Matthews v The Queen - [1991] HCATrans 247

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Adelaide No A2 of 1991
B e t w e e n -
DOUGLAS JAMES MATTHEWS

Applicant

and
THE QUEEN

Respondent

Application for special leave
to appeal

MASON CJ
DEANE J

GAUDRON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT ADELAIDE ON WEDNESDAY. 4 SEPTEMBER 1991. AT 10.04 AM

Matthews

4/9/91

MS M. SHAW:

May it please the Court, I appear with my

learned friend, MR C.J. CALDICOTT, for the applicant. (instructed by Caldicott & Co)

MR J.J. DOYLE, QC, Solicitor-General for South Australia:

If the Court pleases, I appear with
MS A.M. VANSTONE, for the respondent. (instructed
by the Crown Solicitor for South Australia)

MASON CJ: Mr Solicitor. Yes, Ms Shaw?

MS SHAW:

If the Court pleases, this is an application for

an extension of time within which to appeal and an
application for special leave.

MASON CJ:

You need not be concerned about the extension of time, Ms Shaw.

MS SHAW:

Thank you.

If the Court pleases.

I understand

Your Honours have a copy of the list of
authorities, a case book of the relevant materials
and the trial judge's summing up.

MASON CJ: Yes, I think that is right.

MS SHAW:

The summary of the applicant's argument appears at

page 9 of the application book.

MASON CJ: Yes, we have read that.

MS SHAW:

The first special leave point is: can you rely

upon an out of court statement from which you
propose to infer the state of mind of the maker, in
order to prove a future state of mind, when the
statement in question does not amount to an
expression of intention? Further, having inferred
a future state of mind of the maker, can you rely
on that future state of mind to infer the likely

future conduct of the maker and thereby undermine
an accused's account of that future event? It is submitted that the state of mind
evidence should be admissible in only two broad
categories: firstly, to show the state of mind of
the maker at that time if that is at issue in the
case and, secondly, to show a future intent of the
maker to perform an act if the occurrence of that
act is at issue.
It is submitted, in this case, that the Court

of Criminal Appeal, by deciding that state of mind
evidence could be relied upon to infer a future
state of mind, erroneously extended the principles
contained in the judgment of this Court in Walton
v Reg, (1988-1989) 166 CLR 283, as to the use to
which state of mind evidence can be put.

Matthews

4/9/91

It is submitted that the judgment of the Court

of Criminal Appeal is contrary to the remarks of
His Honour former Chief Justice Barwick in Reg v Wilson, (1970) 123 CLR 334, in particular at page 339, as to what evidence is admissible to
prove the relationship…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Matthews v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Matthews v The Queen [1991] HCATrans 247
Case: [1991] HCATrans 247
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerns an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia by Douglas James Matthews against the respondent, The Queen. The applicant sought to challenge a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of South Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether out-of-court statements, which did not explicitly express an intention, could be relied upon to infer the maker's future state of mind. Furthermore, the applicant questioned whether such an inferred future state of mind could then be used to infer the maker's likely future conduct, thereby undermining an accused's account of events. The applicant argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal had erroneously extended the principles established in *Walton v The Queen* and acted inconsistently with remarks made in *R v Wilson* and the approach taken by the House of Lords in *R v Blastland*.

The applicant contended that state of mind evidence should generally be admissible only to prove the maker's state of mind at the time the statement was made, if that state of mind is in issue, or to prove a future intention to perform an act. The Court of Criminal Appeal had permitted the use of statements to infer a future state of mind and, subsequently, to infer future conduct. This was particularly relevant to proving the relationship between the parties, which the Court of Criminal Appeal found to be relevant to both rape and murder charges.

The High Court granted special leave to appeal on the specific ground relating to the admissibility of state of mind evidence.

Orders