Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIEFEL CJ,
GAGELER, KEANE, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ

AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION
COMMISSIONER  APPELLANT

AND

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND
ENERGY UNION & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union

[2018] HCA 3

14 February 2018

M65/2017

ORDER

1.Leave is granted for the appellant to amend the notice of appeal in the manner set out in the proposed amended notice of appeal exhibited to the affidavit of Brendan Charles dated 10 November 2017.

2.The appellant pay the first and second respondents' costs of, and incidental to, the application to amend the notice of appeal.

3.Appeal allowed.

4.Set aside order 2 of the orders made by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia on 21 December 2016 and, in its place, order that orders 7 to 13 of Mortimer J made on 13 May 2016 be set aside.

5.Remit the matter to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia for the re‑imposition of penalties according to law.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

T M Howe QC with C J Tran for the appellant (instructed by Sparke Helmore)

R M Doyle SC with J D Watson for the respondents (instructed by Slater & Gordon)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Industrial law – Pecuniary penalties – Where union official contravened civil remedy provision of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – Where union contravened civil remedy provision through union official's conduct – Where s 546 of Fair Work Act provides court can order person to pay pecuniary penalty – Where s 545(1) of Fair Work Act provides court can make any order it considers appropriate if satisfied person contravened, or proposes to contravene, civil remedy provision – Where pecuniary penalties imposed on both union official and union – Whether s 545(1) or s 546 of Fair Work Act or s 23 of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) empowers court to order that union not indemnify union official against pecuniary penalty – Whether s 545(1) or s 546 of Fair Work Act or s 23 of Federal Court of Australia Act empowers court to order that union official not seek or accept indemnity or contribution from union in respect of pecuniary penalty.     

Words and phrases – "appropriate", "Bragdon order", "civil remedy provision", "deterrence", "implied power", "legally ancillary", "non‑indemnification order", "pecuniary penalty", "penal outcome", "penal purpose", "person other than the contravener", "personal payment order", "reasonably required".

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 545, 546, 564.
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 23.

  1. KIEFEL CJ. Proceedings were brought in the Federal Court by the statutory predecessor to the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner ("the ABCC") against the first respondent, the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union ("the CFMEU"), and the second respondent, Mr Joseph Myles, who was a Vice President of the…

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Details
Case
[2018] HCA 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner against the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) and a union official. The dispute concerned the imposition of pecuniary penalties on both the union official and the CFMEU for contraventions of civil remedy provisions within the *Fair Work Act 2009* (Cth). The core of the appeal involved whether the court had the power to order that the CFMEU could not indemnify the union official against these penalties, or conversely, that the official could not seek or accept such an indemnity.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether sections 545(1) and 546(1) of the *Fair Work Act 2009* (Cth), or section 23 of the *Federal Court of Australia Act 1976* (Cth), empowered the court to make orders prohibiting a union from indemnifying a union official against pecuniary penalties, or prohibiting an official from seeking or accepting such an indemnity.

The High Court reasoned that the power to impose pecuniary penalties under section 546(1) of the *Fair Work Act* does not inherently include an implied power to prohibit indemnification. The Court held that while section 546(1) grants the power to order a person to pay a pecuniary penalty, this express power does not carry with it the necessary implication of a power to make orders that restrict indemnification. Such a restriction was considered to go beyond what was reasonably necessary for the effective exercise of the primary power and would serve to increase the punitive impact of the penalty beyond what was expressly provided for. The Court also found that section 545(1) of the *Fair Work Act* and section 23 of the *Federal Court of Australia Act* did not provide a source of power for such non-indemnification orders.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court that had prohibited the CFMEU from indemnifying the official. The matter was remitted to the Full Court for the re-imposition of penalties according to law, without the non-indemnification orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave is granted for the appellant to amend the notice of appeal in the manner set out in the proposed amended notice of appeal exhibited to the affidavit of Brendan Charles dated 10 November 2017.

2. The appellant pay the first and second respondents' costs of, and incidental to, the application to amend the notice of appeal.

3. Appeal allowed.

4. Set aside order 2 of the orders made by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia on 21 December 2016 and, in its place, order that orders 7 to 13 of Mortimer J made on 13 May 2016 be set aside.

5. Remit the matter to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia for the re‑imposition of penalties according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

Section 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act empowers the Federal Court to make binding declarations of right in civil proceedings in relation to matters in which it has original jurisdiction. Section 22 confers on the Federal Court power to grant all remedies to which it appears a party is entitled in order that all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely and finally determined. Section 23 empowers the Federal Court, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, and to issue or direct the issue of writs of such kinds as the Court thinks appropriate. The facts The events giving rise to these proceedings took place at a construction site for the City to Maribyrnong River Project Package B ("the Package B Project"), which is part of the Victorian Government's Regional Rail Link Project, at Josephs Road in Footscray, Victoria ("the Site"). The Package B Project was being undertaken by an alliance of the Secretary of the Department of Transport, V/Line Pty Ltd, Metro Trains Melbourne Pty Ltd, AECOM Australia Pty Ltd, GHD Pty Ltd, John Holland Pty Ltd ("John Holland"), Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd ("Abigroup") and Coleman Rail Pty Ltd ("Coleman Rail"). The construction work was being carried out in accordance with a joint venture agreement between John Holland, Abigroup and Coleman Rail. The workforce was made up of labour provided by several major contractors as well as various subcontractors. At the time of the events in issue, there were 71 John Holland employees, 15 Abigroup employees and 12 Coleman Rail employees performing building work on the Package B Project. The terms and conditions of employment of the John Holland and Abigroup employees were governed by a single enterprise agreement made under the Fair Work Act: the Abigroup, John Holland and the Australian Workers' Union Regional Rail Link Southern Cross Station to Footscray Junction Project 2012-2015. In May 2013, Myles was a Vice President of the Construction and General Division of the first respondent ("the CFMEU"). After the commencement of the Package B Project in or around 2012, Myles made frequent visits to the Site wherein he made repeated requests of Dennis Summerfield, an employee of John Holland and the General Superintendent at the Site, to "put a CFMEU delegate on the Site". The requests included words to the effect of: "I need a CFMEU delegate on the Site" and "when am I going to get a delegate?". Summerfield responded to each request in terms to the effect that there was no need for a CFMEU delegate because The Australian Workers' Union ("AWU") was party to the relevant enterprise agreement and there was an AWU delegate on the Site. Myles' requests that there be a CFMEU delegate on the Site were lawful requests made by, or a requirement of, the CFMEU within the terms of s 347(b)(iv) of the Fair Work Act such that action organised or taken with intent to coerce compliance with those requests was in contravention of s 348. The joint venture was lawfully entitled to refuse those requests.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL CJ GAGELER J (dissent) KEANE, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ (dissent)
Concerns about practical difficulties in inferior courts punishing for contempt are largely irrelevant to the question of construction concerning the implied power. It may be that if the prohibition in a personal payment order made by a lower court is flagrantly breached, contempt proceedings would need to be brought in a superior court, because inferior courts lack that jurisdiction. This is not an uncommon occurrence. It does not furnish a proper basis for concluding that the power to make such an order is not necessary.Conclusion and orders The power to make a pecuniary penalty order given by s 546(1) carries with it a power to make the person the subject of such an order pay the penalty personally. Section 545(1) is not a source of a power to make a non‑indemnification order. It is not necessary to further consider s 23 of the FCAA. I agree with the orders proposed by Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ for the reasons given by their Honours. The reasoning of Kiefel CJ and of Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ persuades me that neither s 545(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) nor s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is a source of power to prohibit one person from indemnifying another person who has been ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty under s 546(1) of the Fair Work Act. What follows are my reasons for being equally persuaded that s 546(1) is not a source of power to prohibit that other person from being indemnified. Power to prohibit a person who has been ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty from being indemnified can inhere in s 546(1) only if that power can be "derived by implication" from the sub-section's express conferral of power, on application, to order a person "to pay a pecuniary penalty that the court considers is appropriate if the court is satisfied that the person has contravened a civil remedy provision". The implication is sought to be founded on the principle of construction that an express conferral of power carries with it all that is reasonably necessary to ensure its effective exercise[37]. [37]Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) (1999) 198 CLR 435 at 451-452 [50]; [1999] HCA 19, quoting Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1 at 16-17; [1989] HCA 45. See also R v Forbes; Ex parte Bevan (1972) 127 CLR 1 at 7; [1972] HCA 34. Application of that principle to the construction of a statute has traditionally been approached with restraint where the ancillary power sought to be justified is restrictive of liberty and where the express power to which that ancillary power is sought to be appended is not incapable of exercise without it[38]. The principle is stretched too far, in my opinion, when it is sought to be applied to imply an ancillary power to make an order having the purpose and effect of increasing, beyond that which would exist in the absence of the ancillary order, the punitive impact of the penal order for which the statute conferring the primary power makes express provision. [38]The Trolly, Draymen and Carters Union of Sydney and Suburbs v The Master Carriers Association of NSW (1905) 2 CLR 509 at 523-524; [1905] HCA 20, quoting Fenton v Hampton (1858) 11 Moo PC 347 at 360 [14 ER 727 at 732]. See also Transport Workers' Union of New South Wales v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2008) 166 FCR 108 at 127-128 [37]-[38].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL CJ,