HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJJASON SHAW APPLICANT
AND
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND RESPONDENT
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRSShaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2003] HCA 72
9 December 2003
B99/2002ORDER
1. Answer the question reserved in the Case Stated as follows:
Question
Was s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) within the legislative powers of the Commonwealth to the extent that it authorised the respondent to cancel the applicant's visa on 17 July 2001?
Answer
Yes.
2. Costs of the proceeding in the Full Court to be the costs in the matter in the course of which the case was stated.
Representation:
S J Hamlyn-Harris for the applicant (instructed by South Brisbane Immigration & Community Legal Service Inc)
D M J Bennett QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with M N Allars and B D O'Donnell for the respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ. The principal issue raised by the Case Stated is whether the power of the Parliament conferred by s 51(xix) of the Constitution to make laws with respect to "naturalization and aliens" supported s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") in the application of that provision to authorise the respondent ("the Minister") to cancel the applicant's visa on 17 July 2001. The issue should be resolved favourably to the Minister.
The power conferred by s 51(xix) supports legislation determining those to whom is attributed the status of alien; the Parliament may make laws which impose upon those having this status burdens, obligations and disqualifications which the Parliament could not impose upon other persons[1]. On the other hand, by a law with respect to naturalisation, the Parliament may remove that status, absolutely or upon conditions. In this way, citizenship may be seen as the obverse of the status of alienage.
[1]Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Meng Kok Te (2002) 77 ALJR 1 at 5‑7 [21]-[31], 13 [80], 18‑19 [114], 33 [209]-[210]; 193 ALR 37 at 41‑43, 53, 60‑61, 81‑82.
The applicant was born to British parents on 27 December 1972 in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ("the UK"). He arrived in Australia on 17 July 1974 and has not left Australia since that date. The applicant has not become an Australian citizen pursuant to the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) ("the Citizenship Act") and has not applied for Australian citizenship. He is not eligible to vote in this country.
That the applicant and his parents may have entered Australia under a Commonwealth programme of assisted passages, a factual matter as to which the Case Stated is silent, would not be inconsistent with his alien status.
The applicant was regarded by the Minister as the holder of a transitional (permanent) visa which, unless revoked according to law,…
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- Case
- [2003] HCA 72
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether section 501(2) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) was within the legislative powers of the Commonwealth Parliament, specifically in its application to Mr Shaw. The applicant argued that the power to cancel his visa was not a valid exercise of the Parliament's powers under section 51(xix) of the Constitution (naturalisation and aliens) or section 51(xxvii) (immigration and emigration). He further contended that, as a British subject who had resided in Australia since 1974, he could not be classified as an "alien" for constitutional purposes, nor was he still subject to the immigration power, having been absorbed into the Australian community.
The Court determined that Mr Shaw had been absorbed into the Australian community and was therefore beyond the reach of the immigration power. While acknowledging that serious criminal behaviour could be inconsistent with absorption, the Court found that Mr Shaw's criminal history, which began when he was a child, did not negate his absorption into the community, particularly given his long residence prior to his first conviction. Furthermore, the Court held that Mr Shaw could not be considered an "alien" for the purposes of section 51(xix) of the Constitution. At the time of his arrival and for a significant period thereafter, British subjects were not treated as aliens, and the Court found that any retrospective alteration of this status lacked constitutional warrant. The Court also rejected the applicability of the external affairs power, stating it concerned matters external to Australia and had no bearing on the right of a long-term resident to remain in the country.
The High Court answered the question reserved in the Case Stated in the affirmative, finding that section 501(2) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) was within the legislative powers of the Commonwealth to the extent that it authorised the respondent to cancel the applicant's visa on 17 July 2001. The costs of the proceeding in the Full Court were ordered to be costs in the matter.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Answer the question reserved in the Case Stated as follows:
Question
Was s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) within the legislative powers of the Commonwealth to the extent that it authorised the respondent to cancel the applicant's visa on 17 July 2001?
Answer
Yes.
2. Costs of the proceeding in the Full Court to be the costs in the matter in the course of which the case was stated.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ, HUGH J, HEYDON J
The applicant contends that s 501(2) is beyond the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament to the extent that it authorised the respondent to cancel his visa. He argued that s 501(2) is not a valid exercise of the power of the Parliament under the Constitution to make laws with respect to "naturalization and aliens" (s 51(xix)) or "immigration and emigration" (s 51(xxvii)): or, that in any event it could have no application to him as a British subject who had first entered Australia in 1974 and had lived here for the whole of his life since then.The immigration power It is convenient to deal with the applicant's contention with regard to s 51(xxvii) first. It is submitted by the applicant that at the date of the cancellation of his visa, he had long been a member of the Australian community and had ceased to be an immigrant. He was therefore beyond the reach of the immigration power. In support of this proposition the applicant referred to Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; In re Yates[190]. In that case, Knox CJ said[191]:"a person who has originally entered Australia as an immigrant may, in course of time and by force of circumstances, cease to be an immigrant and becomes a member of the Australian community. He may, so to speak, grow out of the condition of being an immigrant and thus become exempt from the operation of the immigration power. The power to make laws with respect to immigration would, no doubt, extend to enable Parliament either to prohibit absolutely or to regulate as it might think fit immigration into Australia, but, in my opinion, it does not extend to enable Parliament to prohibit or regulate anything which is not immigration, and the decision in Potter v Minahan[192] shows that, when the person seeking to enter the Commonwealth is a member of the Australian community, his entry is not within the power to make laws with respect to immigration."[190](1925) 37 CLR 36.[191](1925) 37 CLR 36 at 64-65.[192](1908) 7 CLR 277. In Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor[193], a case of some similarity to this one, the respondent conceded, and rightly so, that the applicant there had been absorbed into the Australian community, and accordingly, s 501(3) of the Migration Act could have no valid application to him.[193](2001) 207 CLR 391 at 407 [32]. Precisely how long a period of residence must have passed, or what communal activities, or abstention from anti-social activities, must have taken place, for absorption into the Australian community to have occurred has not so far been settled by this Court. Gleeson CJ however, did point out in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Te[194], that "absorption" identifies the point at which a person's status as an immigrant comes to an end:"The concept of absorption into the Australian community, vague as it may be, has been developed as a method of indicating that the activity of immigration in which a person has engaged has come to an end."[194](2002) 77 ALJR 1 at 6 [26]; 193 ALR 37 at 42.