R v Compton

Case [2013] SASCFC 134

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v COMPTON AND BARRATT

[2013] SASCFC 134

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Peek and The Honourable Justice Stanley)

9 December 2013

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE - PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE - MISDIRECTION OR NON-DIRECTION

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - MATTERS RELATING TO PROOF - STANDARD OF PROOF - DIRECTION TO JURY - REASONABLE DOUBT - GENERALLY

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE - APPEAL ALLOWED

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - CREDIBILITY - GENERALLY

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS - OTHER CASES

Following a trial by jury, both of the appellants were convicted of two counts of rape.  Each of the appellants appeal against conviction, arguing that (1) the judge erred in directing the jury that “Absolute certainty of guilt is not required.  The prosecution does not have to prove guilt beyond all doubt”; and (2) the verdicts are unsafe and unsatisfactory and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.  The Court granted permission to appeal on the first ground and referred the application for permission to appeal on the second ground to the Court of Criminal Appeal. 

The prosecution case at trial was that the complainant attended at a house where the two appellants resided together with two other persons.  The appellants were in a sexual relationship and shared a bedroom at the premises.  At the relevant time the complainant, a 14-year-old male, also resided in Whyalla with his grandmother and mother.  On the afternoon or evening of the alleged offending the complainant attended at the appellants’ house.  At the house the complainant consumed alcohol and smoked cannabis. 

The prosecution case was that, on the evening of the alleged offending, another resident of the house approached the complainant, threatened him with a knife, and forced him to enter the bedroom where the appellants were waiting.  The complainant alleges he was knocked onto the bed and restrained by the appellant Compton while the appellant Barratt anally raped him with his penis.  The complainant alleges the appellant Barratt then struck him and restrained him while the appellant Compton in turn anally raped him with his penis. 

The two counts of rape were alleged on the basis of a joint enterprise between the appellants. 

The reliability and credibility of the complainant was central to the prosecution case. 

There were significant inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence in relation to matters which were central rather than peripheral to the alleged offending by the appellants. At trial, the complainant was cross-examined about symptoms of mental illness he was suffering around the time of the alleged offences and which resulted in him being hospitalised twice, as well as his conduct in setting fire to a church, breaking into a business, stealing from his grandmother and making threats over the telephone. 

All of these matters were brought…

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R v Compton [2013] SASCFC 134
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[2013] SASCFC 134
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal against a criminal conviction. The central dispute revolved around the directions given by the trial judge to the jury regarding the standard of proof required for a conviction, specifically the concept of "reasonable doubt." The appeal was heard by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The legal issues before the court were whether the trial judge's directions on reasonable doubt constituted a misdirection, and if so, whether this misdirection led to a miscarriage of justice. Specifically, the court had to determine the correct approach to instructing a jury on the meaning of reasonable doubt, particularly in relation to whether a doubt entertained by a jury must be subjected to analysis or evaluation to ascertain its reasonableness.

The court, applying the majority view established in South Australian jurisprudence, particularly in *R v Wilson* and *R v Pahuja*, held that a doubt entertained by a jury of reasonable persons is, by definition, a reasonable doubt. The reasoning, as articulated by King CJ, is that the law does not require jurors to analyse or evaluate their mental states to determine the quality of a doubt. If, at the conclusion of their deliberations, jurors, acting as reasonable persons, entertain a doubt, that doubt is ipso facto a reasonable doubt, and the Crown has not discharged its burden of proof. The court cautioned against directions that suggest a jury must subject a doubt to a process of analysis or evaluation to determine its reasonableness, as this can diminish the jury's sense of their obligation not to convict unless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the trial judge's directions constituted a misdirection on the law concerning reasonable doubt, leading to a miscarriage of justice. The court affirmed that the majority view in South Australia, which holds that any doubt entertained by reasonable persons is a reasonable doubt, is the correct approach to be applied.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

PEEK J
Cox J delivered a separate judgment in which his Honour joined in the order allowing the appeal but expressed a minority view differing with the views of King CJ and Johnston J. In South Australia, it is the majority view of King CJ and Johnston J that is to be applied, as was indeed accepted by the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal in the case of R v Dam Thi Kim Chi[48] decided shortly after R v Wilson.[49] I should add that, in any event, I prefer the views of King CJ and Johnston J to those of Cox J.[50] [48] (1986) 43 SASR 422.[49] (1986) 42 SASR 203.[50] I note that the respondent seeks to rely on the judgment of Martin CJ in Ladd v The Queen (2009) 157 NTR 29 in which his Honour expressed a preference for the minority view of Cox J. There, the jury had asked the trial Judge: “The jury would like to know the legal definition of the word ‘reasonable’ in the context of reasonable doubt”. In answering that question the trial Judge had stated inter alia: “… If you have a reasonable doubt – I should say first it is not required of the Crown to prove its case beyond all doubt. So you’re looking at what is a reasonable doubt and what is a reasonable doubt, is for you to determine. If you have a reasonable doubt, then of course the accused man is entitled to get the benefit of that”.Martin CJ commenced his exposition in Ladd thus: “First, as a matter of principle, is it correct to say that the Crown is not required to prove its case beyond “all” doubt? On one view, that statement is literally correct because juries are entitled to put aside “unreasonable” doubts or doubts that would not be entertained by a juror acting reasonably. On another view, the direction that the Crown is not required to prove its case beyond “all” doubt is not correct because “a” doubt experienced by a jury is, by definition, “a reasonable doubt”. … As will be seen from the passages in the judgment of King CJ to which I am about to refer, it appears that his Honour took the view that “a doubt” entertained by a jury of reasonable persons, irrespective of the strength of the doubt, is, ipso facto, a reasonable doubt”.Martin CJ referred to various passages in the judgment of King CJ in R v Wilson and in R v Pahuja and then made extensive reference to the judgment of Cox J in R v Pahuja. I note that he accepted that King CJ in both R v Wilson (Johnston J concurring) and in R v Pahuja (Johnston J concurring in separate reasons) took “the strict view” (at 82 [212]) that a doubt entertained by a jury of reasonable persons, irrespective of the strength of the doubt, is, ipso facto, a reasonable doubt and that in disagreeing with that strict view, Cox J was expressing “a minority view” (at 74 [171]).The judgment of Cox J in R v Pahuja However, I should say something further about the judgment of Cox J as it concerns the redirections given by the trial Judge in R v Pahuja.[51] Although Cox J differed from the plurality concerning the main directions of the trial Judge, his Honour joined in the order to allow the appeal solely on the basis of the redirections given by the trial Judge which were as follows:[52]The first is the question of “beyond reasonable doubt”. It may be that I left the wrong impression with you at one particular part, so I will now endeavour to clarify it. The expression “beyond reasonable doubt” is simply a matter, really, of plain common sense. If at the end of your deliberations you are left with any doubt, it is for you to decide whether that is a reasonable doubt. If you decide there is a reasonable doubt, then, of course, the Crown have not proved their case. You do not have to go to consider any other matters in relation to that because when you decide you have a doubt, it is for you to decide whether it is a reasonable doubt and if it is a reasonable doubt then the verdict has to be not guilty. (Emphasis added)[51] (1987) 49 SASR 191.[52] R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191, 203 (quoted by Cox J).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PEEK J

The courts in South Australia have taken a firm view of the above matters. In R v Wilson[43] the trial Judge had directed “If you think there is a doubt but that it is merely a fanciful doubt, you will still convict because that is not a reasonable doubt”.[44] King CJ (with whom Johnston J concurred) found this to be radical error. His Honour stated:[45]It is clear from the passages cited above that the High Court in Green’s case set about discouraging judges from qualifying the direction as to onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt by references to fanciful or unreasonable doubts except in cases in which that was considered to be rendered necessary by the arguments of counsel. Where the judge considers such a qualification to be necessary, it is essential that he frame the qualification in terms which do not diminish the jury’s sense of their obligation not to convict upon supposed proofs about which they, as reasonable persons, feel a doubt. The qualification, when made, should be in terms, such as those suggested by the passage cited above from Green’s case, which caution the jury against regarding possibilities which are in truth fantastic or completely unreal as affording a reason for doubt, or in terms, often used, which remind the jury of the capacity of the human mind to conjure up fanciful, nervous or unreasonable misgivings about matters which are not in reality in doubt. It is permissible, if thought necessary, to warn a jury against unreasonable mental processes, but it is not permissible to suggest that they should disregard a doubt which, at the end of their deliberations, they think to exist, or that they are required to subject such a doubt to a process of analysis in order to determine its quality. If at the end of their deliberations, the jury have a doubt, that doubt is ipso facto, as Green’s case establishes, a reasonable doubt. …… Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires that doubts, irrespective of degree of strength which they attain, be given effect to if the jurors, as reasonable persons, are prepared to entertain them.(Emphasis added, Footnotes omitted)[43] (1986) 42 SASR 203.[44] R v Wilson (1986) 42 SASR 203, 205 (quoted by King CJ).[45] R v Wilson (1986) 42 SASR 203, 206-207. In the later decision in R v Pahuja, King CJ further elucidated this matter: [46]… The law does not require a jury to subject its mental states to a process of analysis or evaluation for the purpose of determining their quality. Mental philosophers, psychiatrists, psychologists and lawyers subject mental states to analysis and evaluation, but ordinary jurors are unlikely to be accustomed to doing so. Green (at 33), makes it clear that it is not part of the task of a jury to do so. Jurors are presumed to be reasonable persons. The test of reasonableness of a doubt is that the jury, properly aware of its responsibilities, is prepared to entertain it at the end of its deliberations. To direct or even invite a jury to subject a doubt which it entertains after deliberating upon the case, to a process of analysis or evaluation in order to determine whether it is reasonable, is an error of law. … (Emphasis added)[46] (1987) 49 SASR 191, 195.