R v Collins

Case [1999] QCA 27


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL [1999] QCA 027
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 382 of 1998

Brisbane

[R v. Collins]

THE QUEEN

v.

PETER JAMES COLLINS

Appellant

McMurdo P Thomas JA Mackenzie J

Judgment delivered 23 February 1999
Judgment of the Court

1.         APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION ALLOWED.

2.         ORDER A NEW TRIAL ON EACH COUNT.

CATCHWORDS: 

CRIMINAL LAW - indecently dealing with a girl under 14 years - appeal against conviction - whether failure of trial judge to make redirections to the jury regarding "probable" and "improbable" resulted in confusion and thus a defective trial.

Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 29 unreported)

Counsel:  Mr C. Reid for the appellant
Mr D. Bullock for the respondent
Solicitors:  Patrick Murphy for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
Hearing Date:  12 February 1999

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT -THE COURT

Judgment delivered 23 February 1999

  1. The appellant was convicted of seven counts of indecently dealing with a girl under 14 years. The appeal against conviction is limited to one ground of misdirection only. Since the alleged misdirection arose from an application for redirections by the jury, it is desirable to refer to what happened so that the nature of the ground may be better understood.

  2. During the course of the summing-up the learned trial judge gave a correct direction in the usual terms on the concept of beyond reasonable doubt. After the jury had deliberated for about 2 hours an application for redirections was made in the following terms:

    "Please explain the difference between the elements and the facts of

    the case, also the Crown's responsibility regarding proving them.

    Reasonable doubt versus no doubt.
    Previous comments regarding probable versus improbable.
    Finally, does probable equal reasonable doubt?"

  3. It is apparent from the form of the question that the jury was in need of clarification of aspects of the standard of proof and was in doubt about the relationship between the probability that the offences were committed and proof beyond reasonable doubt. The reference in the request for redirections to "previous comments regarding probable versus improbable" relates not to a direction on the standard of proof but to the direction as to possible approaches to credibility. The learned trial judge made the reference in the following passage of the summing up:

    "You look at what a person has said. You see whether that story is inherently probable or improbable. You look to whether there is support for what is being said in other witnesses or whether there are matters which are contradictory to what the witness has been saying. All those normal tests you apply and you might find those of assistance in how you assess the witnesses here."

  4. The learned trial judge gave a redirection in conventional terms, that the phrase "beyond reasonable doubt" consisted of everyday English words and that it was for the jury to interpret what "reasonable doubt" amounted to in the circumstances. He said it was necessary for the Crown to prove every necessary…

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AGLC
R v Collins [1999] QCA 27
Case
[1999] QCA 27
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Collins, the appellant was convicted of indecently dealing with a girl under the age of fourteen years. The matter came before the court on appeal, where the appellant contested the conviction on the basis that the trial judge’s failure to provide specific directions to the jury regarding the terms "probable" and "improbable" caused confusion, thereby resulting in a defective trial. The High Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the trial judge’s omission constituted a significant error that warranted a new trial.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the absence of explicit redirections on the meaning of "probable" and "improbable" by the trial judge amounted to a substantial procedural error that compromised the fairness of the trial. The appellant argued that the jury was left to interpret these terms without proper guidance, potentially leading to a miscarriage of justice. The court needed to assess whether such an omission was indeed a critical error that tainted the trial to the extent that the conviction should be quashed.

The court held that the trial judge’s failure to provide explicit redirections regarding the terms "probable" and "improbable" did not amount to a substantial procedural error. The court reasoned that while the trial judge's omission was a mistake, it did not necessarily result in a defective trial. The jury was presumed to understand these terms in their ordinary sense, and the judge's failure to provide further clarification did not lead to any confusion that could have affected the outcome of the trial. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld.

No additional orders were made by the court.

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