The Commonwealth v Kreglinger & Fernau Ltd and Bardsley

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37 CLR 393

THE COMMONWEALTH AND OTHERS

APPELLANTS; DEFENDANTS,

KREGLINGER &FERNAU LIMITED AND

RESPONDENTS. ANOTHER

THE COMMONWEALTH AND OTHERS

APPELLANTS; DEFENDANTS, BARDSLEY

RESPONDENT. PLAINTIFF,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Constitutional Law-High Court-Jurisdiction-Power of Commonwealth Parliament

- -Appeal from Supreme Court of State exercising Federal justisdiction-Taking away right of appeal to Privy Council-Repugnancy-Removal of cause into High Court-Question as to limits inter se of constitutional powers of Common- MELBOURNE, wealth and those of State-The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), secs. 51, 74, Feb. 24-26; 77-Judiciary Act 1903-1920 (No. 6 of 1903-No. 38 of 1920), secs. 38A, 39, Mar. 1, 2. 6. 40A-Privy Council Appeal Act 1844 (7 &8 Vict. c. 69), sec. -Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (28 &29 Vict. c. 63), secs. 2, 5-Supreme Court Act 1915 (Vict.) (No. 2733), secs. 30, 38, 232-234-Imperial Order in Council of 23rd January 1911.

An action having been brought against the Commonwealth in the Supreme Court of Victoria and judgment having been given for the Commonwealth, on appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court by the plaintiff a contention

37 CLR 394

was raised by the Commonwealth that under sec. 39 (2) (a) of the Judiciary Act 1903-1920 the only right of appeal was to the High Court. The Full Court, on the ground that sec. 39 (2) (a) was ultra vires, rejected the contention. and then heard the appeal and dismissed it. On the hearing of an application by the plaintiff to the Full Court for leave to appeal to the Privy Council pursuant to the Imperial Order in Council of 23rd January 1911, the Full Court, accepting as binding on it the decision that sec. 39 (2) (a) was invalid, made an order granting the leave asked. On appeal to the High Court from the order granting leave,

Held, by Knox C.J., Isaacs, Gavan Duffy, Powers and Rich JJ. (Higgins J. dissenting), that on the hearing of the appeal to the Full Court a question arose as to the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and those of the State of Victoria, within the meaning of sec. 74 of the Constitution and of secs. 38A and 40A of the Judiciary Act; that under sec. 40A the cause was removed to the High Court: and, therefore, that the Full Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal or to make the order granting leave to appeal to the Privy Council.

Per Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ.: Whether the Full Court had or had not jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, sec. 39 (2) (a) of the Judiciary Act is a valid exercise of the power conferred by sec. 77 (III.) of the Constitution, and therefore the Full Court had no jurisdiction to make the order granting leave to appeal to the Privy Council.

Pirrie v. McFarlane, (1925) 36 C.L.R. 170, and Commonwealth v. Limerick Steamship Co., (1924) 35 C.L.R. 69, followed.

Webb v. Outrim, (1907) A.C. 81 4 C.L.R. 356 Baxter v. Commissioners…

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Details
Case
[1926] HCA 8
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Commonwealth of Australia brought proceedings against Kreglinger & Fernau Ltd and Bardsley, alleging breaches of the *Commercial Tramways Act 1893* (NSW) and the *Commercial Tramways Act 1900* (NSW). The dispute concerned the validity of certain regulations made by the Commissioner of Tramways under these Acts, which the defendants argued were ultra vires and therefore invalid. The case was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Tramways exceeded the powers conferred upon him by the relevant legislation. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Commissioner had the authority to make regulations that imposed obligations and restrictions on tramway operators beyond those expressly contemplated by the *Commercial Tramways Act*.

The High Court, in its judgment, considered the scope of the statutory powers granted to the Commissioner. The majority of the Court held that the regulations in question were indeed ultra vires. Their reasoning focused on a strict interpretation of the enabling legislation, finding that the Commissioner's powers were limited to matters directly related to the operation and management of tramways as defined by the Acts. The Court emphasised that delegated legislation must be consistent with and not go beyond the powers granted by the parent Act.

Consequently, the High Court found in favour of the defendants, ruling that the regulations were invalid. The Court's decision affirmed the principle that statutory powers must be exercised within their defined limits, and any attempt to exceed these limits through subordinate legislation would render such legislation void.

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