SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Civil)
BOYLE v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (CTH)
[2024] SASCA 73
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable Justice Lovell, the Honourable Justice Doyle and the Honourable Justice David)
19 June 2024
PROCEDURE - STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY - JURISDICTION
STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION
STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - PARTICULAR CLASSES OF ACT - REMEDIAL OR BENEFICIAL ACTS OR PROVISIONS
The appellant was employed at the Australian Taxation Office (“ATO”) and lodged a public interest disclosure (“PID”) under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The appellant allegedly committed 24 criminal acts in order to obtain evidence to support the information contained in his PID. After lodging his PID, the appellant uploaded some of the material he had obtained to a ProtonMail account. His lawyer, Mr Findlay, was given the ability to access the ProtonMail server account but agreed with the appellant that he would not do so until the appellant permitted it.
The appellant was charged with 24 criminal offences, namely, using his mobile phone to take photographs of taxpayer information (counts 1-2 and 11-15); covertly recording conversations with ATO colleagues (counts 3-6 and 8-10); and uploading photographs of taxpayer information to a ProtonMail server account (counts 16-24).
The main issues before the primary Judge were whether the alleged unlawful anterior acts committed by the appellant attracted the immunity from criminal liability contained within s 10(1)(a) of the Act, and whether the appellant by uploading material to the ProtonMail server account and potentially giving his lawyer access, amounted to a “legal practitioner disclosure”, thus attracting the immunity.
The primary Judge found the appellant’s conduct in relation to his internal disclosure and his legal practitioner disclosure did not attract the immunity under s 10(1)(a) of the Act and dismissed the application. The appellant appeals that decision on the following five grounds:
1.The appellant’s claim for immunity under s 10 of the Act were criminal rather than civil proceedings;
2.The legal onus of proof to be applied was proof beyond reasonable doubt, rather than proof on the balance of probabilities;
3.The immunity under s 10(1)(a) of the Act extends to anterior conduct that reasonably form part of making a PID;
4.The appellant’s conduct reasonably formed part of the process of making a PID; and
5.The uploading of the material to a ProtonMail server account constituted a legal practitioner disclosure under s 26 of the Act.
The appeal is dismissed.
Held, per Doyle JA (Lovell and David JJA agreeing) in relation to Grounds 1 and 2:
1.The District Court had civil jurisdiction to determine the appellant’s claim for immunity under s 8(4) of the District Court Act 1991 (SA), as conferred by s 23(1) of the Act;
2.The proceedings for the appellant’s claim of public interest immunity under s 23(1)(c) of the Act were properly characterised by the primary Judge as civil proceedings; and
3.The applicable standard of the persuasive onus…
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- Case
- [2024] SASCA 73
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Full Federal Court was the scope of the immunity granted by section 10(1)(a) of the PID Act for "making" a public interest disclosure. Specifically, the court had to determine whether this immunity extended beyond the act of disclosure itself to encompass the conduct of collecting and recording information that formed the subject of the disclosure, and further, whether it covered conduct reasonably forming part of the process of preparing such a disclosure.
The court reasoned that the immunity under section 10(1)(a) was confined to the act of disclosing information in accordance with the PID Act. It held that the word "making" in this context referred to the communication of information unilaterally, as distinct from "giving" information in response to a request. The court adopted a purposive approach to interpretation, acknowledging the PID Act's objects of promoting integrity and accountability in the Commonwealth public sector and protecting those who make disclosures. However, it concluded that this purposive approach did not warrant an expansive interpretation of the immunity to include the antecedent conduct of collecting and recording information. The court found that the primary judge had correctly determined that the appellant's conduct in collecting and recording information did not fall within the scope of the immunity, and that even if the immunity were construed more broadly to include preparatory conduct, the appellant's actions still fell outside its scope due to a limited connection in time, necessity, and purpose to the ultimate disclosure.
The appeal was dismissed. The court affirmed the primary judge's finding that the immunity for "making" a public interest disclosure under section 10(1)(a) of the PID Act is limited to the act of disclosure itself and does not extend to the conduct of collecting and recording information. Consequently, the appellant's conduct, which was the subject of various charges, was not protected by the immunity.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Like the primary judge,[76] I find this an unconvincing contextual indication of the meaning of the reference to “making a public interest disclosure” in s 10(1)(a). The use of the different words “gives” and “making”, despite their similarity in meaning, is readily explained by the different contexts in which they are used. The immunity under s 57(1) contemplates the communication of information in response to a request from a person investigating, whereas the immunity under s 10(1)(a) contemplates the communication of information unilaterally. In the context of the former, the object of the communication is “information”. In the context of the latter, the object of the communication is a “disclosure” of information. These different nouns naturally take different verbs, with it being natural to refer to “making” a disclosure but to “giving” information.[76] Reasons at [207]-[209].Purposive considerations Turning to a consideration of purposive considerations, it is to be accepted that the scope of the s 10(1)(a) immunity must be construed having regard to the objectives of the PID Act. Indeed, s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) mandates that the interpretation that would best achieve the purpose or object of the Act (whether or not expressly stated in the Act) is to be preferred to each other interpretation. The objects of the PID Act are expressly stated in s 6:6 ObjectsThe objects of this Act are:(a) to promote the integrity and accountability of the Commonwealth public sector; and(b) to encourage and facilitate the making of public interest disclosures by public officials and former public officials; and(c) to ensure that public officials, and former public officials, who make public interest disclosures are supported and are protected from adverse consequences relating to the disclosures; and(d) to ensure that disclosures by public officials, and former public officials, are properly investigated and dealt with. The appellant contends that, consistently with s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act, the provisions of the PID Act, and in particular s 10(1), should be construed as far as possible in a manner that would achieve the above objectives. The appellant focuses in this respect upon a construction which would encourage and facilitate the making of public interest disclosures (s 6(b)), and ensure the support and protection of people who make disclosures (s 6(c)). The appellant contends that this approach to the construction of s 10(1) is reinforced by the general rule that legislation which is beneficial or remedial should be given a liberal construction. He contends that the word “making” in s 10(1)(a) should be given the widest scope that is consistent with its fair meaning. I accept, of course, that a purposive approach to the construction of s 10 is appropriate and required. I also accept, as the primary judge did,[77] that s 10, in providing a public official making a public interest disclosure with an immunity from liability, may fairly be described as a remedial or beneficial provision. The PID Act generally, but s 10 in particular, provides protection for individuals who make a public interest disclosure, referred to colloquially as ‘whistle-blowers’. [77] Reasons at [214]-[216].