Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ

JASON SHAW  APPLICANT

AND

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND   RESPONDENT
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

[2003] HCA 72

9 December 2003
B99/2002

ORDER

1.   Answer the question reserved in the Case Stated as follows:

Question

Was s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) within the legislative powers of the Commonwealth to the extent that it authorised the respondent to cancel the applicant's visa on 17 July 2001?

Answer

Yes.

2.   Costs of the proceeding in the Full Court to be the costs in the matter in the course of which the case was stated.

Representation:

S J Hamlyn-Harris for the applicant (instructed by South Brisbane Immigration & Community Legal Service Inc)

D M J Bennett QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with M N Allars and B D O'Donnell for the respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ. The principal issue raised by the Case Stated is whether the power of the Parliament conferred by s 51(xix) of the Constitution to make laws with respect to "naturalization and aliens" supported s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") in the application of that provision to authorise the respondent ("the Minister") to cancel the applicant's visa on 17 July 2001. The issue should be resolved favourably to the Minister.

  2. The power conferred by s 51(xix) supports legislation determining those to whom is attributed the status of alien; the Parliament may make laws which impose upon those having this status burdens, obligations and disqualifications which the Parliament could not impose upon other persons[1].  On the other hand, by a law with respect to naturalisation, the Parliament may remove that status, absolutely or upon conditions.  In this way, citizenship may be seen as the obverse of the status of alienage.

    [1]Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Meng Kok Te (2002) 77 ALJR 1 at 5‑7 [21]-[31], 13 [80], 18‑19 [114], 33 [209]-[210]; 193 ALR 37 at 41‑43, 53, 60‑61, 81‑82.

  3. The applicant was born to British parents on 27 December 1972 in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ("the UK").  He arrived in Australia on 17 July 1974 and has not left Australia since that date.  The applicant has not become an Australian citizen pursuant to the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) ("the Citizenship Act") and has not applied for Australian citizenship. He is not eligible to vote in this country.

  4. That the applicant and his parents may have entered Australia under a Commonwealth programme of assisted passages, a factual matter as to which the Case Stated is silent, would not be inconsistent with his alien status.

  5. The applicant was regarded by the Minister as the holder of a transitional (permanent) visa which, unless revoked according to law,…

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Details
Case
[2003] HCA 72
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an application by Mr Shaw, who entered Australia in 1974 as a two-year-old British subject and was granted a permanent entry permit. The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs had cancelled Mr Shaw's visa. The matter came before the High Court of Australia by way of a Case Stated, with the applicant contending that the Minister's actions were not supported by valid federal law.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether section 501(2) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) was within the legislative powers of the Commonwealth Parliament, specifically in its application to Mr Shaw. The applicant argued that the power to cancel his visa was not a valid exercise of the Parliament's powers under section 51(xix) of the Constitution (naturalisation and aliens) or section 51(xxvii) (immigration and emigration). He further contended that, as a British subject who had resided in Australia since 1974, he could not be classified as an "alien" for constitutional purposes, nor was he still subject to the immigration power, having been absorbed into the Australian community.

The Court determined that Mr Shaw had been absorbed into the Australian community and was therefore beyond the reach of the immigration power. While acknowledging that serious criminal behaviour could be inconsistent with absorption, the Court found that Mr Shaw's criminal history, which began when he was a child, did not negate his absorption into the community, particularly given his long residence prior to his first conviction. Furthermore, the Court held that Mr Shaw could not be considered an "alien" for the purposes of section 51(xix) of the Constitution. At the time of his arrival and for a significant period thereafter, British subjects were not treated as aliens, and the Court found that any retrospective alteration of this status lacked constitutional warrant. The Court also rejected the applicability of the external affairs power, stating it concerned matters external to Australia and had no bearing on the right of a long-term resident to remain in the country.

The High Court answered the question reserved in the Case Stated in the affirmative, finding that section 501(2) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) was within the legislative powers of the Commonwealth to the extent that it authorised the respondent to cancel the applicant's visa on 17 July 2001. The costs of the proceeding in the Full Court were ordered to be costs in the matter.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Answer the question reserved in the Case Stated as follows:

Question

Was s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) within the legislative powers of the Commonwealth to the extent that it authorised the respondent to cancel the applicant's visa on 17 July 2001?

Answer

Yes.

2. Costs of the proceeding in the Full Court to be the costs in the matter in the course of which the case was stated.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant is entitled to succeed. The purported actions of the Minister are not sustained by any valid federal law. No more than if he were now an Australian citizen with a criminal record can the applicant be expelled from Australia on that ground. He is a member of the Australian community. He has been so since his arrival. Although not naturalised and thus not, as such, an Australian citizen, he was not on arrival, and could not thereafter lawfully be made, an "alien". As well, he has passed beyond the process of "immigration". His expulsion from Australia is an internal and not an external affair to this country. No implication of the Constitution supports the challenged laws in his case. The Case Stated must be answered accordingly. In answering it, this Court should not use chance happenings affecting its composition to change its recent statements of the governing law. The facts and applicable legislation A fuller statement of the facts appears in other reasons[75]. Also appearing there are details of the legislation, under (or pursuant to) which the Minister has purported to alter the status of the applicant[76]. When, in 1974, at the age of two years, the applicant arrived in Australia, he was granted a permanent entry permit[77]. That permit immediately recognised the special nationality status of the applicant and his parents at that time. Such special status derived from the fact that the applicant and his parents were subjects of the Queen. Whereas under the Act, as it then stood, the Minister could, in the Minister's absolute discretion, cancel a temporary entry permit[78], issued to persons having a different nationality status, the Minister enjoyed no legal power to cancel a permanent entry permit[79]. The Minister had the power to deport aliens convicted of certain crimes. But under the Act, as it then stood, the term "alien" was defined in language that inter alios excluded British subjects such as the applicant from treatment as foreign nationals or "aliens"[80].[75]Reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ ("the joint reasons") at [3]-[6]; reasons of McHugh J at [42]-[45]; reasons of Callinan J at [130]-[138].[76]Reasons of Callinan J at [133]-[135].[77]Pursuant to the Act, s 6, as it then stood.[78]The Act, s 7(1).[79]Such a permit would not, however, have effect if it had been obtained improperly. See the Act, s 16, as it then stood.[80]The Act, s 5(1). The hypothesis in the Minister's case is that, although at federation and for some time thereafter persons such as the applicant would not have been "aliens" for constitutional purposes and although on arrival and until 1984[81] (with effect from 1 May 1987) the applicant was not an "alien" under the Act, somehow the applicant (and inferentially the many thousands of persons in a like position) became constitutional "aliens", susceptible for that reason to new laws under which they could be expelled from Australia.[81]When the definition of "alien" was removed from the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) by the Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1984 (Cth). The definition of "alien" was removed from the Act itself by the Migration Amendment Act 1983 (Cth).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ HUGH J KIRBY J (dissent) HEYDON J
I would add this in relation to the external affairs power. "External affairs" is a simple and clear expression. It is concerned with events, places and people external to Australia and their relation to Australia. It is not an unbridled power. It must be read with the rest of the Constitution and in conformity with the concept that it embodies, of the sharing and allocation of powers between the central government and the state governments. This applicant is a longstanding resident of Australia who entered the country before it achieved absolute independence from the United Kingdom. The external affairs power has nothing to say about his right to continue to live in Australia.The decision I summarize my conclusions. The applicant does have a long history of criminal behaviour, beginning in 1987 when he was aged 14. The respondent relies on the decision of this Court in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Te[216] as authority for the proposition that the commission of serious crimes against the community is inconsistent with a person's absorption into the community. I accept that to be generally so, but in this case the applicant had been living in Australia for more than 12 years before his first conviction, and that occurred when he was still a child. In my view the applicant had been absorbed into the Australian community by the time that he came to the notice of the criminal courts. And, in any event, I would not regard that first conviction, occurring as it did when he was so young, as putting him beyond the community of ordinary Australians. I reject the respondent's argument that a person cannot be absorbed into the Australian community until he has attained adulthood[217]. Absorption may not necessarily be a matter of choice. It is better gauged by actual presence and conduct.[216](2002) 77 ALJR 1; 193 ALR 37.[217]See The Queen v Director-General of Social Welfare (Vict); Ex parte Henry (1975) 133 CLR 369 at 374 per Gibbs J, 382 per Mason J. That the applicant cannot vote in Australian elections is a factor, but standing alone, and in the case of a longstanding resident, does not detract from his integration in, and participation as, a member of the Australian community. The applicant is beyond the reach of the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate with respect to immigration. Nor do I consider that the applicant can be described as an "alien" for the purposes of the Constitution. At federation, a subject of the Sovereign of the United Kingdom was not an alien for the purposes of s 51(xix). There is authority of this Court to indicate that that is no longer the case. The precise time at which the Australian political and legal evolutionary process culminated in that outcome has not so far been definitively stated. However, in my view, it can be no earlier than the coming into effect of the Australia Acts in 1986. It is clear that the applicant was absorbed into the Australian community at a time when subjects of the Sovereign of the United Kingdom were accorded special privileges and status in Australia indicating that they were not to be regarded or treated as aliens. Retrospectively, to alter that status at this late stage is unacceptable and without constitutional warrant.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ, HUGH J, HEYDON J

The applicant contends that s 501(2) is beyond the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament to the extent that it authorised the respondent to cancel his visa. He argued that s 501(2) is not a valid exercise of the power of the Parliament under the Constitution to make laws with respect to "naturalization and aliens" (s 51(xix)) or "immigration and emigration" (s 51(xxvii)): or, that in any event it could have no application to him as a British subject who had first entered Australia in 1974 and had lived here for the whole of his life since then.The immigration power It is convenient to deal with the applicant's contention with regard to s 51(xxvii) first. It is submitted by the applicant that at the date of the cancellation of his visa, he had long been a member of the Australian community and had ceased to be an immigrant. He was therefore beyond the reach of the immigration power. In support of this proposition the applicant referred to Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; In re Yates[190]. In that case, Knox CJ said[191]:"a person who has originally entered Australia as an immigrant may, in course of time and by force of circumstances, cease to be an immigrant and becomes a member of the Australian community. He may, so to speak, grow out of the condition of being an immigrant and thus become exempt from the operation of the immigration power. The power to make laws with respect to immigration would, no doubt, extend to enable Parliament either to prohibit absolutely or to regulate as it might think fit immigration into Australia, but, in my opinion, it does not extend to enable Parliament to prohibit or regulate anything which is not immigration, and the decision in Potter v Minahan[192] shows that, when the person seeking to enter the Commonwealth is a member of the Australian community, his entry is not within the power to make laws with respect to immigration."[190](1925) 37 CLR 36.[191](1925) 37 CLR 36 at 64-65.[192](1908) 7 CLR 277. In Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor[193], a case of some similarity to this one, the respondent conceded, and rightly so, that the applicant there had been absorbed into the Australian community, and accordingly, s 501(3) of the Migration Act could have no valid application to him.[193](2001) 207 CLR 391 at 407 [32]. Precisely how long a period of residence must have passed, or what communal activities, or abstention from anti-social activities, must have taken place, for absorption into the Australian community to have occurred has not so far been settled by this Court. Gleeson CJ however, did point out in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Te[194], that "absorption" identifies the point at which a person's status as an immigrant comes to an end:"The concept of absorption into the Australian community, vague as it may be, has been developed as a method of indicating that the activity of immigration in which a person has engaged has come to an end."[194](2002) 77 ALJR 1 at 6 [26]; 193 ALR 37 at 42.