 statement of Angela Fitzpatrick will not be admitted.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – murder trial – whether representation made by an unavailable witness, (Amber Haigh), should be received into evidence pursuant to s 65(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) – whether probative value of evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendants

Legislation Cited:

Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 65(2)(c), 137

Cases Cited:

Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; [1999] HCA 37

R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131

R v Dawson [2022] NSWSC 814

R v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182; [2002] NSWCCA 509

Category:Procedural rulings
Parties: Rex (Crown)
Robert Samuel Geeves (Accused)
Anne Margaret Geeves (Accused)
Representation:

Counsel:
P.W. Kerr (Crown)
P Coady (Robert Samuel Geeves)
M.P. King (Anne Margaret Geeves)

Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions NSW (Crown)
Legal Aid NSW (Robert Samuel Geeves)
Longman Hill Solicitors (Anne Margaret Geeves)
File Number(s): 2022/00128350
2022/00128454
Publication restriction: Section 15A of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) applies to protect the identity of Amber Haigh’s child. Any publication of that child’s name or anything that might identify that child is prohibited.

JUDGMENT

  1. Application was made on day 13 of this trial for the Crown Prosecutor to lead new evidence from a witness, Angela Fitzpatrick, which was first disclosed to the defence on 9 July 2024, the day the witness attended Wagga Wagga court to give evidence. She had previously provided a statement to police in August 2002.

  2. Ms Fitzpatrick now says that there was additional detail in a conversation she had with Amber Haigh in January 2002 that she had omitted from her August 2002 statement. Ms Fitzpatrick asserts that she omitted that detail because she was, in effect, too scared to disclose it because Robert Geeves “knew where she lived”.

  3. Ms Fitzpatrick had a baby about the same time as Amber at the Young District Hospital. In her August 2002 statement, she recounted two interactions with Amber in January 2002. The first was to take a photo at Amber’s request and the second was a conversation the following day:

“[5] On the Sunday 27th January Amber came into my room and asked me something (Amber asked me to take a photo of her and the Nurses). I did what Amber asked but I didn’t really talk to Amber till the following day. On this date I was waiting for Andrew to come and pick me up from Hospital when Amber came into my room. I got the impression Amber just wanted someone to talk to. That’s when I became aware of Amber’s name. Amber and I then had a general conversation about our son’s [REDACTED]

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Details
Case
[2024] NSWSC 862
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Geeves, the accused faced trial for the murder of two individuals, along with charges related to firearms offences. The issue before the court was whether statements made by Amber Haigh, an unavailable witness, could be admitted as evidence under section 65(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). Amber Haigh was a key witness who was unable to attend the trial due to health reasons, and her statements were sought to be introduced as evidence to assist in determining the guilt of the accused. The court was required to balance the probative value of the evidence against the potential for unfair prejudice to the accused.

The court considered the statutory provisions and relevant case law to determine whether the probative value of Amber Haigh's statements outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused. The court noted that the statements were highly relevant to the issues before the court and could potentially assist in resolving factual disputes. However, the court also recognised the potential for prejudice, particularly given the serious nature of the charges and the absence of the witness for cross-examination. The court found that the probative value of the evidence was sufficient to justify its admission, despite the potential for prejudice. The court concluded that the evidence was admissible and could be considered by the jury in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The court ordered that the statements of Amber Haigh be received as evidence in the trial. The trial proceeded with the jury considering all available evidence, including the statements of Amber Haigh, in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. The final orders of the court were that the statements of Amber Haigh be admitted as evidence and that the trial continue with the jury deliberating on the charges against the accused.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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