R v Blackman (No 3) - [2018] NSWSC 405

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Blackman (No 3) [2018] NSWSC 405
Hearing dates: 3 April 2018
Decision date: 04 April 2018
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal
Before: Button J
Decision:
(1) “Prasad invitation” accepted
(2) Verdicts of not guilty returned on all counts

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – count of murder – alternative counts – special hearing – judge alone – application for Prasad direction – asserted inadequacy of evidence against accused – Crown case incapable of proving beyond reasonable doubt that accused was the perpetrator – application accepted – accused acquitted of all counts
Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s128
Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), s 21
Cases Cited: R v Blackman [2018] NSWSC 395
R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191; 30 A Crim R 118
R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161; 2 A Crim R 45
Seymour v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 576; [2006] NSWCCA 206
Category: Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Regina
Gary Clifford Blackman
Representation:
Counsel:
P Rosser QC (Crown)
J Watts (Accused)
Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Universal Law (Accused)

File Number(s): 2014/00104664
Publication restriction: Nil.

Judgment

Introduction

At the conclusion of the tender of all of the evidence in this judge-alone special hearing – in which Gary Clifford Blackman (the accused) has been arraigned on a count of murder and two alternative counts – defence counsel submitted that I should “give myself” a “Prasad invitation”, as discussed in the decisions of R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161; 2 A Crim R 45, R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191; 30 A Crim R 118, and Seymour v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 576; [2006] NSWCCA 206.
Oral submissions were thereafter received from both counsel, and I reserved my judgment about whether as the tribunal of law I should give the invitation, and, if so, whether as the tribunal of fact I should accept it, thereby putting an end to the trial.
Two bases for the invitation were relied upon by defence counsel. The first was the asserted inadequacy of the state of the expert medical evidence with regard to the cause of the death of the deceased. That basis can be put to one side, because I do not consider that the expert evidence, in support of the Crown case that the violence meted out to the deceased caused her death, was so weak or otherwise unsatisfactory that it should found such an invitation.
The other basis of the application was the asserted inadequacy of evidence that it was the accused and the accused alone (that being the Crown case) who administered a very severe beating to the deceased in April 2014 that allegedly caused her death. That submission requires deeper analysis.
Section 21 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) speaks of a special hearing by judge alone replicating as closely as…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Blackman (No 3)

Details

AGLC: R v Blackman (No 3) [2018] NSWSC 405
Case: [2018] NSWSC 405
Decision Date: 04 April 2018

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Blackman (No 3) involved the defendant, Blackman, who faced a charge of murder, along with alternative counts. The dispute was heard in the Supreme Court. The matter centred on an application for a Prasad direction, which pertains to a situation where the evidence against the accused is so inadequate that the prosecution cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is the perpetrator. Blackman argued that the Crown's case was incapable of proving these elements, necessitating a specific legal direction to the jury regarding the inadequacy of the evidence.

The legal issue before the court was whether the evidence presented by the Crown was sufficient to meet the threshold of proving the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the evidence was so deficient that it warranted a Prasad direction, effectively acquitting Blackman of all charges. The court had to balance the need for a fair trial with the potential prejudice that might arise from allowing a case with such weak evidence to proceed to a jury.

The court, after thorough consideration, accepted Blackman's assertion that the Crown's case was inadequate. It was found that the evidence did not sufficiently establish Blackman as the perpetrator of the alleged crime. Consequently, the court issued a Prasad direction, leading to Blackman's acquittal on all counts. The reasoning was grounded in the need to prevent a miscarriage of justice, as the evidence was deemed insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court recognised that allowing the case to proceed would risk an unfair trial and potential wrongful conviction.

Orders