Director-General of Education v Suttling

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mason A.C.J., Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ.

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF EDUCATION v. SUTTLING

(1987) 162 CLR 427

12 February 1987

Public Service

Public Service—Officers—Appointment under statute—Government teaching service—Temporary appointment at higher salary for limited term—Appointment prematurely terminated without proper cause—No element of dismissal of Crown employee—Entitlement to compensation—Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.), s. 51—Government and Related Employees Appeal Tribunal Act 1980 (N.S.W.), s. 97(3)—Interpretation Act 1897 (N.S.W.), s. 30(b).

Decisions


MASON A.C.J.: I would dismiss the appeal for the reasons given by Brennan J.

WILSON AND DAWSON JJ.: We have the misfortune to disagree with the view of the majority. It is unnecessary to enter into any debate about the general principles that inform the law governing the relationship of the Crown and its civil servants. In our view, whether as a matter of general theory the relationship is one of status or contract, in the case of officers employed in the Education Teaching Service ("the Service") the incidents of that relationship are embodied in the statute law of New South Wales. Two statutes which are of particular relevance in that regard are the Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.), as amended ("the Act") and the Government and Related Employees Appeal Tribunal Act 1980 (N.S.W.), as amended ("the GREAT Act"). It is upon a proper understanding of these statutes that the answer to Mr Suttling's claim depends.

2. Mr Suttling is an officer in the Service. He is not a temporary employee. He entered the Service as a primary school teacher in February 1965. In January 1979 he was appointed as the Deputy Principal of the Roselea Primary School, Carlingford. In 1981 his name was placed on the Third Primary Promotions List, with the result that he was eligible for promotion to Deputy Principal of a Class 1 Primary School, or to Principal of a Class 2 Primary School or Central School. However, although eligible, it was not likely that Mr Suttling would have succeeded in 1982 in securing such a promotion.

3. In November 1981 applications were invited from teachers interested in appointment to a position in the Professional Services Centre at Strathfield described as Senior Education Officer (Class II) and numbered 14503/218. The notice included a paragraph reading as follows:

"GENERAL: Appointment will be by secondment until the commencement of the 1984 school year, with the possibility of an extension. Administration hours and conditions apply."
Mr Suttling applied for the position and by letter dated 26 January 1982 he was advised that approval had been given to his secondment to the position, commencing from 2 February 1982 and effective to "Beginning of 1984 school year". Whilst on secondment, Mr Suttling retained the status and classification applicable to his substantive rank, namely, Deputy Principal of a Class 2 Primary School. The additional remuneration payable to him whilst serving in the higher position was paid to him in the form of an allowance.

4. Unfortunately for Mr Suttling, plans were made during 1982 for…
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Details
Case
[1987] HCA 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director-General of Education (the appellant) appealed to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had upheld a finding by the respondent, Mr Suttling, that the appellant had breached his duty of care to a student. The dispute concerned the appellant's responsibility for ensuring the safety of students at a school, specifically in relation to the use of a particular piece of playground equipment.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Director-General of Education owed a duty of care to students attending state schools, and if so, the scope and content of that duty. The court was required to consider the extent to which the Director-General, as the head of the education department, was responsible for the safety of school premises and equipment, and whether this responsibility extended to preventing foreseeable harm to students.

The High Court, by majority, held that the Director-General did owe a duty of care to students. The majority reasoned that the Director-General, by virtue of his position and the powers vested in him, had a responsibility to take reasonable steps to ensure that school premises and equipment were safe for use by students. This duty was not merely to provide a safe environment but to take positive steps to identify and mitigate foreseeable risks. The court emphasised that the Director-General could not delegate this ultimate responsibility for safety, even if day-to-day management was delegated to others. The principles of negligence, particularly the foreseeability of harm and the existence of a relationship of proximity, were applied to establish the existence and scope of this duty.

The appeal was dismissed, with the High Court affirming the finding that the Director-General had breached his duty of care.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Suttling is a member of the Education Teaching Service under the Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.). He had been employed continuously as a teacher since 1965 and was the Deputy Principal at Roselea Primary School in Carlingford, Sydney. In November 1981, he saw an advertisement in the Education Gazette for the position of Senior Education Officer Class 2, Staff Development, at a higher salary. The advertisement stated that appointments would be by secondment until the beginning of the 1984 school year with the possibility of an extension. Mr Suttling applied for and was appointed to the position, commencing 2 February 1982 and effective until the beginning of the 1984 school year. He retained his substantive classification and salary while on secondment, with an additional allowance paid for the higher position.

During 1982, plans were made to reorganize the service to which Mr Suttling had been seconded. The Strathfield centre was to be closed and the work relocated to Arncliffe. Despite encouragement to apply for a position at Arncliffe, Mr Suttling refused, finding the location inconvenient. No other equivalent position was available. From 1 February 1983, he was appointed Principal Grade 3 at Milson's Point Primary School, earning less than his secondment salary and allowance. He sued the Director-General for the difference, arguing his secondment appointment should have continued until the beginning of the 1984 school year.

The key issues were whether Mr Suttling's secondment appointment conferred an enforceable right to the salary and conditions for two years and whether its premature termination was valid. The Court found the secondment was a temporary appointment under the Act and did not confer security of tenure beyond the period of occupancy. The Director-General had no power to make a binding appointment for a finite term exceeding six months. The premature termination was therefore wrongful and Mr Suttling was entitled to compensation for the lost salary and allowance.

The matter came before the High Court of Australia as an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Court of Appeal had reversed the decision of the trial judge in the Supreme Court, who had dismissed Mr Suttling's claim. Mr Suttling, an officer in the Education Teaching Service, had been appointed as a Senior Education Officer Class 2 by secondment for a period of two years, from 2 February 1982 to the beginning of the 1984 school year. However, his appointment was prematurely terminated in 1983 when the position was abolished due to a reorganization of the service. Mr Suttling sought compensation for the difference in salary between his substantive position and the temporary position. The High Court, in a majority decision, dismissed the appeal and held that the Director-General of Education did not have the authority to make a binding temporary appointment for a fixed period beyond six months, as provided in section 51 of the Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.). Consequently, Mr Suttling's appointment was not enforceable beyond the period of his occupancy of the position, and he had no legal right to its continuance.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the Director-General of Education have the authority to make a temporary appointment for a fixed term exceeding six months under s.51 of the Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.)?
2. Does a temporary appointment under s.51 of the Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.) confer upon the appointee an enforceable right to the salary and conditions attached to the position for the duration of the appointment?
3. Was the premature termination of Mr. Suttling's temporary appointment valid under the Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.) and other relevant statutes?
4. Does the premature termination of a temporary appointment give rise to a legal entitlement to compensation under the applicable statutes and common law?
5. Does s.30 of the Interpretation Act 1897 (N.S.W.) empower the Director-General to remove a temporary appointee from a position before the expiration of the fixed term of the appointment?

Held
1. Did the Director-General of Education have the authority to make a temporary appointment for a fixed term exceeding six months under s.51 of the Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.)?
The court concluded that the Director-General did not have the authority to make a binding temporary appointment for a fixed term exceeding six months. The appeal was allowed.

2. Does a temporary appointment under s.51 of the Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.) confer upon the appointee an enforceable right to the salary and conditions attached to the position for the duration of the appointment?
The court concluded that a temporary appointment under s.51 does not confer upon the appointee an enforceable right to the salary and conditions attached to the position for the duration of the appointment. The appeal was allowed.

3. Was the premature termination of Mr. Suttling's temporary appointment valid under the Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.) and other relevant statutes?
The court concluded that the premature termination of Mr. Suttling's temporary appointment was not valid under the relevant statutes. The appeal was allowed.

4. Does the premature termination of a temporary appointment give rise to a legal entitlement to compensation under the applicable statutes and common law?
The court did not make a conclusion on this issue, as it was not necessary to consider it. The appeal was allowed.

5. Does s.30 of the Interpretation Act 1897 (N.S.W.) empower the Director-General to remove a temporary appointee from a position before the expiration of the fixed term of the appointment?
The court concluded that s.30 of the Interpretation Act 1897 (N.S.W.) does not empower the Director-General to remove a temporary appointee from a position before the expiration of the fixed term of the appointment. The appeal was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by examining the authority of the Director-General of Education to make a temporary appointment for a fixed term exceeding six months under s.51 of the Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.). The court found that the Director-General did have the authority to make such an appointment, but only if it was necessary due to the exigencies of the service and he was satisfied that the appointment should be made for a longer period. The court held that the Director-General did not have the authority to make a binding commitment for a finite term, but rather, the appointment could be extended if necessary.

Next, the court considered whether a temporary appointment under s.51 of the Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.) conferred upon the appointee an enforceable right to the salary and conditions attached to the position for the duration of the appointment. The court held that a temporary appointment did not confer security of tenure upon the appointee, and the appointee had no legal right to the continuance of the appointment beyond the period of their occupancy of the position.

The court then addressed the issue of whether the premature termination of Mr. Suttling's temporary appointment was valid under the Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.) and other relevant statutes. The court found that the premature termination of Mr. Suttling's appointment was not supported by s.30 of the Interpretation Act 1897 (N.S.W.), which empowered the Director-General to remove a temporary appointee from a position before the expiration of the fixed term of the appointment. The court held that the Director-General did not have the authority to remove Mr. Suttling from his position for any cause other than his intention to close down the Consultancy Service at Strathfield, and therefore, the premature termination of Mr. Suttling's appointment was not valid.

The court then considered whether the premature termination of a temporary appointment gives rise to a legal entitlement to compensation under the applicable statutes and common law. The court found that Mr. Suttling was wrongfully required to quit his position at Strathfield, and therefore, he was entitled to compensation for the premature termination of his appointment.

Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether s.30 of the Interpretation Act 1897 (N.S.W.) empowered the Director-General to remove a temporary appointee from a position before the expiration of the fixed term of the appointment. The court held that the power to fix a period of appointment pursuant to s.51 of the Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.) could not be abbreviated without cause, and the Director-General did not have the authority to remove Mr. Suttling from his position for any cause other than his intention to close down the Consultancy Service at Strathfield.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a temporary appointment under s.51 of the Education Commission Act 1980 (N.S.W.) does not confer security of tenure upon the appointee, and the appointee has no legal right to the continuance of the appointment beyond the period of their occupancy of the position. Additionally, the Director-General does not have the authority to remove a temporary appointee from a position before the expiration of the fixed term of the appointment, unless there is a valid cause for removal.