Boyle v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

BOYLE v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (CTH)

[2024] SASCA 73

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable Justice Lovell, the Honourable Justice Doyle and the Honourable Justice David)

19 June 2024

PROCEDURE - STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY - JURISDICTION

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - PARTICULAR CLASSES OF ACT - REMEDIAL OR BENEFICIAL ACTS OR PROVISIONS

The appellant was employed at the Australian Taxation Office (“ATO”) and lodged a public interest disclosure (“PID”) under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) (“the Act”).

The appellant allegedly committed 24 criminal acts in order to obtain evidence to support the information contained in his PID. After lodging his PID, the appellant uploaded some of the material he had obtained to a ProtonMail account. His lawyer, Mr Findlay, was given the ability to access the ProtonMail server account but agreed with the appellant that he would not do so until the appellant permitted it.

The appellant was charged with 24 criminal offences, namely, using his mobile phone to take photographs of taxpayer information (counts 1-2 and 11-15); covertly recording conversations with ATO colleagues (counts 3-6 and 8-10); and uploading photographs of taxpayer information to a ProtonMail server account (counts 16-24).

The main issues before the primary Judge were whether the alleged unlawful anterior acts committed by the appellant attracted the immunity from criminal liability contained within s 10(1)(a) of the Act, and whether the appellant by uploading material to the ProtonMail server account and potentially giving his lawyer access, amounted to a “legal practitioner disclosure”, thus attracting the immunity.

The primary Judge found the appellant’s conduct in relation to his internal disclosure and his legal practitioner disclosure did not attract the immunity under s 10(1)(a) of the Act and dismissed the application. The appellant appeals that decision on the following five grounds:

1.The appellant’s claim for immunity under s 10 of the Act were criminal rather than civil proceedings;

2.The legal onus of proof to be applied was proof beyond reasonable doubt, rather than proof on the balance of probabilities;

3.The immunity under s 10(1)(a) of the Act extends to anterior conduct that reasonably form part of making a PID;

4.The appellant’s conduct reasonably formed part of the process of making a PID; and

5.The uploading of the material to a ProtonMail server account constituted a legal practitioner disclosure under s 26 of the Act.

The appeal is dismissed.

Held, per Doyle JA (Lovell and David JJA agreeing) in relation to Grounds 1 and 2:

1.The District Court had civil jurisdiction to determine the appellant’s claim for immunity under s 8(4) of the District Court Act 1991 (SA), as conferred by s 23(1) of the Act;

2.The proceedings for the appellant’s claim of public interest immunity under s 23(1)(c) of the Act were properly characterised by the primary Judge as civil proceedings; and

3.The applicable standard of the persuasive onus…

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Details
Case
[2024] SASCA 73
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal by an Australian Taxation Office employee against a decision of the primary judge who found that the appellant was not entitled to immunity from civil, criminal, or administrative liability for making a public interest disclosure. The dispute arose from the appellant's disclosure of concerns about the ATO's debt collection practices and his treatment within the organisation. The appellant argued that his actions, including collecting and recording information, were covered by the immunity provided under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) (the PID Act).

The central legal issue before the Full Federal Court was the scope of the immunity granted by section 10(1)(a) of the PID Act for "making" a public interest disclosure. Specifically, the court had to determine whether this immunity extended beyond the act of disclosure itself to encompass the conduct of collecting and recording information that formed the subject of the disclosure, and further, whether it covered conduct reasonably forming part of the process of preparing such a disclosure.

The court reasoned that the immunity under section 10(1)(a) was confined to the act of disclosing information in accordance with the PID Act. It held that the word "making" in this context referred to the communication of information unilaterally, as distinct from "giving" information in response to a request. The court adopted a purposive approach to interpretation, acknowledging the PID Act's objects of promoting integrity and accountability in the Commonwealth public sector and protecting those who make disclosures. However, it concluded that this purposive approach did not warrant an expansive interpretation of the immunity to include the antecedent conduct of collecting and recording information. The court found that the primary judge had correctly determined that the appellant's conduct in collecting and recording information did not fall within the scope of the immunity, and that even if the immunity were construed more broadly to include preparatory conduct, the appellant's actions still fell outside its scope due to a limited connection in time, necessity, and purpose to the ultimate disclosure.

The appeal was dismissed. The court affirmed the primary judge's finding that the immunity for "making" a public interest disclosure under section 10(1)(a) of the PID Act is limited to the act of disclosure itself and does not extend to the conduct of collecting and recording information. Consequently, the appellant's conduct, which was the subject of various charges, was not protected by the immunity.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

I have had the advantage of reading the draft judgment of Doyle JA in relation to Grounds 1 and 2. I agree with his reasons on those grounds. In this judgment I deal with Grounds 3, 4 and 5. I would dismiss the appeal. My reasons follow.Background The Act establishes a framework for a Commonwealth Government employee to make a public interest disclosure (as defined) to an authorised internal recipient or supervisor if they become aware of disclosable conduct (as defined). This is described as an internal disclosure. The internal recipient of a public interest disclosure is authorised to investigate the disclosure. If the Commonwealth Government employee complies with the framework, they attract under the Act an immunity from criminal, civil or administrative liability for making the disclosure. Apart from an internal disclosure, the Act recognises three other types of disclosure, each of which requires the adoption of a different procedure. In the context of this case, only the legal practitioner disclosure is relevant. The appellant at the relevant times was employed by the Australian Taxation Office (“ATO”) as a debt collection officer in the Early Intervention Section of the Debt Business Line. The primary Judge accurately set out in her reasons the full history of the matter. It is not necessary for the disposition of the appeal to repeat it. In summary, the appellant became, to use a neutral phrase, disgruntled and unhappy with a direction to staff to issue Standard Garnishees on taxpayer bank accounts in certain circumstances rather than employ a less harsh regime. The appellant considered that “[d]ebt staff in multiple units around the country were inappropriately, indiscriminately, and carelessly issuing Standard Garnishees during the month of June 2017, due to unethical directives of the Debt leadership”. The appellant also had other concerns, including that he was unjustly treated in 2015-16 for his case management and that he was singled out and victimised because he had spoken out during a meeting against the Standard Garnishee directive when it was initially issued on 8 June 2017. The appellant at the relevant time was a Commonwealth public service employee and was therefore entitled to utilise the provisions of the Act which provides a framework for employees to disclose allegations of misconduct. It was common ground that the appellant, on 12 October 2017, lodged a public interest disclosure (“PID”) with the ATO and that it complied with the requirements of the Act. Information contained within the PID attracted the immunity. The appellant’s PID was allocated to an authorised recipient for investigation pursuant to s 43 of the Act. His PID was not dealt with appropriately. By letter emailed to the appellant on 27 October 2017, the authorised recipient advised that he had discontinued the investigation pursuant to s 48(1)(c) of the Act, having determined that the disclosure did not concern serious disclosable conduct. It is accepted for the purposes of this litigation that this decision was incorrect.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

If either proposition is established the appellant must fail in his application for an immunity.The evidence How and why the appellant sent Mr Findlay the information was disputed and the subject of evidence. The appellant gave evidence but declined to call Mr Findlay. Cross-examination of the appellant was limited as the circumstances surrounding his contact with Mr Findlay were entirely within the appellant’s knowledge. The respondent had no information on which to mount a challenge to the appellant’s version of events. After the appellant completed his evidence, he partially waived legal professional privilege enabling the respondent to call Mr Findlay to give restricted evidence. The respondent called Mr Findlay as they believed he could give relevant evidence on the topic. It is apparent from the transcript that the respondent had not been able to obtain a statement from Mr Findlay before calling him and therefore was unaware of precisely what Mr Findlay would say when giving evidence. The appellant did not challenge Mr Findlay’s evidence. The way the evidence was adduced meant there was little or no cross-examination of either the appellant or Mr Findlay on the relevant topics. That is, neither were challenged on their version of events. Their evidence was inconsistent on some issues. The paucity of, and the inconsistencies in, the evidence on these issues is relevant when considering the operation of s 23 of the Act, which relevantly states:23 Claims for protection(1) If, in civil or criminal proceedings (the primary proceedings) instituted against an individual in a court, the individual makes a claim (relevant to the proceedings) that, because of section 10, the individual is not subject to any civil, criminal or administrative liability for making a particular public interest disclosure:(a) the individual bears the onus of adducing or pointing to evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility that the claim is made out; and(b) if the individual discharges that onus—the party instituting the primary proceedings against the individual bears the onus of proving that the claim is not made out; and… The primary Judge found that the appellant failed to produce evidence or sufficient evidence under s 23(1)(a) to attract the immunity. The appellant challenges that finding. As the primary Judge found that the appellant did not overcome the onus set out in s 23(1)(a), she did not go on to consider whether the respondent had, in any event, discharged the onus under s 23(1)(b). The respondent submitted the primary Judge correctly found that the appellant had not produced evidence sufficient to discharge the onus set out in s 23(1)(a) and in any event, it clearly met the onus set out in s 23(1)(b).Appellant’s evidence The appellant tendered affidavits as part of his evidence in chief. Numerous exhibits were attached to those affidavits. While the appellant supplemented his affidavit evidence with oral evidence, in relation to his discussions with Mr Findlay, he relied entirely on what he stated in the affidavits.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In any event, insofar as the implication of those words might be understood merely as ensuring that all aspects of the disclosure itself are covered by the immunity, they are unnecessary and would, in any event, not assist the appellant in the present case. And insofar as they might be understood as extending beyond the act of disclosure to anterior conduct such as collecting and recording information and evidence, then they would give rise to similar difficulties as those associated with the construction contended for by the appellant.Conclusion For the reasons given, the immunity for “making” a public interest disclosure under s 10(1)(a) of the PID Act is confined to an immunity for the act of disclosing information in accordance with that section. The primary judge was correct to hold that the immunity does not extend to the appellant’s conduct in recording and collecting information that is the subject of counts 1-6 and 8-15. Ground 3 has not been made out.Ground 4: conduct reasonably forming part of the process of preparing the disclosure Ground 4 involves a challenge to the primary judge’s finding that, even if the immunity were to be construed as extending to acts reasonably forming part of the process of preparing the disclosure, the appellant’s conduct the subject of Counts 1-6 and 8-15 fell outside the scope of the immunity. In circumstances where I have rejected the appellant’s challenge to the breadth of the immunity under Ground 3, it is not strictly necessary to deal with this ground. Indeed, there is a difficulty in doing so in that, having rejected the submission that the immunity in s 10(1)(a) extends beyond the act of disclosure, it is somewhat artificial to attempt to address in any detail the precise metes and bounds of the immunity contended for by the appellant. It would also be somewhat artificial to attempt to identify the extent to which the appellant’s formulation of the immunity (that is, conduct which reasonably forms part of the process of making a public interest disclosure) extends beyond the HRLC’s formulation of the immunity (that is, conduct which is reasonably necessary for making the public interest disclosure). That said, I agree generally with Lovell JA’s reasons for rejecting this ground. In particular, I agree that the primary judge did not err in having regard to other lawful steps that were available to obtain the information collected and recorded by the appellant. I also agree that the primary judge did not err in having regard to the fact that various aspects of the information collected and recorded did not directly reveal any disclosable conduct. These matters were relevant in the primary judge’s assessment of the connection between the steps taken and the nature and content of the disclosure ultimately made. Having regard to the limited connection in time, necessity and purpose between the appellant’s charged conduct and the disclosure made, in the context of the primary judge’s detailed findings as a whole, I agree with Lovell JA that the appellant has not demonstrated error in the primary judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s charged conduct fell outside the immunity. While her Honour was addressing the appellant’s construction of the immunity, her conclusion would apply a fortiori to the HRLC’s construction of the immunity. Ground 5: legal practitioner disclosure

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Like the primary judge,[76] I find this an unconvincing contextual indication of the meaning of the reference to “making a public interest disclosure” in s 10(1)(a). The use of the different words “gives” and “making”, despite their similarity in meaning, is readily explained by the different contexts in which they are used. The immunity under s 57(1) contemplates the communication of information in response to a request from a person investigating, whereas the immunity under s 10(1)(a) contemplates the communication of information unilaterally. In the context of the former, the object of the communication is “information”. In the context of the latter, the object of the communication is a “disclosure” of information. These different nouns naturally take different verbs, with it being natural to refer to “making” a disclosure but to “giving” information.[76] Reasons at [207]-[209].Purposive considerations Turning to a consideration of purposive considerations, it is to be accepted that the scope of the s 10(1)(a) immunity must be construed having regard to the objectives of the PID Act. Indeed, s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) mandates that the interpretation that would best achieve the purpose or object of the Act (whether or not expressly stated in the Act) is to be preferred to each other interpretation. The objects of the PID Act are expressly stated in s 6:6 ObjectsThe objects of this Act are:(a) to promote the integrity and accountability of the Commonwealth public sector; and(b) to encourage and facilitate the making of public interest disclosures by public officials and former public officials; and(c) to ensure that public officials, and former public officials, who make public interest disclosures are supported and are protected from adverse consequences relating to the disclosures; and(d) to ensure that disclosures by public officials, and former public officials, are properly investigated and dealt with. The appellant contends that, consistently with s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act, the provisions of the PID Act, and in particular s 10(1), should be construed as far as possible in a manner that would achieve the above objectives. The appellant focuses in this respect upon a construction which would encourage and facilitate the making of public interest disclosures (s 6(b)), and ensure the support and protection of people who make disclosures (s 6(c)). The appellant contends that this approach to the construction of s 10(1) is reinforced by the general rule that legislation which is beneficial or remedial should be given a liberal construction. He contends that the word “making” in s 10(1)(a) should be given the widest scope that is consistent with its fair meaning. I accept, of course, that a purposive approach to the construction of s 10 is appropriate and required. I also accept, as the primary judge did,[77] that s 10, in providing a public official making a public interest disclosure with an immunity from liability, may fairly be described as a remedial or beneficial provision. The PID Act generally, but s 10 in particular, provides protection for individuals who make a public interest disclosure, referred to colloquially as ‘whistle-blowers’. [77] Reasons at [214]-[216].