Miller v Stephen

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17 CLR 397

voidable for breach or non-observance of the provisions of the

Crown Lands Acts, and that steps would be taken to have it declared void. The Department at that time apparently intended to proceed under the provisions of sec. 44 of the Crown Lands Act of 1895, but it ignored the defendants request for an explanation of the meaning of the letter. We think that any expenditure incurred by the defendants from Duffy J. this date till the termination of the original leases in 1910

was incurred at their own risk. In December 1910 the old leases terminated, and the Crown received rent for the year 1911 pur- porting to be paid under the new leases. We think this receipt of rent might be taken by the defendants as an intimation that the Crown did not intend to avoid the transaction which the letter of 25th June 1906 had declared to be voidable, but no evi- dence has been given of any expenditure by the defendants between December 1910 and 11th May 1911, much less of any expenditure of which they have not since had the full benefit. On 11th May 1911 the Department wrote to the defendants informing them that the documents were absolutely void, and demanding possession of the lands. Under these circumstances we do not think that the defendants are entitled to any order for restitution or compensation in this proceeding.

Decree varied by declaring the indorsements

on the improvement leases void and not merely voidable, and omitting the reference to the Master in Equity and the order as to costs. Decree as varied affirmed. Solicitor, for the appellants, T. D. Ryan, Bingara, by B.A. McBride.

Solicitor, for the respondent, J. v. Tillett, Crown Solicitor for New South Wales.

17 CLR 398

[ ] MILLER STEPHEN

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF

NEW SOUTH WALES. Public Service of New South Wales-Right to gratuity-Officer whose services are

dispensed with by Public Service Board-Officer over 60 called on to retire- Public Service Act 1902 (N.S.W.) (No. 31 of 1902), secs. 9 (2), 66, 67, 71.

Sec. 66 of the Public Service Act 1902 provides (1) that every officer in the public service shall be entitled on attaining the age of 60 years to retire, (2) that any such officer may, unless called upon to retire, continue in the service until he attains the age of 65 years, and (3) that " if any such officer continues in the public service after he has attained the age of 60 years, he Gavan Duffy and may at any time before he attain the age of 65 years be called upon by the Governor, acting upon the recommendation of the Board, to retire; and every such officer so called upon to retire shall retire accordingly."

Sec. 67 provides that every officer on attaining the age of 65 years is to retire unless called upon to continue to perform his duty, and that (3) 'every officer who retires under the…

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Details
Case
[1913] HCA 68
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales regarding the entitlement of a public servant to a gratuity upon retirement. The appellant, George Miller, as the nominal defendant for the Government of New South Wales, appealed a decision in favour of the respondent, Alfred Farish Hindmarsh Stephen. The dispute centred on the interpretation of sections 66 and 71 of the Public Service Act 1902 (NSW) and whether Mr. Stephen's retirement qualified him for a gratuity calculated under section 71(a) or 71(b).

The legal issues before the High Court were whether Mr. Stephen's services were "dispensed with by the Board" within the meaning of section 71(a) of the Public Service Act 1902, and consequently, whether he was entitled to a gratuity calculated in respect of his entire service, or only service prior to 23rd December 1895 as provided by section 71(b). Mr. Stephen contended that his retirement, initiated by a recommendation from the Public Service Board and an order from the Governor in Council, constituted his services being "dispensed with" under section 71(a). The Government argued that his retirement was a compulsory retirement under section 66(3), which specifically directed him to retire, and therefore his entitlement to a gratuity was governed by section 67(3) and section 71(b).

The Court reasoned that the Act distinguished between "retirement" and "dispensing with services." It found that section 66(3) described a process where an officer is "called upon by the Governor, acting upon the recommendation of the Board, to retire," which is distinct from services being "dispensed with." The Court examined various sections of the Act and concluded that the term "dispensed with" was used in contexts such as redundancy (section 9(2)) or dismissal for specific offences (section 61(2)), and not for compulsory retirement due to age. Therefore, Mr. Stephen's retirement under section 66(3) did not amount to his services being "dispensed with" within the meaning of section 71(a).

The High Court reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. It held that Mr. Stephen was not an officer whose services were dispensed with by the Board within the meaning of section 71(a). Consequently, his entitlement to a gratuity was governed by section 67(3) and section 71(b), meaning he was only entitled to a gratuity calculated in respect of his service prior to 23rd December 1895. The appeal was allowed, and judgment was to be entered for the defendant.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the case of Miller v. Stephen, the central facts revolve around the retirement of Alfred Farish Hindmarsh Stephen from the public service of New South Wales and the subsequent dispute over the gratuity he was entitled to receive. Stephen was an employee in the Audit Department of the Government of New South Wales and had been a contributor to the Superannuation Account under the Civil Service Act of 1884. On 1st July 1903, Stephen reported to the Deputy Auditor-General that he had exceeded the age of 60 and was not yet desirous of retiring. Following this, the Deputy Auditor-General recommended Stephen's retirement under section 66 of the Public Service Act 1902. By an Order of the Executive Council dated 18th August 1903, Stephen was granted leave of absence on full pay for nine months and was called upon to retire from the public service at the expiration of this leave. The terms of his retirement were subsequently varied by an Order in Council dated 15th September 1903, allowing him to sever his connection with the Service as from 1st September 1903 by being paid £425, equivalent to twelve months' salary, in lieu of all claims for leave of absence. Stephen retired on 1st September 1903 and was subsequently paid a gratuity of £592 6s. 8d., along with a refund of his contributions to the Superannuation Fund, with interest thereon, amounting to £195 0s. 6d. Stephen contended that he was entitled to a higher gratuity calculated according to section 71(a) of the Public Service Act 1902, which would have included service up to the commencement of the Act. The defendant, on behalf of the Government, argued that Stephen's retirement under section 66 of the Act meant he should only be entitled to the gratuity specified in section 71(b). This case was brought before the court to determine whether Stephen's services were "dispensed with by the Board" within the meaning of section 71 of the Public Service Act 1902, and whether he was entitled to the full gratuity as claimed.

The matter came before the High Court of Australia as an appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal concerns an action initiated by Alfred Farish Hindmarsh Stephen against George Miller, who appeared as the nominal defendant representing the Government of New South Wales. The plaintiff sought to recover a balance of gratuity he believed was payable under the Public Service Act 1902. The Supreme Court had ruled in favor of Stephen, awarding him a gratuity of £197 9s., which was subsequently appealed by the defendant. The High Court, upon hearing the appeal, varied the decree by declaring the endorsements on the improvement leases void and not merely voidable, and omitted the reference to the Master in Equity and the order as to costs. The appeal was allowed, and the decree as varied was affirmed. The procedural journey of this case highlights the intricate process of statutory interpretation and the role of the Board in the context of public service laws.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the plaintiff is a person whose services were dispensed with by the Board within the meaning of sec. 71 (a) of the Public Service Act 1902.
2. Whether, upon the facts hereinbefore set forth, the plaintiff was entitled to a gratuity in respect of his service between the 23rd December 1895 and 16th August 1902.

Held
1. Whether the plaintiff is a person whose services were dispensed with by the Board within the meaning of sec. 71 (a) of the Public Service Act 1902.

The court concluded that the plaintiff's services were not dispensed with by the Board within the meaning of sec. 71 (a) of the Public Service Act 1902. Instead, the plaintiff retired in pursuance of the direction in sec. 66, which required him to retire because the Governor, acting on the recommendation of the Board, called upon him to retire. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and this question was answered in the negative.

2. Whether, upon the facts hereinbefore set forth, the plaintiff was entitled to a gratuity in respect of his service between the 23rd December 1895 and 16th August 1902.

The court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to the full gratuity specified in sec. 71 (a) of the Public Service Act 1902. Instead, the plaintiff was only entitled to the gratuity prescribed by sec. 71 (b), payable only in respect of service prior to 23rd December 1895. Therefore, this question was also answered in the negative.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court of Australia in Miller v. Stephen considered whether the plaintiff, who had been called upon to retire by the Governor on the recommendation of the Public Service Board, was entitled to a gratuity under section 71(a) of the Public Service Act 1902. The Court held that the plaintiff's services were not "dispensed with by the Board" within the meaning of section 71(a) and therefore he was not entitled to the gratuity specified in that subsection. Instead, the Court found that the plaintiff was entitled to the gratuity specified in section 71(b).

The Court's reasoning was based on the language of the Public Service Act 1902, which distinguished between the process of retirement and the dispensing of services. The Court found that the language of the Act indicated that when an officer was called upon to retire, their services were not "dispensed with" within the meaning of section 71. The Court also found that the Board had express power to "dispense with the services of permanent officers" in some cases with, and in others without, the approval of the Executive.

The Court further held that even if the plaintiff's services had been "dispensed with by the Board," he would still not be entitled to the gratuity specified in section 71(a) because he had retired under section 66 of the Act, which provided for compulsory retirement. The Court found that section 67(3) of the Act, which referred to section 71, imported no more of section 71 than the words in subsection (b), and that the plaintiff's contention that he was within subsection (a) of that section depended on his coming within the terms of its opening words.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that an officer who retires under section 66 of the Public Service Act 1902 is not an officer whose services have been "dispensed with by the Board" within the meaning of section 71(a) of the Act, and therefore is not entitled to the gratuity specified in that subsection. Instead, the officer is entitled to the gratuity specified in section 71(b).