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Victims Compensation Fund Corp v Brown

Victims Compensation Fund Corp v Brown

Case [2003] HCATrans 334 2 September 2003

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[2003] HCATrans 334

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S162 of 2003

B e t w e e n -
VICTIMS COMPENSATION FUND CORPORATION
Appellant
and
SCOTT BROWN
First Respondent
SHARON LEWIS
Second Respondent
DISTRICT COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Third Respondent

McHUGH ACJ
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 2 SEPTEMBER 2003, AT 11.36 AM

__________________

MR M.G. SEXTON, SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales:If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.L. LONERGAN, for the appellants. (instructed by Crown Solicitor for New South Wales)

MR A.J. BELLANTO, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR G.C. HALSALL, for the respondents. (instructed by Hilton King & Associates)

McHUGH ACJ: Before you commence, I have a certificate from the Deputy Registrar that he has been informed by the solicitor for the third respondent, the District Court of New South Wales, that the third respondent submits to the order of the Court save as to costs. Yes, Mr Solicitor.

MR SEXTON: If the Court pleases, it is an appeal from the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. Your Honours, it has its origins in the incident on 15 March 1998, when the first and second respondents were living together in Wollongong. The first respondent answered a knock at the door and was stabbed, punched and kicked by an assailant. The second respondent was standing nearby and observed this attack.

Your Honours, on 5 May 1998, both respondents made applications for compensation to the Victims Compensation Tribunal in New South Wales, the first respondent as a primary victim, with respect to both the physical injuries that he sustained and also for shock, the second respondent claimed as a secondary victim and claimed compensation for shock.

Your Honours, I will go to the legislation which is because of its titles only perhaps somewhat confusing. The applications were made under the Victims Compensation Act 1996. Your Honours, the relevant provisions are an annexure to our written submissions but your Honours also have a volume with three pieces of

legislation in it, and the first piece of legislation is the Victims Compensation Act 1996. There was an earlier piece of legislation, 1987 legislation, that was repealed.

KIRBY J: Apparently, there was an affidavit at the special leave hearing showing that there was a significance in this decision for a number of other cases. Is that correct?

MR SEXTON: Yes, that is so, your Honour.

KIRBY J: That strikes me as surprising given that it was the peculiarity of the decision relating to the differentiation between symptoms and disability, the non‑coincidence of them, that gave rise to the factual foundation for this particular case. That would not be a universal or even, I would have thought, common phenomenon.

MR SEXTON: Your Honour, it seems to be potentially an…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Victims Compensation Fund Corp v Brown

Details

AGLC: Victims Compensation Fund Corp v Brown [2003] HCATrans 334
Case: [2003] HCATrans 334
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the Victims Compensation Fund Corporation against a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The dispute concerned the entitlement of Mr. Brown to compensation under the *Victims Compensation Act 1987* (NSW) for injuries sustained during a criminal act. Mr. Brown had been injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by a drunk driver. The primary issue was whether the injuries sustained by Mr. Brown were compensable under the Act, given that the criminal act occurred on private property and not in a public place.

The central legal question before the High Court was the interpretation of section 11(1)(a) of the *Victims Compensation Act 1987* (NSW), which stipulated that compensation was payable for a "personal injury arising out of or as a consequence of a criminal act of violence". The specific point of contention was whether the phrase "in a public place" within the definition of a "criminal act of violence" in section 4 of the Act applied to all criminal acts of violence, or only to those specifically defined as such. The Court also had to consider whether the accident, occurring on private property, constituted a criminal act of violence within the meaning of the Act.

The High Court, by majority, held that the definition of "criminal act of violence" in section 4 of the Act was not limited to acts occurring in a public place. The Court reasoned that the definition in section 4 was a standalone definition and the reference to "public place" in that section was descriptive of certain types of criminal acts of violence, not a jurisdictional limitation on the entire Act. Therefore, an injury sustained as a consequence of a criminal act of violence, even if it occurred on private property, could be compensable under the Act. The Court found that the drunk driver's actions constituted a criminal act of violence, and Mr. Brown's injuries arose from that act.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The matter was remitted to the Supreme Court for determination of the amount of compensation payable to Mr. Brown.

Orders