R v Mead

Case [2017] QCA 310

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Mead [2017] QCA 310

PARTIES:

R
v
MEAD, Raymond John
(appellant/applicant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 211 of 2016
CA No 308 of 2016
SC No 169 of 2016
SC No 846 of 2016
SC No 1326 of 2016

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction & Sentence
Miscellaneous Application – Criminal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 2 August 2016; Date of Sentence: 2 November 2016 (A Lyons J)

DELIVERED ON:

19 December 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

19 October 2017

JUDGE:

Gotterson and Philippides JJA and Boddice J

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal against conviction dismissed.

2.   Leave to amend the application for leave to appeal against sentence in accordance with paragraph 1 of the appellant’s Outline of Submissions on Sentence filed 16 May 2017 granted.

3.   Application for leave to appeal against sentence refused.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – APPEAL DISMISSED – where the appellant was convicted by a jury of murder and pleaded guilty to assault occasioning bodily harm – where the circumstances of the alleged offending were that the appellant stabbed the deceased and then assaulted the deceased’s mother – where the appellant claims to have been pushed by the deceased’s mother and inadvertently stabbed and killed the deceased as a result of the fall – where the appellant asserted that the testimony of the deceased’s mother, as the principal witness, was either contradicted by other evidence or was otherwise so improbable as to be impossible to accept – where there was a relatively minor inconsistency in the witness’ memory of time – where the forensic evidence left open the possibility the appellant wielded the knife in his right hand, instead of left as the witness said – whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – OBJECTIONS OR POINTS NOT RAISED IN COURT BELOW – IMPROPER ADMISSION OR REJECTION OF EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – where the deceased’s mother provided evidence of an incident two years prior to the alleged offending whereby the appellant threatened to kill her while holding a knife to her throat – where defence counsel did not object to the admission of the evidence at trial – where the learned trial judge characterised the evidence as relationship evidence – where evidence was led that quarrels between the appellant and the deceased’s mother often involved the deceased both directly and indirectly – where the appellant argues the evidence was plainly irrelevant to the relationship between the appellant and the deceased, who was not present for that altercation – where the respondent contends the evidence was admissible as relationship evidence – where the respondent contends in the alternative that there was no miscarriage of justice because defence counsel had a rational basis to have not objected – where the respondent contends in the…

Continue reading R v Mead

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
R v Mead [2017] QCA 310
Case
[2017] QCA 310
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant in the matter of R v Mead was convicted by a jury of murder and pleaded guilty to assault occasioning bodily harm. The circumstances of the alleged offending involved the appellant stabbing the deceased and then assaulting the deceased's mother. The appellant claimed to have been pushed by the deceased's mother, resulting in him inadvertently stabbing and killing the deceased during the fall. The appellant contested the credibility of the deceased's mother's testimony, the principal witness, claiming it was contradicted by other evidence or was otherwise improbable. The appeal centred on whether the jury could have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant's guilt.

The court considered several legal issues, including whether the jury could have reasonably concluded the appellant's version of events was improbable. The court found that while there was a minor inconsistency in the witness' memory of time, and forensic evidence left open the possibility the appellant wielded the knife in his right hand, these factors were not enough to render the jury's verdict unreasonable. Additionally, the court examined the admissibility of evidence concerning an incident two years prior where the appellant threatened the deceased's mother with a knife. The court determined the evidence was admissible as relationship evidence and did not occasion a miscarriage of justice. The court also considered whether the trial judge erred in admitting the forensic pathologist's opinion evidence and whether the misdirection on the issue of intoxication amounted to a miscarriage of justice. The court found no error in the trial judge's handling of these matters.

The court dismissed the appeal against the conviction, finding the jury's verdict was not unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence. The court granted leave to amend the application for leave to appeal against sentence to replace the ground of manifest excess with the contention that the learned primary judge erred in ordering that parole eligibility be deferred by six months. However, the court refused the application for leave to appeal against sentence. The final orders were the dismissal of the appeal against conviction, the granting of leave to amend the application for leave to appeal against sentence, and the refusal of the application for leave to appeal against sentence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal against conviction dismissed.

2. Leave to amend the application for leave to appeal against sentence in accordance with paragraph 1 of the appellant’s Outline of Submissions on Sentence filed 16 May 2017 granted.

3. Application for leave to appeal against sentence refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Furniture evidence: According to the appellant, had Ms Locke’s account of being thrown up into the wall been true, then “several photos and [a] small chair” would been knocked over.[56] A photo taken of the scene, however, did not show any furniture as having been displaced. Furthermore, there was no sign of a struggle, “[n]o damage to the walls, no damage to any photos being knocked over – anything”.[57][56]Appellant’s Outline of Submissions, p 3.[57]AT1-35 ll8-9. Exhibit 4 shows a child’s plastic chair close to the wall and a large multi-photo frame leant up against the wall. It is clear from the photograph that a scuffle against the wall would not necessarily disturb the frame or the chair given their respective heights. Also, it cannot be inferred from viewing the photograph alone that these items were not moved from their original position during the scuffle merely because they had not been tipped over. It was reasonable for the jury to have concluded as much and accepted Ms Locke’s version of events. State of the kitchen: Ms Locke recounted that before the deceased was stabbed, the appellant entered the kitchen and took his medication. This provided the appellant with an opportunity to access a knife. The appellant draws attention to the fact that the photographic evidence[58] does not show any glass or medication in the kitchen.[59][58]Exhibits 1.15 and 1.16.[59]Appellant’s Outline of Submissions, p 3. This complaint is inconsequential in my view. On his own version of events, the appellant entered the kitchen and took the knife.[60] Whether he took a glass from the cupboard and consumed his evening medication or not was not essential to the integrity of Ms Locke’s testimony about the stabbing.[60]AT1-25 ll9-11. Timing: According to the appellant, the last text message he sent to the deceased was at 11.25 pm when he was in the shed, 30 metres away from the living room. The appellant recounts sending the message and walking seven or eight metres down the backyard to relieve himself. He then walked to the undercover area next to the house and finished his drink.[61] Before entering the house, he waited for the double roller door on the garage to seal and then entered through the internal door.[62] The appellant estimates the first emergency call was made at 11.31 pm, whereas Ms Locke’s version of events occurred over a period of 15-20 minutes. So long a period of time, the appellant submitted, was inconsistent with the evidence.[63][61]The appellant pointed out that the photos in Exhibits 1.4, 1.6 and 1.7 show a champagne flute and empty champagne bottle in this area, corroborating his story: AT1-21 ll35-39.[62]AT1-21 l20 – AT1-22 l12.[63]Ibid pp 3-5, 11. The appellant’s hypothesis is contradicted by evidence adduced at trial. The text message sent at 11.25 pm was in fact sent by the deceased’s fiancé, Beau Delmo, to the deceased.[64] The final text sent from the appellant’s phone was to Mr Delmo at 11.16 pm.[65] Ms Locke’s evidence was that she heard the garage door and understood the appellant to enter the house at about 11.15 pm or 11.30 pm. The first emergency call in fact occurred at 11.33 pm.[66][64]AB367.[65]AB362.[66]AB390.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In written submissions prepared by Mr Copley QC, the appellant sought leave to amend the notice of application for leave to appeal his sentence by replacing the ground of manifest excess with the following:[132]“The learned primary judge erred in ordering that parole eligibility be deferred by six months.”I would grant leave accordingly.[132]Sentence Form, para 1. The appellant informed the Court he wished to rely upon Mr Copley QC’s submissions by way of the filed Sentence Form: AT23-39.Sentencing considerations The circumstances concerning Counts 1 and 2 have been outlined above. On the day of sentencing, the appellant pleaded guilty to an ex officio indictment charging him with an offence against s 119B(1)(b)[133] of the Code in that, between 10 February 2016 and 11 March 2016 at Wacol, he, without reasonable cause, caused or threatened to cause a detriment to Ms Locke in retaliation because Ms Locke provided evidence against him. He also pleaded guilty to three summary charges of offending against s 177(2)(B) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) by contravening domestic violence orders on 6 August 2013, 16 February 2014 and 10 March 2016 respectively. All of these offences were the subject of the sentencing hearing on 11 November 2016.[133]The offence was charged as a domestic violence offences under s 564(3A) of the Code. The offence of retaliation against a witness related to the letters the appellant provided to Mr Weightman, and which he asked be forwarded to Ms Locke. Ms Locke received the letters on 10 March 2016. She gave them directly to police without opening the envelopes. The letters requested she withdraw her domestic violence complaints and contained threats that she would be “torn apart” in court and that lies she had told to “child safety” would be raised so that she would lose her children. The domestic violence offences were related to several domestic and family violence temporary protection orders which named Ms Locke as the aggrieved and the appellant as the respondent. The appellant was prohibited from committing acts of domestic violence against Ms Locke and from contacting or attempting to contact her. The first offence referred to an occasion where the appellant contacted Ms Locke’s hairdresser and informed her that he wished to reconcile the marital relationship. The latter two occasions involved the night of the stabbing and the circumstances founding the retaliation offence. The appellant was 52 at the time of sentencing and between 49 and 51 during the offending period. In her sentencing remarks, the learned sentencing judge took the following circumstances into account by way of mitigation:[134](i)the appellant had six children with whom he remained in contact;(ii)the appellant had a good employment history and a good work history including skills in relation to inventions;(iii)the appellant suffered from gout, a history of depression and some hand issues;(iv)at the time of sentencing, there had been no breaches of prison discipline during custody and the appellant had behaved well.[134]Sentencing Remarks, Sentence Book “SB” 50 Tr4 ll40-47.