Criminal Law—Evidence—Questions asked with a view to establishing good character of accused—Cross-examination of accused—Questions tending to show previous convictions—Discretion of judge—Crimes Act 1958 (Vict.), s. 399.* * So far as is material, proviso (e) to s. 399 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vict.) provides: "A person charged and called as a witness ... shall not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad character, unless ... (ii) he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good character ... Provided that the permission of the judge must first ... be obtained."
Decisions
December 22. The following written judgments were delivered:- BARWICK C.J. The applicant, Francis Alexander Donnini, was convicted on 6th March 1972 in the County Court at Melbourne upon a charge of robbery under arms and upon two charges of illegally using a motor vehicle. The applicant's appeal to the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal was dismissed by majority and the present application is for special leave to appeal against that decision. (at p117)
2. At the trial the Crown alleged that the applicant was one of two armed and hooded men who, on 12th May 1971, robbed the Murrumbeena Branch of the A.N.Z. Banking Group Ltd. of a sum of $12,640. The Crown relied upon identification of the applicant as the smaller of the robbers by two female bank clerks; police evidence of an interview with the applicant at Long Bay Gaol in Sydney in which the applicant was said to have confessed his complicity in the robbery; the finding in the applicant's flat of a pair of shoes which, according to the evidence of a male bank clerk, were "very much like" the shoes worn by the smaller of the two robbers and which were in fact a reasonable fit for the applicant's feet, and of a newspaper account of the robbery separately placed in a drawer in the flat; and finally the fact that the applicant went to Sydney by air on the day after the robbery. (at p117)
3. The applicant in evidence at the trial denied that he had had any part in the robbery and denied the entire account of the interview with him given by the police officers. He accounted for his journey to Sydney as having been arranged some time before with a man called Sidler who provided the money for the air fare. The applicant said that Sidler had said that he had won at horse racing the money out of which the applicant's air fare was provided. It later appeared that Sidler had been involved…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Donnini v The Queen [1972] HCA 71
Case
[1972] HCA 71
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered the appeal of Donnini against his conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of a confession made by the appellant to police officers.
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the confession, obtained after the appellant had been cautioned but before he was formally charged, was admissible in evidence. This involved determining whether the caution administered was sufficient to render the subsequent confession voluntary and therefore admissible, or if the circumstances surrounding its procurement rendered it inadmissible due to unfairness or oppression.
The Court analysed the principles governing the admissibility of confessions, particularly in the context of police questioning. It was held that a caution, while important, does not automatically render a subsequent confession admissible. The voluntariness of the confession remains paramount, and the court must be satisfied that it was not obtained by undue pressure, coercion, or unfair inducement. The Court considered the appellant's state of mind, the length of questioning, and the overall conduct of the police. Ultimately, the Court found that the confession was admissible, as there was no evidence to suggest it was other than voluntary, despite the caution being administered prior to formal charge.