Jones v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)

Case

[2025] NSWSC 810

17 July 2025

No judgment structure available for this case.

Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Jones v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2025] NSWSC 810
Hearing dates: 17 July 2025
Date of orders: 17 July 2025
Decision date: 17 July 2025
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Hamill J
Decision:

Bail granted

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – release application – show cause – extremely serious allegations – chilling – offence allegedly committed where warrant existed – flight to Western Australia – where applicant pregnant through period of remand – where applicant gave birth days before bail application – where applicant unable to access programmes – separation of mother and infant – Bugmy Bar Book – cause shown – whether risk “unacceptable” – family support – strict conditions – conditional bail granted

Legislation Cited:

Bail Act 2013 (NSW), s 19

Cases Cited:

N/A

Texts Cited:

N/A

Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Nykeeta Jones (Applicant)
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Respondent)
Representation: Solicitors:
Legal Aid Commission (Applicant)
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2025/00210995
Publication restriction: N/A

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT

  1. Nykeeta Jones makes a release application in circumstances where she is required to show cause why her detention is not justified. As I have said in previous applications on other occasions, the show cause requirement under the Bail Act 2013 (NSW) arises in a vast array of circumstances, some more serious than others. It has to be said that on the material before me, this is a case at the very serious end, or perhaps extremely serious end, of cases in which the “show cause” requirement arises.

  2. The reason that I make that observation is that there are two sets of charges. The first set of charges involved the possession of a shortened firearm, an offence which occurred on or about 17 July 2024. It became known to police after they executed a search warrant at premises where the applicant was living. She was aware of the fact of the search and, according to material in the prosecution case, so was her sister. Her sister later told police that Ms Jones was aware after the search that she (the applicant) was wanted by police in respect of the possession of the shotgun and was actively avoiding apprehension.

  3. A warrant was issued for her arrest and it was during the currency of that warrant, that a far more serious offence was allegedly committed in around November of that year. That offence was originally charged as an attempted murder along with a kidnapping and other offences. The facts, without going into them in great detail, are chilling.

  4. It is alleged that the applicant was involved in a joint criminal enterprise with one male offender and another female offender whereby the alleged victim was kidnapped, taken to an isolated place in a stolen motor car, forced to strip naked whereupon it is alleged that the applicant gave him a choice of being shot or being stabbed. I do not think the victim made that choice, but, rather, the male offender then shot him in the leg and, as he sought to retreat, he was shot again. Fortunately, the consequences were not as bad as they might have been. That is, he did not die, but managed to get away.

  5. Although I should say: that is only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the extent of violence involved. Each of the females that were present during the kidnapping were armed with knives. The shooting was preceded by the male offender hitting the complainant to the jaw with the butt of the firearm. I am not recounting all of the detail of this horrendous alleged crime in this necessarily brief judgment, but they are patent in what is a chilling statement of facts contained within a prosecution case statement.

  6. Thereafter, the applicant took flight according to the allegations, and indeed, this does not seem to be disputed. She was later arrested in Western Australia and extradited back to New South Wales.

  7. As I said at the outset, this represents an extremely serious version of a case where an applicant for bail is required to show cause why their detention is not justified.

  8. How then does Ms Jones show cause? She does so by reference to a combination of circumstances, but with special reliance on one particularly striking circumstance.

  9. Throughout the period of her remand, which commenced upon her arrest on 25 November 2024, she has been pregnant and, as recently as last Sunday, she gave birth to a child. That child was immediately taken from her and, despite the fact that there is a capacity in some cases for the Department of Corrective Services to accommodate mothers and newborn children at the Jacaranda Cottage, the evidence tendered in the case is that because of the nature of the charges and her consequent classification, the applicant is not suitable for such programmes. Accordingly, the baby will be separated from her mother for the period of the remand.

  10. As I have said, Ms Jones has been in custody since 25 November 2024. At the moment, the case is before the [REDACTED] Local Court for “case conference mention” on 7 August. The likelihood is that there will be no trial date until well into 2026. There is an element of prediction and speculation in that, but I do not think that anybody is suggesting that she will get a trial date any time before the beginning, but more likely, the middle of next year.

  11. That is an extensive period of separation between mother and child, and part of the material tendered by [REDACTED] is the Bugmy Bar Book relating to the incarceration of a parent or caregiver. I have not mentioned that the applicant is a First Nations woman, and the Bugmy Bar Book goes into some detail of that which is reasonably obvious in any community; that is, that the separation of mother and child creates extreme trauma for both mother and child, and interferes with the important bonding that goes on in the very infancy of a newborn.

  12. That matter alone, as I said in the course of argument on the application, might be said to give rise to her showing cause, notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations and the conduct surrounding her avoiding police after the execution of the search warrant, and then her flight to Western Australia. However, there are other matters and information to be taken into account which are relevant to the question of risk, which is a separate question, but which are also relevant to the question of showing cause.

  13. Ms Jones is a woman approaching 40. She is 38, almost 39, years of age now. She does have a criminal record, but never before has she been charged with or convicted of an offence of violence. There are a number of driving offences on her record, one of some seriousness. There is some suggestion of drug use on the criminal record, and in terms of the facts of the present case, there is very strong evidence, if accepted, of serious drug use. However, the current offences took place over a relatively confined period of time, and do seem to be a spectacular departure from her normal behaviour.

  14. Further, as was submitted on her behalf, when she has been charged in the past, she appears to have been compliant with conditions, and this is not a case where there is a history or litany of previous breaches of bail or breaches of bonds and the like.

  15. Taking into account the delay in the case, the separation between Ms Jones and her baby, particularly as that would impact on the infant, the applicant’s lack of a record for violent offending, and the likelihood that she will be in custody well into next year, I am satisfied she has shown cause. A number of those matters are also relevant to an assessment of risk.

  16. Ms Jones comes to the Court today, “virtually”, from the prison hospital, but members of her family are present in the courtroom; I acknowledge them, including her mother, and note her mother is offering the applicant accommodation. At this stage, the baby is with the applicant’s mother, and it is proposed that Ms Jones would go and live with her mother and her newborn baby if she is granted bail.

  17. That is relevant to show cause, as I have said. However, it is also very relevant to the assessment of risk because, as is submitted on her behalf, being a new mother is very likely to impact on her conduct and behaviour over the coming months and years. One would expect that she will be preoccupied with caring for the new baby, and unlikely to again become involved in the kind of incredibly serious criminality that is alleged against her.

  18. There are conditions of bail which will also mitigate risk, but the combination of her lack of criminal record for offences of violence before this dramatically serious series of (alleged) offences, the support she has from her mother and family, and the fact that she is to be looking after the little baby, satisfies me there is no “unacceptable” risks of the kind quite properly asserted by [REDACTED] on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

  19. It is a difficult application – I acknowledge that – but I am satisfied (1), that Ms Jones has shown cause why her detention is not justified, and (2), that there are no unacceptable risks for the purpose of s 19 of the Bail Act, even though there are real bail concerns that arise simply by her taking flight, avoiding police, and the very serious nature of the allegations made against her.

  20. Accordingly, bail is granted on the following conditions:

  1. The applicant is to be of good behaviour.

  2. The applicant is to appear at the Local Court at [REDACTED] on 7 August 2025.

  3. The applicant is to live at [REDACTED].

  4. The applicant is to report to the [REDACTED] Police Station each day between the hours of 8am and 6pm.

  5. The applicant is not to leave the premises at which the applicant is required to live except:

  1. when in the company of the applicant’s mother, [REDACTED]; OR

  2. for the purposes of reporting to the police; OR

  3. to attend pre-arranged conferences with their lawyers; OR

  4. to attend court; OR

  5. to obtain emergency medical treatment.

  1. The applicant may only travel away from the Correctional Centre from which she will be released when in the company of [REDACTED]. This is a pre-release condition and must be complied with before the applicant is released on bail.

  2. The applicant is not to drink alcohol or enter any premises in which alcohol is sold.

  3. The applicant is not to take any illegal or prescription drugs other than a drug prescribed for the applicant by a doctor.

  4. The applicant is not to approach or communicate with, or attempt to make contact with, [REDACTED] by any means, including telephone and internet social media platforms, or through another person, except for a lawyer.

  5. The applicant is not to approach or communicate with, or attempt to make contact with, any person the applicant knows to be a prosecution witness, including [REDACTED], other than a serving police officer, by any means, including telephone and internet social media platforms, or through a third party, other than a lawyer.

  6. The applicant is to comply with any regime of medical treatment recommended by a medical practitioner from the [REDACTED] including taking medication as required.

  7. The applicant is not to go within 500 metres of any point of international departure from the Commonwealth of Australia.

  8. The applicant is not to apply for a new passport or other travel document. This is a post-release condition.

  9. One acceptable person is to enter into an agreement under which they agree to forfeit the sum of $3,000 if the applicant fails to appear before court in accordance with the bail acknowledgment. This is a pre-release condition. For the purposes of the surety conditions, [REDACTED], is nominated as an acceptable person.

  10. The applicant must not possess or use any firearm or pistol.

  11. The applicant is to present herself at the front door of the premises where she will reside at the direction of any police officer who believes on reasonable grounds that the direction is necessary to confirm compliance with the house arrest condition. Such a direction is only to be given with respect to the rights of other occupants of the premises to peace and privacy.

**********

Decision last updated: 23 July 2025

Actions
Download as PDF Download as Word Document


Cases Citing This Decision

2

Police v Lymberopoulos [2007] SASC 247
Cases Cited

0

Statutory Material Cited

1