Criminal Law—Murder—Evidence—Admissibility—Statements made by deceased wife charging accused with desire to kill her—Possibility of prejudice—Judge's discretion—Cross examination of accused about previous accidental death in family—Whether breach of ruling excluding evidence of death by shooting of accused's first wife.
Decisions
June 17. The following written judgments were delivered:- BARWICK C.J. The applicant was convicted before the Supreme Court of Victoria on 24th November 1969 of the murder of his wife on 13th March 1969 and sentenced to death by that Court. He now applies to this Court for special leave to appeal against his conviction on three grounds - (i) that evidence of statements by his wife that she knew he wanted to kill her were inadmissible, (ii) that, if contrary to his submission, that evidence was admissible, it ought none the less to have been rejected by the trial judge in the exercise of his discretion to exclude evidence unduly prejudicial having regard to its evidentiary significance in the trial and (iii) that the jury ought to have been discharged because the Crown Prosecutor had in cross examination either transgressed a ruling of the judge or had asked questions designed or at least calculated to remind the jury of highly prejudicial press publicity current at the date of the applicant's committal for trial. (at p336)
2. The applicant's wife died of gunshot wounds received by her whilst she was driving a tractor drawing a load of hay during the hours of day on a property in Victoria which the applicant was managing. The applicant had borrowed a shotgun from a neighbour, as he claimed in his evidence, for the purpose of shooting rabbits. On the day of his wife's death he had placed the rifle on the top of the load of hay. He claimed that he had set the safety catch on the gun by pushing it forward. In fact this action released the safety catch: but the applicant denied that he knew this. He claimed that he had not discharged the gun but that it had discharged accidentally, perhaps when a dog had jumped upon the load of hay. There were no eye witnesses present. The contest at the trial was as to whether the applicant, admittedly present at the time, had shot his wife in the back of the head or whether the gun placed on the load of hay had accidentally discharged at a time when it was pointing towards the back of her head, the jury having of course to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had discharged the gun before they could convict. (at p337)
3. The fundamental rule governing the admissibility of evidence is that it be relevant. In every instance the proffered evidence must ultimately be brought to that touchstone. The evidence of which the admissibility was challenged on behalf of the applicant consisted of…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Wilson v the Queen [1970] HCA 17
Case
[1970] HCA 17
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Wilson, against his conviction for murder. The applicant had been found guilty of the murder of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment. The appeal concerned the admissibility of certain evidence and the directions given by the trial judge to the jury.
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of the applicant's prior inconsistent statements and whether the judge's directions to the jury regarding the assessment of this evidence and the issue of intent were adequate and correct in law. Specifically, the court had to determine if the jury had been properly instructed on how to consider the prior statements as evidence of the applicant's state of mind at the time of the alleged offence, and whether the overall summing up adequately conveyed the elements of the crime of murder.
The High Court, in allowing the appeal, found that the trial judge had misdirected the jury on the use of the prior inconsistent statements. The court held that these statements, while potentially relevant to the applicant's state of mind, had been presented to the jury in a manner that suggested they could be used as direct evidence of guilt, rather than as evidence from which an inference about the applicant's intent could be drawn. The court also found that the summing up, when considered as a whole, did not sufficiently clarify the distinction between motive and intent, nor did it adequately explain the onus of proof on the prosecution to establish the necessary intent for murder.
Consequently, the High Court quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial.