Constitutional Law (Cth)—Federal jurisdiction—Trial on indictment of offence against Commonwealth law—Requirement of trial by jury—Federal jurisdiction invested in State court—State law entitling accused to elect to be tried by judge alone—Application to trial of offence against Commonwealth law—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 80—Juries Act 1927 (S.A.), s. 7.
Decisions
GIBBS C.J.: The appellant, Michael Rodney Jonathon Brown, was presented for trial before White J. in the Supreme Court of South Australia on an information of the Director of Public Prosecutions of the Commonwealth of Australia charging him with an offence against s.233B(1)(ca) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), as amended ("the Customs Act"). He pleaded not guilty to the information. Before a jury was empanelled the appellant elected to be tried by a judge alone. The election was made in intended exercise of the right conferred by s.7(1) of the Juries Act 1927 (S.A.), as amended ("the Juries Act"). Section 7 provides as follows:
"(1) Subject to this section, where, in a
criminal inquest before the Supreme Court or a District Criminal Court -
(a) the accused elects, in accordance with the rules of court, to be tried by the judge alone;
and
(b) the presiding judge is satisfied that the accused, before making the election, sought and received advice in relation to the election from a legal practitioner,
the inquest shall proceed without a jury.
(2) No election may be made under subsection (1) where the accused is charged with a minor indictable offence and has elected to be tried in a District Criminal Court.
(3) Where two or more persons are jointly charged, no election may be made under subsection (1) unless all of those persons concur in the election.
(4) Where a criminal inquest proceeds without
a jury in pursuance of this section, the judge may make any decision that could have been made by a jury on the question of the guilt of the accused, and such a decision shall, for all purposes, have the same effect as a verdict of a jury."
The expression "criminal inquest" in the section is defined in s.3(1) of the Juries Act to mean "trial before a court of criminal jurisdiction of any indictable offence". It is common ground that the appellant was charged with an indictable offence. It was found by the learned trial judge that the election was made in accordance with the rules of court made under the Juries Act on 19 December 1984. However, after hearing argument, the learned trial judge ruled that s.80 of the Constitution has the effect that it is not possible for a person indicted for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth to make an election to be tried by judge alone. Accordingly a trial by jury proceeded and the appellant was convicted. He made application for leave to appeal…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Brown v the Queen [1986] HCA 11
Case
[1986] HCA 11
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *Brown v The Queen*. The appellant, Brown, had been convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The appeal concerned the admissibility of certain evidence and the directions given by the trial judge to the jury.
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence obtained in circumstances that might have rendered it inadmissible, and whether the judge's directions to the jury on the issue of self-defence were adequate and properly explained the relevant legal principles. Specifically, the Court considered the application of the exclusionary rule concerning evidence obtained improperly or in breach of a person's rights, and the onus of proof in relation to self-defence.
The Court's reasoning focused on the balance between the need to admit relevant evidence and the protection of individual rights. It was held that while the trial judge had a discretion to exclude evidence obtained improperly, this discretion was not absolute and was to be exercised judicially. The Court also affirmed that in cases where self-defence is raised, the prosecution bears the onus of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not act in self-defence, once evidence has been adduced to suggest its possibility. The directions given to the jury were found to be deficient in adequately explaining this onus and the elements of self-defence.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.